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The Saudi Ministry of Health’s budgets demonstrated a sharp continuous increase in the 
period from 2006 to 2015, putting high burdens on the government at a time when the 
economy suffered slow growth as a result of the plummet in oil prices. This research was 
conducted to provide a solution for the Saudi government to ensure the sustainability of 
the Saudi public healthcare sector. 
This research started by investigating the major causes of the sharp increases in the 
Ministry of Health budgets, then explored the possible funding options existing in other 
economies to find the most suitable options that meet the Saudi context. Afterwards, this 
research investigated the attitudes of Saudi residents towards paying for their healthcare 
services, and the most preferred method to pay through. Finally, this research estimated 
the maximum value that people in Saudi Arabia are willing to pay for their healthcare 
services.  
This research collected data from the Saudi Ministry of Health books, the Saudi Central 
Bank, the Saudi General Authority for Statistics, and reports from the Saudi Ministry of 
Finance. Also this research collected survey data from a subset of the population of Saudi 
Arabia from different areas, and at different times.  
This research found that the weak strategy used by the Saudi Ministry of Health for 
estimating the necessary budgets was the main reason for the continuous increase in the 
Ministry of Health budgets. Moreover, it was found that Taxation, Medical Savings 
Accounts, and Private Health Insurance are the most suitable funding options according 
to the Saudi setting and needs. When people’s decision to participate was investigated, 
the majority were willing to take part, and it was found that nationality, the possession of 
Private Health Insurance and the eligibility to healthcare influenced people’s decisions. 
Moreover, it was found that the majority prefer to pay via Private Health Insurance or 
xiii 
 
Medical Savings Accounts, and it was found that gender, health status, education, and the 
available access to healthcare affected people’s preferences. Finally, when people’s 
maximum willingness to pay was examined, it was found that the majority are willing to 
pay 2.7% on average from their total income, and it was found that gender, nationality, 
employment, education, chronic diseases, age, marital status, having Private Health 
Insurance, and the access to healthcare services influenced people’s willingness to pay.  
This research suggests that the population of Saudi Arabia participate in funding their 
own healthcare services through either Private Health Insurance or Medical Savings 
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    Introduction 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (SA) is the largest country in the Middle East, occupying 
approximately four fifths of the Arab peninsula, with a land area in excess of two million 
square kilometres. It lies at the furthermost part of southwestern Asia, bordered by 
Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan to the north; Bahrain, Qatar, the Arabian Gulf, and United Arab 
Emirates to the east; Oman and Yemen to the south; and the Red Sea to the west. The 
population of SA was estimated at about 31 million in 2015, of whom 67% are Saudis 
(51% male and 49% female); of the non-Saudis 69% male and 31% female (GAFS, 2015). 
The crude birth rate in SA is 21 per 1,000 population, and the annual population growth 
rate is 1.9% (2.0% for Saudis and 1.6% for non-Saudis). Nearly 29% of the total 
population are younger than 15, 68% are between 15 and 64, and 3% are aged older than 
65. Moreover, the crude death rate is 3.9 per 1,000 population (GAFS, 2015), and the life 
expectancy is 74.34 years (Du and Wu, 2016). (Lisa Du, 2016) 
This Chapter gives an overview of the Saudi Economy and the major changes that are 
taking place there. It also presents a profile of the Saudi healthcare system and the fiscal 
situation of the public healthcare system so as to outline the thesis questions and 
objectives of this study.  
 Saudi Economy 
1.1.1 Overview of the Saudi Economy 
The Saudi economy is one of the richest economies in the world with a GDP in 2015 of 
646 billion US dollars1, making SA the top economy in the Middle East, and the twentieth 
globally (SAMA, 2015). The Saudi economy is largely driven by a revenue from 
exporting oil and natural gas, which accounts for 73% of 2015 actual revenues, and 18% 
of GDP (MOF, 2015). This wealth from natural resources makes the Saudi economy 
                                               




significantly less reliant on debt that other economies — indeed SA ranked 173rd globally 
for indebtedness in 2015 (6% of GDP) (Economics, 2017). 
1.1.2 Saudi Economy Challenges and Trend  
The Saudi economy has recorded slow growth in the last two years, down from 3.59% in 
2014 to 3.35% in 2015 then to 1.46% in 2016 (MOF, 2016, MOF, 2017). This was a result 
of the sharp and sustained decrease in oil prices, which plummeted from $110 in 2014 to 
a low of $22 per barrel at the beginning of 2016 (see Figure 1) (OPEC, 2017). At the same 
time SA has become embroiled in a significant and costly military intervention in Yemen, 
a conflict which was estimated to be costing the equivalent of $175 million a month when 
only its air forces were involved (Alsaad, 2015); since that time the intervention has 
expanded to include ground and naval forces as well. These two factors have had a 
significant negative impact on the Saudi economy (causing a deficit of $26.8 billion in 
the country’s budget in 2014, $103.6 billion in 2015, $83 in 2016, and $61.4 in 2017) 
resulting in a stay on governmental project payments to the private sector (MOF, 2015). 
Expecting oil prices will remain low for the foreseeable future and with no end in sight 
to the war in Yemen, the Saudi government has launched “Saudi Vision 2030” which 
contains ambitious plans to steer the Saudi system away from its primary dependence on 
oil. 
Figure 1 Oil Prices  
 













1.1.3 Saudi Vision 2030 
In April 2016, under the chairmanship of the custodian of the two holy mosques King 
Salman bin Abdul-Aziz, the council of ministers endorsed Saudi Vision 2030 which was 
drafted by the Saudi Council of Economic and Development Affairs based on instructions 
from the deputy crown prince Mohammad bin Salman. 
The vision was set to meet the era after oil, where the main objective is to reform the 
entire Saudi system in order to make oil a secondary source for the Saudi economy. The 
vision also aims to minimise the country’s spending by prioritising important 
governmental projects. 
For instance, starting from the fourth quarter of 2016, the government immediately cut 
subsidies on fuel, electricity, water and sanitation, taxed idle lands, increased the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) service fees, and also stopped automatic promotions to government 
employees and froze their allowances for seven months. The vision also plans to privatise 
proportions of the governmental assets, starting with selling 5% of Saudi Aramco (the 
leading company in the oil industry) in 2019, and to restructure the public investment 
fund to turn it into the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world (projected to reach $1.8 
trillion by 2030). 
The ultimate aim of the vision is to increase non-oil exports from 27% to 50% of total 
exports by 2030. Moreover, the vision also outlined a plan to increase the government 
debt by selling government bonds and Sukuk (Islamic compliant bonds) in the 
international market. It also plans to start applying a value added tax (VAT) at a 
percentage of 5% on many products, and an excise tax of 50% to 100% on specific 




 Saudi Healthcare System 
1.2.1 Overview of the Saudi Healthcare System 
Article 31 of the Saudi constitution requires the government to provide free healthcare 
services at the point of use to all Saudi citizens (SCM, 2005). The result is that Saudi 
citizens can avail of healthcare services in the Ministry of Health (MOH) facilities at no 
charge and, if access to these facilities is unavailable, can access private sector facilities 
for which the MOH will pay.   
In addition, Article 12 of the Saudi Council of Cooperative Health Insurance (CCHI), 
allows free access to MOH healthcare facilities to any non-Saudis (and their dependents) 
who work for the government and do not have access to their own agency healthcare 
facilities (CCHI, 1999). The only exception is non-Saudi Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
employees and their dependents who, despite having access to their own facilities, are 
also allowed to access MOH facilities. This free access to MOH healthcare facilities is 
also extended to some other limited categories by supreme2 and special3 orders, including 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens, non-Saudis with single sponsorship (private 
housekeepers, personal drivers, nursemaids, and farmers in Saudi households), the 
disabled, orphans, those with specific illnesses (AIDS, Hepatitis, Leprosy, and 
Tuberculosis), minorities of displaced tribes, prisoners, pilgrims, students with 
sponsorship, Saudi wives, sons and daughters of a Saudi mother, and mothers to a Saudi. 
These limited categories represent a minor percentage of the total population of SA. For 
example, the number of non-Saudi MOD employees is small (and restricted to healthcare 
and IT positions) because almost all of the other jobs in the MOD are restricted to Saudi 
citizens. Similarly, the total number of publicly employed GCC citizens in SA in 2015 
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was only 16, 1,887 are employed privately, and there are 10,100 students in different 
public educational facilities (GCC, 2015).  
Separately, Article 2 (Sections 1,2,3,4, and 5) of the second Chapter of the Saudi 
executive regulations of the cooperative health insurance system, requires private 
employers, regardless of the size and nature of the company, to provide all employees — 
Saudis and non-Saudis and their dependents — with Private Health Insurance (PHI) 
(CCHI, 2014). Usually the company provides health policies related to the income of the 
employee ranging from VIP policies, which cover all healthcare services at any private 
healthcare facility, to policy C, which covers basic illnesses in specific private healthcare 
facilities and for which the holder must share some of the cost. 
All those who work in public security and defense sectors are fully covered by healthcare 
facilities dedicated to those sectors. For example, those who work in the MOI and their 
dependents get free access to all MOI healthcare facilities in SA and those who work in 
the Ministry of National Guard (MONG) are fully covered by the MONG facilities. Due 
to lack of access, some of these sectors have also introduced PHI to cover the healthcare 
expenses of their employees in private facilities (limited to few employees). The 
academic and administrative staff (and their dependents) receive free access to the 
healthcare facilities within the university; students of the university also have this access. 
Except in cases of emergency, employees who work for one sector are not eligible to 
obtain healthcare services from those dedicated to another sector.  
The rest of the population are obliged to obtain PHI before travelling to SA. In 2015, PHI 
was provided by 27 companies, led by BUPA, TAWUNIYA, and MEDGULF who 





Article 13 of the CCHI exempts non-Saudis who work in private healthcare facilities from 
obtaining PHI as long as the healthcare facility where they work is qualified to cover their 
healthcare needs, with prior approval from the CCHI (CCHI, 1999). 
The Saudi General Organisation of Social Insurance (GOSI) obliges private sector 
employers to contribute 2% of each Saudi and non-Saudi’s basic salary to an occupational 
hazards fund, which is collected, pooled, and operated by GOSI, to cover specific work 
related injuries (GOSI, 2017). 
1.2.2 Healthcare Levels of Coverage 
The majority of the healthcare services in SA are provided by MOH healthcare facilities. 
According to 2016 data, MOH healthcare facilities accounted for 47% of patient visits, 
of which 41% were by Saudi citizens (see Figure 2) (MOH, 2016). Private sector facilities 
account for 37% of patient visits (the vast majority made by Saudis), and other 
governmental healthcare facilities (operated by Security, Defense, University, Specialist, 
or ARAMCO i.e. all non-MOH operated governmental healthcare facilities) accounted 
for 17% (the majority made by Saudis) (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2 shows that 78% of the healthcare services that were provided by the Saudi 
healthcare system were accessed by Saudis. The majority of the Saudi citizens’ healthcare 
visits were in the MOH healthcare facilities (41%), followed by private sector facilities 
(22%), and governmental healthcare facilities (15%). Patient visits by other nationalities 
represents 22% of the total, the majority of which were in the private sector facilities 
(15%), followed by MOH healthcare facilities (5%), and small fraction in the other 





Figure 2 Patient Visits to all Healthcare Provisions in Saudi Arabia in 20164 
 
Source: Saudi Ministry of Health (MOH, 2016). 
1.2.3 The Eligibility to the Healthcare Services in Saudi Arabia 
Healthcare in SA is delivered by the MOH, other governmental healthcare facilities 
(SDU), and the private sector. Eligibility of access to these facilities can be represented 
by a Venn diagram with six slices summarised in Figure 3. Each slice from 2 to 6 consists 
of two cohorts (A and B). Cohort A represents the main group (i.e. those employed in the 
public or private sector and entitled to free access to healthcare in their own right) and 
cohort B contains their dependents. Slice 1 is slightly different to the other slices. That is, 
all Saudis in slice 1 are in cohort A regardless of whether or not they are employed. Non-
Saudis in slice 1 consist of cohorts A and B, as before. 
 
                                               
4 Data for 2016 was used because there was missing data regarding the Saudis and non-Saudis in the section 
of the patient visits to most of the other Governmental Healthcare facilities in the MOH statistical books 
from 2006 to 2015. The MOH 2016 statistical book reported patient visits by Saudis and non-Saudis in 
most of the other governmental healthcare facilities except in the MONG and the MOI healthcare facilities. 
Therefore, 2016 statistical book is the best option to provide data in this regard. For the missing patient 
visit data in the MONG and the MOI healthcare facilities, it was found that the MOH 2006 statistical book 
provided data for these two types of healthcare facilities, where non-Saudi patient visits to each of these 
two hospitals represent less than 3% of the total. Therefore, in Figure 2, it was assumed that all the patient 
visits to the MONG and the MOI healthcare facilities were from Saudis, as less than 3% of non-Saudis 
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Figure 3 The Eligibilities to the Three Provisions of Healthcare in Saudi Arabia5 
 
Figure 3 shows that slice 1 represents all the Saudis and non-Saudis who are not eligible 
to receive any healthcare services outside of MOH healthcare facilities. Slice 2 represents 
non-Saudi employees and their dependents who can only access private sector healthcare 
services based on the level of healthcare coverage that is provided to them by their private 
employer. Slice 3 represents the non-Saudi employees and their dependents who can only 
access healthcare services that are provided by their employer in other governmental 
healthcare facilities. 
Slice 4 contains Saudi employees and their dependents who, through their private 
employer, have guaranteed healthcare access to private sector healthcare facilities and 
also have access to MOH healthcare facilities because they are Saudi citizens (double 
access). Slice 5 represents Saudi employees and their dependents who have guaranteed 
access to healthcare in other governmental healthcare facilities, and who also have access 
to MOH healthcare facilities because they are Saudi citizens (double access). 
                                               
5 This is just a conceptual chart to explain the six slices, and does not reflect the reality 100%. For example, 
slices 2 and 3 look the largest in the figure, but this does not mean that the non-Saudis who are privately or 
SDU employed are the largest groups. 
Saudis and non-Saudis whom are eligible to Healthcare only in the MOH 
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Saudis eligible to Healthcare in the 





Slice 6 represents Saudis and their dependents who, through their employer, have 
guaranteed access to private sector healthcare facilities as well as other governmental 
healthcare facilities. This happens for example if a female in slice 4, cohort A is married 
to a person in slice 5, cohort A. In such a case, this female and her family are guaranteed 
access to private sector, MOH, and other governmental healthcare facilities (triple 
access). The first access is guaranteed in the private sector healthcare facilities because 
she is privately employed, the second access is though her husband’s eligibility in the 
other governmental healthcare facilities, and the third access is in the MOH healthcare 
facilities as she and her family are Saudi citizens. 
If a person in any of the six slices wants to access healthcare services outside of their 
eligibility, a full charge is applied. 
 Saudi Public Healthcare Sector Fiscal Situation (MOH) 
1.3.1 Saudi Public Healthcare Sector Economic Challenges (MOH) 
In the last ten years the MOH budget has trebled from $5.0 billion in 2006 to $16.5 billion 
in 2015, and has, on average, increased by more than the country’s total expenditure 
(13.6% vs 11%). In 2015, with the country significantly impacted by falling oil prices, 
the MOH budget increased by a further 4% even though the entire budget grew by just 
0.58% that year (see Table 1). Indeed, in 2015 the MOH budget had increased to 7.25% 
of total government spending, the largest percentage allocation the MOH had received in 
the preceding ten-year period.  
The Saudi MOH is usually the third largest ministry in SA in terms of budget allocation 
(after the MOD and Ministry of Education (MOE)) receiving 6.48% of the total budget, 
on average, versus 32.77% and 15% for the MOD and MOE, respectively. However, 
growth in the MOH budget has been much higher than that of the MOD and the MOE in 




the total Saudi budget (see Table 1). Moreover, in spite of the continuous increases in 
healthcare spending, the efficiency of the Saudi healthcare system has been decreasing, 
dropping from 17th in the world in 2009 to 38th in 2016 with a 42.7% efficiency score (Du 
and Wu, 2016). 
Table 1 Saudi GDP, Total Budgets, and the Changes in the Three Highest 
Ministries’ Budgets in Billions of US Dollars. 












































06 356.1  89.3  29.5  33.0 16.5  18.5 5.2  1.4 5.9 
07 384.6 8.0 101.3 13.4 35.4 20.0 34.9 16.9 2.0 16.7 6.0 15.8 1.6 6.0 
08 476.2 24 120.0 18.4 38.2 7.8 31.8 17.7 4.9 14.8 6.7 10.5 1.4 5.6 
09 429.0 -9.9 126.6 5.5 41.2 7.9 32.5 20.2 13.8 15.9 7.8 17.0 1.8 6.2 
10 526.8 22.7 144.0 13.6 45.2 9.6 31.4 22.1 9.4 15.3 9.3 18.8 1.7 6.5 
11 669.5 27.0 154.6 7.4 48.5 7.2 31.3 22.8 3.1 14.7 10.6 13.6 1.6 6.8 
12 733.9 9.6 184.0 18.9 56.4 16.4 30.7 24.6 8.0 13.4 12.5 18.1 1.7 6.8 
13 744.3 1.4 218.6 18.8 67.0 18.6 30.6 29.4 19.2 13.4 14.4 15.4 1.9 6.6 
14 753.8 1.3 228.0 4.2 80.7 20.5 35.4 30.1 2.6 13.2 15.9 10.3 2.1 7.0 
15 646.0 -14.3 229.3 0.5 81.8 1.3 35.7 31.3 3.9 13.6 16.6 3.9 2.5 7.2 
 Av10 6.84 Av 11.0 Av 12.0 32.7 Av 7.3 15.0 Av 13.6 1.8 6.5 
 
Source: (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority SAMA 2006-2016; Ministry of Finance MOF 2006-2015; 
General Authority for Statistics GAFS 2006-2015; Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015) 
(SAMA, 2015, SAMA, 2014, SAMA, 2013, SAMA, 2012,  SAMA, 2011, SAMA, 201 0, SAMA, 2009, SAMA, 20 08, SAMA, 2007, SAMA, 2006, SAMA, 2016, SAMA, 2004, MOF, 2015, MOF, 2014, MOF, 2013, MOF,  2012, MOF, 2011, MOF , 2009, MOF, 2008,  MOF, 2007, MOF, 2006 , MOF, 2010, GAF S, 2015, GA FS, 2014, GA FS, 2013 , GAFS, 20 12, GAFS, 2011, GAFS , 2010, GAF S, 2009, GAF S, 2008, GA FS, 2007, GA FS, 200 6, MOH, 2015, MOH, 2014, MOH, 2013, MOH, 2012, MOH, 20 11, MOH, 2010, MOH, 2009, MOH, 2008, MOH, 2007 , MOH, 2006)  
Abbreviations: 1Year. 2Increase or decrease as percentage. 3Saudi total budget. 4Saudi Ministry of Defense 
budget. 5Saudi Ministry of Defense budget as a percentage of the Saudi total budget. 6Saudi Ministry of 
Education budget. 7Saudi Ministry of Health budget. 8Saudi Ministry of Health budget as a percentage of 
Saudi GDP. 9Saudi Ministry of Health budget as a percentage of Saudi total budget. 10Average annual 
increase or decrease. 
 
1.3.2 Saudi Public Spending on Healthcare among other Countries 
Compared to other countries to which comparisons might be useful based on economic, 
political, geographical, and commercial similarities (62 countries represented by the 
GCC, Middle East, Arab, Asia, and OPEC), the Saudi total6 government spending on 
healthcare services for the period from 2005 to 2014 ranks 7th per capita on average 
($1,170). As a percentage of total government expenditure, SA ranks 18th (7.6%), and as 
                                               
6 The WHO data that was used in this part, is not the same as what Table 1 showed, as the WHO might take 
into account all the public spending on health. That is, the WHO data might include the public financing to 
agencies within the MOH, such as the other governmental healthcare facilities. This was the only source of 




a percentage of GDP, the Saudi spending on healthcare ranks 31st (2.64%) (see Figure 1 
in the Appendix). 
Specifically, versus other GCC countries, which are tied by political and economic 
agreements for sharing commercial, military, scientific, and social benefits, the Saudi 
government spent the most on healthcare as a percentage of GDP on average. As a 
percentage of total government expenditure, SA ranked 3rd, and ranked 4th in terms of 
government spending on health per capita (WHO, 2017). 
Versus the sixteen countries in the Middle East, the Saudi government spending on health 
per capita ranked 5th. As a percentage of GDP, SA is ranked 7th, and ranked 8th as 
percentage of total government expenditure.    
Among twenty Arabic countries, Saudi government spending on health per capita ranks 
4th, and 6th in terms of spending as percentage of GDP. As a percentage of total 
government expenditure, SA came in the middle of the Arabic countries. 
In comparison to the entire Asian continent (45 countries), Saudi ranked 7th by public 
spending on healthcare per capita. As a percentage of GDP and as percentage of 
government spending, SA ranked 15th and 26th respectively. 
Among oil based economies, Saudi government spending on health ranked 3rd as a 
percentage of GDP, 4th as a percentage of total government expenditure, and also 4th by 
spending per capita. 
 2008 Crisis and the Plummet in Oil Prices  
Healthcare spending in SA was adversely affected by the 2008 financial crisis and the 
sharp decline in oil prices in 2008–2009. All those GCC and OPEC countries that had 
higher spending on health than the Saudi government in the three comparative measures 
in the period under investigation, were similarly adversely impacted as were Lebanon, 




declines in their spending on health per capita in 2010, the figures indicate that Qatar, 
UAE and SA were the worst affected. Since 2011, Saudi government spending on health 
per capita has been increasing faster than both UAE and Qatar (87% versus 8% and 
31.6%, respectively). Similarly, unlike both Qatar and UAE, spending as a percentage of 
general government expenditure and as percentage of GDP has also been increased every 
year in SA since 2011 in line with rebounding oil prices (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). 
 Research Objectives, Questions, Rationale and Contribution 
1.4.1 Research Objectives 
Given the backdrop of the Saudi parlous fiscal situation following the financial crisis and 
exacerbated by declining oil prices since then and the ambitious Saudi 2030 plans to 
reform the Saudi system, this thesis will investigate the Saudi healthcare system in order 
to identify the most appropriate funding mechanism for the Saudi MOH with a view to 
controlling government spending on health. 
Specifically, this research aims to explore what might be a suitable healthcare financing 
system for the Saudi MOH as the country moves away from a fully governmental funded 
model. To better understand the current fiscal situation, this research will start by 
exploring the reasons for the rampant inflation in the healthcare budget since 2006. It will 
then consider the various funding mechanisms in place in other economies, as well as any 
implications that Islam might have on how these could be implemented in a Saudi setting. 
The research will then investigate the willingness of the Saudi population to co-fund their 








1.4.2 Research Questions 
This thesis will answer four research questions: 
 
1: What is the reason for the sharp increase in the MOH budget over the past 10 
years? 
Chapter 2 of this thesis will explore the drivers of the increases in healthcare spending 
globally and whether the same drivers apply to SA. This Chapter will also analyse the 
supply and demand side reasons for the rampant increases in healthcare spending in SA 
in order to investigate if these increases can be attributed to the demand for specific types 
of health service, or to the implementation of costly prevention programmes for specific 
infectious or chronic diseases. Relevant supply side factors could be whether the MOH 
recruited more healthcare providers every year, especially consultants (who per head are 
more expensive than other healthcare practitioners), whether the MOH has invested 
heavily in modern medical technology, and/or increased the number of healthcare 
facilities during the period in question. 
 
2: What are the most appropriate funding mechanisms to use to charge Saudi 
citizens for using healthcare services? 
In many countries around the world patient contribution strategies are used to meet 
shortages where an economy cannot fully fund the healthcare system from central 
government coffers. Chapter 3 of this study will reference the experience of other 
countries which use patient contribution strategies and, in light of Saudi Vision 2030, will 
discuss the suitability of each contribution mechanism for the Saudi setting based on the 






3: What is the willingness to pay for healthcare services, and which healthcare 
funding option is the most preferred by people in Saudi Arabia? 
Once this thesis identifies the factors that contribute to the MOH budget from question 
one and based on the identified options from question two, Chapter 4 will then undertake 
a survey to investigate the willingness of the population of SA to contribute to their own 
healthcare needs, and then to rank the identified healthcare funding mechanisms.  
 
4: How much are people in Saudi Arabia willing to pay for healthcare services? 
Chapter 5 builds directly on the results in Chapter 4. That is, after understanding the 
willingness to pay (WTP) of people in SA, this study will investigate the maximum 
willingness of people in SA to pay for their healthcare services. 
 
By the end of this thesis, the study will have some recommendations about what the Saudi 
healthcare financing system might look like as the economy undergoes significant 
change, with the potential to influence policy in line with Saudi Vision 2030. 
 
1.4.3 Research Rationale 
The importance of investigating the aforementioned topics is due to the critical state of 
the financial situation in SA. The country derives the majority of its budget from oil, and 
low oil prices and oil price volatility (even with OPEC efforts to control the supply to 
ensure stable and better prices (Alarabiya, 2019d, News, 2019)) have created an 
unsustainable budgeting situation for the Saudi government. This, in addition to the costly 
military intervention in Yemen, has caused the Saudi economy to slow in the past few 
years, such that the Saudi government has incurred significant budgets deficits. Moreover, 
investigating these topics in the context of health is important because of the sharp and 
unsustainable increase in the Saudi MOH budgets, which notwithstanding the parlous 




rate faster than that of the total government budget. Specifically, even though the 
government budget was severely impacted by falling oil prices in 2015, the MOH budget 
increased significantly that year to represent the largest percentage allocation of total 
government budget that the MOH had received in the preceding ten years period, 
notwithstanding the entire government budget grew at a very low percentage that year. 
The MOH budget even grew much faster than the budgets of other ministries with higher 
budgets than the MOH. This sustained level of public spending on healthcare means that 
SA is ranked one of the highest among GCC, OPEC, Middle East, Arab, and Asian 
countries.  
Oil prices have also been volatile in the recent past (see for instance the 2008 financial 
crisis and the sharp decline in oil prices that adversely affected the Saudi public spending 
on healthcare in 2008–2009). But the impact of that shock was not sustained insofar as 
when oil prices rebounded two years later, the Saudi government spending on healthcare 
per capita and as a percentage of the total government budget surged in the following 
years. However, this time is different. Oil prices have traded at relative lows since 2014 
influenced by high supply from non-OEC producers and the general global shift away 
from fossil fuels (Alarabiya, 2016). In addition, as part of OPEC, the Saudi government 
is constraining its own oil supply and so further exacerbating the impact of the sustained 
oil price shock on total government revenue (Alarabiya, 2018b). There is also no end in 
sight to the war in Yemen. This is the first time that SA has faced such sustained negative 
shocks that have significantly increased the risks to government finances and could even 
threaten the sustainability of the healthcare services in SA. 
Expecting oil prices will remain low for the foreseeable future, and the fact that such a 
source is constrained by the extent of its reserves (Alarabiya, 2018g), the Saudi 
government has recognized that oil is an unsustainable source of funding. In order to 




Vision 2030 which aims to develop alternative sources of sustainable funds, to prioritise 
certain projects, and to generally eliminate the country’s unnecessary spending. Since the 
introduction of this ambitious Vision, the government has implemented several initiatives 
to rationalise spending. Examples include the stopping for revaluation of government 
employees’ promotions and allowances and governmental project payments to the private 
sector. Subsidies on fuel, electricity, water and sanitation were also cut and fees for 
Ministry of Interior services were increased. VAT at 5% was introduced for the first time, 
excise tax was levied at 50% to 100% on specific products, and idle lands have been 
taxed. In addition, the government is planning to sell 5% of Saudi Aramco, and to increase 
its debt percentage. In short, nothing is off the table, the entire Saudi economic system is 
under review in order to implement reforms to cut unnecessary spending and to raise 
different and sustainable sources of funding. 
This thesis seeks to apply the ethos of Saudi Vision 2030 to the healthcare sector. 
Specifically, by investigating, inter alia, the supply and demand side reasons for the sharp 
increases in the MOH budget and whether these budgets need to be maintained at these 
higher levels, this study also seeks to influence policy designed in order to implement 
reforms to cut unnecessary spending in the Saudi healthcare system. For instance, when 
the eligibilities to healthcare services were investigated, it was found that the Saudi 
government has invested significantly in healthcare infrastructure of the other 
governmental healthcare facilities and supported the private healthcare sector though 
directing the law to oblige private employers to provide PHI to their employees and their 
dependents. However, Saudi citizens who consume the majority of healthcare at these 
two provisions also consume healthcare in the MOH. Such multi-eligibilities reduce the 
access of those who are eligible to healthcare only in the MOH and may create overuse 
of the public healthcare resources which are not in line with the Saudi Vision 2030 which 




sources of funding. Therefore, investigating these topics will enable this research to 
influence a healthcare policy that could mitigate the strain of these multi-eligibilities on 
MOH resources, and indeed to also suggest possible ways of raising sustainable funds for 
healthcare from these eligibilities. 
1.4.4 Research Contribution 
On the policy side, this thesis will give the decision makers a broad vision of how the 
healthcare system in SA should change, starting with modifying the government free 
funded model to a one that is based on ensuring that the Saudi population pay a proportion 
of their healthcare costs. Because nothing like this has been tried in SA before, this 
research will give decision makers and researchers inside and outside SA an insight into 
how a population with a very limited experience with sharing public costs would respond 
to such a reform. Building further, because this research is conducted against a backdrop 
of change in SA, it also provides decision makers and researchers insights into how people 
react to being asked to share public costs in specific contexts, i.e. relative hardship and 
relative prosperity. Moreover, this thesis designs and recommends a policy that would 
reduce the multi-eligibilities of Saudi citizens and mitigate the burden on MOH resources. 
This will enable the ministry to better invest its resources to target a smaller proportion 
of the population. It will also bring additional non-governmental investment into the 
private sector and the other governmental healthcare facilities to meet the extra demand 
from Saudis who, being entitled to free healthcare in these two provisions, will no longer 
be able to access the MOH for free. Furthermore, shifting a part of the public healthcare 
cost to the Saudi population will ensure a sustainable source of funding for the MOH, and 
this will start changing the Saudi population perspective about the public services, which 
they currently expect will be provided for free to them. Moreover, investigating the supply 
and demand for MOH services will show the decision makers if there are specific 




strengthened. Finally, this study will also give decision makers in Islamic countries an 
insight into how an Islamic population would respond to different funding mechanisms 
that are compliant with Islamic rules.  
On the theory side, investigating the four topics in this thesis will provide future 
researchers with a thorough investigation of the strategy that has been used to date to 
finance the Saudi MOH, and what is the cause of the rampant inflation in its budgets. This 
will encourage studies in the future that specifically investigate one or more of the factors 
that might be found to be driving the increases in the MOH budget. In addition, this study 
will be a cornerstone for future researchers to engage in further studies to build on the 
unique and unresearched financial policy that will be designed in this thesis. This might 
include the investigation of the willingness to pay and/or the preferences of people within 
a specific provision (MOH, Private Sector or SDU) or within a specific slice (the slices 
from 1-6, see Figure 3). Moreover, this study will inspire the health economics field in 
SA, which is at an early stage of development, and, specifically the willingness to pay for 
healthcare in SA which has thus far not been studied in great detail. This thesis will also 
make a significant contribution to the research about preferences for different 
mechanisms used to fund healthcare services, which is under researched inside and 
outside SA. 
On the methodological side, this research will be undertaken in an Islamic country ruled 
by Islamic principles. This will impose additional constraints to the research 
methodology, most obviously the difficulty in reaching females participants. I addition, 
due to the significant role of these Islamic principles in managing people’s life in SA, 
designing the research methodology (i.e. the healthcare funding options that people will 
be asked to consider, the need for clear explanation of these options, and the need for 
sampling times to avoid the five prayers times during the day) must be in line with these 




policymakers may not take heed of the results of research conducted contrary to Sharia 
law and future researchers may not build on it. In addition, because SA is a developing 
county, this research will also face additional methodological and sampling challenges 
such as sampling in tribal areas, interacting with people with low levels of education, and 
also the prevalence of military employees in certain locations. How this research deals 
with these constraints imposed by religion, culture and tradition will be useful for future 
researchers exposed to similar complications. Moreover, the timeframe during which this 
study is conducted is a difficult one financially for the Saudi population such that the 
nature of the questions asked could induce negative reactions, and in certain hostile tribal 
locations, even potential harm to the researcher. Nonetheless, in order to ensure the 
randomisation and a good representation of the study sample no locations will be avoided. 
The experiences of the researcher and the methods used to overcome barriers and to 
ensure the appropriateness of the sample might be useful for future researchers 
conducting studies in SA (or an area/country with similar complicating factors). 
 Conclusion 
The level and growth of public spending on healthcare in SA is high relative to other 
economies. In light of the country’s parlous financial situation, brought on and 
exacerbated by the financial crisis and subsequent decline in the price of oil, respectively, 
continued increases in healthcare spending from central government are no longer 
feasible. The Saudi government is aware of this and, as part of Saudi Vision 2030 which 
aims to make oil a secondary source for the Saudi economy, has identified the need to 
transform the funding mechanism of the public healthcare system, in order to shift part of 
the costs to the population and the private sector. This thesis will assist in this mission by 
using scientific methods to help to find the best solution in order to mitigate the fiscal 





This thesis begins by exploring the reasons behind the public healthcare expenditure 
growth globally, and identifies which of these are relevant for SA. Specifically, it 
investigates the demand for MOH healthcare facilities by investigating population and 
other demand side trends and supply side drivers of MOH healthcare services including 
the capital, operational, and other frequent expenditures budgets. It then explores the 
experiences of other countries in requiring their populations to co-fund their healthcare 
costs, and investigates to what extent are the Saudi population open to the implementation 
of such strategies, as well as determining the highest level they would be willing to pay 
to participate. This systematic process will help to identify the best solutions to alleviate 


















    Drivers of the MOH Expenditure Increases 
Based on the difficult Saudi financial situation as outlined previously, the significant 
increases in the MOH budgets, and the Saudi mission to transform the Saudi system, this 
Chapter will investigate the Saudi MOH healthcare system in order to identify the reasons 
for the increases in its budgets with a view to controlling costs. This Chapter will outline 
the study objectives and questions, study methodology, the drivers of the healthcare 
expenditure increases at macro level, then at micro level, and by the end of this Chapter, 
the findings will be summarised in a conclusion.  
 Study objective and Methodology 
2.1.1 Study Objective 
This study aims to investigate the MOH healthcare system in order to identify the drivers 
of its budgets increases in the past 10 years. This is to develop a financial strategy by 
which the Saudi MOH can reduce the dependence on the country’s general revenue, and 
ensure the sustainability of the Saudi citizens’ healthcare system.  
To serve the purpose of this study, two questions must be answered namely: 
1. What are the main drivers for the increases in public spending on healthcare 
globally, and are they the case in Saudi Arabia?  
2. What are the drivers of the MOH budgets increases over the past 10 years? 
By answering the first question, this study will give a view at macro level to understand 
the major reasons that contributed to the inflation of healthcare spending globally, and 
whether any of these reasons are the case in SA. By answering the second question, a 
broad vision at micro level will be achieved as to how the demand and supply of the MOH 





2.1.2 Study Methodology 
To answer the first question, this study will refer back to relevant literature reviews 
existing in other economies, and find out what researchers considered to be the primary 
reasons for the inflation of spending on healthcare services. Afterwards, the study will 
relate each reason to the situation in SA going back ten years. For instance, if the 
researchers attribute the increases to population growth as a main reason, then, the Saudi 
population growth trends will be investigated in line with the changes in the MOH 
budgets. 
In the second question, this study will scrutinise each healthcare service and activity that 
the MOH delivered in the past ten years in detail, and analyse the trend of each to find 
out whether it is interpreted by the changes in the relevant budget. For example, the 
changes in the number of Primary Healthcare Centres (PHC) will be compared to the 
movement of the MOH capital expenditure (CAPEX) in the past ten years. 
To achieve the stated objectives, this study will analyse the Saudi MOH budgets and 
activities in the last ten years, relying on ten statistical books from the MOH. The length 
of these books ranges from 248 to 356 pages, and they contain more than 500 tables, 
which will be analysed in this study (see Table 1 in the Appendix). These books explain 
in detail five dimensions, which are: the MOH healthcare facilities, manpower, healthcare 
activities, spread of communicable diseases, and Al Hajj season7. Each dimension will be 
fully analysed and discussed in depth, going through the types, quantities, capacities, 
specialities, and classifications, also analysing the relationship between the changes of 
each item with other items within these books. 
 
                                               
7 Al Hajj season is a period of about two weeks, when Muslims go to Makkah and Madinah cities to carry 




Moreover, this study will also rely on ten statistical books from the Saudi General 
Authority for Statistics (GAFS), covering the same period. These books discuss the 
budgets and the activities of a number of ministries in SA. Reference will also be made 
to ten statistical books from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), discussing 
the progress of the Saudi and the global economy. This study also relies on ten annual 
reports from the Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF), which show the total estimated 
revenues, the estimated expenditure, debt, and the total spending on each governmental 
sector, as well as the actual data for some items for the year prior. They also contain some 
comparative analyses between the expected and actual figures. 
In line with Saudi governmental rules, all the ministries in SA use the Hijri calendar, 
which is based on the moon movements, where the beginning of each month is marked 
by the observation of the crescent moon, and the month is either 29 or 30 days long. On 
the other hand, SA announces the country and the ministries’ budgets at the beginning of 
the Gregorian calendar, and the difference between the two calendars is about 8 days. 
Therefore, there will be minor timing differences between MOH and MOF statistical data, 
but these will not have any effect on the study. 
 Drivers of the MOH Expenditure Increases (Macro Level Investigation) 
The public spending on healthcare services showed increases in many countries in the 
last ten years, especially the countries with an old healthcare system like Japan (see Figure 
1 in the Appendix). In SA, the public spending on health accounts for one of the highest 
spending among 62 countries distributed over four contents; given the fact that the Saudi 
healthcare system is emerging (SA has only been founded 86 years). Moreover, for the 
reason that the Saudi public spending on healthcare peaked in the last ten years, in a time 
of economic turmoil; this part of the study aims to find for the reasons behind the 
increases of healthcare expenditure in different countries, and investigates whether they 




This will be conducted through searching for the drivers in the previous studies, and 
examining them in the Saudi healthcare system for the period from 2006 to 2015. 
Moreover, further comparative analyses will be conducted if necessary. This will give a 
broad overview to understand which reason affected the Saudi MOH budgets the most. 
2.2.1 Literature Review 
The drivers of increasing public spending on healthcare depend on the general policy of 
the healthcare system used in the country. In other words, the reasons for the increases of 
healthcare expenditure in one country would not be applicable in others. Therefore, this 
issue remains somewhat unclear and a subject for debate. 
In general, changing medical technology potentially explains the persistent growth in 
healthcare expenditure in many countries, as is the case with pharmaceutical spending 
(Braendle and Colombier, 2016, Łuczak and García-Gómez, 2012). In Canada, they 
attributed public healthcare expenditure increase in the period from 1998 to 2008 to many 
reasons; like the increase of general inflation, the number of physicians, population 
growth, the methods of diagnosis, and the demand, as well as technology and 
pharmaceuticals (Di Matteo, 2014).  
Some studies mentioned that chronic diseases account largely for the increases in 
spending on healthcare, and are considered as a great challenge for the global economies. 
Specifically in Europe, spending on chronic diseases takes up an increasingly greater 
proportion of private and public budgets (Busse, 2010, Tsiachristas et al., 2016). 
Some attributed the reason to an increasing number of healthcare facilities with a higher 
degree of specialisation like university hospitals and research centres (Vatter and Rüefli, 
2003). Others stated that political issues were the cause, this happens because presidential 
candidates or ministers tend to improve health services to secure their positions (Potrafke, 




smokers consume more healthcare services than non-smokers, and their treatment period 
is longer (Bearman and Neckerman, 2011). Other studies cited immigrants as a potential 
reason, as a result of their having been more likely to work in physically demanding and 
risky jobs (Braendle and Colombier, 2016). 
Indeed, most of the previous studies believe that ageing is one of the main reasons for 
increasing healthcare expenditure (Lopreite and Mauro, 2017, Tabata, 2005, Di Matteo 
and Di Matteo, 1998). Since old people need much more healthcare services, including 
nursing and other social services, as well as expensive technology and longer length of 
stay in hospitals including follow up, ageing increases the healthcare expenditure of the 
economy exponentially (Di Matteo, 2005, Braendle and Colombier, 2016, Vatter and 
Rüefli, 2003, Piacenza et al., 2010). 
Moreover, some studies implied that the healthcare cost of a person in his/her last years 
is seven times greater than other periods in his/her life (Felder et al., 2000, Blanco-
Moreno et al., 2013). Another study added that the prevalence of both morbidity and 
disability generally increases with age, which in turn increases healthcare expenditure. 
However, it soars in the last year of a person’s life (van Baal and Wong, 2012). In 
addition, studies expected that there would be major economic consequences as a result 
of the rapid increase in the percentage of the ageing population worldwide (de Bruin et 
al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Saudi MOH Situation from 2006 to 2015 
The previous studies suggest that the healthcare expenditure growth was due to thirteen 
reasons, which are; inflation, population growth, ageing, demand for healthcare services, 
foreign patient visits, chronic diseases, specialised healthcare facilities, general number 
of physicians, designating new ministers, changing medical technology, drugs, diagnosis 




Due to how the data of the medical technology and drugs are classified, there was a lack 
of access to their costs and quantities; also missing was the number of smokers’ visits to 
healthcare facilities, and no data on the misuse of healthcare resources. It was noted as 
well that there was a lack of access to the number of patient visits to primary healthcare 
centres chronic diseases clinics in 2006 and 2007. 
This part will discuss the major reasons, which significantly influenced healthcare 
spending based on available data. 
 Inflation 
Table 2 in the Appendix indicates that the sharp increases in the MOH budgets did not 
occur mainly because of inflation, which increased cumulatively by 44.3% between 2005 
and 2014. The data shows that the MOH budget had increased 2.2 times by 2015 in 
comparison to 2006 in real terms, this represents 9.2% average growth, which accounts 
for a higher level of increase than the Saudi total budget and the Saudi GDP (9.2% vs 
6.7%, 3%) (see Table 1 in the Text and Table 2 in Appendix). Such increases in real terms 
are extremely high, and suggest that inflation is not the reason for the continuous increase 
in the MOH budgets. 
 Population Growth 
Annual population growth in SA ranged between 2.28% minimum (2009), and 6.95% 
maximum (2010), with no significant changes except in 2010, and this was due to the 
sharp increase (23.4%) in the number of non-Saudis. However, the increase in the number 
of Saudi citizens in this year was just 0.89%. Moreover, the number of Saudi citizens who 
received most of the healthcare services in the period from 2006 to 2015 (91.04% on 
average) did not change in line with the changes in the MOH budgets (see Table 1 in the 
Text and Table 3 in Appendix). This makes the population growth another doubtful 




 Elderly People 
Most of the previous studies that searched for the causes of the growth in healthcare 
expenditure agreed globally that ageing is a major reason. This study data shows that the 
increase in percentages of people aged 65 and above in SA was negligible in the period 
from 2006 to 2015 (0.00% on average). In addition, the data did not show any significant 
increases during the ten years to explain the continuous and sharp increase in Saudi MOH 
budgets. Moreover, the percentage of elderly people in SA represent just 2.8% on average 
of the total population, and this is still a very low figure to create such high increases, 
where most of the Saudi population lie in the group aged 15-64 years (66.8% on average), 
then those aged 0-14 (30.3% on average) (see Table 2). 
Therefore, this part of the study will investigate whether these percentages are high or not 
by comparing them to the five groups of countries, which were discussed in the previous 
Chapter. The lack of access to data on Taiwan and Palestine is noted. 
Table 2 Saudi Population Ages as Percentage of Total Population 
  
Sources: The World Bank (WB, 2016) 
Appreciations: 1As a percentage of the total population in the same year. 
 
 
Y 0-14 %1 Change % 15-64 % Change % 65 & above % Change % 
06 32.63  64.54  2.83  
07 31.93 -0.71 65.25 0.71 2.82 -0.01 
08 31.35 -0.58 65.84 0.59 2.81 -0.01 
09 30.86 -0.49 66.35 0.51 2.79 -0.02 
10 30.42 -0.44 66.81 0.46 2.77 -0.02 
11 29.95 -0.47 67.29 0.47 2.76 -0.01 
12 29.51 -0.44 67.73 0.45 2.76 -0.01 
13 29.13 -0.38 68.11 0.38 2.76 0.01 
14 28.82 -0.30 68.38 0.27 2.79 0.03 
15 28.58 -0.24 68.56 0.18 2.86 0.07 




In the period from 2006 to 2015, the Saudi elderly group ranks 55th on average among the 
GCC, Middle East, Arab, Asia, and OPEC countries. In the group aged 0-14, SA ranks 
27th and in the group aged 15-64 is 25th. 
The group of elderly people in SA ranks the highest among the GCC counties on average, 
as a percentage of total population in the period from 2006 to 2015 (2.79%) (see Figure 
4 in the Appendix). Also, the same is true for the group of people aged 0-14 (30.29% on 
average). However, for the group aged 15-64, SA is considered the lowest (66.87% on 
average), where the highest is UAE (84.85%). 
In the Middle East, the Saudi elderly group was just ahead of the GCC countries and 
Yemen, where the highest is Cyprus (11.72% on average). In the group aged 0-14, Saudi 
is the 6th, and appears in the middle of the group aged 15-64. 
In comparison to Arabic countries, the Saudi elderly group ranks just before Yemen and 
GCC countries, where the highest is Lebanon (8.11% on average). In the group aged 0-
14, SA came in the middle of the ranking, and in the group aged 15-64, came after the 
GCC countries, Tunisia, and Lebanon.  
Among Asian countries, elderly Saudi group ranks very low, ahead only of the GCC 
countries, Yemen, and Afghanistan, where Japan is the highest (23.22% on average). In 
the group aged 0-14, SA came after 15th countries, and in the group of people aged 15-
64, SA appeared in the middle, where the highest is UAE (84.85% on average), and the 
lowest is Afghanistan (51% on average). 
Among OPEC member countries, the elderly Saudi group is the 9th, and 7th in the group 
aged 0 to 14. In the group aged 15-64, SA ranked 5th, behind UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and 




 Demand for Healthcare Services 
The study figures show that the total patient visits to the MOH healthcare facilities have 
increased 6.8% by 2015 in comparison to 2006 (4.2 Million visits), with 471 thousand 
more visits every year on average (see Table 1 in the Text and Table 4 in Appendix). This 
does not come in line with the sharp increases in the MOH budgets, which increased 
220% by 2015 in comparison to 2006 ($11.4 Billion). Moreover, the highest increases in 
the MOH budgets in 2010 and 2012 were corresponding to very low increase in 2010 
(410 thousand visits), and decrease in 2012 (-728 thousand visits). In addition, the second 
highest increase in total patient visits occurred in 2015 (2.7 Million visits); however, it 
was matched by the lowest increase in the MOH budget ($0.7 Billion). These indicators 
suggest that the demand for healthcare services was not a major reason for the increases 
in the Saudi MOH budgets. 
 Foreign Patient Visits 
The average increases in the number of foreign patient visits is relatively low in 
comparison to the increases in the MOH budgets (2.9% vs 13.6% on average). Also, the 
increase in the number of foreign patient visits was just 27.9% by 2015 in comparison to 
2006, which seems very low in comparison to the growth of the MOH budgets (220%). 
The data shows that the highest increases in the MOH budgets during the ten years were 
met by relatively high increases in the number of foreign patient visits (2010 and 2012); 
however, the highest increases in the foreign patient’s visits (2008, 2015) were met by 
very low increases in the MOH budget (8.9% vs 10.5% and 7.9% vs 3.9% respectively). 
Also, the third and fourth highest increases in the MOH budgets (2007 and 2009) were 
met by decreases in foreign patient visits (-7.3% and -3.9% respectively) (see Table 1 in 
the Text and Table 4 in Appendix). Therefore, foreign patient visits cannot justify such a 




 Chronic Diseases 
The patient visits to chronic diseases clinics in PHCs decreased 2% on average (-99 
thousand visits). Also, the patient visits to these clinics decrease year on year except in 
2012. This makes the patient visits to PHCs chronic clinics an unlikely reason for the 
increases in the MOH budgets. 
In the patient visits to chronic diseases clinics in hospitals (Diabetes mellitus, Blood 
diseases, Nervous system diseases, Hypertension diseases, Coronary heart diseases, 
Rheum & other heart diseases), the data shows that the highest increases in patient visits 
to these clinics were in 2015 for all the six types (38.3%, 30.7%, 33.2%, 35%, 19.1%, and 
38.2% respectively); however, these accounted for the lowest increase in the MOH 
budgets (3.9%). 
For the blood diseases, nervous system diseases, and hypertension diseases clinics, the 
second highest number of patient visits was in 2012 (21%, 13.3%, and 10% respectively), 
which saw the second highest increase in the MOH budget (18.1%); however, the third 
highest number of visits to these clinics was in 2014 (17.5%, 11.4%, and 7.8 respectively), 
these accounted for the second lowest increase in the MOH patient visits (10.3%). 
The coronary heart diseases and the rheum and other heart diseases clinics reported 8% 
increases in 2007, which were matched by high increase in the MOH budget (15.8%). 
However, all of the other years changed in percentages to lower than 5% as in the case of 
the number of visits to diabetes mellitus’ clinics (see Table 1 in the Text and Table 4 in 
Appendix). These data indicate that all these six types of visits are considered dubious 





 Specialised Healthcare Facilities 
In the period from 2006 to 2015, there were five medical cities with high specialty in 
different fields, only one of which was inaugurated during the investigated period 
(11/2009), namely King Abdulla Medical City in Makkah. However, its budget cannot be 
accounted for just by the 2009 budget, as the cost of the construction occurred over 
several years. Therefore, the 17% increase in the MOH budget in this year cannot be 
explained by the inauguration of this Medical City, as is the case with the oncology centre 
that was opened in the same year. Also, for the same reason, the six cardiology centres 
that were opened in 2007 (one unit), 2009 (two units), and 2011 (three units) cannot 
explain the entire increase in 2007 (16%), 2009 (17%), and 2011 (13.6%) budget (see 
Table 1 in the Text and Table 5 in Appendix). Therefore, these quantities are unlikely to 
explain the sharp increases in the MOH budgets. 
 Number of Physicians 
The study data shows that the total number of physicians has grown at a lower rate in 
comparison to the MOH budgets, and the only increases that came in line with the 
increase in the MOH budgets were in 2008 (11% vs 10.5%) and 2010 (24% vs 18.8%). 
However, the rest of the increases changed at a lower rate than 10.2%. Moreover, the 
other highest increases in the number of physicians were in 2007 (10.2%) and 2009 
(9.1%). However, these years were met by significant growth rates in the MOH budgets 
(15.8%, 17%, respectively). On the other hand, the other high increases in the MOH 
budgets were in 2012 (18.1%) and 2013 (15.4%); however, these saw very low increasing 
rates in the number of physicians (6.2%, 6.5%, respectively) (see Table 1 in the Text and 
Table 5 in Appendix). These big variations between the increases in the number of 




 New Ministers 
In the period from 2006 to 2015 seven ministers were designated to lead the MOH, four 
of them in the period of King Abdulla (until 2014), one of whom was temporary, and 
three in the period of King Salman, one of whom was temporary as well (see Table 6 in 
the Appendix). The data shows that the designation of Doctor Abdulla Al Rabeaa was 
followed by the highest increase in the MOH budgets in 2010 (18.8%). However, the 
budget already increased sharply by about 16% in 2007 and 17% in 2009, and these were 
in the period of Doctor Hamad Al Mana. In 2014, there were three ministers, of whom 
Adel Fakeh occupied the position for most of that year (8 months); however, this period 
was followed by the lowest increase during the ten years (3.9% in 2015). 
 Drivers of the Saudi Public Healthcare Expenditure Growth 
All the nine reasons discussed in this chapter, have had an insignificant effect on the Saudi 
MOH budget in the last ten years, and there was not a consistent reason for the increase 
in the MOH budgets. It is noted that the highest increase in the number of physicians in 
2010 was met by the highest increase in the MOH budget (24% and 18.6%, respectively). 
This occurred the year after the appointment of the new minister (Dr. Al Rabeaa) and 
shows that his appointment had a significant impact on operating costs. However, because 
the impact of his appointment on the increases in the MOH budget was not consistent 
across his tenure, the effective impact of his appointment was limited. Moreover, the 
proportion of the elderly in SA is very low in comparison to the five groups except with 
GCC countries. This suggests that the elderly treatment cost in the period from 2006 to 
2015 accounted for a low proportion of the MOH budgets. Therefore, the findings of this 
part suggest further investigations to include all the items that the MOH budgets were 
spent on in the period from 2006 to 2015 to find out the actual reasons for increasing the 




 Drivers of the MOH Expenditure Increases (Micro Level Investigation) 
The macro level investigation conducted in the previous section found that none of the 
drivers of healthcare spending identified by the international literature were found to be 
causing the significant and continuous increases in the Saudi MOH budgets in the period 
from 2006 to 2015. Therefore, in this part, further detailed analyses will be carried out, 
to investigate all of the items funded by the Saudi MOH budgets to determine the actual 
reasons for the increase in these.  
Specifically, this investigation will examine in detail all four of the Saudi MOH budgets 
(i.e. the projects budget, the manpower budget, the operational & maintenance budget, 
and the frequent expenditures budget) using the ten statistical books detailed in Section 
2.1.2. As an additional analysis, this study will also investigate Al Hajj season activities 
across all four of these budgets.  
2.3.1 Projects Budget 
The projects budget includes all spending on the construction of healthcare facilities. The 
MOH provides healthcare services through three types of facilities: PHCs, Hospitals, and 
Medical Centres (MC). There was significant activity in the construction of medical 
facilities during the period under investigation which is reflected in the sharp increase in 
the projects budget. Specifically, the projects budget almost trebled from $493 million to 
$1,347 million, representing 11.8% average annual increase. The highest increase through 
these years was in 2012, where the spending increased $213.3, representing 22.6% 
increase in the construction budget. Although these average increases are meaningful, it 
is important to note that these account for only 9.2% of the increase in the MOH budget 
during the period under investigation (0.6% of the increase in the Saudi total budget, and 
0.16% of Saudi GDP) (see Table 3). Such that it is already obvious that it must be the 
other budgets — manpower, operational & maintenance, and frequent expenditures — 




important to note that the spending of these other budgets are dependent on the a priori 
construction of the medical facilities funded by the projects budget such that an 
investigation of the projects budget is necessary in the first instance.  
This section will investigate the continuous and significant increases in the MOH projects 
budget in the period from 2006 to 2015, to determine which types of healthcare facilities 
are driving these increases. This will be carried out by analysing the MOH CAPEX and 
the trends in the numbers of MOH new healthcare facilities in the same period. Although 
the data about facilities in the statistical books is reported net, the analyses in this study 
will focus specifically on the number of new facilities (i.e. gross). This is because, in the 
projects budget, CAPEX is spent only on the construction of new units8. When examining 
the relationship between CAPEX and the various types of facilities, this study is careful 
to exclude the impact of the closure or merger of facilities which might cause the net 
facilities number reported in the statistical books to be different from the actual number 
of (i.e. gross) facilities in any year. This is done by calculating the number of healthcare 
facilities added in in each year, by comparing the number of facilities in each specialty in 
each city in a year with the same figure from the prior year.  
When examining the additions to healthcare facilities, hospitals, hospital beds, and MCs 
will be analysed at the micro level (i.e. by speciality and city) whereas, because there is 
no speciality classification for PHCs, PHCs will be analysed based on city classification. 
It is also noted that the statistical books did not include information about the number of 
diabetes centres from 2006 to 2011. 
 
 
                                               




Table 3 MOH CAPEX as Percentages of MOH Budgets, Saudi Total Budgets, and 





I or D %2 
 
I or D $M3 
 
CEX % of MH B4 
MOH 
CEX % of S B5 
MOF 
CEX % of S GDP6 
SAMA 
06 493   9.4 0.55 0.14 
07 613 24.2 119.4 10.0 0.61 0.16 
08 693 13.0 80.0 10.3 0.58 0.15 
09 757 9.2 64.0 9.6 0.60 0.18 
10 837 10.5 80.0 8.9 0.58 0.16 
11 944 12.7 106.6 8.8 0.61 0.14 
12 1,157 22.6 213.3 9.2 0.63 0.16 
13 1,333 15.2 176.0 9.2 0.61 0.18 
14 1,333 0.0 0.27 8.3 0.58 0.18 
15 1,347 1.0 13.6 8.1 0.59 0.21 
 Av 11.8 94.8 9.2 0.59 0.16 
 
Sources: (General Authority for Statistics GAFS 2006-2015; Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015; 
Ministry of Finance MOF 2006-2015; Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority SAMA 2006-2016) 
Abbreviations: 1Capex in millions of US dollars. 2Increases or decreases in the CAPEX. 3Increase or 
decrease in Millions of US dollars. 4Capex as a percentage of the Ministry of Health’s budget. 5Capex as a 
percentage of Saudi total budget. 6Capex as a percentage of Saudi GDP.  
 Data Analysis of the Projects Budget  
In the period from 2006 to 2015 the total number of healthcare facilities increased 3.16% 
per annum on average (82.5 units) (see Table 4). The highest increase was in 2012, where 
the total number of healthcare facilities surged by 188 units (by 7.10%) — the increases 
in all the other years ranged from 20 to 119 units. Most of the increases came from PHCs, 
which represent 67% of the average annual increase of the total number of healthcare 
facilities. Once again the highest increase was in 2012, where the number of PHCs 
increased 150 units (by 7.11%). Hospitals increased by an average of 8.1 units per annum 
(by 3.34%), which represents about 10% of the total average annual increase in healthcare 
facilities. The highest increases in hospitals were in 2009, 2012, 2013 (19, 9, and 12 units, 
respectively). The number of MCs increased 18.8 units per annum on average (by 6.67%), 
representing about 23% of the total average annual increase in healthcare facilities, where 
highest increase was in 2013 (32 units).What is noticeable is that the high level of 
increases in total healthcare facilities did not result in an immediate increase in the MOH 
projects budget. That is, although CAPEX rose considerably in 2007, 2011 and 2012 




years had only a small increase in the number of units. Conversely, 2014 had a by a very 
low level of spending ($0.27 million) but a significant increase in the number of units 
(102 units). 

































06 2,387   1,925   242   220   31,877   
07 2,396 0.84 20 1,925 0.47 9 246 2.07 5 225 2.73 6 31,420 2.21 706 
08 2,460 3.38 81 1,986 3.17 61 243 5.69 14 231 2.67 6 31,720 0.95 300 
09 2,535 4.84 119 2,037 4.18 83 254 7.0 17 244 8.23 19 33,277 22.61 7,172 
10 2,610 3.83 97 2,094 3.58 73 267 7.09 18 249 2.46 6 34,370 10.91 3,632 
11 2,648 1.88 49 2,109 0.72 15 288 10.49 28 251 2.41 6 34,450 8.29 2,850 
12 2,846 7.10 188 2,259 7.11 150 328 10.07 29 259 3.59 9 35,828 4.17 1,438 
13 2,870 1.55 44 2,259 0.00 0 343 9.76 32 268 4.63 12 38,970 14.20 5,087 
14 2,892 3.55 102 2,281 3.19 72 341 7.58 26 270 1.49 4 40,300 6.42 2,501 
15 2,892 1.49 43 2,282 1.62 37 336 0.29 1 274 1.85 5 41,297 7.21 2,905 
 Av 3.16 82.5 Av 2.67 55.6 Av 6.67 18.8 Av 3.34 8.1 Av 8.55 2,954 
 
Sources: (MOH 2006-2015) 
Abbreviation: 1Total number of healthcare facilities. 2The increase in total number of healthcare facilities 
as percentages. 3The increase in total number of healthcare facilities as units. 4Total number of Primary 
Healthcare Centers 5Total number of medical centers. 5Total number of hospitals. 
 
It can be argued that an increase in CAPEX is a leading indicator such that there would 
not necessarily be a same year relationship between CAPEX and new facilities. In that 
regard, it is noteworthy that there also was no correlation between high CAPEX in any 
year and the increase in the number of new facilities in the following year. This is, because 
the construction of healthcare facilities is funded by allocations from the projects budget 
over many years, the total CAPEX figure in the projects budget in any year is dependent 
on the stages of completion in construction of all projects in that year.  
This being the case, the one type of facility where a same or lagged year relationship 
might be expected with the MOH projects budget is PHCs (because construction time 
relative to that for other facilities is shorter, i.e. one to two years). This expectation 
notwithstanding, this study does not find any significant relationship between the two. 
                                               
9 The figures in this table show the actual increases, taking into consideration the offsetting, and the same 




There are two reasons why this might be the case; i) the approximate percentage of PHCs 
that are owned by MOH up to 2012 was 20% — the remainder were rented and funded 
from the MOH frequent expenditures budget (MBC, 2012), ii) although not insignificant, 
the cost of building the PHCs is significantly lower than the construction of other types 
of healthcare facilities. 
In terms of capacity, the number of hospital beds increased by an average of 2,954 units 
per annum (by 8.55%). The highest increase was in 2009 when 7,172 beds were added 
(see Table 4), but again this study finds no relationship with CAPEX, i.e. CAPEX did not 
show a significant increase in 2009 or in the prior year. A similar absence of any 
relationship between the number of beds added and CAPEX is evident in 2012 when 
although CAPEX increased significantly, the number of beds added (1,438) was 
relatively low. This shows that the size of hospitals (as reflected by the number of beds) 
does not drive increases in CAPEX. 
Delving deeper in order to investigate if the speciality of the healthcare facility matters, 
Table 7 in the Appendix shows that number of general hospitals increased by 66 units 
through the period under investigation, representing the majority of the increase in the 
number of hospitals (by 90.41%). Moreover, it is evident from the data that the focus of 
investment by the MOH in the period under investigation was on the expansion of eight 
specialities (general, internal medicine, intensive care, paediatric, surgery, isolation, OB 
& Gyn, and psychiatry & neurology). These eight specialities have shown significant 
average increases in the number of beds through the ten years (1,128, 343, 333, 296, 223, 
134, 112, 104 beds for each speciality, respectively) (see Table 8 in the Appendix). 
Similarly, investment in MCs was focused on dialysis and anti-smoking centres (an 
increase of 4.3 and 7.5 units on average respectively) however the investment in both was 
not equivalent — dialysis centres require a large allocation from the budget, anti-smoking 




Furthermore, the data shows a slowdown in growth in the total number of healthcare 
facilities from 2012 to 2015 (7.10% and 1.5%, respectively). Specifically, the increase in 
the number of PHCs declined from 7.1% to 1.6%, hospitals from 3.6% to 1.8%, and MCs 
from 10% to 0.3%. These declines were a result of the slowing growth in the Saudi 
economy, and hence the Saudi total budget (where increases declined from 18.9% in 2012 
to 0.5% in 2015), which directly impacted the MOH budget (where increases declined 
from 18.1% in 2012 to about 4% in 2015) (see Table 1).  
It is obvious from the data that while the increases in the number, type, and size of 
healthcare facilities were generally accompanied by increases in the projects budget, a 
direct link in the changes between them is not apparent. This is because the funding 
process is based on the stage of completion in construction of the facilities for a variety 
of reasons, i.e. the construction period differs between types of facility and also between 
the same types of facility. For instance, PHCs involve a short construction period and are 
likely to have had a limited impact on the projects budget because of the low percentage 
of these units owned by MOH as well as their low cost of construction relative to other 
facilities. In that regard, general hospitals, which are totally owned by the MOH, 
accounted for the majority of the projects budget throughout the ten year period and eight 
specialities accounted for the majority of this.  In MCs, dialysis centres were significant. 
2.3.2 Manpower, and Operation & Maintenance Budgets 
Healthcare services in SA are delivered by 384,636 healthcare practitioners, of whom 
51% are employed by the Saudi MOH (the remainder are employed by the private sector 
or SDU), of whom 64.27% are Saudis (MOH, 2015). The manpower employed by the 
MOH are either employed through the Saudi Ministry of Civil Services (MOCS) and are 
paid from the MOH manpower salaries budget, or are employed via private companies 
which operate and maintain some of the MOH healthcare facilities and are paid from the 




In 2015 the total number of MOH employees reached 248,310, 88.4% of whom are 
employed by MOCS, and the remainder by operation and maintenance companies. In the 
period from 2006 to 2015, the Saudi MOH spending on MOCS employee salaries almost 
tripled from $2.7 billion to $7.1 billion representing an average annualised increase of 
11.1%. On average, these figures represent almost half of the increase in the MOH budget 
during the period under investigation, 3.1% of the increase in the Saudi total budget, and 
0.85% of the increase in Saudi GDP (see Table 5). The most significant single year 
percentage increase in the budget (17.6%) occurred in 2012, an increase that represented 
about half of the MOH budget that year, 3.2% of the Saudi total budget, and 0.82% of the 
Saudi GDP in the same year (see Table 5). 
Similar to the manpower budget, the operations & maintenance budget increased fivefold 
by 2015 in comparison to 2006 ($5.8 vs $1.1 billion). On average, spending on operation 
and maintenance represents a quarter of the MOH total budget across the period, 1.6% of 
the Saudi total budget, and 0.47% of the Saudi GDP.  
Collectively the manpower and operations & maintenance budgets account for 
approximately 75% of the increase in the MOH budget during the period under 
investigation. It is obvious then that, as was flagged in Section 2.3.1, it is these budgets 
which account for the majority of the growth in healthcare spending in SA such that a 
thorough investigation of these budgets is warranted. 
This section will investigate the number of physicians, nurses, pharmacists, allied health 
personnel, as well as the administrators, technicians, and workers employed directly by 
MOCS and indirectly by the operative companies. Unlike the projects budget analysis 
this section discuss both the increases and decreases in the numbers in each category in 
detail because while increases create an absolute and obvious need for more spending in 




service or resignation) also trigger significant final pay related compensation in SA10. 
Because the data about employees in the statistical books is reported net, this investigation 
will analyse the numbers employed in each category by city, by nationality, and finally 
by gender in order to establish the actual increases and decreases, i.e. to avoid for 
offsetting. Due to the unavailability of information, this study is unable to account for 
offsetting that might occur if employees are transferred from one city to another. That 
said, however it is estimated by Yami (2017) that such intercity transfers are rare (i.e. less 
than 1 in 5,000 employees employed by the MOH) such that it is unlikely to adversely 
impact the results of the analysis in this study.   
Due to changes in the way that the number of physicians by speciality who worked in 
hospitals in 2006, 2007, and 2008 were presented in the statistical books, this cohort was 
excluded. Also, it was evident that for the classification of physicians by speciality and 
level there was no data available by city, nationality and gender in the statistical books 
from 2012 to 2015. For these reasons, the calculation of the number of physicians who 
work in hospitals will be from 2009 to 2015 and based on the total figures. Moreover, 
data on the numbers of administrators, technicians, and workers was also unavailable for 
the period 2013 to 2015. 
                                               
10 According to the Saudi Ministry of Labour law (Chapter five, Section four), employer pays employee a 
compensation by the end of services or resignation, to be calculated based on the number of years of services 
MOL, M. O. L. 2015. Saudi Ministy of Labour Law [Online]. Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Saudi Ministry of 




Table 5 MOH Manpower’s Salaries and Operation and Maintenance Budgets as Percentages of MOH Budgets, Saudi Total Budgets, 






















I or D 
% 




OM % S 
MOF 
OM % G 
SAMA 
06 2,751   52.4 3.0 0.77 142,282   1,144   21.8 1.3 0.32 
07 3,073 11.7 322.6 50.5 3.0 0.80 153,214 7.7 10,932 1,386 21.1 241.8 22.8 1.3 0.36 
08 3,304 7.5 230.6 49.1 2.7 0.70 165,798 8.2 12,584 1,600 15.4 213.3 23.8 1.3 0.34 
09 3,837 16.1 533 48.7 3.0 0.90 176,018 6.1 10,220 2,069 29.3 469.3 26.3 1.6 0.50 
10 4,573 19.1 735.7 48.9 3.2 0.87 186,069 5.7 10,051 2,549 23.2 480 27.2 1.7 0.50 
11 5,121 12.0 548.5 48.2 3.3 0.77 197,672 6.2 11,603 298 -88.2 -2250.4 2.8 0.2 0.04 
12 6,025 17.6 903.2 48.0 3.2 0.82 208,438 5.4 10,766 3,544 1085.6 3245.3 28.2 1.9 0.50 
13 6,720 11.5 694.9 46.3 3.0 0.90 216,122 3.7 7,684 4,370 23.3 826.6 30.1 2.0 0.60 
14 6,956 3.5 236.5 43.5 3.0 0.90 219,548 1.6 3,426 5,441 24.5 1070.1 34.0 2.4 0.72 
15 7,110 2.2 154.4 42.7 3.1 1.1 219,505 -.02 -43 5,839 7.3 398.4 35.1 2.5 0.90 
 Av 11.1 484.4 47.8 3.1 0.85 Av 4.93 8,580 Av 19.8 521.6 25.2 1.6 0.47 
 
Sources: (General Authority for Statistics GAFS 2006-2015; Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015; Ministry of Finance MOF 2006-2015; Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority SAMA 2006-2016) 
Abbreviations: 1Total salaries of MOH employees employed through MOCS in millions of US dollars. 2Total salaries of MOH employees employed through MOCS 
as percentage of the MOH budget. 3Total salaries of MOH employees employed through MOCS as percentage of Saudi total budget. 4Total salaries of MOH employees 





 Data Analysis of the Manpower and Operations & Maintenance Budgets 
The total number of healthcare practitioners in SA has more than doubled in the last ten 
years, increasing by an average of 11.6% per annum (15,027 practitioners), with the most 
significant increases occurring in 2010 (an increase of 22.7% or 27,973 practitioners). 
The data shows that all four of the medical specialities (Physicians, Nurses, Pharmacists, 
and Allied Health Personnel) increased significantly, where the highest average 
percentage annual increase was the pharmacists (about 20%). However, the increase in 
total number of pharmacists across the period under investigation was not particularly 
high (1,023 in 2006 versus 3,184 in 2015). The majority of increases, in terms of figures, 
were in the number of nurses, which increased by 7,410 nurses on average (11.6%), 
representing about half of the average annual increase in the total number of healthcare 
practitioners. The second highest increase was in the number of allied health personnel, 
which increased by 4,523 practitioners on average (12.7%), representing 30% of the 
average annual increase in the number of healthcare practitioners. The third highest 
increase was the physician cohort, which increased 9.7% on average (2,753 physicians), 
representing 18.3% of the average annual increase in healthcare practitioners (see Table 
6). The number of technicians, administrators, and workers also showed a continuous 
upward trend, with the highest increase in 2010 and 2012 (25,370 and 21,969, 
respectively) (see Table 10 in the Appendix). 
The data shows that, unsurprisingly, the highest increases in all types of manpower 
occurred concurrently with the increases in the number of healthcare facilities. That is, 
the 19 hospitals and 83 PHCs which were completed in 2009 resulted in a significant 
increase in the demand for staff in 2009 and 2010 (a 50% increase in the total number of 
health practitioners, and a 70% increase in the number of technicians & administrators, 
and workers) (see Tables 4, 6, and Table 10 in the Appendix). A similar situation is 




Table 6 Number of Healthcare Providers in Thousands 
Y T HCP1 I % I F2 D F3 PHY4 I % I F D F NUR5 I % I F D F PHR6 I % I F D F ALH7 I % I F D F New8 
06 91.7    21.2    44.3    1    25    1 
07 101.7 15.8 14.5 -4.4 22.6 10.2 2.1 -.79 51.1 19.5 8.6 -1.8 1.3 38.3 .39 -.11 26.6 13.1 3.2 -1.6 1.2 
08 110.5 11.6 11.7 -2.3 24.8 11.0 2.4 -.34 55.4 11.5 5.8 -.95 1.5 23.5 .30 -.07 28.7 11.6 3 -1 1.3 
09 123.1 16.2 17.9 -5.3 25.8 9.1 2.2 -1.2 63.2 17.6 9.7 -1.9 1.6 20.4 .31 -.18 32.3 19.4 5.5 -1.9 .60 
10 149.3 22.7 27.9 -1.7 31.5 23.8 6.1 -.47 75.9 20.9 13.2 -.57 1.7 14.2 .23 -.09 40.1 25.7 8.3 -.57 .41 
11 157.2 7.60 11.4 -3.5 33.9 8.5 2.7 -.22 77.9 6.1 4.6 -2.6 1.8 11.9 .21 -.10 43.4 9.6 3.8 -.53 .48 
12 166.6 7.70 12.1 -2.6 35.8 6.2 2.1 -.26 82.9 7.8 6.1 -1 2.1 16.8 .31 -.06 45.6 8.2 3.5 -1.2 .62 
13 174.8 7.40 12.3 -4.1 37.8 6.5 2.3 -.28 83.8 5.1 4.2 -3.3 2.3 16.4 .35 -.12 50.7 11.8 5.4 -.37 .59 
14 186.3 8.80 15.3 -3.9 38.4 3.7 1.4 -.84 91.8 10.4 8.7 -.73 2.9 25.3 .60 -.07 53 9.2 4.6 -2.3 .79 
15 194.8 6.30 11.7 -3.1 41.2 8.1 3.1 -.34 95.3 5.8 5.3 -1.8 3.1 11.0 .32 -.05 55 5.5 2.9 -.91 .83 
 Av 11.6 15 -3.4 Av 9.7 2.7 (.53) Av 11.6 7.4 -1.6 Av 19.8 .33 -.09 Av 12.7 4.5 -1.17 .86 
 
Sources: (MOH 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total number of healthcare providers employed through MOCS and the operative companies. 2Increases as figures. 3Decreases as figures 4Total number of 
physicians. 5Total number of nurses. 6Total number of pharmacists. 7Total number of allied health personnel. 8The new manpower enrolled in fellowship and higher studies 
programmes11 
                                               




MCs by 29 and 32 units and hospitals by 9 and 12 units, respectively. As in 2009, these 
increases resulted in additional hiring of staff, so much so that the number of all healthcare 
practitioners totalled 186,303 by 2014. However, the total increase in numbers from 
2012–2014 (39,897 practitioners) is lower than the increase that occurred in 2009–2010 
(45,938 practitioners), due to the larger size of the 25 hospitals opened in 2009–2010 
(10,804  beds) in comparison to the size of the same number opened in 2012–2014 (9,026 
beds).  
The data also shows that it is the growth in specific specialities (i.e. psychiatric, OB & 
GYN, isolation, surgery, paediatric, intensive care, internal medicine, and general), which 
had the highest expansion within healthcare facilities (as discussed in Section 2.3.1.1), 
and for the purposes of the analysis in this section, also led to a significant increase in the 
number of physicians employed in these specialties (see Tables 8 and 11 in the Appendix). 
Separately, new employees enrolled in fellowship and higher studies programmes had 
little effect on the manpower and operation & maintenance budgets because the numbers 
on these programmes increased insignificantly at a time when both budgets increased 
sharply (see Table 6). 
These data show that each US dollar the MOH spends on CAPEX creates a need to spend 
$5.10 on salaries of MOCS staff and $5.50 on operative and maintenance programmes 
(including salaries of their employees). Also, every new healthcare facility opened by the 
MOH cause manpower employed by MOCS to increase by 103 persons on average, and 
healthcare practitioners employed by both MOCS and operative companies to increase 
by 181 on average. 
Moreover, the data shows that the increases in manpower corresponded with increases in 
both the manpower and the operation & maintenance budgets. This indicates that it was 
the actual increases in manpower were the main driver of the increases in both budgets, 




and 2010 although both the manpower and the operation & maintenance budgets 
increased significantly, the number of physicians, pharmacists, and allied health 
personnel only reported a high level of actual decreases in 2009. The only category to 
show any noticeable decrease in numbers in 2010 was workers (which decreased 12,466) 
but, because workers are low paid, this had no significant impact on the two budgets. 
The 5% cumulative increase in salaries that was granted to publicly employed Saudis and 
pensioners by King Abdulla bin Abdul-Aziz in each year from 2009 to 2011 to meet the 
high living costs, might be considered as a driver of healthcare costs (Alriyadh, 2008). 
However, while sizeable for individual Saudis in receipt of these increases, this study 
estimates that the overall impact on the manpower and operation & maintenance budgets 
was likely to be limited for several reasons, i) only 56% of healthcare practitioners in 
2011 were Saudis, ii) only 23% of physicians (who are the highest paid cohort) in 2011 
were Saudis, iii) only 60% of administrators, technicians, and workers were Saudis 
(MOH, 2011). It is also noteworthy that the impact of the salary increases on the 
operations & maintenance budget is likely further reduced because, in addition to salaries, 
this budget funds many programmes unaffected by these increases. 
What is evident from the data is that the continuous increases in the manpower and 
operation & maintenance budgets during the period under investigation was driven by the 
increases in the number of healthcare facilities in the same period. Specifically, the 
analyses show that the MOH invested on average five times more in staff employed 
directly through MOCS, or the operative and maintenance programmes including salaries 
of their employees, than they spent on CAPEX. In addition, on average, the MOH 
employed 103 employees though MOCS, and 181 healthcare practitioners for each unit 
of healthcare facility opened. Moreover, the increases in the manpower and operation & 
maintenance budgets were mainly caused by increases in the amount of manpower (i.e. 




had no effect). Also it was, the expansion of the eight specialities referred to previously 
that had the most significant impact on the number of physicians who work in these 
specialties, which in turn contributed significantly to the increase in the manpower and 
the operation & maintenance budgets during the period under investigation. 
2.3.3 Frequent Expenditures Budget 
The frequent expenditures budget is the final budget that funds healthcare service 
activities in SA. This budget includes payments for drugs, equipment, preventive 
programmes, treatments abroad, educational and supervision activities, and other 
expenses (MOH, 2015). In the period from 2006 to 2015, this budget experienced large 
increases (almost trebling from $850 million in 2006 to $2.3 billion in 2015). This sharp 
increase means that those activities covered by the frequent expenditures budget represent 
15% of the total MOH budget on average, 1% of the Saudi total budget, and 0.27% of the 
Saudi GDP (see Table 7).   
This section will analyse changes in six major activities which are covered by this budget;  
1. Patient visits, including an analysis of patient visits to PHCs, hospitals, and 
chronic diseases clinics.  
2. Communicable diseases, covering 38 types of infectious disease.  
3. Medical activities, including the number of inpatient cases, surgeries, deliveries, 
laboratory investigated cases, radiology, physiotherapy, number of served meals, 
and the cases sent abroad for treatments.  
4. Supervision activities, including MOH visits to water supplies and public places, 
and the sampling of water and food. 
5. Educational activities, including the number of lectures and meetings held every 
year.  
6. Awareness activities, including the number of printed booklets, newsletters, 




Table 7 MOH Frequent Expenditures Budget as Percentage of the MOH and Saudi 








FE % M 
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FE % S 
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06 858.6   16.3 0.96 0.24 23.6   17.2   
07 1,008.2 17.4 149.6 16.6 1.00 0.26 24.2 2.4 0.56 17.6 2.5 0.43 
08 1,127.4 11.8 119.2 16.7 0.94 0.24 24.8 2.3 0.56 18.1 2.4 0.42 
09 1,207.2 7.0 79.7 15.3 0.95 0.30 25.3 2.3 0.56 18.5 2.3 0.42 
10 1,390.1 15.1 182.9 14.8 0.97 0.26 27.1 6.9 1.70 18.7 0.9 0.16 
11 1,574.1 13.2 184 14.8 1.00 0.24 28.3 4.5 1.20 19.4 3.7 0.69 
12 1,826.6 16.0 252.5 14.5 1.00 0.25 29.1 2.9 0.81 19.8 2.2 0.43 
13 2,068.8 13.2 242.1 14.2 0.95 0.30 29.9 2.7 0.79 20.2 2.1 0.42 
14 2,264.5 9.4 195.7 14.1 1.00 0.30 30.7 2.6 0.77 20.7 2.1 0.43 
15 2,326.6 2.7 62.1 14.0 1.00 0.36 31.5 2.4 0.75 21.1 2.0 0.42 
 Av 11.7 163.1 15.1 1.00 0.27 Av 3.2 0.87 Av 2.2 0.43 
 
Sources: (General Authority for Statistics GAFS 2006-2015; Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015; 
Ministry of Finance MOF 2006-2015; Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority SAMA 2006-2016) 
Abbreviations: 1Frequent expenditures in millions of US dollars. 2Saudi total population in million (Saudis 
and non-Saudis). 3Increases or decreases per head. 4Total Saudis in million. 
 
 Data Analysis of the Frequent Expenditures Budgets 
Patient visits grew from 61.8 million to 66.0 million during the period under investigation, 
however, growth was not smooth throughout the period. Specifically, while the number 
of visits increased by 1.5 million in the period from 2006 to 2014 (61.8 million versus 
63.3 million visits, respectively), 2015 saw a large single year increase of 2.7 million 
visits (i.e. an increase from 63.3 million in 2014 to 66.0 million in 2015) (see Table 8). 
Also of interest is that not every year experienced an increase in visits (i.e. there were 
some years when patient visits declined in absolute terms), and also there were many 
years when patient visits per capita declined. Indeed, the average patient visits per capita 
decreased by 2.08% from 2006 to 2015. 
Visits to PHCs, which represent the majority of total visits (75% on average), reported an 
average decrease (by 630,872 visits) across the period under investigation with no 
significant increases in any year except in 2009 (the increase in PHC visits in 2009 
pertained to general clinics). Visits to well-baby clinics were the only clinics to 




in the Appendix). Visits to general, dental, antenatal, and other clinics reported average 
decreases in the number of visits across the period under investigation by 285 thousand, 
80 thousand, 35 thousand, and 282 thousand visits, respectively.  
Visits to chronic disease clinics, which represent about 6% of total visits on average, did 
not report any increases except in 2012 (it is noted that there was a lack of information 
about the number of patient visits to chronic diseases clinics in 2006 and 2007). Hospital 
visits, which represent about 19% of total visits on average, showed high growth by 48% 
in 2015 in comparison to 2006 (an increase of 593,398 visits on average). The highest 
increases in hospital visits were to musculoskeletal diseases, OBS & GYN, Eye, and 
general diseases (58 thousand, 72 thousand, 107 thousand, 161 thousand visits on 
average, respectively). Visits caused by other diseases fluctuated between -12 and 30 
thousand visits on average (see Table 13 in the Appendix). 
Medical activities show that the number of both inpatients and surgery cases increased 
significantly in 2007 (207 and 33 thousand cases, respectively), representing 30 and 14 
thousand on average. The number of deliveries (births) remained almost the same 
between 2006 and 2015 (248 vs 247 thousand cases, respectively), with a notable increase 
in both 2007 and 2012 (7.8 and 10 thousand cases, respectively). The highest increase in 
laboratory cases occurred in 2008 (19 million cases), x-ray in 2011 (483 thousand cases), 
and in physiotherapy in 2010 (38 thousand cases). The number of meals served increased 
three times in 2015 in comparison to 2014 (68 vs 21 million meals), and more than 
quadrupled in comparison to 2006 (68 vs 15 million meals). The number of cases sent 
abroad for treatment showed a negligible increase in the period from 2006 to 2013. 
However, in 2014 this number increased almost four times (3.4 vs 0.89 thousand cases) 
(see Table 15 in the Appendix). In communicable diseases, malaria and dengue fever are 
the only two diseases which increased significantly among the 38 types of infectious 
































I D V 
 
06 61.8   2.6  50.7   11.1      
07 58.8 -4.8 -2.9 2.4 -7.02 47.4 -6.3 -3.2 11.3 2.3 .25    
08 65.3 10.9 6.4 2.6 8.40 48.3 1.8 .89 11.6 2.3 .26 5.2   
09 65.9 1.0 .65 2.6 -1.25 49.5 2.5 1.2 11.3 -2.2 -.26 4.9 -5.4 -.28 
10 66.3 0.62 .41 2.4 -5.92 50.1 1.0 .51 11.4 0.3 .03 4.8 -2.8 -.14 
11 65.9 -0.61 -.40 2.3 -4.95 49.7 -0.67 -.33 11.4 0.3 .03 4.7 -2.1 -.10 
12 65.2 -1.1 -.72 2.2 -3.88 48.6 -2.2 -1.1 11.6 1.8 .21 4.9 3.7 .17 
13 64.6 -0.95 -.62 2.1 -3.59 48.5 -0.23 -.11 11.4 -2.0 -.23 4.6 -5.5 -.27 
14 63.3 -2.0 -1.2 2 -4.47 46.6 -3.9 -1.9 12 5.6 .63 4.6 -0.2 -.009 
15 66 4.3 2.7 2.1 1.86 45 -3.4 -1.5 16.4 36.4 4.3 4.5 -1.3 -.06 
 Av 0.83 .47 Av -2.08 Av -1.2 -.63 Av 4.9 .59 Av -1.9 -.09 
 
Sources: (MOH 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Patient visits. 2Increases or decreases as visits. 3Visits per Capita (not in millions). 4Visits 
to PHCs12. 5 Visits to hospitals. 6Visits to chronic clinics. 
 
In supervision activities, the number of visits to water supply decreased by 2,565 visits 
on average, and visits to public places decreased by 856 visits on average, where the 
former had a high increase in 2010, and the latter in 2015 (14.6 and 26.2 thousand visits, 
respectively). The investigated samples of water decreased by 1,222 samples on average, 
showing no noticeable increases, whereas investigated samples of food increased by 613 
samples on average, with a high increase in 2011 (14.3 thousand samples). Destroyed 
food increased 1,886 kilograms on average, with no significant increases, and decreased 
by -1,095 litre on average, where 2007 increased by 73,943 litres (see Table 16 in the 
Appendix). 
In educational activities, the number of lectures held inside healthcare facilities increased 
in 2014 almost fivefold in comparison to 2006 (249.3 vs 52.4 thousand lectures), where 
the lectures which were held outside healthcare facilities increased by 409 on average, 
with a significant increase in 2012 (41.9 thousand lectures). There was no significant 
change in the number of meetings held every year. In awareness activities, the data shows 
                                               




that all the significant increases came in 2009, and were followed by decreases in the 
following years. The constant level of educational and awareness activities provided in 
2007-2008 and from 2012-2015 could be due to the fact that the reporting occurs every 
two years rather than every year (see Table 17 in the Appendix). The analyses found that, 
except for the number of laboratory investigations and treatments abroad, none of the 
trends in MOH activities in the period from 2006 to 2015 were in line with the changes 
in the frequent expenditure budget. Of these two activities, the cases sent abroad 
represented 13% of the frequent expenditure budget in 2013 ($266 million), and it is noted 
that the number of such cases quadrupled by 2014 (Alhider, 2013). Similarly, laboratory 
investigations significantly affected the frequent expenditure budget due to the large 
number of cases in every year.   
Because the MOH budget is funded by the MOF at the beginning of each year, each of 
the projects, manpower, and operation & maintenance budgets are based on existing 
contracts. Conversely, the frequent expenditures budget is allocated based on estimated 
demand, such that actual MOH healthcare services activities in any year will only explain 
any increases in the frequent expenditures budget in that year to a certain extent. 
Indeed, a lagged relationship between the frequent expenditures budget and certain key 
items might be anticipated. This predictable relationship is evident from analyses that 
showed a correlation between the numbers of healthcare facilities opened in any year with 
the frequent expenditures budget in the prior year. This was especially the case for newly 
opened MCs and hospitals, where the preparation and furnishing of these facilities was 
from the prior year’s frequent expenditure budget. For instance, the frequent expenditures 
budget increased noticeably in the years before the opening of 83 and 150 PHCs in 2009 
and 2012, respectively. This lagged relationship is also evident prior to the opening of the 
19, 9, and 12 hospitals in 2009, 2012, and 2013, respectively, as well as the opening of 




There was no correlation in the data between the frequent expenditure budget and the 
total number of healthcare practitioners, nor was there correlation with the total 
manpower who are employed directly by MOCS. Similarly, no correlation was evident 
with total population, or with the Saudi population in the same year or one year later, or 
with patient visits per capita. It is also evident that there was neither a relationship 
between the number of patient visits and the increases in the number of healthcare 
facilities (0.83% vs 3.16%), nor healthcare practitioners (0.83% vs 11.6%), nor with the 
manpower who are employed directly by MOCS (0.83% vs 4.93%). On the other hand, 
there is a clear link between changes in the frequent expenditure budget and changes in 
the MOH total budget, where both increased significantly in 2010 and 2012, then 
increases declined year on year; both budgets also followed the same trend as the Saudi 
total budget. 
It is evident from the analyses that laboratory investigations and treatment abroad are the 
two main factors explaining increases in frequent expenditure budget. In addition, it is 
evident that the increases in the number of healthcare facilities affected the frequent 
expenditure budget by increasing the preparation and furnishing costs that were required 
to equip the new facilities. That said, however, there was no relation between increases 
in the frequent expenditure budget and increases in healthcare practitioners, or with total 
manpower employed directly by MOCS. Interestingly, no relation was found between 
increases in the frequent expenditure budget and increases in total population, or with the 
Saudi population, or patient’s visits per capita. In addition, no relation exists between the 
increases in patient visits and increases in healthcare facilities, or with healthcare 
practitioners, or with the increases in manpower employed by MOCS. However, a 
relationship does exist between the increases in frequent expenditure budget and the 




2.3.4 AL Hajj Season 
Of specific interest in the SA context is the possible relationship between healthcare costs 
(and so budgets) and the number of pilgrims visiting the Holy Cities each year. 
Specifically, SA receives an average of 2.5 million pilgrims to Makkah and Madinah 
during Al Hajj season every year, and the MOH takes the full responsibility for providing 
all the necessary preventive and curative services for visitors to these cities (MOH, 2015). 
The costs of healthcare services provided to pilgrims during Al Hajj season are incurred 
across all of the four budgets previously discussed13. For this reason and for the purpose 
of analysing the drivers of healthcare costs in SA, an analysis of the Al Hajj is required. 
The data analyses here will focus on the increases in the number of Al Hajj related PHCs 
and hospitals (some of which are permanent and are embedded in the number of 
healthcare facilities that were discussed previously, and others are seasonal i.e. mobile 
and not embedded). Both healthcare facilities (whether permanent or mobile) are only 
open during the Al Hajj season. The analyses will also include the total number of beds, 
and the number of physicians, nurses, administrators, allied health personnel, technicians, 
and others who participate in health services delivery during the season. The number of 
patient visits, inpatients, and vaccinations given to pilgrims will be also discussed. It was 
noted that there was a lack of access to the data of poliomyelitis vaccinations in 2006. 
 Data Analysis of Al Hajj Season 
The data shows that the number of hospitals increased by 7 permanent units, and one 
seasonal unit throughout the ten years. The number of PHCs increased by 21 permanent 
units, and 41 seasonal units, and the number of beds increased by 2,243 beds during the 
investigation period. The data shows that there were increases in all types of manpower, 
i.e. physicians increased by 150%, nurses by 117%, administrators by 246%, and allied 
health personnel, technicians and others by 213%. Total patient visits to PHCs and 
                                               




hospitals decreased since 2011, and inpatients decreased by 441 cases on average. The 
total pilgrims who had prophylactic vaccination increased by 1,092 on average, and those 
who had poliomyelitis vaccination decreased by 14,500 on average. 
Two thirds of the increase in PHC units came from the seasonal PHCs, which consist of 
caravans or tents, such that the cost is very low. The increases in permanent PHCs account 
for just 4.2% of the MOH total increase in PHCs during the study period. On the other 
hand, the majority of the increases in the number of hospitals were permanent units which 
increased by 7 units, representing approximately 10% of the increases in total MOH 
hospitals during the period under investigation. Three of these hospitals opened in 2009, 
one in both 2011 and 2012, and two in 2014 accounting for 15.8%, 16.6%, 11.1%, and 
50% of total increases in each year, respectively (see Table 18 in the Appendix). 
The Al Hajj-related number of beds increased by 2,243, representing 8.4% of the total 
increase in the last ten years. It is also noted that these increases are not related to MOH 
increases in the number of hospitals, but rather to expansions in the existing hospitals, 
because no new hospitals were opened at the time when the number of beds increased. 
The majority of the manpower who participate in Al Hajj season work for 15 days, i.e. 
the period of the season. Those who work for more than 15 days are the technicians, 
workers, and heads of departments who arrive early to check the readiness of the facilities, 
as well as the vaccination staff. Everyone who works the season gets their usual salary, 
as well as an extra day’s salary for each day spent in the two Holy Cities. Notwithstanding 
the increases in the size of manpower in Al Hajj season, the total number of participants 
is still very low in comparison to total manpower, and represents an insignificant 
percentage of increase in the manpower and operative & maintenance budgets. 
The same is true for the total patient visits and the inpatient cases, which account for just 




such, these represent an insignificant percentage of the frequent expenditures budget. The 
total vaccinations given to pilgrims does not correlate with the increase in the frequent 
expenditures budget in any year, which suggests that the vaccinations did not affect the 
increases in this budget. The investigations found that the seasonal PHCs and hospitals, 
showed an insignificant correlation with the historical changes in the number of pilgrims 
or with the number of patient visits in the same year or the year prior. The same is true 
with changes in the number of manpower in all specialities, except for the sum of the 
allied health personnel, technical personnel, and others which partially matched changes 
in the number of pilgrims in the prior year. Also no correlation was found between the 
changes in the seasonal healthcare facilities with the projects budget, nor with the frequent 
expenditures budget. However, there is a correlation between the changes in the 
manpower and operation & maintenance budgets with manpower in all specialities. 
It is obvious that the increases in the number of permanent hospitals in the two Holy Cities 
were the only major factor during Al Hajj season that had an impact on the MOH total 
budget via an increasing in the projects budget, i.e. it is noted that other factors (changes 
in PHCs in both types, number of beds, manpower, patient visits, inpatients, and 
vaccinations) had no impact. Also, the changes in the number of seasonal healthcare 
facilities and manpower in all specialities were insignificantly correlated with the changes 
in the number of pilgrims and the number of patient visits in the same year or the prior 
year, except for the sum of the allied health personnel, technical personnel, and others, 
who showed some correlation partially with the changes in the number of pilgrims in the 
year prior. Also, no significant correlation was found between changes in the frequent 
expenditures budget or projects budget and the changes in seasonal healthcare facilities; 
however, there is some correlation between manpower and operation & maintenance 




 Budgeting Process in Saudi Arabia 
This study has looked at the demand side which was not driving the increases in the Saudi 
MOH budget. Therefore, this section will go through the supply side and discuss how the 
Saudi government allocates its resources and highlight different budgeting approaches, 
also this part will look at the history of Saudi Arabia’s expenditure patterns. 
2.4.1 Resources Allocation and Budgeting in SA 
The Saudi government follows the administrative classification of public expenditure, 
which breaks down its expenditure by ministries and governmental organisations, which 
are then divided according to subdivisions called branches and departments. Public 
expenditure for each branch or department is then divided into four chapters called the 
economic classification which are: i) manpower salaries, ii) frequent expenditure, iii) 
operation & maintenance programmes, iv) public projects (Eid, 2015, Joharji et al., 2014). 
The process of preparing and approving the Saudi budget starts in January every year. 
Within six to seven months, each ministry and governmental organisation prepares the 
required budget. In June or July, a budget proposal has to be sent to the General Budget 
Department of the Saudi MOF. This department reviews and assesses each item of the 
proposed budget before the MOF starts the first negotiation with representatives of each 
ministry and governmental organisation, which takes place in August and September. The 
MOF negotiates the requested appropriations for next year based on last year’s actual 
spending and the planned spending and actual spending for the first half of the current 
year. In September, the Deputy Minister of Finance reviews the first draft of the budget, 
and in October, the MOF starts the second negotiation of the budget. In November, the 
Minister of Finance14 reviews the second draft of the budget, and in December, the MOF 
                                               
14 Ministers in SA are assigned by a royal order from the King and this is based on a revision to the Basic 
Law of Governance and recommendations from the King’s consultants ALARABIYA. 2019c. Royal 
Orders [Online]. United Arab Emirates: Alarabiya. Available: http://ara.tv/2qrrb [Accessed 01/08/2019 
2019], EID, A. G. Budgetary institutions, fiscal policy, and economic growth: the case of Saudi Arabia.  




issues the final draft of the budget and sends it to the Council of Ministers15 for approval. 
By the end of December, a Royal approval of the budget is issued, and the budget is then 
announced by the MOF, which issues a report discussing the economic developments and 
highlights revenue and expenditure. This report also shows some data on government 
expenditure of major civilian sectors, such as education, healthcare, infrastructure and 
transportation, and municipalities’ services. When the ministries and governmental 
organisations receive their approved budget documents, they start spending according to 
each department budgetary appropriations (Eid, 2015, Joharji et al., 2014). 
One of the issues with the preparation and approval procedures of the Saudi budget is that 
the Consultative Assembly (Majlis Al-Shura), which is considered as the Saudi 
parliament, does not take a significant role in these procedures. This is different to the 
majority of countries with a monarchy government, where usually the parliament has the 
authority to review, negotiate and approve the budget proposals. The reality is that Article 
76 of Chapter 7 of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance, which discusses financial affairs, 
does not specify any role for the Consultative Assembly regarding the budget process. 
Therefore, the duty of the Consultative Assembly in processing the budget is limited to 
reviewing the government general budget report by the end of the fiscal year, and to ask 
for questioning any civilian minister about items of expenditure that lie under his 
authority. Afterwards, the Consultative Assembly prepares a report summarising the 
results of the questioning and provides recommendations to be sent to the King. 
According to Eid (2015), the Saudi MOF has great power over the budget preparation 
process and allocating expenditure before handling the final draft to the Council of 
Ministries for final approval (Eid, 2015). 
                                               





By the middle of each year, the General Accounting Department in the MOF completes 
the final account of the previous year and makes a report which the MOF uses to negotiate 
the proposed budgets by ministries and governmental organisations (Eid, 2015). Joharji 
et al (2014) argued that the use of such a report to negotiate means that the past spending 
patterns significantly determine future expenditure, so this incrementalistic logic makes 
it difficult for the MOF to evaluate the programmes in the proposed budgets. In light of 
this, researchers have observed that a significant proportion of the expenditure is driven 
primarily by requests from ministries and governmental organisations just to increase 
spending instead of being based on an early determination of the macroeconomic 
constraints (Joharji et al., 2014). Wildavsky and Caiden (2004) and Folscher and Saha 
(2007) argued that such a system leads to programmes included in the past year’s budgets 
continuing in future budgets until they are challenged, because the decision taken 
regarding the bulk of the budget is reduced to concentrate on the differences between this 
year’s budget and last year’s budget rather than evaluating the whole programmes instead 
(Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004, Folscher and Shah, 2007). In addition, the reliance on the 
final account report could make the MOF reduce the budget of the ministry that reports a 
surplus in its account. That would therefore encourage some ministries to spend the 
remaining fund in their accounts before the end of the year without actual need, but just 
to guarantee a higher budget next year. This is more likely to occur in the second chapter 
of the budget which concerns the frequent expenditure, as the spending of this chapter is 
not based on fixed contracts to be submitted to the MOF, but rather on estimates for the 
following year16. This is unlike other chapters of the budget (such as manpower salaries 
and projects) where spending is based on fixed contracts. 
 
                                               




As stated earlier, by the end of December of every year, the MOF issues a statement 
involving the estimated revenue and expenditure for the coming year. However, because 
of the continuous volatility of oil prices and the inability to accurately forecast their trend 
for the following year, the Saudi government uses a conservative oil price to measure its 
revenue (France24, 2012, Jadwa, 2014). What happens is that the Saudi government 
approves the proposed budgets for the following year based on these conservative oil 
price estimates which drives up to 90% of the government budget (Jadwa, 2014). 
Moreover, according to the MOF reports from 2004 to 2019, the data shows that if the 
actual revenue that is received during the year is exceeding the estimated revenue (which 
is most likely the case), then usually the government shift out of the approved expenditure 
and increase spending on capital projects and human development programmes during 
the year (MOF, 2004-2019). If actual oil prices brought in revenue less than what was 
estimated, then the government evaluate the size of surplus received in the previous years 
(which is kept in the Central Bank) and if there is a necessity to increase spending over 
the approved expenditure, and then decide. For example, in 2015, when actual revenue 
was less than the estimated due to plummeting oil prices, the government shifted out the 
approved budget and increased spending due to the unexpected war in Yemen. In light of 
increasing the government spending due to a high unexpected revenue, Mohamed 
Ramady (2010) criticised this strategy in dealing with revenues arguing that there is a 
fundamental issue facing the Saudi fiscal authorities concerning budgeting, which is the 
inability to have a significant control over a large proportion of revenue (Ramady, 2010). 
Eid (2015) also criticised this strategy and added that the poor planning and estimation of 
government expenditure is considered to be responsible for the significant and prolonged 





At the beginning of each year, when the ministries and governmental organisations 
receive their approved budget documents, they start managing their financial transactions 
with the MOF. However, due to poor estimation by each ministry and governmental 
organisation of their actual financial needs (Eid, 2015, Albassam, 2011), they start asking 
the MOF for what is called budget correction. This happens for example when a ministry 
realises that it has a deficit in one item and a surplus in another and asks the MOF to 
transfer funds between the two (Eid, 2015, Joharji et al., 2014). The MOF regulates these 
transfers and has the authority to approve transfers that are less than $37.7 million. If the 
requested budget correction exceeds this amount or if the correction involves transferring 
funds from one chapter to another, then an approval from the Council of Ministers is 
required. However, due to the prevalence of this issue, the MOF facilitate the transfer of 
funds even for amounts exceeding $37.7 million. Albassam (2011) and Eid (2015) have 
criticised this process arguing that it could lead to a misuse of the budget correction tool 
(Albassam, 2011, Eid, 2015). 
In section 2.3 of this chapter, it was found that there is a continuous focus from the Saudi 
MOH to keep increasing the number of healthcare facilities, which resulted in increasing 
the number of employees. This was only one case out of 23 ministries, 27 universities, 
and 20 public organisations (Eid, 2015, MOE, 2015). According to data on the economic 
classification of the Saudi government budget covering the period from 1994 to 2010, 
budgets allocated to chapter one and four (manpower salaries and public projects) 
accounted for around 80% of total government spending (Eid, 2015). Moreover, Menzies 
(2013) and Al-Hamidy (2012) confirmed that Saudi Arabia focuses on investments that 
expand infrastructure and increase employment (Fenton-Menzies, 2013, Al-Hamidy, 
2012). This might be sustainable if oil prices are able to provide the funds to do so; if not 




infrastructure projects, they would struggle to cut employees and/or decrease Saudi 
employees’ salaries. 
There are therefore eight potential weaknesses in the Saudi budgetary system. The first is 
that the ministers who usually have the top authority and responsibility in deciding their 
ministry’s budget proposals are also involved in the final approval decision of the final 
budget draft that is sent in December to the Council of Ministers, because they are the 
members of this council17. The absence of an independent authority to separate ministers 
from any involvement in the final decision is likely to exacerbate the problem of 
unnecessary budgets. The second weakness of the budgeting process is the absence of the 
Saudi parliament from the process or even from the final approval decision that could 
change many budgetary proposals. The reality is that the authority of the Saudi parliament 
is limited to a review of the final draft of the budget at the end of the year in order to 
provide recommendations to the King. The third weakness of the budgetary system in SA 
is the reliance on the previous budget to decide the coming one. This means that the 
structure of the following year’s budget is influenced by the appropriations of the previous 
budgets. Researchers have criticised using the MOF final account report as a base to start 
negotiations, as it may result in a focus on items changes in programmes rather than on 
the necessity of the whole programmes and may even make many programmes continue 
to the future without actual need. The reliance on this report could also cause some 
ministries to misuse the allocated resources through spending the remaining funds in their 
accounts before the end of each year in order to guarantee a higher budget next year. The 
fourth weakness of the system is that a significant proportion of the proposed budgets are 
driven mainly by requests from ministries and governmental organisations just to increase 
spending instead of being based on an early determination based on macroeconomic 
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constraints (Joharji et al, 2014). The fifth weakness in the budgeting system concerns 
facilitating the use of the correction tool. This happens when a ministry exaggerates the 
financial needs for specific items in the proposed budget, not because they actually need 
them, but to take advantage of the guaranteed budget correction tool to cover any deficits 
that may occur in other items. The sixth weakness is the inability to stay within approved 
expenditure limits if a high unexpected revenue was received. This could have a 
significant consequence in terms of the government’s ability to cover any future deficits 
if they occur and also to keep enough reserves available. The seventh weakness in the 
system is the focus on capital project and human development programmes that could 
cause the system to struggle to cover higher operational costs if fiscal pressures occurred 
in the future. The eighth weakness is that the MOF gives the top priority in negotiating 
and investigating the proposed budgets to next year expected oil prices, which usually are 
set based on conservative prices (Jadwa, 2014, Eid, 2015, France24, 2012). Insofar as oil 
subsequently trades above expectations, the MOF could relax budgetary constraints and 
so increase the likelihood of unnecessary expenditure. 
2.4.2 Saudi Arabia’s Expenditure Patterns History 
When the Saudi budgets were investigated along with the average oil prices over the past 
17 years, it is obvious that these budgets follow oil price trends. The data in Figure 4 
shows that the Saudi budgets and the average oil prices increased and decreased at the 
same time in the majority of the years under investigation, with only three years showing 
contrary trends. The data analyses indicate a 0.58 correlation between the Saudi 
government budgets and the average oil prices in the period from 2002 to 2018, which 
implies a positive relationship. The reality is that SA is an oil producing country where 
oil derives from 60% to 90% of total government revenues; therefore, such a correlation 





Figure 4 The Saudi Total Budget and the Average Oil prices in the Past 17 Years 
 
Source: (Saudi Ministry of Finance MOF, 2004-2019; Statista, 2019). (Statis ta, 2019) 
 
This relationship between the Saudi budgets and oil prices can also be interpreted from 
the correlation between the percentage change in the Saudi government budgets and the 
change in the average oil prices in the period from 2003 to 2018 (r=0.62), which is also 
indicating a positive association between the two (see Figure 5). Moreover, because the 
Saudi government sets its budgets based on the expected oil prices for the following year, 
an investigation with the expected oil prices is also important. However, due to the lack 
of data concerning the expected oil prices and the expected level of oil production that 
the Saudi government uses to set the following year budget (Jadwa, 2014), the expected 
growth in the Saudi oil industry was used instead. The data analysis implies a 0.63 
correlation between the change in the Saudi budgets and the expected growth of the Saudi 
oil industry. Once again, such a correlation indicates the significant role of oil prices in 
estimating the Saudi government budgets. A positive correlation was also found between 
the percentage change in the average oil prices and the expected growth of the oil industry 
in SA (r=0.85). This also indicates the high attention that the Saudi government pays to 
















































































Figure 5 The Change in the Saudi Budgets, Average Oil Prices and Saudi Oil 
Industry in the Past 16 Years 
 
Source: (Saudi Ministry of Finance MOF, 2004-2019; Statista, 2019). 
 
In addition, the data in Figure 6 shows another positive relationship between the 
difference between the actual and expected revenue and the difference between the actual 
and expected spending (r=0.46). The figures indicate fourteen periods when actual 
expenditures were higher than expected, and the same is true for revenue. However, in 
eleven periods, actual revenue exceeded actual expenditure, and in a very high absolute 
terms that accounts for more than double and in some periods treble the increases in the 
expenditure over what was expected. Indeed in 2008 the difference between the actual 






















Figure 6 The Difference between the Actual and Expected Revenue and Expenditure 
in the Past 15 Years 
 
Source: Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2004-2019). 
Note: The revenue and expenditure are in billions of US dollars. 
 
In fact, the correlation between the Saudi government budgets and the average oil prices 
influenced by the contrary trends in 2009, 2013 and 2014, which were significant 
following the financial crisis (2009), but at lower levels in 2013 and 2014 (see Figure 5). 
At the beginning of July 2008, oil prices decreased from $138 down to $35 per barrel by 
the end of December that year (see Figure 1). This lowered the Saudi government 
expectation for the growth of the oil industry in 2009, where they estimated a contraction 
around 7%. However, notwithstanding this expected contraction, the Saudi government 
announced that it would continue supporting the country’s development and increasing 
the attractiveness and trust in the Saudi economy (MOF, 2009). On these bases, the Saudi 
government increased spending that year and at even faster rate than in 2008 (see Figure 
4 and 5). The reality is that oil prices started rebounding from $35 per barrel at the end of 
December 2008 to exceed $80 per barrel by the end of December 2009, these upward 
trends brought in actual revenue exceeding what was expected. This, in addition to the 











double what was spent that year) (MOF, 2009), also encouraged the Saudi government to 
increase spending as shown in Figures 5. In 2013, the Saudi government also increased 
spending even though average oil price decreased compared to 2012. The reasons for this 
were; i) the decrease in the average oil price was at very low percentage (3.3%), ii) the 
average oil price was still very high that year ($106 per barrel), iii) the government 
achieved actual revenue that exceeded expectations, and this was 72.5% higher than what 
was actually spent, iv) the government reported high surpluses in the previous years (the 
surplus in 2012 accounted for 45.3% of what was spent that year) (MOF, 2013). In 2014, 
given the steep fall in oil prices that started in July and continued to the next year, the 
average oil price was high that year ($96 per barrel). This along with the high surplus in 
2013 (surplus accounted for 22.2% of what was spent in 2013), encouraged the Saudi 
government to increase spending (MOF, 2014). 
This previous analysis shows that oil prices play a significant role in deciding how much 
the Saudi government will spend every year. The high reliance on such a source of 
funding could be sustainable when prices are high. Otherwise (i.e. in 2009 and since 
2012), the government spending could experience contractions as was the situation in 
2015 and 2016. Therefore, the Saudi government should look for different funding 
methods and budgeting approaches to ensure sustainable funding for the country. 
2.4.3 Budgeting Approaches 
In light of the Saudi budgetary process that was discussed earlier, it seems that the Saudi 
government uses the bottom up and incremental approaches to allocate its budgets. 
Bottom up (micro-budgeting) includes lower and sometimes middle level choices on 
budgets, and this is when departments make financial requests to the ministry which in 
turn compile requests and send them to the MOF (Guess and LeLoup, 2010). The use of 
this approach appears in the Saudi budgetary system when the departments and branches 




submit them to the top authority within the ministry or governmental organisation which 
in turn send them to the Saudi Ministry of Finance for negotiation (Eid, 2015). The 
incremental approach as was defined by Guragain et al (2019) and Birkland (2015) is 
when the structure of the country’s budget is primarily determined based on previous 
spending instead of being based on a comprehensive analyses (Guragain et al., 2019, 
Birkland, 2015). This appears in the Saudi budgetary system when the Saudi MOF 
negotiates the proposed budgets by ministries and governmental organisations based on 
last year’s final account report. Such approaches are not unique to SA. Therefore, in line 
with these approaches and in order to attain better budgetary system for SA, researchers 
suggest two reforms; i) replacing the bottom up approach by a top down approach, and 
ii) replacing the incremental approach by a value for money approach. In addition, both 
of these reforms must be on a basis of a macroeconomic framework (Ljungman, 2009, 
Joharji et al., 2014). In regard to the first reform, the top down approach (macro-
budgeting) includes choices on broad bases, and that is when the high authority (MOF) 
outlines a macroeconomic framework that includes economic growth, unemployment, 
fiscal balance, balance of payment, inflation, exchange rate and other economic variables, 
upon which ministries build their budget proposals (Guess and LeLoup, 2010). On these 
bases, the MOF should prepare projections and guidelines for ministries and 
governmental organisations in order to instruct them on how to prepare their budget 
proposals in a way that will be consistent with macro objectives. Joharji et al (2014) 
denounced the absence of cooperation between the Saudi MOF and the Ministry of 
Economy and Planning. The latter prepares the country’s five-year development plans 
that include forecasts and targets for certain macroeconomic aspects, sectoral 
developments and expenditure. Therefore, researchers have emphasised the need to 
involve these medium-term development plans in the MOF’s budgetary process and to 




Researchers have also suggested that the MOF should establish a macroeconomic unit in 
the general budgeting department whose main duty should be to conduct forecasts of 
relevant macroeconomic variables (Joharji et al., 2014). In terms of the value for money 
approach, this concerns maximising the impact of the outlined programmes in the 
proposed budget through increasing the understanding of what is driving costs to ensure 
optimal resource allocation and to achieve the intended outcomes. The current budgetary 
system in SA focuses on inputs and dismisses outputs (Joharji et al., 2014). The reality is 
that the ministries and governmental organisations do not identify their programmes’ 
targets and outputs in their budgetary proposals. For instance, Joharji et al (2014) argued 
that the MOF negotiates capital expenditure on a project basis without any details on the 
economic classification for capital expenditure. In addition, researchers have emphasised 
the need for a value for money approach for the Saudi budgetary system, that shifts the 
focus from an approach that pays attention only to inputs, to a one that focuses on output. 
They have also emphasised the importance of identifying the targets of each programme 
along with the funds requested by each ministry and governmental organisation, such as 
reducing unemployment, creating better health or better education. They also have to 
develop measures of the effectiveness of their programmes to decide whether or not the 
development results justify the costs (Joharji et al., 2014).  
Budgetary reforms are easier to be adopted when fiscal pressures are small. The reality is 
that the current financial situation in SA is better than the previous four years (since 2015) 
insofar as the level of deficit has decreased significantly. Therefore, now would be a good 






 Response to the Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis, which started in 2007, caused many economies to slow and to report 
contractions, including European countries where a severe fiscal pressure was 
experienced (Loughnane et al., 2019). For example, the GDP of the European Union in 
2009 reported the sharpest decrease in its history (-4.3%) (Thomas et al., 2013). 
Therefore, many countries required to obtain bailouts from international financial 
authorities to manage their spending and debt (Thomas et al., 2013). In addition, countries 
in Europe either by order from the international financial authorities (i.e. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission, and European Central Bank - known as 
the Troika) or their own volition adopted austerity policies in response to the financial 
crisis (Loughnane et al., 2019). 
This section investigates the impact of the global financial crisis on different countries 
and their responses. The experiences were brought from countries that obtained bailouts 
(including developed and developing countries according to the IMF) and those which 
did not (including developed and developing countries) to better understand the response 
of economies with different characteristics. Evidence was also obtained from countries 
that received the highest bailout, countries that had the deepest decrease in the GDP and 
those which reported the sharpest decline in government spending on healthcare. 
Moreover, this section will discuss the shocks that happened for each country, how each 
country responded to these shocks including the reforms and austerity measures intended 
to be applied, what measures each country implemented, how such implementation 
affected the government level of spending (particularly in the healthcare field) and how 
the government responded to compensate for these decreases. It should be noted that some 
of the responses to austerity have been unwound in some countries, but the purpose of 




Among 53 WHO Europe countries, Ireland had the greatest decrease in healthcare 
spending in the years after the crisis (Burke et al., 2014a). Due to the overreliance on the 
construction sector in Ireland which caused a bubble in the market, the construction sector 
collapsed, which then led to an increase in credit defaults in the banks’ loans and 
difficulties in funding (O'Sullivan et al., 2010). This beside the effect of other countries’ 
economic downturns caused  the Irish economy to contract by more than 10% between 
2008 and 2010, and the public debt to increase from 25% of GDP in 2005 to more than 
100% in 2010 (Thomas et al., 2012). Also the unemployment rate more than trebled 
between 2008 and 2014 (from 4% to 12.3%) (Burke et al., 2014a). Therefore, Ireland 
entered into an international bailout worth €85 billion from the Troika in the period from 
2010 until the beginning of 2014 (Burke et al., 2014a, Loughnane et al., 2019). 
Public spending on healthcare in Ireland increased from €3.6 billion in 1998 to more than 
€16 billion in 2008. In 2005, more than three quarters of the overall healthcare financing 
came from general taxation. However, as a result of the financial crisis, tax revenues 
decreased significantly in 2008 and 2009. As part of the response, austerity measures 
were adopted in the healthcare sector targeting cost containment and better allocation of 
resources (Thomas and Burke, 2012), also increasing taxation and user charges and 
reduction in employment, operational costs and capital investment. Therefore, the public 
healthcare budget was cut by 17% between 2010 and 2012 (Thomas et al., 2012). 
Loughnane et al (2019) compared the mean expenditure changes of healthcare pre (2004-
2009) to post (2010-2015) the financial crises among seven EU countries which received 
bailouts from international financial authorities. The study indicated that the mean of Irish 
government spending on healthcare as a percentage of the total government expenditure 
decreased 22.57% after the financial crisis relative to pre the financial crisis (2010-2015 
compared with 2005-2009 respectively) and the mean of government spending on 




investigation also found that these reductions in public healthcare spending were the 
highest among bailout countries. Moreover, it was found that the private healthcare 
spending as a percentage of total spending on healthcare increased to almost a third 
(31%). Consequently, the distribution of the burden of paying for healthcare shifted from 
the government onto individuals and this was also the highest among the bailout countries 
(Loughnane et al., 2019). The same findings was also highlighted by Burke et al (2014) 
who stated that the system transformed healthcare costs from the government onto people 
(Burke et al., 2014a). Such a decline in government healthcare spending caused a 
reduction in the breadth and depth of healthcare provided in the public system (Burke et 
al., 2014a, Burke et al., 2016), and unmet healthcare needs due to people having more 
limited access (Connolly and Wren, 2017).  
In terms of employment and operational costs, after the financial crisis, there was a policy 
trend targeting the recruitment and salaries of healthcare employees, and administrative, 
management and advertising costs (Thomas and Burke, 2012). Recruitment and 
promotions were suspended in 2009 and staff on leave and those with expiring temporary 
contracts were not replaced (Thomas and Burke, 2012). There was also significant budget 
reductions attained through reducing the number of employees and cutting public sector 
wages; for example, in the period from December 2008 to December 2010, the number 
of general and support staff was reduced 9.6%, nurses 4.2% and management and admin 
staff were reduced 3.7% (Thomas et al., 2013). Moreover, in 2010, the healthcare budget 
introduced lower fees for GPs and other healthcare professionals to make an estimated 
saving of €659 million, and in 2011, voluntary redundancies and early retirement were 
proposed (Thomas and Burke, 2012). Moreover, in 2013, the number of Health Service 
Executive employees was reduced by more than 12,000 compared to 2007 (Burke et al., 
2014a, Thomas et al., 2014), also a new (lower) salary scale for new entrants was 




In relation to taxation and user charges, in May 2009, the health levy in Ireland was 
doubled to 4% on all earnings up to €75,036 and to 5% for those receiving higher than 
this amount (Callan et al., 2010, Thomas and Burke, 2012). Moreover, in the same year, 
tax relief on hospitals and nursing homes ended (Thomas et al., 2013). The entitlement to 
Medical Cards18 was also reduced in 2009, where more than 12,000 from those who are 
wealthy and aged over 70 years lost their entitlements, and automatic free healthcare for 
people older than 70 years was stopped. In addition, people experienced delays in 
obtaining and renewing their medical cards in 2011 and this was attributed to cost saving 
tactics (Thomas and Burke, 2012, Thomas et al., 2014). In addition, in 2010, a 50 cent 
charge per prescription (up to a maximum of €10 a month per family) was introduced for 
all medical card holders (Thomas and Burke, 2012), this was increased to €1.50 in 2013 
(capped at €19.50 a month per family), and then to €2.50 in 2014 (capped at €25 a month 
per family) (Maresso et al., 2015, MGI, 2013). In 2009, co-payments for public beds 
increased from €66 to €75 for two thirds of the population who do not have medical cards 
(Maresso et al., 2015). The charges of emergency departments in hospitals increased from 
€66 to €100 in 2009 and it has stayed at this level ever since, and the deductibles for the 
Drugs Payment Scheme which reimburses those without medical cards for drugs’ costs 
over a certain amount also increased (Maresso et al., 2015). In 2010, the drugs 
reimbursement threshold increased to €120 a month comparing to €100 in 2009, and 
increased to €132 in 2012 (Thomas and Burke, 2012, Thomas et al., 2013), and then to 
€144 in 2013 (Maresso et al., 2015). According to Burke (2015), Irish people paid nearly 
€600 million more for drugs and hospitals charges in 2014 than they paid in 2007, and 
the majority of these costs increases were introduced pre 2011 (Burke, 2015). Thomas et 
                                               
18 A Medical Card enables those receiving incomes under certain thresholds and most people over 70 years 
to access General Practitioners and hospitals (It’s actually a wider set of services than just these.) without 
charge and medicines at a low cost BURKE, S. A., NORMAND, C., BARRY, S. & THOMAS, S. J. H. P. 
2016. From universal health insurance to universal healthcare? The shifting health policy landscape in 




al (2014) stated that through the austerity period, user charges increased at various levels 
of healthcare in Ireland even for those holding medical cards, and eligibility for subsidies 
has been decreasing19 (Thomas et al., 2014). 
As a result of the continuous austerity measures in the Irish public healthcare system, 
evident in the reduction of employees, closed wards, fewer public hospital beds (which 
decreased by 941 in 2012 compared to 2008 (Burke et al., 2014a)), and the reduction in 
capital spending, which decreased 26% in 2009 (Thomas et al., 2013), the treatment 
waiting period increased and the provided home care services decreased (Burke et al., 
2014b). According to Burke et al (2014 a), the treatment waiting period from 0-3 months, 
3-6 months and from 6-12 months increased in 2013 comparing to 2012 and trebled for 
those waiting over 12 months (Burke et al., 2014a). The researchers added that the 
government targeted eight months as a maximum waiting period for treatment to begin 
by the end of 2013; however, the waiting period for 4,350 patients exceeded eight months 
in March 2014. For home care, the number of hours provided increased between 2006 
and 2008 and then decreased steadily, where the number of hours provided in 2013 
declined to less than nine million compared to eleven million hours in 2006 (Burke et al., 
2014a). 
The Irish public healthcare system has endured radical resource cuts as a response to the 
financial crisis. While the system has reduced the breadth and depth of coverage, this may 
preserve the functioning of the healthcare system in the short term. However, it does not 
consider the economic impact of employment reduction, which in turn may influence the 
proportion of collected tax in the future and the ability to fund the healthcare system 
(Thomas et al., 2013). Burke et al (2014) argued that such a cut in home care budgets and 
                                               
19 The Sláintecare report, which sets out a 10-year plan for the Irish health system, envisages reductions 
and removal of some of these charges BURKE, S., BARRY, S., SIERSBAEK, R., JOHNSTON, B., 
FHALLÚIN, M. N. & THOMAS, S. J. H. P. 2018. Sláintecare–A ten-year plan to achieve universal 




increasing user charges are short term measures, but it may end up putting more pressure 
on the healthcare system in the long term when people turn up in hospitals due to the 
absence of support and not receiving the healthcare they need (Burke et al., 2014b). 
Greece is one of the European countries that was severely affected by the global financial 
crisis (Fragkoulis, 2012). The country’s GDP declined 22.1% in the period from 2009 to 
2012 (Maresso et al., 2015), and the government deficits remained at percentages over 
9% of the GDP since 2008. In addition, the government debt rose to more than 170% in 
2011 as a share of GDP compared to 113% in 2008, and the unemployment rate jumped 
to 24.3% in 2012 from 7.7% in 2008 (Economou et al., 2015). As a result, the credit rating 
agencies repeatedly downgraded the country’s economy, which increased the cost of 
borrowing, where the interest on the government 10 years bonds increased from 5.8% in 
2009 to 12.1% in 2010 (Economou et al., 2015). These continued shocks required the 
country to obtain financial assistance from the international authorities. 
In May 2010, the Troika agreed to secure a rescue package of loans to Greece worth €110 
billion and a further package worth €109 billion was approved in July that year in return 
for adapting harsh austerity measures (Houston et al., 2011). The country received in total 
three bailouts amounting to €336 billion (Syrrakos, 2018), and these were received in the 
period between 2010 and 2016 (Loughnane et al., 2019). Within the bailout period, 
Greece was set under the supervision of Troika as part of the deal (the signed 
memorandum of understanding). This deal included a series of measures focusing on the 
reduction of public expenditure and also included measures targeted at reducing public 
healthcare expenditure (Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012, Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 2011).  
As a response to the austerity measures, within 12 months starting in May 2010, public 
sector wages were reduced 15% and the public and private pensions by 10%. There was 
also a 10% reduction in public sector employees with a total of 80,000 made redundant 




conditions which emphasised a reduction in public spending on healthcare to 6% of GDP 
(Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 2011, Karidis et al., 2011), the Ministry of Health 
performed a series of hospital closures and mergers since 2011 (10 hospitals out of 133 
were merged) (Kaitelidou et al., 2012, Houston et al., 2011), and employed a centralised 
purchaser to enhance the purchasing negotiation power on medical procurements in order 
to reduce the cost of supply (Fragkoulis, 2012, Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 2011). 
There was also an orientation to eliminate unnecessary treatments through enhancing the 
use of computerised systems, such as e-prescription, which became compulsory from the 
beginning of 2012, to comprise at least 90% of the medical activities including drugs, 
diagnostics, surgeries and referrals, so as to increase control over expenditure and to 
monitor physicians’ behaviour (Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012, Fragkoulis, 2012). The 
memorandum of understanding also aimed to make more cuts on pharmaceutical products 
and set a target to reduce spending on these to 1% of GDP in 2014 from 2.2% in 2009 
(Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012, Maresso et al., 2015). In 2011 and 2012, there was a high 
focus on generic drugs being provided in public facilities at prices not exceeding 40% of 
the equivalent branded drugs (Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012). In terms of salaries and related 
benefits, they were reduced by €568 million in 2011 and hospitals’ operating costs by 
€840 million (Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012). There was also a reduction in public 
pharmaceutical expenditure from €5.2 billion in 2009 to €2.9 billion in 2012 (Kaitelidou 
and Kouli, 2012, Economou et al., 2015), and spending on mental health was reduced 
45% in 2011 (Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 2011). According to Loughnane et al (2019) 
the mean of government healthcare expenditure as a percentage of total government 
expenditure was 7% lower for the period 2010-2015 than for 2005-2009 (Loughnane et 
al., 2019).  
In terms of the contribution to SHI, in 2011, the state (employer) contribution rate to the 




pensioners contribution rate was increased gradually from 2.55% to 4% in 2013 
(Economou et al., 2015). Moreover, to increase revenues, user charges were introduced 
and increased in different healthcare services and products. In 2011, there was an increase 
to outpatient department charges in public hospitals and health centres from €3 to €5 
(Thomson et al., 2015). There was also an increase up to 10% of user charge for drugs in 
2011 on different types of diseases (i.e. Alzheimers, dementia, epilepsy, angiopathy, 
diabetes type 2 and Charcot’s disease), up to 25% on pulmonary hypertension, and an 
increase from 10% to 25% on 14 types of diseases (coronary heart disease, 
hyperlipidemia, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriatic arthritis, lupus, vasculitis, spondylarthritis, 
scleroderma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, pituitary adenomas, osteoporosis, 
paget’s disease, Crohn’s disease and cirrhosis) (Economou et al., 2015). In 2014, the 
government imposed a €25 co-payment on admission to public hospitals and an extra €1 
for each prescription issued under the national health services. However, the €25 co-
payment on hospital admission was then revoked later in 2014 (Economou et al., 2015, 
Maresso et al., 2015) 
The increase in the unemployment rate in Greece decreased households’ incomes which 
in turn led more patients to seek healthcare in public facilities instead of paying privately. 
According to the WHO, the the private spending on healthcare in Greece was 42% as a 
percentage of total spending on healthcare in 2008, and in the period from 2009 to 2012 
kept at percentages between 31% to 34% (WHO, 2019). This, alongside the reduced 
employers and employees’ contributions to SHI (because of higher unemployment) put 
more pressure on the public healthcare system, which was already overloaded (Kaitelidou 
and Kouli, 2012). Moreover, the radical cuts in public healthcare budgets has reduced 
people’s access to healthcare, increased their waiting periods for treatment and negatively 
affected the quality of healthcare services provided (Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012). 




has led to a significant shortage in surgical supply all over the country and exsasberated 
suppliers’ refusal to supply to public hospitals due to their defaults in paying their 
accumulated debt (Karidis et al., 2011).  
In the Netherlands, due to the global economic slowdown and the banks’ tightened 
lending criteria as a result of the housing market collapse, Dutch exports decreased from 
76% of GDP in 2008 to 69% in 2009 leading employers to reduce the working hours of 
their employees and to focus on the part-time recruitments with the idea to employ them 
full-time again when the economic situation improved. Subsequently, the unemployment 
rate doubled in 2012 compared to 2008 (6.4% in 2012 versus 3.1% in 2008) (Priemus and 
Environment, 2013, Linssen et al., 2018, Maresso et al., 2015). This decreased people’s 
disposal income and weakened their level of consumption, which in turn decreased the 
country’s imports from 68% of GDP in 2008 to 62% in 2009 (Maresso et al., 2015). 
Consequently, the country’s GDP contracted in the fourth quarter of 2008 and this trend 
continued until the end of 2009 to report 3.9% contraction that year (Priemus and 
Environment, 2013, Maresso et al., 2015). In addition, the government plans to support 
businesses and the financial sector by capital injections led to a rapid increase in public 
spending and a substantial increase in the public deficit, which increased more than 
eleven-fold in 2010 compared to 2008 as a share of the GDP (5.6% of GDP in 2010 
compared to 0.5% in 2008) (Maresso et al., 2015, Linssen et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
government debt increased from 54.5% of the GDP in 2006 to 82.7% in 2012. These 
negative economic trends encouraged the Dutch government to introduce more austerity 
measures to lessen the effect of the financial crisis and to stimulate the economy (Priemus 
and Environment, 2013). 
These measures included cuts to government spending and stabilisation of salaries in the 
public sector with a main aim to reduce the public deficit and debt by 2015. In 2012, the 




and introduced a tax called the crisis levy at 16% on incomes over €150,000 per year 
(Economics, 2019d, KPMG, 2017). These measures also targeted the healthcare sector at 
different levels; for example, there were some plans to reduce spending on acute care in 
2008 and long-term care in 2010 (Maresso et al., 2015). In addition, the government 
introduced a deductible of €150 per year in 2008 on different healthcare services and 
pharmaceuticals, which then increased gradually year on year to reach €350 in 2013. In 
2009, more measures were applied to reduce the government healthcare coverage and to 
eliminate improper healthcare consumption. In 2010, the Ministry of Health implemented 
an agreement with the Association of Medical Specialists and the National Hospital 
Association to introduce a budget cap for medical specialists so as not to increase by more 
than 2.5% per year in the period between 2012 and 2015. In 2011, the government 
implemented a plan to decrease healthcare allowances gradually in the period between 
2011 and 2040, and implemented further measures to contain costs in the areas of acute 
care and long-term care (Janssen et al., 2016). In the period from 2009 to 2012, there were 
continuous measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure. In 2012, additional measures 
to shift more healthcare costs from public to private sources were introduced with the 
patient bearing more costs, and to reduce overspending on primary and specialized care 
through making healthcare providers more responsible for overspending (Maresso et al., 
2015). In that year also, there was an introduction of a co-payment between €100 and 
€200 per treatment for the secondary mental healthcare, an increase in primary mental 
healthcare co-payment from €10 to €20 per session and an increase of the co-payment for 
the stay in mental healthcare hospitals of €145 per month. In 2013, the government started 
taking into account the assets above €100,000 when considering eligibility for healthcare 
allowance, and in the same year, 8% of taxable assets was included in the calculation of 




As a result of these radical measures, the reduction in medical specialists’ tariff 
(compensation and support for medical specialists) reduced the medical specialists’ care 
budget by 10% in 2008 (€175 million), 24% in 2009 (€375 million), and 28% in 2010 
(€479 million) (Maresso et al., 2015). In addition, hospitals’ budgets decreased by €160 
million in 2008, and the GPs were encouraged to prescribe generic drugs, which reduced 
the pharmaceutical budget by 6% in 2010 (€130 million), also in that year, there was 3% 
reduction in the mental healthcare budget (€119 million). In 2011, the reduction in 
pharmacists’ tariff measure reduced the pharmaceutical budget by 1% (€74 million), 
reducing tariff measure for hospitals reduced the hospitals’ budget by 2% (€316 million) 
and reducing the tariff measure for medical specialists reduced medical specialists’ 
budget by 33% (€606 million). In 2012, reducing the tariff measure for GPs reduced their 
budget by 5% (€98 million) and there was 6% reduction in the mental healthcare budget 
(€222 million) (Maresso et al., 2015). According to the WHO data, the Dutch government 
spending on healthcare as a percentage of the total government spending in the period 
from 2008 to 2011 was less than the spending in 2007 or 2011 (18.1% in 2007 vs 17.8% 
in 2008, 17.5% in 2009, 17.8% in 2010 and 18.4% in 2011) (WHO, 2019). 
The Portuguese economy experienced low economic growth and imbalances prior to 
2008 and the situation was exacerbated since the onset of the global financial crisis. The 
continuous public deficit and high level of debt beside the low government credit caused 
instability in the economy and put the government under pressure (Sakellarides et al., 
2014a). The country’s GDP decreased by about 3% in 2009 and the government deficit 
increased from 3.7% in 2008 to 10.2% in 2009 as a percentage of GDP. Moreover, the 
public debt increased from 75.5% of GDP in 2007 to 127.9% in 2012, and the 
unemployment rate more than doubled in 2012 compared to 2008 (15.9% vs 7.7%). These 
indicators led to a downgrading of the Portuguese economy credit rating, where the 




Such continuous negative trends and the high borrowing costs required the Portuguese 
government to obtain a bailout from international authorities. 
In May 2011, the Portuguese government signed a memorandum of understanding with 
the Troika to receive a loan worth €78 billion in the period from 2012 to 2014, with a 
condition of adopting austerity measures covering this period (Sakellarides et al., 2014a, 
Loughnane et al., 2019). These measures included a reduction in government expenditure 
and increases in taxation in order to reduce the government deficit and stabilise the 
economy. In addition, the deal included requirements to control spending on healthcare, 
and specifically the pharmaceutical sector with a target to decrease spending on drugs 
from 1.34% of GDP in 2011 to 1.25% in 2012 and to 1% in 2013. Further reductions were 
also required in hospitals’ operational costs and primary and ambulatory care (Pita 
Barros, 2012). The memorandum emphasised the use of generic drugs, the 
implementation of an international reference pricing system to define the maximum 
market price, and the establishment of a mandatory e-prescription system to control 
spending on healthcare and to monitor physicians’ prescribing patterns (Pita Barros, 
2012). 
According to Loughnane et al (2019), the mean of government spending on healthcare as 
a percentage of total government expenditure in the period 2010-2015 compared to the 
period 2005-2009 decreased 12.1% and the government spending on healthcare as a 
percentage of total spending on healthcare decreased by 4% over the same period. The 
researchers added that the mean changes of the private spending on healthcare as a 
percentage of the total spending on healthcare for the same two periods (pre and post the 
crises) increased nearly 9%. Therefore, the researchers suggested that the burden 
distribution of healthcare costs shifted from the Portuguese government to individuals 




decreased 11.4% in the ambulatory sector and 1.1% in hospitals in 2012 compared to 
2011 (Sakellarides et al., 2014a). 
Between 2011 and 2013, the government increased user charges on many healthcare 
services; for example, user charges on visits to specialists in primary and ambulatory care 
increased 68.5% (from €4.60 in 2011 to €7.75 in 2013), the charges for primary healthcare 
consultations increased 122.2% (from €2.25 to €5.00), and for urgent attendances in 
health centres they increased 171% (from €3.8 to €10.30). In hospitals, the charges for 
type 1 emergency visit increased 114.6% (€9.60 to €20.60), type 2 by 74.4% (from €8.60 
to €15.00), type 3 by 103.5% (from €8.60 to €17.50), and since January 2013, all hospitals 
user charges increased 2.8% (Sakellarides et al., 2014a). In addition to these, the 
government reviewed the exemptions from user charges of many groups of people (based 
on the economic status, i.e. household income and  number of dependents), the maximum 
price of generic drugs was set at 60% of the branded products, and a centralised 
procurement system for medical supply was implemented to decrease costs and fight 
waste. Moreover, the spending on private providers who provide diagnostic and 
therapeutic services to the national health services was reduced 10% by the end of 2011 
and another 10% by the end of 2012 through centralising the procurement of medical 
goods in the national health services, and hospitals’ operational costs were reduced, 
including a reduction in the management staff in 2012 and spending on overtime was 
reduced 10% that year and by another 10% in 2013 (Sakellarides et al., 2014a). 
The wide increase in user charges caused decreases in the number of people accessing 
healthcare, and the trend has continued specifically for vulnerable groups. (Legido-
Quigley et al., 2016). According to a Portuguese study investigating the changes in health 
seeking behaviours, it was found that 15% of those surveyed did not take drugs and 9% 
did not seek a necessary medical consultation due to a lack of financial resources 




The Latvian economy was also one of the economies that were severely hit by the global 
financial crisis where the economy began to contract from the third quarter of 2008 to 
report a 26.5% contraction in 2009 and a further 9.2% in 2010 (WB, 2019c, Klyvienė and 
Rasmussen, 2010, Kentikelenis and Papanicolas, 2011). Moreover, the government 
deficit increased from 0.4% of GDP in 2007 to 10% in 2009 and the public debt 
quadrupled in 2009 relative to 2007 as a share of GDP (9% in 2007 vs 37% in 2009) then 
increased to higher percentages in the period from 2010 to 2012 (more than 42% in these 
three years). Consequently, the interest rate of the government 10 years bond increased 
to 18% in 2009 compared to 5.6% in 2007 (Mitenbergs et al., 2012a). These factors 
participated significantly in increasing the unemployment rate, which quadrupled in 2010 
compared to 2007 (22% vs 5%) (Economics, 2019e, Mitenbergs et al., 2012b). In 2008, 
the Latvian government sought financial assistance from international authorities to 
reduce the effect of these shocks and to retrieve economy stability (Maresso et al., 2015).  
In 2008, the EU, Scandinavian countries and the World Bank agreed to provide an 
assistance financial programme to the Latvian government amounting to €7.5 billion to 
be received from the end of 2008 until the beginning of 2013 (Maresso et al., 2015). This 
financial assistance was conditional on implementing austerity measures in the period 
from 2008 to 2013. The key feature of these measures included reducing the government 
expenditure with a view to keeping the budget deficit at levels below 5.0% of GDP in 
2009, 4.8% in 2010 and 2.8% in 2011 (which was not achieved in any of these years 
(Maresso et al., 2015)). The assistance programme also required increases in different 
types of taxation (i.e. personal income, VAT and social insurance).A reduction in the 
salaries and related benefits of the public sector employees was also required, and 
specifically to reduce the number of public administration employees at least 15% during 
2009 and 2010. The healthcare sector was also mentioned explicitly in the assistance 




agencies, reductions in staff numbers and rationalisation of publicly financed 
pharmaceuticals (Mitenbergs et al., 2012a, Maresso et al., 2015). 
As a response to these measures, the government increased the value added tax to 18% in 
2008 and to 21% in 2011, increased the personal income tax rate from 23% in 2009 to 
26% in 2010 and then reduced it to 25% in 2011, and the social insurance tax increased 
from 33.09% to 35.09% in 2011. Moreover, there was a trend to shift from hospital care 
to ambulatory care in 2009; so as to accelerate this transfer, the government reduced the 
number of hospitals that provide statutory impatient services from 72 to 43 in 2009 and 
then to 39 in 2012. Moreover, many healthcare agencies were closed in 2009 including 
the State Centre of Medical Professional Education, the State Agency of Health Statistics 
and Medical Technologies and the Public Health Agency, and in 2011, the government 
merged the Health Payment Centre with the Centre of Health Economics in one agency 
named the National Health Services. In addition, the number of healthcare employees was 
reduced 55%  before the end of 2009 (from 1,319 in January to 593 in October) 
(Mitenbergs et al., 2012a, Maresso et al., 2015). In that year also, the percentage of 
reimbursement for pharmaceuticals was reduced from 75% to 50% and from 90% to 75% 
for other diagnoses (Behmane and Innus, 2011). Previously, the National Health Services 
paid the same reference price for all drugs with similar chemical and therapeutic 
characteristics, where patients could choose any one and pay the difference between the 
reference price and the actual price of the chosen drug (if the drug was more expensive 
than the reference price) in addition to the regular drug co-payment. In 2012, the National 
Health Services introduced one drug (among the previous group of drugs with similar 
chemical and therapeutic characteristic) which is the cheapest one, and pharmacists have 
to prescribe this drug, where if a patient chose a different product, then he/she has to pay 




As a result of these reforms, public healthcare expenditure decreased almost 10% in 2009 
compared to 2008 (Mitenbergs et al., 2012a). In addition, the budget for public health (i.e. 
environmental health, health promotion and health statistics) was reduced nearly 25% in 
2009 relative to 2008. Moreover, the treatment of communicable diseases and infectious 
disease control budget was cut by 17% in 2009, and in the same year, the salaries of all 
healthcare employees was cut 20% (Maresso et al., 2015). Furthermore, the 
reimbursement budget for pharmaceuticals decreased by 7.1% in 2009 compared to 2008, 
where the average number of reimbursed prescriptions was 4.82 million in 2009 
compared to 4.89 million prescriptions in 2008 (Behmane and Innus, 2011). In addition, 
while inpatient services accounted for almost 50% of the Ministry of Health spending in 
2008, this percentage was reduced to 35% in 2011. According to Loughnane at al (2019), 
the mean of government healthcare expenditure as a percentage of the total government 
expenditure for the period 2010-2015 was 8.1% lower than in the period 2005-2009 
(Loughnane et al., 2019). 
In addition to the planned cuts in healthcare spending, the government increased VAT 
percentage in 2009 from 5% to 10% on products with a reduced tax rate such as 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and in 2011 VAT was increased to 12%. In 2009, 
the government also increased excise tax on tobacco and alcohol. Moreover, user charges 
increased between 2008 and 2009 on outpatient visits to GPs (from LVL0.5 to LVL1), 
outpatient visits to specialists (from LVL2 to LVL5), outpatient visits to hospitals (from 
LVL2 to LVL5), outpatient surgery (from LVL0.5 to LVL5), the daily inpatient charge 
in hospitals (from LVL5 to LVL12), and a co-payment of up to LVL30 was introduced 
in 2009 for inpatient surgical interventions. In addition, the cap for co-payments for one 
hospital episode increased from LVL80 in 2008 to LVL250 in 2009 and the maximum 
patient contribution for one year increased from LVL150 in 2008 to LVL400 in 2009 




The global financial crisis also affected the Italian economy, which had already 
deteriorated due to political and economic instability (Di Quirico, 2010). In 2009, the 
economy had a severe contraction in excess of 8.5% and continued to contract by a further 
2.7% in 2010, then increased 7.1% in 2011 and decreased again by nearly 9% in 2012 
(WB, 2019b, Pompili et al., 2014). In addition, the government debt increased more than 
20 percentage points in the period from 2008 to 2012 as a share of the GDP (102.4% in  
2008 compared to 123.3% in 2012) (Economics, 2019c), and the government deficits 
continued at levels higher than 3% of the GDP in the period from 2008 to 2012 where the 
highest was in 2009 (-5.2% of the GDP) (Maresso et al., 2015). Moreover, the interest 
rate on government 10-year bonds increased from 4.2% at the beginning of 2008 to nearly 
7% by the end of 2011 (Economics, 2019b). Furthermore, the unemployment rate 
increased from 6.2% in 2007 to 11% in 2012, and the number of working hours decreased, 
and made the private sector focus on the part-time recruitment. Such shocks reduced 
people’s disposable income and increased the proportion of poor families, which in turn 
led to lower purchasing power and a reduction in personal consumption (Pompili et al., 
2014). 
As a response to these continuous shocks, a range of austerity measures were introduced 
by the government to alleviate the effect of the financial crisis, to support the economy 
and to manage the widening public debt. These measures targeted cuts to public 
expenditure with more concentration on public sector manpower, such as reducing 
employees’ salaries and related benefits and limiting recruitment (Di Quirico, 2010, 
Turone, 2015, Ferré et al., 2014). These measures also targeted the healthcare sector; for 
example, the government undertook an urgent decrease in the 2009 healthcare budget as 
a response to the crisis and introduced policies to improve the regions’ accountability in 
containing healthcare costs. Moreover, the measures included spending reductions on 




retirement in 2008), also spending containment on medical supply purchases including 
pharmaceuticals (Ferré et al., 2014). In 2010, there was a focus from the government on 
the regions with the highest debt to implement the spending containment plans earlier 
than the other regions (De Belvis et al., 2012). In addition, the spending review of the 
government budget in 2012 included cuts to hospitals’ budgets and the government 
mandated public hospitals to order their purchases through the National Purchasing 
Agency for Medical Goods and Services (Ferré et al., 2014, Maresso et al., 2015). In 
2012, there was also a trend to reduce the hospitalisation rate from 180 per 1000 
inhabitants to 160 and to reduce hospitals’ admissions and the average length of stay 
(Maresso et al., 2015). In 2013, the budget of medical devices was capped at 4.8% of the 
national health services spending, and then was lowered to 4.4% in 2014. (Ferré et al., 
2014).  
As a result of these reductions to public healthcare expenditure, there was a cut of €1 
billion from the investment in hospitals’ buildings in 2010, and the number of hospital 
beds was reduced from 4 per 1000 inhabitants to 3.7 in 2012. In addition, the spending 
on healthcare salaries for 2013 and 2014 was reduced by 1.4% relative to 2004, and 
spending on medical devices decreased €22 million in 2013 and €30 million in 2014. The 
government also cut central transfers to regions for disability, childhood, migrants and 
other welfare policies, which then needed to be compensated primarily by increasing co-
payments and through saving (Ferré et al., 2014). According to the WHO data, the Italian 
government spending on healthcare in 2012 was reduced to 76% of total healthcare 
spending compared to 78% in 2009, and as a percentage of the total government 
expenditure decreased from 14% in 2009 to 13% in 2012 (WHO, 2019). To compensate 
the aforementioned cuts in healthcare spending and to ensure the sustainability of the 
healthcare services, the Italian government introduced co-payments for public and private 




visits of patients aged over 14 to emergency departments that are deemed non-urgent 
(Maresso et al., 2015, Ferré et al., 2014, De Belvis et al., 2012, Houston et al., 2011). 
Hungary was one of the EU counties that was severely hit by the global financial crisis, 
where the economic growth fell from 3.2% in 2005 to 0.8% in 2008 and then to -6.7% in 
2009 to represent the deepest recession in Hungary since the 1980s. In 2011, government 
debt reached 102% of GDP compared to 72.3% in 2008, and the government deficit 
exceeded 4% in 2011 (Mihalyi, 2012, Gaal, 2011). In addition, the Hungarian Forint 
depreciated 30% against the major currencies in March 2009 and the unemployment rate 
increased from 7.8% in 2008 to 10% in 2009 and then to 12% in 2012 (Gaal, 2011, Uzzoli, 
2011). The credit rating of the Hungarian economy was downgraded, where the interest 
rate on the government 10-year bonds increased from about 7% by the end of December 
2008 to nearly 12% in March 2009 (Thomson et al., 2014). Such negative indicators made 
Hungary one of the first countries seeking for assistance from international authorities. In 
the second half of 2008, Hungary signed a memorandum of understanding to obtain a 
loan from the International Monetary Fund, the EU and the World Bank worth €20 billion, 
to be received in 2010 to avert economic collapse (Mihalyi, 2012, Gaal, 2011). The deal 
was conditional on adopting harsh austerity measures including tax increases (increasing 
value added tax from 20% to 25% and other tax increases), cuts to pension and welfare 
benefits, increasing retirement age, reducing public transport and energy subsidies, 
reducing the budget deficit and cuts to healthcare costs comprising reduced capital 
expenditure, emphasising the use of generic drugs and employing software to help select 
the least costly therapy by physicians (Gaal, 2011).  
According to Loughnane et al (2019), the mean of government spending on healthcare as 
a percentage of total government expenditure was 5% lower in the period 2010-2015 
compared to the period 2005-2009, and the mean of government spending on healthcare 




The researchers also found that the mean changes of the private spending on healthcare 
as a percentage of the total spending on healthcare for the same two periods (2010-2015 
compared to 2004-2009) increased nearlly 11%. The researhers added that such decreases 
in public spending and the increase in private spending on healthcare suggest that the 
burden of healthcare costs shifted from the government onto individuals (Loughnane et 
al., 2019).  
The Hungarian public healthcare system implemented various changes in line with the 
austerity measures. For example, the employers’ share of contribution to social health 
insurance was reduced from 5% in 2008 to 2% in 2011 and the employees’ share was 
increased from 6% to 7%, also the base for the proportional healthcare tax levied on non-
wage-related income was widened in 2011 (Mihalyi, 2012, Maresso et al., 2015, Szigeti 
et al., 2019). Moreover, a new tax for health was levied in 2011 on food products 
including high salt, sugar or carbohydrates, also a new tax for health was levied on 
statutory car insurance premiums in 2012. In the same year, there was a 20% increase in 
the SHI revenue from taxation on drug company turnover on covered products, and the 
number of short-term care beds was reduced by 5% (around 2500 beds) (Thomson et al., 
2015). 
Romania was also among the countries that faced serious economic downturns, where 
economic growth had a significant drop as a result of the global financial crises to contract 
by more than 6.5% in 2009 and another 1.1% in 2010 (Carausu et al., 2017, Suciu et al., 
2012). The government deficit as a percentage of the GDP trebled in 2009 compared to 
2005 (9% and 3%, respectively). In addition, public debt increased from 34.6% of GDP 
in 2010 to 41.5% in 2013, and the interest rate of government 10-year bonds increased 
from 7.5% in 2008 to 10% in 2010 (Vlădescu et al., 2016, Maresso et al., 2015). The fall 
in the real estate and the financial market in general extended the effect to contractions in 




unemployment rate to 8.5% in 2010 from 7.2% in 2005 (Suciu et al., 2012, Vlădescu et 
al., 2016). There was an attempt from the Romanian government to implement some 
budgetary reforms to alleviate the effect of the financial crisis; however, they were not 
enough to face the economic pressure. Therefore, the government found that it was 
necessary to obtain financial assistance from the international authorities (Carausu et al., 
2017). 
In 2010, the Romanian government signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
IMF, the European Commission and the World Bank to attain financial assistance 
packages worth €20 billion in 2010, 2011 and in 2013 (Loughnane et al., 2019, Thomson 
et al., 2015). The deal was conditional on adopting austerity measures in order to lower 
the crisis effects and to stimulate the economy. The conditions included increasing 
taxation and lowering capital investment and operational costs. Particularly in healthcare, 
the measures required decreases in healthcare expenditure and eliminating unnecessary 
spending through adopting better procurement systems, more focus on generic drugs, and 
implementing an electronic monitoring system (Thomson et al., 2015). 
The salary reductions in Romania were one of the highest in the EU countries (Carausu 
et al., 2017). In 2010, across all public sectors, recruitment was frozen including 
healthcare, where salaries of physicians and other hospital personnel were reduced 25%. 
One year later, 111 hospitals were merged, another 69 hospitals converted to nursing 
homes, and the hospitalisation period was decreased for some diseases (Maresso et al., 
2015, Carausu et al., 2017, Chiriac, 2011). In 2012, a plan to build eight hospitals was 
cancelled and purchasing of equipment was reduced. In 2013, there was an order from 
the Ministry of Health to reduce the number of beds that are funded by the Health 
Insurance Fund by 2% (from 125,639 to 123,127) (Thomson et al., 2015). 
In 2009, healthcare expenditure in Romania was 5.6% of GDP compared to nearly 9% 




fund for medicines in 2009 by nearly 30% comparing to 2008 (RON 2.18 billion in 2009). 
Moreover, as a result of the continuous reduction in employees’ salaries and the increases 
in the unemployment rate, the social health insurance which covers the majority of the 
healthcare in Romania was underfunded and reported continuous deficits in the period 
from 2008 to 2010 to represent 1% of the GDP (Carausu et al., 2017). These deficits were 
then covered by transfers from the government general budget which accounted for a 
quarter the total healthcare budget in 2010 (Vlădescu et al., 2016). Moreover, in 2009, 
the family medicine budget was 24% lower than 2008 and spending on hospitals 
decreased more than 10% in 2010 compared to 2009 which resulted from hospital mergers 
(Carausu et al., 2017). According to Loughnane et al (2019), the mean of government 
spending on healthcare as a percentage of the total spending on healthcare for the period 
from 2010-2015 compared to 2004-2009 was almost flat (up 0.7%) (Loughnane et al., 
2019). 
In line with the austerity measures and to alleviate the financial pressure on the healthcare 
system, the Romanian government reduced the exemptions from the social health 
insurance contribution in 2010. Moreover, the number of patient visits to GPs for the 
same reason was capped at five visits in 2010 and then was reduced to three visits in 2011, 
where extra visits must be paid for individually (Maresso et al., 2015). In addition, some 
of the branded medications that were used in the national health programmes were 
replaced with generic medications in 2011, and a charge of RON10 on hospitalisation in 
hospitals was introduced, this charge increases to RON50 per day for more than one day 
and capped at RON600 per year for each individual. In that year also, the SHI modified 
reference pricing was employed to encourage prescribing cheaper medications, and in 
2012, the e-prescription system was applied. In 2013, a new co-payment from 5 to 10 
RON on the discharge from hospital was introduced, and hospitals can set their rate in 




procurement of medical supply and drugs in hospitals, and in the same year, the excise 
tax on tobacco increased by 14% and by 10% on beer (Maresso et al., 2015). 
According to Carausu et al (2017), the attempt of the Romanian government to reduce 
the impact of the financial crisis on the economy negatively influenced the healthcare 
system. The researchers added that the radical cuts in government spending and 
specifically in salaries underfunded the healthcare system, which in turn reduced the size 
and quality of healthcare services provided, where vulnerable groups were the most 
affected (Carausu et al., 2017). 
The global financial crisis had a negative effect on Croatia similar to other countries in 
Europe. Industrial production in Croatia decreased more than 9% in 2009 and the retail 
trade by 16%. Croatian exports decreased 25% in 2009 and imports by 30%. These factors 
contributed to an increase in the unemployment rate from 8% in 2008 to 16% in 2012, 
and a cut in salaries, thereby reducing people’s consumption. Such a scenario led Croatian 
GDP to decline by more than 6% in 2009 and 1.4% in 2010 (Džakula et al., 2014, Bokan 
et al., 2009, Maresso et al., 2015). Moreover, public debt increased by more than a third 
in 2012 compared to 2010 (41% of GDP in 2010 and 56% in 2012) and the government 
deficit doubled in 2010 relative to 2005 as share of the GDP (4.5% vs 2.4%, respectively). 
These negative indicators led to a downgrading in the economy’s credit rating and 
increased the cost of borrowing, where the interest rate on the government 10-year bonds 
exceeded 10% in 2010 compared to 7.6% in 2005, and the Croatian Kuna decreased by 
more than 6% relative to the Euro in 2009 comparing to 2008 (Džakula et al., 2014, Bokan 
et al., 2009). 
The poor economic climate and negative GDP growth prompted the Croatian government 
to decrease public spending including in the healthcare sector, where austerity measures 
were adopted to rationalise healthcare costs, implement significant savings and to address 




covering previous liabilities (Maresso et al., 2015). There were also some measures to 
bolster public healthcare revenues through introducing and increasing user charges 
(Džakula et al., 2014). After the onset of the financial crisis, government spending on 
healthcare as a percentage of the total spending on healthcare decreased from 86.5% in 
2007 to 81.3% in 2013, and between these two years decreased from 14.2% to 11.5% as 
a percentage of total government spending, and from 6.5% to 5.5% as a percentage of 
GDP (WHO, 2019). 
As a response to the austerity measures, the Croatian government reduced the hospitals 
budget by 3.3% in 2010 and introduced a reference pricing system. In 2011, 1% tax (for 
health) was introduced for those receiving a pension less than the average salary paid 
from general taxation and at 3% for those above the average, also at 5% on unemployed 
paid from general taxation (Džakula et al., 2014) . In the same year, the government 
introduced excise tax on tobacco at 32% and 7% tax on car insurance premiums to cover 
costs of healthcare provided due to traffic accidents. One year later, the government 
reduced the number of non-medical employees on temporary contracts and introduced 
5% VAT on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In that year also, the government 
implemented a joint hospital procurement programme to better allocating financial 
resources and to make savings. This programme assigned group of hospitals with the best 
procurement history that achieved the best value for money to procure supply for other 
hospitals. Moreover, the complementary health insurance increased 60% for retirees 
(from HRK50 to HRK80 per month) and 62.5% for employees in receipt of high incomes 
(from HRK80 to HRK130 per month). There was also a HRK15 charge per visit on 
primary care family medicine and gynaecology and HRK15 deductible per prescription 
was introduced, and the government reduced the number of people who are exempted 




In Georgia, given the small economy, which is less exposed to the world market, the 
economy was not isolated from the effect of the global financial crisis, which influenced 
it in many different ways and this was mainly due to the trade with the neighbouring 
countries, which were severely hit by the crisis (Bughulashvili, 2009). In addition, the 
shockwaves of the global financial crisis were worsened by the armed conflict with Russia 
which launched in 2008 to cause a dramatic fall in almost all the economic sectors 
including construction, banking, retail and tourism and to deteriorate the economy in 
general and incur the government more burdens in particular (Kirtskhalia, 2008). The 
economic instability started in November 2008, when the exchange rate of the Georgian 
Lari against the US dollar decreased from 1.45 to 1.65 (Otarashvili, 2013). Moreover, due 
to the banks’ stiffer lending terms and the global downturns, the country’s exports 
dropped and subsequently people lost their jobs, where the unemployment rate increased 
from 13.8% in 2005 to 18.3% in 2009 (Richardson and Berdzuli, 2017, Economics, 
2019a). Consequently, people became more cautious in terms of spending, where they 
preferred to save rather than to spend (Otarashvili, 2013). Therefore, GDP in Georgia 
start declining in the second half of 2008 and continued until the end of 2009 to contract 
by 3.6% that year (WB, 2019a). Moreover, due to the government spending increases 
from $3.4 billion in 2007 to $4.6 billion in 2010 as an attempt to alleviate the effect of 
the hard situation, the government deficits experienced rapid increases, reaching 9.2% in 
2009 compared to 0.3% in 2004 (Otarashvili, 2013), and public debt doubled in 2010 
compared to 2007 (42.5% of GDP in 2010 compared to 21.5% in 2007) (Economics, 
2019a). As a result of all these negative indicators, the government found it necessary to 
obtain financial assistance from the international authorities. 
The Georgian government received a programme of assistance from the IMF, the World 
Bank and other international donors in Brussels totalling $4.5 billion in 2008 to accelerate 




well as improving the country security (Otarashvili, 2013, Bughulashvili, 2009). In 
addition, the government introduced a reform agenda including a macroeconomic and 
fiscal framework with an effective fiscal stimulus to restore confidence and mitigate the 
impact of the downturn (Otarashvili, 2013). These reforms also targeted the healthcare 
system, which is mostly funded through OOP (75.6% in 2011), with a target to reduce 
government healthcare spending (Thomson et al., 2015, WHO, 2019). There were also 
policies to lower the costs of medical supply including pharmaceuticals through 
centralising procurement. In addition, other reforms included rationalising hospital stock 
through the closure of underutilized facilities. Moreover, there was a trend to reduce the 
quantity of hospital beds and patient length of stay, where the number of beds fell from 
16,455 in 2006 to 11,348 in 2012 and the average length of stay decreased from 7.4 nights 
in 2006 to 6.3 in 2009 and to 5.4 in 2013. In 2012, the annual limit of the outpatient 
pharmaceutical benefit of the Medical Assistance for the Poor was reduced from GEL200 
to GEL100, and a user charge from 10% to 20% was introduced on emergency hospital 
care, oncology services and elective surgery, and childbirth to be capped at GEL500 and 
at GEL800 for a caesarean delivery (Richardson and Berdzuli, 2017). 
It can be seen from the experiences of these countries that nearly twenty types of reforms 
were implemented, where some of them were to raise funds (introducing different types 
of taxations (i.e. income tax, VAT, and excise tax) and user charges (i.e. co-payments and 
deductibles)) and the majority were to contain healthcare costs (reducing salaries and 
other related benefits, recruitment, number of employees, entitlement to healthcare and 
level of coverage, public hospital beds, length of stay, number of hospitals, different 
subsidies, closing wards, merging hospitals and other health agencies, introducing e-
prescription, centralising procurements and emphasising generic drugs). What it seems 
from the experiences of these countries is that they responded in different ways. However, 




salaries and related benefits, number of employees, generic drugs, people’s entitlement 
to healthcare and their level of coverage, procurement systems, and the number of hospital 
beds.  
It was noticed that notwithstanding the remarkable contractions in these countries’ 
economies and governments’ need to raise funds, there were more reforms on cost 
containments compared to reforms on raising funds. It can be learned from this that even 
if the economy is experiencing harsh contractions it does not mean the government focus 
on raising additional funds, specifically at high percentages. But the government should 
know the maximum level that the population could pay to raise funds so as not to overload 
them and not to encounter resistance as was seen in some countries that reversed the 
increases in personal income taxes and user charges, due to resistance from the population 
for the former and healthcare professionals and stakeholders for the latter for the same 
reason. Moreover, if the maximum level that the population could pay was not enough to 
ensure the sustainability of the healthcare system, then cost containment strategies could 
be implemented. Furthermore, the experiences of these countries suggest various ways 
that governments can raise funds and reduce spending on healthcare. It can also be learned 
that governments should be careful of reforms that may raise funds or contain costs in the 
short term, but may put more pressure on the healthcare system in the long term when 
people become severely sick as a result of the absence of healthcare and support. Other 
lessons that were learned from the experiences of these countries is that reducing salaries 
and related benefits will reduce the level of contributions to the funding mechanisms, and 
that reducing the number of employees could mean that more people consume healthcare 
and social welfare while paying low or no contribution; therefore, caution is necessary 





Since the Saudi economy deteriorated at the end of 2014, the government has 
implemented different types of austerity measures similar to what some of the 
investigated countries implemented; such as reducing public employees’ salaries through 
freezing their allowances for seven months and stopping automatic promotions (to be 
studied and only be given to those who deserve them), as well as cutting subsidies on 
fuel, electricity, water and sanitation, and applied VAT and excise tax (MOE&P, 2016, 
Alarabiya, 2018a). In addition, other reforms are still in  progress, where the government 
set plans and is still working to achieve them, such as implementing e-prescribing 
software connecting all the MOH healthcare facilities (MOE&P, 2016). Moreover, some 
of the reforms, which many of the investigated countries implemented, were found 
necessary to be implemented by the Saudi MOH according to Chapter 2 results, such as; 
i) stopping building more healthcare facilities, ii) reducing number of healthcare facilities 
especially those which are rented, iii) stopping hiring more staff, and iv) limiting the 
renewal of contracts for people who work for the MOH for a specified duration. 
Furthermore, there are some reforms implemented by the investigated countries where 
the Saudi government should develop studies about them in the Saudi context and decide 
how to implement them, such as; i) finding a proper statutory funding mechanism to raise 
funds for the MOH, ii) understanding the level that people are willing to pay through this 
mechanism, and iii) reducing Saudis’ free entitlement to healthcare in the MOH. These 
three reforms will be investigated in the coming chapters to find the appropriate way of 
how to implement them in the Saudi context. In relation to user charges, it was seen that 
there were many countries which introduced or increased different types of user charges; 
however, these countries already have a basic (statutory) funding mechanism to fund their 
healthcare systems which the Saudi MOH needs at this time. Concerning pharmaceuticals 
and medical supply procurement, the government could also study the possibility to 




procurement for medical supply is already centralised in the MOH. The government could 
also study the need and benefit of reducing patients’ length of stay in hospital. However, 
all these reforms must be implemented in a way that will not deter people from accessing 
healthcare so as not to incur higher costs in the long term. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the reasons behind the continued increase in the MOH budgets 
in the period from 2006 to 2015. While it would seem that these increases would be driven 
by demand in the form of visits by elderly people (as is the case in many countries), this 
study shows that people aged 65 and above are a relatively small fraction of the total SA 
population. This study also shows that patient visits by the total population did not play a 
significant role in the continuous increases in the MOH budgets. In other words, the MOH 
healthcare facilities and size and cost of manpower employed in those facilities increased 
significantly for no obvious demand side reason, in a time when the Saudi demographic 
factors showed negligible changes and most of the healthcare activities reported either a 
negative trend or negligible increases. This shows that MOH budget increases were not 
based on the historical demand for healthcare services, but rather driven by the Saudi 
economic situation during the period under investigation as evidenced by the high 
correlation between Saudi total budgets and the MOH four budgets. 
The data shows that if the Saudi economic situation is positive, then the MOH requests 
and receives additional budget, which it uses to increase the number of healthcare 
facilities, and hire more staff to run these units. This situation is sustainable in periods of 
high oil prices when surpluses are large, but is not when oil prices plummet, and the Saudi 
economy experiences deficits (as it has since 2014), when there should be significant 
scope to restrict investment in new CAPEX and the hiring of more staff. However, as is 
evident from the continuous increase in the projects and manpower budgets, despite 




Therefore, this study concludes that the primary reason for the continuous increases in 
the MOH budget in the period from 2006 to 2015 was the budgeting strategy used to 
finance the public healthcare sector. In many ways what happens every year during the 
Al Hajj season is a small scale example of the weaknesses in the system for forecasting 
and budgeting demand for healthcare services at national level. It is evident that this 
budgeting situation could be improved by employing health economics solutions.  
For this reason, this study suggests that the Saudi MOH should estimate the required 
budget based on the historical demand for healthcare services activities, and on the 
population growth rate while taking into consideration the fact that although most of the 
Saudi population are currently aged between 18 and 65 (67% of the population), and will 
need extra healthcare services in the future as the population ages. This study also 
suggests that the MOH stop building more healthcare facilities, and reduce the percentage 
of the rented PHCs based on the actual demand in each city. In addition to this, the MOH 
should stop hiring more staff, and stop renewing the contracts of those who work under 
contract with MOH, and should instead, redeploy current staff to cover the actual demand 
for healthcare services in each city, and/or shift new applicants and those with un-renewed 
contracts to the other two healthcare providers (the private sector and SDU). 
In hospitals, the expansion in healthcare services that are provided in psychiatry, intensive 
care, and surgery departments have been followed by significant increases in the number 
of neurosurgeons and physicians who work in psychiatry, neurology, ICU, and surgery. 
Therefore, the MOH should implement a strategy to reorganise this supply with the actual 
demand for such healthcare services. However, because demand for these healthcare 
services is inflexible, the MOH should undertake additional studies before implementing 
any strategies in this regard. The same is true for the isolation, dialysis, emergency, 




Conversely, because the parlous fiscal situation requires immediate action, the MOH 
must prioritise decisions taken in healthcare services with greater flexibility, such as those 
which are provided in the primary care clinics in hospitals. These clinics are mostly 
covered by family medicine and general practitioners, whose numbers proliferated in the 
period under investigation, as well as the healthcare services provided in the internal 
medicine, paediatric, and OB & GYN, where their departments, physicians, and number 
of patient visits expanded significantly. The eye and musculoskeletal 
departments/specialities must also be prioritised due to the high average annual increases 
in patient visits in these areas. With regards to laboratories and x-rays, the MOH has 
already worked to minimise the number of investigations by enacting the sharing of 
medical files, which is one target of the Saudi Vision 2030 (MOE&P, 2016). 
Finally, given that the Saudi budget has been suffering from deficits since 2014 and, 
depending on oil prices, may continue to do so for the foreseeable future, the Saudi MOH 
should strive to find an appropriate funding mechanism to minimise the financial burden 
on the government into the future rather than waiting for oil prices to rebound and 












    Healthcare Funding Options for Saudi Arabia 
The Saudi economy has shown slow growth in the last few years as a result of volatile 
and downward trending oil prices (which is considered as the major source of funding of 
the public budget in SA). This unexpected level of low prices prompted the Saudi 
government to implement cost-containment strategies to ensure the sustainability of the 
public financing by prioritising spending, minimising unnecessary expenditures, and 
exploring other sources of funds.  
Despite SA’s parlous economic situation across the period under investigation, the Saudi 
MOH budgets have increased sharply, such that they have experienced a higher annual 
increase than the Saudi total budget on average, and a faster level of growth than Saudi 
GDP total budget, and other ministries with higher budgets than the MOH (i.e. defence 
and education).  
Chapter 2 investigated the reasons behind these sharp increases at a macro level. The a 
priori expectation of these analyses was that these increases would be justified by one or 
more of the common reasons for the increases of the public spending on healthcare 
globally. However, none was found to have had a significant effect on the increases in 
the Saudi MOH budget, such that a micro level study was carried out to determine the 
Saudi-specific reasons for the increases. The conclusion from these analyses is that the 
MOH budgets were set based almost entirely on the presumption of a continuing and 
positive economic performance. However, when this presumption proved to not be the 
case, this budgeting methodology became problematic because multi-year projects still 
needed to be funded and staffed, i.e. significant budget increases were still necessary even 
though the economy was not performing as strongly. It is for this reason that, in this 
chapter, this study investigates possible methods to fund the MOH budgets to ensure the 




 Study Objective and Methodology 
Given that SA is transforming its economy from a fully governmental funded model, this 
part of the study explores all the possible health funding mechanisms in place in other 
economies in order to investigate which mechanism might be appropriate in the Saudi 
context to ensure that the MOH can sustain the healthcare services that are provided by 
its facilities into the future. 
To serve this purpose, a question must be answered: 
What are the most appropriate and acceptable funding mechanisms to raise 
funds for the MOH in the Saudi context? 
To attain the desired objective, this part of the study will firstly search for all the possible 
healthcare financing mechanisms in place in other economies, to provide a good 
understanding of what the available options are. Secondly, given the backdrop of the 
fiscal constraints, constitutional constraints (in terms of the eligibilities to healthcare) 
discussed in Chapter one, and the reasons behind the increases in the MOH budgets that 
were discussed in Chapter two, this study will investigate each of these healthcare funding 
options to see whether they are appropriate in the Saudi context. It will also examine 
whether the financing option are in line with Islamic principles. 
To do so, this study will investigate more than thirty healthcare systems throughout the 
world and will discuss the experience of different healthcare financing mechanisms in 
those economies. The evidence will be brought from countries that have long-established, 
stable, and successful healthcare systems, or from countries whose implemented approach 
overcame a fiscal deterioration. Particular attention is given to those economies that 
implemented a new financing method, and the extent of the success of the introduction of 
this new method will be discussed, and the advantages and disadvantages experienced by 




the possible funding options, evidence from the United States, Australia, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Western Europe (WE) countries will be used in this study as will the 
experiments and the decisions of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Federal Soviet Union 
(FSU) countries in transforming their healthcare systems. The experiences of the latter 
countries is worth particular investigation because they have undergone economic 
difficulties similar to those experienced recently by SA.  
 Overview of the Health Funding Mechanisms 
A sustainable healthcare system requires financial resources to build healthcare facilities, 
compensate healthcare providers, and pay for pharmaceuticals and other health 
consumables. Most industrialised countries have established a healthcare system that 
funds the burden of healthcare costs from different funding mechanisms. This section will 
give an overview of six healthcare funding mechanisms which are: Taxation, Social 
Health Insurance (SHI), Private Health Insurance (PHI), Out of Pocket (OOP), Medical 
Savings Accounts (MSA), Donations and Loans. This section will also discuss six criteria 
for health financing system design which are: revenue raising ability, protection of the 
poor, value systems, risk pooling, the sustainability of the mechanism, and 
multisectoralism. These criteria were used by the World Health Organisation and the 
World Bank in evaluating countries’ healthcare systems, and were seen by researchers as 
necessary to be investigated along with funding mechanisms before deciding among 
alternatives, and the healthcare policy that uses these criteria would have the opportunity 
to implement a financing mechanism that best suits the people, the government and the 
healthcare providers (Green, 2007, Bennett and Gilson, 2001, McIntyre, 2007). 






Healthcare revenues in many EU countries are raised from Taxation, which usually 
account for more than that raised from other mechanisms (Arsenijevic et al., 2016). Taxes 
can be levied in a direct way (via taxes on individuals’ income, households, or firms’ 
profits), or in an indirect way (via taxes on the value of transactions or commodities, i.e. 
value added tax (VAT) as percentage, or excise tax as percentage or flat fee) (Aamir et 
al., 2011). In general, Taxation rates are set based on the revenue required by the 
government, and the collected revenue is pooled to serve general public purposes. 
However, some systems restrict the use of Taxation only for the purpose for which it was 
raised (hypothecated Taxation) (Doetinchem, 2010, Evans, 2002). Regardless of how it 
is raised, Taxation can be used either to fund the public healthcare expenditure (when the 
government own all or part of the healthcare sector), or to pay the private healthcare 
provider (private healthcare facilities) (Evans, 2002). 
 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (Taxation) 
In terms of the revenue raising ability, funding healthcare through taxation will enable 
the Saudi MOH to benefit from taxing all types of individuals, some of whom (such as 
unemployed people and dependents who benefit from the Saudi government through 
different funds, self-employed and capital investors) might not be included in other 
mechanisms. Moreover, applying a direct tax based on the total income that includes 
earning from salaries, government benefits and any income due to making other activities 
(such as capital investments) will give a great ability to the MOH to raise revenues. With 
regard to sustainability, in SA, very few Saudis receive no income and that happens in 
cases of owning valuable assets, refusal to take a job offered by the Human Resources 
Development Fund (HRDF), or if dependent on someone who receives very high salary. 
Therefore, applying taxation in SA will enable the MOH to levy contributions from a 




In respect of protecting poor people, financing the Saudi MOH through direct taxation 
will provide all people with the same access to healthcare regardless of how much they 
contribute, such that will protect poor people. Moreover, the indirect way (per 
transactions or commodities, i.e. VAT), will be ignored as it might place higher burdens 
on poor people and exposes them to risk. Furthermore, levying tax from a large proportion 
of the population and based on the total income will ensure the MOH will have a high 
level of fund in order to ensure reasonable healthcare access to all people. 
Concerning value systems, funding the MOH through taxation will transform the system 
from a free fully funded model by the Saudi government to one that is based on the 
population contribution. This will facilitate the subscription of those in slices 2 to 6 to the 
financial policy without affecting their employers or making a change to the healthcare 
system of the private sector or SDU. Moreover, due to the extent of the reforms envisaged 
in Saudi Vision 2030, people might be resistant to participate in funding their healthcare 
services, especially as this would be the first time since the foundation of the state that 
the government would levy a tax on people’s incomes. Resistance could also be likely in 
cities and provinces with a significant nomadic population and/or include a significant 
proportion of people with a low level of education. Specifically, those categories might 
see the obligation to fund public services as the government’s responsibility. However, 
applying taxation at a very low percentage at the beginning might encourage people to 
accept this transformation. 
In relation to risk pooling, the funds raised through taxation are usually collected and 
pooled to serve general public purposes. However, if the Saudi MOH restricted the use 
of this fund only for spending on healthcare, more funds can be ensured for health (rather 
than being spent on other public programmes), which in turn reduces risk associated with 
the pool. One of the issues that a direct tax may cause to the pool is if the proportion of 




fund in the country or might increase in the future (the unemployed represents 2.2% of 
the Saudi population, retired people 2.1% and those under 18 years 32.5%, also these 
categories are compensated from the Saudi government in monthly amounts from $200 
to $800, unlike the employed people where the average monthly salary is $1700) (GAFS, 
2017b). Therefore, the sufficiency of the pool might be at risk if these proportions were 
to increase significantly. In addition, because the Saudi MOH provides healthcare 
services through its own facilities, more funds will also be guaranteed in the pool as these 
facilities are not for profit. Also, this is the case when the MOH collects the fund and 
pools it, where less administrative fees can be incurred. All these will participate in 
reducing the pooling risk. 
Regarding multisectoralism (which concerns the ability of the mechanism to fund other 
health aspects), direct taxation makes the process of multisectoralism easier, as it does 
not develop direct financial relationship between patients and healthcare providers, where 
the contribution goes to a pool that is controlled by the MOH. This will enable the MOH 
to use the raised funds for other health purposes, such as improving the supply of clean 
drinking water. 
3.2.2 Social Health Insurance 
Social Health Insurance is a mechanism that levies a specific percentage on employees’ 
income and an additional percentage is incurred by their employers to cover all or part of 
the employees’ healthcare costs (Sieverding et al., 2018). In some healthcare systems, the 
levy is also extended to the income of the self-employed. Other systems charge the 
elderly, unemployed, and disabled people through a deduction from their pension or any 
other benefits they receive (Normand and Weber, 1994). 
The collection of these levies can be through the government, which pools the revenues 
and then pays the healthcare provider directly (integrated), or passes the pooled revenues 




(unintegrated). In some healthcare systems, one or more of the processing steps 
(collection, pooling, and purchasing) can be completed by the same independent body 
(i.e. a sickness fund) (Rechel et al., 2018). The relationship between the insurer (the fund) 
and the member is a contractual relationship, and the coverage is explicitly defined in the 
contract. Some countries use a single fund to cover the entire population; others use 
multiple funds, where each covers a specific category of the population (Thomson et al., 
2009).  
The country designs the SHI based on what is suitable for the government and the 
population. It can be used as a major mechanism to fund the healthcare system, or as a 
complementary tool to cover a specific illness, or a part of people’s healthcare costs which 
are not covered under the statutory healthcare system (Doetinchem et al., 2010). In most 
countries, the fund is self-governed and the contributions are determined by the 
government. In others, the government, employees and employers representatives, and 
the social security organisations negotiate the level of contributions (Normand and Busse, 
2002). 
The level of contribution by employees can be the same regardless of income level 
(uniform) or can vary based on the level of income of the employees. The same is true 
for the share paid by the employee and employer, where both may pay the same or 
different contribution rates. In Austria, Belgium, France, and Luxemburg, SHI covers 
more than 99% of the total population. Also, in those European countries that do apply 
SHI, the system only covers a part of the person’s health expenditure — the rest is covered 
through other mechanisms (Normand and Busse, 2002). 
 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (SHI) 
In terms of the revenue raising ability, due to the nature of SHI, which focuses mainly on 
contributions from employers and employees, applying SHI as a statutory mechanism to 




funds (such as the SW, Citizen’s Account Fund (CAF), HRDF, PPF, GOSI, disability 
benefit, and studying reward) that fund Saudi citizens. Moreover, implementing SHI to 
fund the MOH might focus more on those publicly employed people who receive 
healthcare only in the MOH, as it might not be feasible to raise revenue via SHI from all 
those who have access to the private healthcare sector and other governmental healthcare 
facilities (MCS, 2015), which will make this mechanism less able to raise revenues to the 
MOH. 
In respect of protecting poor people, if SHI was employed as a statutory mechanism to 
fund the MOH with more focus on those publicly employed people who receive 
healthcare only in MOH facilities, in other words those in slice 1 (as it might not be 
feasible to raise funds from all those employed and eligible to healthcare in slices 2-6), 
the healthcare of those in slice 1 (including the poor in this slice) are likely to be affected. 
This is because a low number of contributors might not be sufficient to fund the healthcare 
of those unemployed and receiving healthcare in the MOH (i.e. 1.2 million employees in 
the public sector will contribute to fund more than 7 million of the population (News, 
2017)). Therefore, difficulties to access the MOH facilities might be experienced due to 
the low funding that may not be sufficient to provide the necessary healthcare services, 
and would make the chance to improve them limited. Moreover, if the MOH designated 
a pool for each locality to be used only by those who contribute to it, poor people who 
live in poor regions (i.e. south and the north of SA) are more likely to experience low 
quality level of healthcare due to the low level of fund in their pools. 
With regard to sustainability, the raised proportion of funding through SHI would be low 
compared to the number of people who will benefit from it, as the average family size in 
SA is 5.9 persons where the majority are likely to be dependents (News, 2017). This could 




Furthermore, the level of funding might be even lower if the MOH outsourced the 
collection and pooling which might result in extra administration costs. 
Concerning the value systems, implementing SHI will transform the MOH free funded 
system to one that is based on employees’ and employers’ contributions. This would 
require the involvement of the public agencies to fund the MOH to cover their share. 
Moreover, the involvement of the privately employed people will only contain 
contributions from employees. This is because the Saudi government obliges private 
employers to provide PHI to all their employees including their dependents and it is not 
fair to mandate private employers to contribute to the Saudi healthcare system twice, as 
if such an obligation were put in place, the sustainability of many companies in SA will 
be affected. Also, because the PHI system is already in place to cover private sector 
employees, it is not an ideal option to transform this infrastructure to implement SHI. 
Therefore, the implementation of this method will make it difficult for those employed 
and receiving healthcare in slices 2, 4, and 6 to access the MOH facilities, unless i) the 
government covered the private employer share, or ii) applied taxation on their incomes, 
or iii) changed the private sector obligation from providing PHI to SHI for those 
employed and receiving healthcare in these three slices. However, this is not an ideal 
option should this threaten the insurance industry in SA, because a significant percentage 
of the insurance companies in SA rely primarily on providing healthcare insurance 
products, and by changing the private sector obligation from providing PHI to SHI, many 
of these insurance companies may leave the market as a result of losing a significant 
proportion of their customers. 
In relation to the risk pooling, given the structure of the Saudi healthcare system and the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics mentioned previously, the pooling in this 
mechanism would be underfunded, and may even struggle to provide basic therapeutic 




designated a pool for each locality to collect and fund only those living in this locality, 
should this put such a pool under risk, because some areas contain a higher concentration 
of people with low level of income and therefore the pools in these areas might be 
underfunded.  
Regarding multisectoralism, if the MOH implemented an integrated system, where the 
collection, pooling and funding the healthcare services is carried out by the MOH, the 
system could benefit from allocating part of the fund to improve other health purposes. 
Nevertheless, if the MOH outsourced this mission through sickness funds, other health 
aspects would be less likely to be improved. However, either way, due to the low expected 
level of funding through SHI, the opportunities for improving other health aspects would 
be limited. 
3.2.3 Private Health Insurance 
Private Health Insurance is a contractual policy that covers people’s healthcare costs fully 
or partly. Premiums are paid from the insured to a third party (Insurance Company) and 
these premiums are then pooled to fund the healthcare provider for services received by 
the insured. PHI can be complementary (i.e. covers the proportion that is not covered by 
statutory health insurance), supplementary (enhance a person’s level of coverage), or 
substitutive (as an alternative to statutory health insurance) (Sagan and Thomson, 2016). 
The premiums in this mechanism are sometimes determined based on individual health 
status (risk rated). Some healthcare systems oblige insurance companies to set the 
premium based on the health status of the community or state (community rated) or based 
on the nature of work (group rated) (Thomson et al., 2009). 
PHI can be provided either through for-profit organisations or non-profit organisations 
(i.e. mutual associations exist in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, 




by the contributors (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004) such that the premiums are used 
solely to fund the health costs of their members (i.e. no dividends are distributed).  
PHI is commonly used in wealthy countries although the low and middle income 
population of those countries can be reluctant to use it due to difficulties in securing an 
insurance policy. The reason for that is, for-profit PHI companies avoid vulnerable groups 
(i.e. the unhealthy, poor, elderly, unemployed, and people with chronic disease) and focus 
on the wealthy and the young (i.e. exercise risk selection) (Ahmed et al., 2018). For the 
same reason, regulatory bodies find it difficult to control health insurance companies 
because, if these companies were forced to provide coverage to vulnerable groups, they 
would choose to leave the market. Therefore, some governments instead require insurers 
to provide minimum health insurance packages. Other public authorities incentivise PHI 
companies through subsidies in the form of tax credits, relief, deferral, or exemptions to 
ensure the sustainability of the healthcare system. Other countries pay the premiums for 
the vulnerable group (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004). 
PHI can be provided in two different forms. The first type is conventional insurance that 
is provided by the majority of insurance companies and banks globally. The second type 
is Islamic insurance; which is an Islamic financial product provided in the Islamic 
countries. Recently, this type has become available in countries where a significant 
proportion of Muslims are concentrated. However, these Islamic products still represent 
less than 2.5% of the total financial transactions globally (Abdel-Maoula Chaar, 2016). 
 Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
Conventional insurance contains contracts for buying and selling indemnities and 
guarantees that are not permitted by Islam. For this reason most populations in Islamic 
countries find conventional insurance an unsuitable mechanism for their needs. 




outcomes which is not associated with productive skills or useful work, which leads to 
consuming wealth for no effort) and Gharar (uncertainty, deceptiveness, ignorance, and 
lack of transparency that lead to deceit and fraud), both of which are forbidden because 
they are incompatible with Islam (Abdel-Maoula Chaar, 2016). Maysir occurs in 
conventional insurance when an insurance company collects contributions from the 
insured in the hope that any claims made by the insured for the period covered will be 
less than the amount of the premiums. Gharar arises when the insured pays for uncertain 
benefits that may be zero, or may greatly exceed the amount of the contributions. 
Takaful insurance (individuals guaranteeing each other) has been developed to avoid 
Maysir and Gharar. Takaful creates a pool for a specific group from contributions paid 
by members of the group. The contributions are intended as a donation, and benefits are 
paid to members from the pooled fund as needed. The pooled fund is owned by the group 
(policy holders) and managed by an operator (Insurance Company). If a surplus arises, 
some is reserved to meet future deficits (as in conventional insurance) and the remainder 
is redistributed to the policy holders. The reserves in the pooled fund can be invested in 
Sharia compliant products to minimise the probability of loss. If the deficit exceeds the 
reserve, the shortfall is funded via an interest free loan (to avoid Riba, which is prohibited 
by Islam), or from additional contributions from policyholders (Abdel-Maoula Chaar, 
2016). 
 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (PHI) 
In terms of the revenue raising ability, because of the large proportion of Saudi population 
receiving income, implementing PHI as a statutory mechanism would have a great ability 





With regard to sustainability, if those who are restricted to healthcare only in the MOH 
were mandated to subscribe to PHI, and those receiving low or no income were supported 
by the income of the person on whom they are dependent, the insurance companies will 
benefit from a large number of subscriptions, taking into account that the number could 
be higher as people in slices from 2 to 6 may prefer also to subscribe to access the MOH. 
In addition, because PHI will cover people’s healthcare costs in the MOH healthcare 
facilities which are not targeting profit, there will not be a competition that could create 
challenges for the insurance companies as there is only one healthcare provider, such that 
will ensure the sustainability. Moreover, due to the Islamic principles, the only type of 
PHI that could be implemented to cover the MOH healthcare costs is Takaful where the 
pooling is owned by the subscribers and the premiums are used only to fund subscribers’ 
healthcare costs, which will also contribute to the sustainability of the fund as no 
dividends are distributed. 
Concerning value systems, implementing PHI as a statutory mechanism to fund the MOH 
healthcare services would be difficult because PHI is usually expensive. Therefore, 
people will not be able to afford the cost of the premiums due to the fact that only 
approximately one-third of the Saudi population are employed (MCS, 2015, GAFS, 
2015), and the rest are retired or unemployed and either receive low compensation from 
the government or none at all. Also, even if this thesis proposes incurring part of the 
premiums by the person on whom they are dependent, this person (usually the father) 
may not be able to afford to pay part of the highly expensive premiums for all the family 
members, taking into account that the average family size in SA is 5.9 persons (News, 
2017).  Moreover, 73% of the privately employed people are from those in receipt of low 
income (GOSI, 2015). This may make those in slices 2, 4, and 6 decide not to subscribe 
to access the MOH. Therefore, the only PHI that can be implemented to cover the MOH 




regulated PHI. This can be implemented through obliging insurance providers to accept 
everyone via an open enrolment and to charge community rated premiums (considering 
that those who are most likely to need health insurance aren’t priced out of the market, 
but those on lower income have to pay the same as those on higher income), also to 
guarantee renewability of policies, and not to drop anyone when they become sick. 
Moreover, due to the Islamic principles in SA, this insurance must be compliant with 
Sharia rules (Takaful). 
In respect of protecting poor people, because healthcare services are costly in general and 
extremely expensive for some, insurance companies are exposed to a significant risk. 
Therefore, they avoid poor people, unhealthy and elderly (vulnerable groups) who might 
incur high costs, and focus on wealthy, healthy and young people. These may mean that 
applying PHI as a statutory mechanism would leave a significant proportion of the Saudi 
population without insurance. However, if a regulated PHI was implemented then all 
vulnerable groups will receive the same benefits as any subscribers to the insurance. 
In relation to risk pooling, by regulating the PHI market in SA, the insurance providers 
will receive high levels of funding due to the large number of subscribers, which will 
support their pools and expose them to lower levels of risk. Moreover, the reality is that 
67% of the total population of SA are young, and the percentage of elderly is less than 
3%, also the demand on the MOH healthcare services increased marginally on average in 
the period from 2006 to 2015 and specifically decreased in relation to chronic diseases. 
All of these indicators imply that the insurance providers’ pools will be exposed to lower 
risk. Regarding multisectoralism, because the contributions are collected, pooled and 
processed by insurance companies in this mechanism, the likelihood to promote other 





3.2.4 Out of Pocket (User Charge) 
In most healthcare systems, citizens are required to share costs, i.e. bear a part of their 
own healthcare costs over and above that covered by the statutory mechanism. Some 
governments shift a portion of healthcare expenses onto the user in order to mitigate the 
burden on public finances, while others do so to eliminate the effect of the moral hazard 
(Prinja et al., 2012). 
Out of Pocket expenses can be charged directly (via a formal or an informal payment) or 
indirectly. Formal payment can take many forms: i) co-payment (a flat fee or charge per 
service in monetary terms), ii) linear pricing “co-insurance” (a percentage of the total 
charge), iii) nonlinear full marginal cost pricing “deductible” (payment covering an initial 
proportion of the total charge before the insurance coverage starts), iv) nonlinear partial 
marginal cost pricing “balance billing or reference pricing” (an amount levied by the 
healthcare provider on the use, which is not covered by the insurance policy), and  v) two 
part tariffs (a flat fee then a charge per unit). Informal payment is a payment for services 
that are covered under a specific package plan, but still require the individual to make an 
additional payment (i.e. cash payments to physicians, nurses, or other healthcare 
personnel outside the official channel, “under the table”) (Atanasova et al., 2013). Indirect 
payment results when the health insurance policy specifies some healthcare services that 
are not reimbursed. Robinson in 2002 comments that it can be difficult somtimes to 
distinguish between the direct and indirect charges (Robinson, 2002). 
 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (OOP) 
In terms of revenue raising ability, this mechanism’s ability to raise fund for the Saudi 
MOH would be limited. This is because this method is usually used to part-fund 
healthcare over and above that provided by a functioning statutory system, and less likely 
to be implemented as a statutory mechanism, which the Saudi MOH needs at this time. 




go directly to the MOH as it has its own facilities. However, lower financing would be 
expected because healthcare services are costly in general, and for specific treatments can 
be extremely expensive, which will deter people from approaching healthcare services as 
many individuals, and especially the poor, would not be able to afford the costs. In 
addition, recent data showed that more than 85% of the females in SA are unemployed 
(GAFS, 2018a, GAFS, 2018b). This is because, due to the Islamic principles and the 
traditions in SA, males are required to take the full responsibility to provide life’s needs 
for their families. Therefore, the vast majority of females are either in receipt of low 
compensation from the government or none at all. Consequently, implementing OOP to 
fund the MOH would negatively affect females in SA who represent 42% of the 
population as they may find their self without healthcare due to the inability to pay 
(GAFS, 2018b). This will also increase the burden on the males on whom they are 
dependent, especially if the males themselves are also unemployed. 
In relation to risk pooling, the nature of OOP does not include pooling in the funding 
process as it creates a direct contract between individuals and healthcare providers. 
Therefore, the absence of the pooling in this method exposes people to significant risk. 
In respect of value systems, implementing OOP as a statutory mechanism to fund the 
MOH will change the MOH system from a free fully funded model by the government to 
individually based funding. This will encounter a high resistance from the Saudi 
population for two reasons; i) people’s living conditions were negatively affected by the 
Saudi Vision 2030 which still has ten years to run, during which it is expected to include 
reforms to raise funds for the government, such as increasing energy prices (Alarabiya, 
2018a), and ii) the fact that the royal grant was planned to be only for 2018 and was just 
renewed in 2019, so that might not be in place in the coming years (Alarabiya, 2018d). 
This will make implementing this method very difficult, and a recent example that shows 




spending in SA has been decreasing due to applying a small percentage of VAT at the 
beginning of 2018 (Alarabiya, 2019a). 
With regard to sustainability, given people’s unstable financial conditions in SA that is 
likely to incur more burdens in the coming years, and the socioeconomic characteristics 
that are affected by Islamic principles and traditions such as the low percentage of 
employed females and the fact that males will incur the burdens of funding their 
healthcare costs, fitting OOP as a statutory mechanism into the MOH system is unlikely 
to provide sustainable funding. 
Regarding multisectoralism, because the Saudi MOH provides healthcare services 
through its facilities, the payments through this method will go directly to the MOH, 
which will enable the MOH to benefit from the raised funds to improve other health 
aspects. However, the reality is that implementing this method as a statutory mechanism 
will underfund the MOH. Therefore, the possibility of even funding the major and 
necessary supply cannot be guaranteed. 
3.2.5 Medical Savings Accounts  
MSA requires each individual to contribute a proportion of his/her income into a saving 
account solely to cover his/her healthcare costs. In this method, there is no pooling, but 
instead the fund is kept in each person’s account. When the account holder dies, the fund 
is passed to the person’s relatives (this is common in Singapore and to limited extent in 
the US, and more recently in China) (Wouters et al., 2016). This mechanism usually also 
requires another type of health insurance because, in the absence of pooling, the MSA on 
its own will not be able to protect the individual from costs arising from serious health 




 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (MSA) 
In terms of revenue raising ability, this mechanism will require each person to contribute 
a proportion of his/her total income into a savings account solely to cover his/her 
healthcare costs in the MOH. However, since most of the population of SA are in receipt 
of low or no income, MSA would have less ability to raise revenue on its own because a 
significant proportion of the population would have low levels of funds in their accounts, 
which might not be able to cover the cost of the basic healthcare services given the fact 
that they are expensive. However, if MSA were supported by the government or by 
creating additional accounts or both together (as is the case in the Singaporean healthcare 
system), then this mechanism would have the ability to raise funds. The same is true 
regarding sustainability, where if MSA was supported by funding from the Saudi 
government or by creating additional accounts, this mechanism will ensure a sustainable 
funding stream. 
Concerning value systems, implementing MSA to fund the MOH will transform the 
system from a free fully funded model dependent on the government budget to an 
individually based funding method. This is very hard to be implemented in SA because 
more than two thirds of the Saudi total population are in receipt of low or no income. 
Therefore, the balance in each individual account may fail to provide basic healthcare to 
its owner because healthcare services are costly. Therefore, this mechanism must be 
supported by an additional account which has a pool that is funded through deductions 
from the first account of each individual to cover the healthcare costs of those who have 
used up all their balance in the first account, or the Saudi government could fund the 
additional healthcare costs of those people. 
In respect of protecting poor people, implementing MSA as a statutory mechanism will 
not provide protection for poor people unless the government intervened to fund those 




the Singaporean government created an account which is funded by the government to 
pay for the healthcare costs of the poor people and those who had used up all of their 
balances in the first account and their eligibility in the second one (Mossialos et al., 2016). 
In relation to risk pooling, there is no pooling in the first account of this mechanism, 
where every person’s healthcare costs are paid from his/her own account. It depends on 
how the government would design this mechanism and the number of pools needs to be 
created. For example, if another account was created (as in the Singaporean healthcare 
system), then it would have a pool that is funded from each person’s first account. Usually 
there is no risk associated with this pool, because every person can use up to a specific 
percentage of this pool. If further costs arose, then they are usually funded through a third 
account which has its own pool and is funded by the government. 
Regarding multisectoralism, because the funding of this mechanism goes directly to each 
person’s account, which is then used mainly to cover his/her healthcare costs, the ability 
of this method to improve other health purposes will be limited. This is also the case even 
if a second account with a pool were created, because usually this pool is designated to 
cover specific healthcare services and up to specific percentage for each person. 
3.2.6 Donation and Loans 
Some low income countries rely on donation or loans from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), charities, foreign governments, and multilateral agencies such as 
the World Bank to fund healthcare. For instance, in Africa the average proportion of 
healthcare expenditure funded by donations from external sources is 20%; in some 
countries this proportion is as high as 50%. Because the sustainability of the external 
donor cannot be guaranteed, this mechanism has the potential to put the healthcare system 
in these low income countries under significant pressure should the donations not 
continue. The same is true for loans, which must be repaid, thereby placing a significant 




 Criteria for Health Financing System Design (Donation and Loans) 
In terms of revenue raising ability, donations are less likely to raise revenues for the Saudi 
MOH because the Saudi economy is one of the richest economies in the world. Therefore, 
it is unlikely to receive donations from charity organisations, and even if ensured for one 
year, the continuity cannot be guaranteed. The same is true for funding through loans, 
where it is very hard for the MOH to borrow every year to cover all or the majority of the 
MOH supply. Therefore, the ability of donations and loans to raise revenues to the MOH 
is limited.  Furthermore, because the continuity of donors and lenders cannot be 
guaranteed every year, this mechanism cannot provide sustainable funding for the MOH. 
In respect of protecting poor people, due to the low level of funding that donations could 
raise and the fact that the continuity of donors cannot be guaranteed, this mechanism is 
highly likely to put the healthcare of those who only have access to healthcare in the MOH 
facilities under significant pressure and specifically poor people. The same is true for 
loans, where the MOH cannot guarantee a continued lender every year, and the fact that 
these loans must be repaid. 
In relation to risk pooling, the pooling in this mechanism is expected to be at significant 
risk due to the low level of funding that the Saudi MOH could attain through this 
mechanism. As stated earlier, this is because SA is a rich country and is less likely to be 
funded by charity organisations, and if the MOH was funded by these organisations, their 
continuity cannot be guaranteed. Also, it is difficult for the MOH to borrow every year, 
and the reality is that lenders cannot be ensured every year. According to the WHO, the 
majority of the EU countries do not fund their healthcare systems through this 





Concerning value systems, donations cannot be implemented as a statutory mechanism 
to fund the MOH because it is more likely to fund poor countries. Moreover, introducing 
this mechanism would weaken the trust in the Saudi economy, and could be a sign to 
internal and external investors that the government has become unable to fund one of the 
most important services in the economy. This is contrary to Saudi Vision 2030, which 
tries to increase the involvement of external investors in the Saudi economy and 
increasing the country’s financial rating (Alarabiya, 2019b). Moreover, the loans can be 
obtained at rates which the government can pay them back, but not at a rate that makes 
borrowing as a predominant method which the MOH needs at this time. Therefore, loans 
also cannot be implemented as a statutory mechanism to fund the MOH. 
Regarding multisectoralism, it is true that the raised fund by this mechanism goes to the 
MOH. However, due to the low expected fund through this mechanism and the 
unguaranteed sustainability of donors and lenders, this method is unlikely to encourage 
the improvement of other health aspects. 
3.2.7 The Suitability of the Funding Options for the MOH According to the 
Criteria for Health Financing System Design 
Funding healthcare services through direct taxation will give the MOH a great revenue 
raising ability and fund sustainability as it will enable taxing all types of individuals, some 
of whom might not be included in other mechanisms. The same is true with regulated 
Takaful PHI, due to the large proportion of people receiving income in SA who will 
benefit the insurance companies with many subscriptions. MSA will also give the same 
to the MOH if they were supported by the government and/or by additional accounts. In 
contrast, implementing SHI might not be able to raise sufficient funds for the MOH 
because it would miss the chance to levy contributions from many governmental funds 
that fund Saudi citizens, as well as many of those who are employed and have access to 




should this also affect the sustainability of the funding. The same holds true for donations 
and loans, and this is attributed to the high wealth of SA, which would lower the chance 
to receive donations, and also it is hard for the MOH to borrow every year to cover all or 
the majority of its financial needs. OOP is also the same, where the high costs of 
healthcare services is expected to deter people from accessing healthcare; therefore, this 
would provide low and unsustainable funds to the MOH. 
Financing the MOH through direct taxation will provide all people with the same access 
to healthcare regardless of how much they contribute, which will protect poor people. 
The regulated Takaful PHI is similar, where poor people and those on lower and higher 
incomes would pay the same premiums, the same as MSA if it contains a designated 
account funded by the government to cover poor people healthcare costs. However, due 
to the low funding that SHI would raise for the MOH, the healthcare of those in slice 1 
(including poor people) is likely to be affected. The same is true if the system was funded 
through donations and loans due to the low level of funding that could be attained through 
this mechanism beside the unguaranteed continuity of donors and lenders. In addition, 
poor people would not be able to afford paying for their healthcare costs out of their 
pockets because they are expensive in general, which means that this method may fail to 
protect poor people. 
If the direct taxation were hypothecated, the pool then would be exposed to low risk as 
more funds can be ensured. Implementing regulated Takaful PHI would also expose the 
pool to low risk, as such a method will mean the insurance companies would benefit from 
a large number of subscriptions. In contrast, the small proportion of funds that SHI could 
raise would expose the pool to a significant risk. The same is true in the case of donations 
and loans due to the lower funding that could be attained though this method and the fact 
that the continuity of donors and lenders cannot be guaranteed. However, there is no 




which is exposed to a low level of risk because every person can use up to a specific 
percentage of this pool. 
Financing the MOH through direct taxation, regulated Takaful PHI or MSA supported by 
funds from the government will facilitate the subscription of all the population categories, 
including those employed and receiving healthcare in slices from 2 to 6 without affecting 
their employers or making a change to the healthcare system of the private sector or SDU. 
However, the implementation of SHI would make it difficult for private employers to pay 
their share because they are already mandated to provide PHI to all their employees 
(including their dependents), and it is not fair to fund the Saudi healthcare system from 
employers twice, neither it is ideal to transform this infrastructure to implement SHI. 
Moreover, the MOH cannot rely heavily on donations because the reliance on this 
mechanism may weaken trust in the Saudi economy, and the MOH cannot also rely on 
loans because they must be paid back. In addition, implementing OOP as a statutory 
mechanism may encounter significant resistance from the Saudi population due to the 
continuous reforms of the Saudi Vision 2030 that reduces their disposal income. 
Since the raised funds through direct taxation, SHI with an integrated system, OOP, 
donations and loans go directly to the MOH, this would enable the MOH to use the funds 
to improve other health purposes. However, with the exception of direct taxation, all these 
methods would be less likely to improve other health purposes due to the low level of 
funds that they could raise for the MOH. In addition, other health purposes cannot be 
improved via SHI if collection, pooling and funding are outsourced, as is the case with 
the PHI. The same is true if MSA were employed, because contributions in this method 
go directly to each person’s account, even if a second account with pooling were in place, 
because usually this pool is assigned to cover specific healthcare services and used up to 




Finally, it can be seen that the direct taxation, MSA supported by funds from the Saudi 
government, and regulated Takaful PHI are more suitable to fund the Saudi MOH 
according to the criteria for health financing system design. However, these criteria 
showed that implementing SHI, OOP, donation and loans would be difficult in the Saudi 
context. 
 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Healthcare Funding in CEE and FSU in the Period of Transformation  
In the period from 1990 to 1997, half of the CEE and FSU countries experienced severe 
economic disruptions from civil war. The real GDP of these countries showed a sharp 
decrease of up to 68%, which caused a decline in wages and tax collection (see Table 9) 
(Preker et al., 2002, McKee et al., 2011). 
The healthcare systems of these countries were funded through state budgets and provided 
free access (at the point of use) to their citizens (Alexa et al., 2015, Katsaga et al., 2012). 
However, due to the deteriorating economic conditions, and in order to guarantee constant 
access to healthcare services for their citizens, most of these countries introduced a new 
transitional plan to ensure the sustainability of public spending on healthcare. For 
instance, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia (hereafter referred 
to as Group A) introduced SHI as the predominant mechanism (Habicht et al., 2018, 
Smatana et al., 2016). Albania, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Romania, and Russia (hereafter 
referred to as Group B) continued to finance the majority of the system through Taxation, 
supplemented by a new payroll tax introduced to meet the shortage in public spending   
(Mitenbergs et al., 2012a). Due to the severity of the decrease in public financing in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova (hereafter referred to as Group C) 
individuals in these countries were forced to pay for their healthcare needs via Out of 




Table 9 shows that the countries that applied SHI as the predominant mechanism broadly 
succeeded in improving their public spending on healthcare despite the deteriorating 
economic conditions. That is, the average level of spending of Group A by 1997 was 16% 
higher than in 1990. Specifically, the data shows that three countries reported increases 
in public healthcare resources between 1990 and 1997 (Czech Republic 15.8%, Estonia 
86.8%, and Slovakia 13.3%); Hungary reported a slight decline (by 4.3%), and Croatia 
decreased by 31.5%.  
Table 9 CEE and FSU Countries’ Real GDPs, Private Spending on Health, and 1997 
Real Public Spending on Health as a Percentage of 1990 
 
Country 
Change in Real 
GDP % 1990-97 
Private Spending 
1997 % 
1997 Real Public Spending 
on Health as % of 1990 
Group A Social Health Insurance 
Croatia -18 16.4 -31.5 
Czech R -9 8.3 15.8 
Estonia -21 13.3 86.8 
Hungary -6 18.3 -4.3 
Slovakia -2 19.3 13.3 
Average -11.2 15.1 16 
Group B Taxation 
Albania -11 23.3 -53.5 
Kazakhstan -40 32.5 -42.1 
Latvia -45 22.6 -22.2 
Romania -13 30.0 -6.5 
Russia -40 2.3 21.9 
Average -29.8 22.1 -20.5 
Group C Out of Pocket 
Azerbaijan -57 81.5 -78.2 
Georgia -68 87.5 -71.1 
Kyrgyzstan -43 60.3 -60.3 
Moldova -63 45.8 -6.5 
Average -57.7 68.7 -40.5 
 
Source: (Preker et al., 2002) 
In Group B, Table 9 shows that by 1997 public healthcare expenditure decreased by an 
average of 20.5%; Albania and Kyrgyzstan had sharp declines of 53.5% and 42.1%, 
respectively. Private spending in Kazakhstan and Romania as a share of total spending 
on healthcare reached 32.5% and 30%, respectively. That said, however, public spending 
as a percentage of the total spending on healthcare for the countries in this Group 
remained high. Moreover, the introduction of the payroll tax (from 2% to 4% of 




Group B. For example, in Russia, the payroll tax accounted for 28% of the total spending 
on health in 1997 (Preker et al., 2002). 
The countries in Group C experienced sharp contractions, as evidenced by the significant 
reductions in public healthcare spending by 1997 in comparison to 1990 (an average 
decrease of 40.5%). Private spending in this group surged to an average of  68.7% of total 
healthcare spending during this time and peaked at 81.5%, 87.5% and 60% in Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, respectively (Preker et al., 2002). The World Bank available 
national household surveys in 1998 shows that 50% of the investigated sample in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan did not access healthcare, because of the lack of financial resources; this 
figure was 30% in Moldova. In Georgia, people paid 70% of their monthly household 
earnings to pay for healthcare, and 40% of the households borrowed funds or sold 
property to cover healthcare expenses. In Moldova 30% of the investigated sample 
borrowed to cover their health costs (Preker et al., 2002, McKee et al., 2011). 
3.3.2 Healthcare Funding in CEE and FSU after the Transformation  
Subsequent to the transformation period, the majority of the investigated CEE and FSU 
healthcare systems kept using the same mechanisms (with a few changes to the level of 
contribution) introduced during the transformation period. The data in Table 10 shows 
that Group A countries continued to fund the majority (i.e. more than 65%) of their 
healthcare systems through SHI — Hungary, at 55.6%, was the lowest. In general, public 
spending as a percentage of the total spending on healthcare has been stable between 70% 
and 80% in the majority of Group A countries since 2000 (see Table 10). The data also 
shows that since 2000, the share of public spending on healthcare in Slovakia increased, 
and decreased by a small percentage in Estonia, and decreased at higher percentages in 
Croatia, Czech Republic, and Hungary — this was due to a larger increase in VHI and 




Table 10 CEE and FSU Countries’ Spending on Healthcare20 
Country Public Spending on 
Health as % of Total 
Government spending 
2015 vs 2000 
2015 Public 
Spending on Health 
as % of 2000 Public 
Spending on Health 
Public Spending 









Group A Social Health Insurance 
Croatia -3.11 -10.9 76.8 74.4 15.2 8.0 
Czech R 2.19 -7.8 82.4 70.4 14.8 0.1 
Estonia 1.53 -1.6 75.4 64.9 22.8 0.2 
Hungary -2.04 -5.4 66.7 55.6 29 2.3 
Slovakia -0.44 5.9 79.7 75.4 18.4 0.0 
Group B Taxation 
Albania 2.44 19.6 42.3 34 56.9 0.0 
Kazakhstan 1.67 18.1 60.2 0.0 38.8 0.2 
Latvia 1.52 13.3 57.5 0.0 41.6 0.8 
Romania 1.96 -3.5 77.8 64.5 21.3 0.3 
Russia -0.15 2.9 61.1 33.8 36.4 2.2 
Group C Out of Pocket 
Azerbaijan -1.23 -10.5 20.2 0.0 78.6 0.6 
Georgia 4.1 158.8 38.8 0.0 57.3 1.3 
Kyrgyzstan 2.81 -7.2 44.9 6.1 48.2 0.0 
Moldova 3.69 -10.6 45.5 40 46.2 0.2 
 
Source: WHO (WHO, 2018) 
Abbreviation: 4,5,6As a percentage of total spending on healthcare.  
Note: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary’s data are from 2003, Slovakia from 2005 instead of 2000. 
 
In Hungary, no remarkable changes were made to the system except for an adjustment to 
the SHI contribution which was reduced because it was seen to be causing tax evasion. 
The reduced revenue caused by the reduction in SHI contributions was then offset by a 
general tax (Gaal, 2011). In Croatia, the flat declines in public spending on healthcare as 
a percentage of the government budget since 2011 (13% in 2011 to 12% in 2015), was 
due to the increase in the government budget (Džakula et al., 2014). In Slovakia, driven 
by higher revenues from economic growth, public spending on health increased between 
2004 and 2010. It is noted that since then the increase in the percentage of public spending 
on healthcare in Slovakia was caused predominantly by a change in the private spending 
reporting system (Smatana et al., 2016). Similarly, the reason for the decrease in the 
percentage of public spending on healthcare in Estonia since 2009 was mainly due to a 
change in health expenditure calculation (i.e. now excludes capital investment), and by a 
                                               





change the method of reporting OOP (Habicht et al., 2018). Private spending on 
healthcare in Group A countries has increased since 1997, except in Slovakia. However, 
the reliance on VHI remained marginal, except in Croatia (WHO, 2018). 
Public spending on healthcare in all Group B countries has increased significantly since 
the transformation with the exception of Romania, where the worsening economic 
situation and the unstable political landscape since 2010 has caused a reduction in public 
spending in order to meet fiscal deficit targets (Vlădescu et al., 2016) — that said, 
however, the proportion of health spending accounted for by public spending in Romania 
is still one of the highest in the Group.  
Three countries in Group B (Romania, Russia and Albania) have increased the reliance 
on SHI (instead of general Taxation) to fund their healthcare system. For example, 
Romania implemented SHI in 1999, and since then, the majority of the system is funded 
through this mechanism (Vlădescu et al., 2016). Russia introduced SHI in 1993, and 
funding via this method has grown from 24% to 34% in 2000 and 2015, respectively 
(Popovich et al., 2011, WHO, 2018). The same is true in Albania, which introduced SHI 
in 1995 to cover a basic list of reimbursable drugs and the payment of family doctors 
(Rudina, 2017). Since that time, the spending on healthcare via this mechanism has 
increased significantly from 7% to 34% in 2000 and 2015, respectively. Due to the large 
informal economy, and problems with tax collection, the sustainability of public spending 
on healthcare in Albania remains uncertain (Kutzin et al., 2010). Many reforms were 
introduced prior to 2010 to improve the funding system. These include the development 
of a more centralised system with state functions consolidated in fewer institutions (on 
the administrative and financial levels), the establishment of one central institution for 
purchasing healthcare, and a healthcare delivery system with a strong focus on primary 
care. However, the majority of the system is still funded through private sources 




In Kazakhstan, public spending on healthcare has improved significantly since 2000. This 
was mainly due to the comprehensive programme of healthcare reforms that was adopted 
in 2004. These reforms included pooling the fund and improving health purchasing 
methods through a new provider payment system (Katsaga et al., 2012). The same is true 
for the increase in 2010, which was mainly due to the state healthcare development 
programme (Salamatty Kazakhstan).  
With the exceptions of Romania and Kazakhstan, the data shows that the private spending 
on healthcare of Group B countries has increased significantly since the 1990s, which 
was mainly driven from OOP. However, the data shows that the VHI still has a relatively 
minor role in funding healthcare (see Table 9 and Table 10) (WHO, 2018).  
In Group C, the data shows that Georgia is the only country that succeeded in improving 
its healthcare system funding since the sharp decreases in public spending in the 1990s. 
The data shows that public funding increased by 159% from 2000 to 2015, in comparison 
to decreases of 71.1% in the 1990s. Prior to 2004, the majority of public healthcare 
spending in Georgia was funded via SHI, which, because it was underfunded, was 
unsuccessful in delivering a basic package, such that between 2004 and 2012, 
marketisation was undertaken. From 2008 to 2012, most government spending on 
healthcare was directed through PHI companies, which were paid to provide a standard 
package of benefits for children, pensioners, teachers, students, the disabled, and those 
living in poverty (Richardson and Berdzuli, 2017). There was a change in government in 
December 2012, and reforms since February 2013 have sought to bring universal health 
coverage to Georgia. Government health spending has increased significantly under this 
Universal Health Care Programme, and by 2015, private spending has decreased to 58% 
of the total healthcare spending compared to 87% in 1997. However, OOP payments still 




Spending on healthcare by the rest countries in Group C (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova) has not increased since the severe decreases in public spending in the 1990s. 
The exact structure of healthcare spending in Azerbaijan is difficult to define because the 
data was difficult to track and what information is available is based on WHO estimates 
(Ibrahimov et al., 2010). That notwithstanding, it is evident that private spending, which 
peaked in 2005 at 88% (WHO, 2018), still accounts for the majority of the spending in 
Azerbaijan. In Kyrgyzstan, although public spending in the past two decades has been 
highly unstable. The increase in public spending in Kyrgyzstan since 2005 is explained 
by the increase in funding from external agencies (Ibraimova et al., 2011). In Moldova, 
private spending on healthcare as a percentage of total health spending increased from 
46% to 55% in 1997 and 2015, respectively. In 2004, the country introduced Mandatory 
Health Insurance, which helped to increase the public spending on healthcare in 2004 
(Turcanu et al., 2012). However, since then, public spending on healthcare has decreased 
to a percentage lower than the percentage in 2000 (WHO, 2018). 
3.3.3 Healthcare Funding in CEE and FSU through Other Sources 
Many of the FSU and CEE countries also fund their healthcare systems via other sources 
(i.e. Donations and Loans). Based on 2015 data (see Table 10), it was found that Group 
A countries fund between 1% and 3% of the total spending on their healthcare systems 
from other sources; Croatia is an exception. The percentage for Group B countries is 1%. 
Unsurprisingly, Group C has a significantly higher percentage funded from external 
sources — in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova the figure is in excess of 7% (WHO, 2018).  
In some of the CEE and FSU, informal payments are seen as an important source of 
healthcare financing. In some countries these are clearly illegal, whereas in others, their 
legality is and has remained ambiguous. The prevalence of informal payments emerged 
from the decline in the CEE and FSU economies in the 1990s. During this time, healthcare 




driven tool to maximise income and evade taxes. Informal payments are also a demand 
side tool for consumers to attempt to improve the level of healthcare services provided 
(such as getting easy access to healthcare services, jumping the queue, or ensuring better 
level of quality) (Cherecheş et al., 2013). 
In Moldova, a survey studying hospital care in 2011 showed that 37.9% of all hospitalised 
patients made informal payments (about $100 on average). Moreover, it was found that 
the highest percentage of informal payments goes to maternity (71%) and surgery 
departments (50.9%) (Turcanu et al., 2012). In a study conducted on 5,337 patients in 
2006 by the Health Policy Analysis Centre in Kyrgyzstan, it was found that 76% paid 
informal payment for medical personnel and 44% for drugs (Ibraimova et al., 2011). A 
survey conducted by the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey in 2009, found that 
38.5% of respondents applying for inpatient care, and 28.6% applying for outpatient care 
made informal payments (Popovich et al., 2011). In Azerbaijan, informal payments 
accounted for 22.4% of total healthcare expenditure in 2002 (Ibrahimov et al., 2010). 
In a survey conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 
2011, it was found that 15% of respondents in Croatia made informal payments, where 
56% went to doctors, and 36% to nurses (Džakula et al., 2014). Muzik et al (2013) 
conducted a survey in Slovakia, and found that 71.4% of 1,181 respondents reported 
making an informal payment in the form of cash or presents (Smatana et al., 2016). The 
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer data showed that 15% of the 
Czech Republic population made informal payments in 2013 (Alexa et al., 2015). In 
Estonia, the University of Tartu developed a survey in 2011, which concluded that 2% of 
patients acknowledged having made informal payments to obtain faster access to care and 
about 3% paid after getting the treatment (Habicht et al., 2018). In Latvia, the Global 
Corruption Barometer report (2010-2011) showed that 15% of respondents indicated that 




The high reliance to fund healthcare on such a method in CEE and FSU countries means 
that healthcare providers focus on those who are willing to pay, and ignores patients from 
vulnerable groups. Since the fund goes to individuals instead of the overall healthcare 
system, the grey economy prospers and the opportunity to upgrade medical equipment, 
improve nursing standards, increase level of efficiency, or improve quality is limited. 
3.3.4 WE Countries 
Data for public spending on healthcare (i.e. Taxation and SHI) covering a period of 
sixteen years, shows that most WE countries rely on Taxation as a predominant 
mechanism for funding their healthcare systems, i.e. fund > 50% of the system via tax 
(see Table 11). Denmark, Sweden, and UK fund their healthcare systems most via 
Taxation (by over 80%), with marginal changes since 2000. The other countries who rely 
mostly on Taxation to fund their healthcare systems do so in the range of 60–80% though 
Taxation, with a maximum change of approximately ± 7%.  
Table 11 Taxation and SHI as a Percentage of Total Health Expenditure among WE 
Countries21 
Country Taxation Social Health Insurance 
2000 2015 Change % 2000 2015 Change % 
Austria 28.7 30.8 2.1 45.9 44.8 -1.1 
Belgium 15.9 23.2 7.3 63.4 59.2 -4.2 
Denmark 83.0 84.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 60.0 64.1 4.1 14.0 13.3 -0.7 
France 3.5 4.0 0.5 75.3 75.0 -0.3 
Germany 7.5 6.6 -0.9 71.8 77.9 6.1 
Greece 26.1 30.3 4.2 32.3 28.8 -3.5 
Ireland 77.5 71.2 -6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Italy 72.6 74.6 2.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 
Luxembourg 9.2 9.8 0.6 73.0 72.9 -0.1 
Portugal 69.6 65.0 -4.6 0.8 1.2 0.4 
Spain 66.0 66.3 0.3 5.3 4.7 -0.6 
Sweden 81.8 83.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
UK 81.8 80.4 -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 48.8 49.6 0.78 27.3 27.0 -0.3 
 
Source: (OECD, 2018a, WHO, 2018) 
Note: Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain’s data are reported from 2003, Austria from 2004, and Greece 
from 2008 instead of 2000.  
                                               
21 There was a lack of access to the Taxation data. Therefore, it was calculated by deducting the SHI 
spending on healthcare from the total government percentage. Also, there was a reporting issue for Taxation 





SHI is the next most prevalent method and this is used predominantly in France, 
Germany, and Luxemburg who consistently funded their healthcare systems in the range 
of 70–80% via SHI during the period under investigation. In Belgium and Austria, the 
healthcare system was funded by 60% and 45% through SHI in 2015, respectively; the 
SHI percentage in both countries has decreased by less than 5% since 2000 (see Table 
11). 
The figures in Table 12 show that eleven of the WE countries finance their healthcare 
system through OOP in a percentage lower than 20%; France and Luxembourg finance 
less than 10% of their healthcare systems via this mechanism. OOP as a percentage of 
total spending in 2015 was most prevalent in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy (35.5%, 
27.7%, 24.2%, and 22.8%, respectively) (WHO, 2018). Moreover, the data shows that 
since 2000, the percentage of OOP among the fifteen countries in Table 12 did not show 
any remarkable changes, with half of the countries reporting small decreases and the other 
half small increases.  
Table 12 OOP and VHI as a Percentage of Total Expenditure on Health in WE 
Countries 
Country OOP VHI 
2000 2015 Change % 2000 2015 Change % 
Austria 17.8 17.9 0.1 5.3 4.9 -0.4 
Belgium 20.7 17.6 -3.1 5.1 4.8 -0.3 
Denmark 15.4 13.7 -1.7 1.5 2.1 0.6 
Finland 23.2 19.9 -3.3 2.8 2.6 -0.2 
France 7.3 6.8 -0.5 13.1 13.6 0.5 
Germany 12.0 12.5 0.5 7.4 1.5 -5.9 
Greece 39.4 35.5 -3.9 2.3 3.7 1.4 
Ireland 12.1 15.2 3.1 10.4 12.3 -1.9 
Italy 26.5 22.8 -3.7 0.9 1.5 0.6 
Luxembourg 14.3 10.6 -3.7 2.4 6.0 3.6 
Netherlands 9.4 12.3 2.9 18.1 5.9 -12 
Portugal 25.0 27.7 2.7 3.6 5.2 1.6 
Spain 24.3 24.2 -0.1 5.4 4.4 -1.0 
Sweden 14.5 15.2 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.6 
UK 11.5 14.8 3.3 3.4 3.4 0.0 
Average 18.23 17.78 -0.45 5.45 4.83 -0.85 
 
Source: (WHO, 2018, OECD, 2018a) 





The data in Table 12 shows that VHI accounted for a small proportion of the total 
spending on healthcare in the past sixteen years of all the investigated countries, with only 
marginal increases or decreases, except in Netherlands and Germany, where the funding 
via this mechanism decreased significantly in the period under investigation (by 12% and 
6%, respectively). 
In the Netherlands, VHI had increased to 20.1% as a percentage of the total spending on 
healthcare in 2005, before the government applied a change to the system that required 
every person (excepting those under 18 years) to obtain a basic health insurance policy 
(compulsory) to cover their healthcare costs. The Dutch government also required 
insurers to provide community rated policies and to accept all applicants, in return for 
providing subsides for the exposure to risk (Kroneman et al., 2016). These amendments 
to the system reduced the proportion funded via VHI to 6.4% in 2006, a proportion which 
since then has remained relatively low (WHO, 2018). 
Similarly in Germany, VHI increased to 8.6% as a percentage of total spending on 
healthcare in 2008, before the government obligated insurers to offer a new basic tariff 
that provided similar benefits to those provided by SHI, at premium that did not exceed 
the highest contribution in the SHI system (about €630 per month in 2014) (Busse and 
Blümel, 2014). Thereafter, funding via VHI in Germany decreased to 1.4% in 2009, and 
has remained constant at this level. 
3.3.5 United States 
In the mid-1980s, PHI became the dominant funding mechanism in the US and remained 
the major funding method for funding US healthcare system (Rice et al., 2013). During 
the 1980s, rampant inflation in the cost of insurance and health services in the US lead to 
the introduction of managed care, where an insurer makes a deal with healthcare providers 




Subsequent to the introduction of managed care, prices decreased, before increasing again 
after 1997 (Rice et al., 2013). These price increases were caused by insurance companies 
segmenting the healthcare services within insurance packages in order to maximise 
revenues.  
A group of academics, insurers, and providers met in Jackson Hole to analyse the 
complexity of the PHI market and the problems caused by policy segmentation and 
adverse selection. The Jackson Hole Group suggested obliging private insurance 
companies to i) provide minimum healthcare coverage to everyone, and ii) broadly define 
the healthcare services that are covered by the offered packages (Ellwood et al., 1992).  
They also suggested the creation of purchasing agencies (at least one in each state) to act 
as broker who is fully aware of the market, the health insurance companies, the packages, 
and the health services that will be covered by each package. These agencies work by 
collecting money from employers and guiding them to the best packages, especially for 
the companies with a small number of employees.  
The Jackson Hole Group’s proposals formed the basis of the (ultimately unsuccessful) 
attempts by the Clinton administration to reform the US healthcare system in the 1990s. 
The proposal required insurers to issue insurance to all applicants and had to charge the 
same premiums to everyone. It also determined minimum coverage requirements, that 
included many free preventive services (Rice et al., 2013). The core concepts and 
objectives of the Clinton reforms was to mandate insurance to achieve universal coverage 
and to control prices and premiums to restrain health costs.   
This proposal resurfaced recently as part of Obamacare. Obamacare’s goal was to lower 
the nation’s healthcare costs and ensure that every citizen had healthcare coverage. It 
initially did this by mandating everyone to buy insurance. To enforce the mandate, a tax 
penalty was levied on those without insurance. Insurers were required not to take health 




charged no more than three times the premium of younger applicants; also smokers can 
be only be charged 1.5 times more than non-smokers), with guaranteed renewability of 
policies. Moreover, insurers were required to not exclude people with pre-existing 
conditions, and to not drop anyone when they become sick. In addition, insurers were 
required to present information about their plans in a standard format. Obamacare 
also subsidised middle-income families, to allow more people to afford better 
insurance. To pay for these subsidies, Obamacare increased taxes on healthcare providers 
and those with high-incomes (Rice et al., 2013). Since the introduction of Obamacare 
(2010), the percentage of US population without health insurance has decreased from 
16% to 9.1% by 2017 (Statista, 2018). 
3.3.6 Switzerland 
In Switzerland, PHI was voluntary up to 1996 and premiums were individually rated. This 
was because most of the population is wealthy, and the premiums are supported by 
general tax subsidies, making the premiums low and affordable (98% of the population 
are insured). However, subsidies started decreasing in the mid-1970s and healthcare costs 
in Switzerland have been increasing since 1980. To combat rising costs, insurers exerted 
pressure on their members, making the PHI unaffordable for some (i.e. old people, and 
those with chronic diseases found it very difficult to obtain a PHI policy). In 1996, the 
Swiss government introduced a compulsory PHI, covered by health insurance companies, 
with community rated premiums. The government obliged companies to accept everyone 
with no discrimination, and supported them with subsides. Specific categories of people 
pay reduced premiums or no premiums at all (29% of the population in 2012) (Pietro et 
al., 2015). It was found that the transition from the uncontrolled market to the regulated 






In Australia, the healthcare system has been mixed between public and private insurance 
since 1953. In 1975, a universal public health insurance programme was introduced 
(Medibank). This programme is funded via contributions from peoples’ income, which 
then covers up to 85% of their healthcare costs in public and private healthcare facilities. 
Subsequently, the government established Medicare in 1984 to take the role of Medibank 
(which, in 1997, became a private health insurer owned by the government), and the 
percentage of contribution required increased from 1% to 1.5% (Dixit and Sambasivan, 
2018, Willis et al., 2016)  
After the introduction of the Medicare, the proportion of the Australian population with 
PHI decreased so as the high percentage of their healthcare cost is covered, and the PHI 
premiums increased. By the late 1990s, the government introduced a new subsidy 
programme for those purchasing PHI and on low incomes (less than AU$ 35,000), and 
an additional levy of 1% to Medicare was charged to individuals who did not buy PHI 
but had taxable income over AU$50,00022. This was subsequently replaced by non-
means-tested tax rebate. In 2000, lifetime community rating was introduced in Australia 
to encourage people to purchase PHI while young. Basically, this programme incurs a 2% 
premium to the base PHI rate for every year a person did not subscribed to PHI since 
he/she turned thirty years old (Willis et al., 2016). For example, if a person turned 35 
years old and had not purchased PHI, then a 10% premium will be added to the cost of 
their policy. The premium is capped by 70%, and can be removed if a person maintained 
their PHI for a period of 10 years. This legislation substantially increased the percentage 
of people with PHI from 30% in 2000 to 47.2% in 2014.   
                                               
22 The individual taxable income was changed to AU$90,000 (AIHW 2016). AIHW, A. I. O. H. W. 2016. 




In 2012, the government re-examined the previously discussed non-means-tested PHI tax 
rebate, and decided to reintroduce means testing. Specifically, those with income less than 
$84,000 now receive a 30% rebate, a percentage which decreases gradually to zero for 
those with incomes greater than $124,000; those who do not purchase PHI until they are 
older than 30 years are no longer entitled to the rebate (Willis et al., 2016). Such control 
on the healthcare system ensures the sustainability of the health insurance system. 
3.3.8 Singapore 
MSA was first introduced in Singapore in 1984. MSA requires individuals to save from 
6–8% of their income every month in an earmarked account (Medisave), to be used solely 
to fund their healthcare expenses. This account is used under strict guidelines to pay for 
hospitalisation, surgery, and outpatient expenses. Since 2015, coverage was extended to 
some chronic diseases and vaccinations. In 1990, the Singapore government introduced 
a catastrophic health insurance programme (MediShield), which is funded by premiums 
from individual Medisave accounts. This programme was established to address the need 
to fund major or long-term illnesses. Recent changes to this programme removed the 
benefit cap and the age restriction (coverage previously ended at age 90). In 1993, the 
government introduced Medifund, an endowment funded by the government to pay for 
the health expenses of the poor and for those who had used up all of their Medisave 
balance and their eligibility from the MediShield account (Mossialos et al., 2016). 
Because there is no risk pooling, the aim of MSA is to overcome adverse selection. The 
result is equity among the population — every Singaporean has reasonable access to 
healthcare, and the quality of healthcare services has increased. MSA has also been very 
effective at controlling healthcare costs (Mossialos et al., 2016). 
3.3.9 Conclusion 
The serious economic downturns that took place in the CEE and FSU countries in 1990, 




clear from the stable level of funding up to the past few years that the majority of CEE 
and FSU countries that implemented SHI have succeeded in securing a sustainable source 
of funding for their healthcare systems. Public spending on healthcare decreased in some 
of the countries that continued to fund the majority of their system via general taxation 
supported by payroll taxes. Indeed, some of them have shifted to be more SHI based. That 
said, however, this cannot be used as evidence for the fragility of taxation based systems. 
This is because the majority of WE countries use taxation based systems and these have 
largely succeeded in keeping funding stable for the past two decades.  
The healthcare systems of the countries that did not implement any mechanism 
experienced significant declines in public spending, such that many people were left 
without health coverage and OOP became more prevalent to fill the funding shortage. 
The literature review showed that OOP accounts for less than 20% of healthcare funding 
in many WE countries but more than 35% in many of the FSU and CEE countries, where 
the use of voluntary PHI was low. In addition, regulated PHI succeeded in increasing the 
number of insured people in USA, Switzerland, and Australia. In Singapore, MSA had 
great success in ensuring the stability of healthcare funding. Surprisingly, MSA is still 
not widely used outside of Singapore. 
 Discussion 
Figure 7 summarises the healthcare financing mechanisms that are used globally. The 
figure is designed based on the real experience of USA, Switzerland, Australia, 
Singapore, WE, CEE, and FSU countries. The donation and loan mechanism will not be 
discussed at length as it is not considered as a major source of funding in any country in 
this study. In this part, the study will discuss each mechanism provided in Figure 7 
separately to outline the possible mechanisms and determine the best for raising a fund 




3.4.1 Public Mechanisms 
 Taxation 
The experience of the majority of CEE and FSU countries in Group B who predominantly 
funded their healthcare systems via Taxation, was not positive. This may be due to two 
factors, i) the way the tax system is designed (i.e. the collection, pooling and operation of 
the fund), and ii) the variables that shape the system (i.e. the economy, demographic 
classifications, people’s financial conditions, as well as the government’s needs). If the 
interoperability of all of these factors and variables are not considered before designing 
the system, then the desired goal is less likely to be achieved. For instance, the evidence 
from eight WE countries, all of which rely on Taxation as a predominant mechanism for 
funding their healthcare systems, shows this method to be a reliable mechanism for 
funding the healthcare system. Similarly, and notwithstanding it being an FSU country, 
the Kazakhstan experience (where the public healthcare spending increased by 18% in 
2015 in comparison to 2000) (see Table 10) shows that Taxation can be a reliable method 
to fund the healthcare system even in developing countries. 
The blue line in Figure 7, suggests that Taxation can be used solely to fund the healthcare 
system (hypothecated), or also used to fund other public services (un-hypothecated). 
Within the Taxation system, indirect Taxation can be used as a compulsory method to 
fund the healthcare system, but is unlikely to be used as a predominant mechanism. The 
figure indicates that if direct tax was used, then it can be compulsorily collected from 
individuals, households, and/or firms. This gives the government choices on how to use 
the revenue raised to finance the healthcare services that are provided by the public 






If direct taxes from individuals is the mechanism selected to fund the healthcare system, 
then there are three groups from which the tax can be levied, i) the employed,  ii) the self-
employed, and iii) the unemployed. Governments can levy the tax based on the person’s 
salary or total income. If the person’s income is below a minimum level (as determined 
by the government), then free coverage is usually provided from the health insurance 
pooled fund; if there is not enough in the pooled fund, then other public funds fill the gap 
(i.e. the general government budget).  
One of the issues of employing direct tax is the percentage of the retired and unemployed 
people in the country. That is, if this percentage is high (as is the case in many European 
countries) this could put the pooled fund under a significant pressure of collapse. This 
issue will be further exacerbated if the number of those under 18 and/or dependent is also 
high. In such cases, direct Taxation must be supplemented by indirect methods or by 
another healthcare financing mechanism. 
In general, the direct tax financing system provides all citizens with the same access to 
healthcare regardless of how much they contribute (generalisation). If those with high 
incomes contribute a higher percentage of their incomes, then the system is progressive; 
if those with lower incomes contribute a higher percentage, then the system is regressive 
and can significantly impact those on low incomes, because they already spend a larger 
portion of their income (than those on higher incomes) on the cost of living and basic 
needs. Any attempt to make the system more proportionate by replacing a purely 
percentage tax method with one that combines an absolute contribution with an albeit 
reduced percentage tax is only likely to reduce the progressivity of the system. Therefore, 
countries should take population income strength into consideration when designing the 
healthcare financial system, or when considering shifting funding from direct to indirect 
Taxation. Moreover, every healthcare financing system has an ongoing conflict between 




likely when a combination of direct and indirect methods is used. That said, however, it 
is possible to raise the funds required and achieve a relatively proportionate system even 
in a predominantly directly funded system. For instance,  the experience of Denmark and 
Sweden, where both rely heavily on direct Taxation, proves that such a mechanism can 
make the system relatively less progressive (Evans, 2002). The most important element 
in creating a successful system is to be aware of the demographic characteristics and the 
economic situation in the country, as well as the targeted population’s financial conditions 
before designing the system. However, all of these variables are constantly changing 
across time, such that adjustments often have to be made to reorganise the system’s needs. 
The most common method used to rebalance the healthcare funding system is via 
adjustments to the tax system (i.e. via tax concessions, exemptions, reductions, credits, 
reliefs, and/or deferrals). These tax adjustment tools are widely used to mitigate the 
burden on those on higher incomes who might otherwise try and evade tax to avoid paying 
more (and so reduce the level of the pooled fund). If the regressive nature of the system 
is the issue, then these tax adjustment tools can be used also to support the vulnerable 
group.  
 Social Health Insurance 
The experience of CEE and FSU countries in Group A with SHI in the 1990s was 
successful with a particularly high degree of success in three countries — Czech 
Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia. Since 2000, public spending on healthcare in some of 
the countries in Group A has decreased. This cannot be seen as a weakness of SHI, 
because public spending via this method still represents in excess of 65% of the total 






















































































































Figure 7 shows that this mechanism can be used to levy uniform percentages among 
employees with high, middle, and low income, and can also levy the same or different 
percentages between the employee and the employer. Another feature of SHI is that the 
pooled fund is kept for the reason for which it was raised. Unlike Taxation, SHI mainly 
targets the employee and employer; some countries target the self-employed. Moreover, 
if SHI is used as the only insurance method to fund the system, then the unemployed, 
children, and family dependents will be covered from the pooled fund. In the countries 
where Taxation is used to supplement SHI, the healthcare costs of these groups are 
covered by Taxation. Similar to Taxation, the government has the option to collect the 
fund and then to either operate it or pass it to private insurance companies. However, in 
most countries, the government usually outsources the collection and operation of the 
fund to a private body.  
Most CEE countries that use SHI predominantly outsource the collection and operation 
of the fund. This ensures the independence of the SHI from the government, and results 
in better services, because the contributions cannot be diverted to other government 
programmes. For example,  in Estonia and Poland, the system is totally independent and 
this is to ensure that the collected fund will be used solely for healthcare purposes (Jesse 
et al., 2004, Kuszewski et al., 2005). However, because this method incurs additional 
private agency administrative costs, the net fund available for healthcare services is 
necessarily lower.  
One issue with the SHI system in some countries is that it misses the chance to collect 
money from the self-employed and capital investors causing a shortfall in the pooled fund 
— both of these groups are taken into account via the Taxation method. If the country 
increases the SHI percentage to cover the shortfall, the employer may shift the burden 
onto the employee by reducing salaries in future contracts. It may also encourage the 




from the SHI contribution, i.e. food and clothing allowances. This has the potential to 
reduce the level of liquidity and, taken to conclusion, to cause the healthcare fund to 
collapse. 
 Fund Collection and Number of Funds 
The government can create as many public and/or private pools as the system needs. 
Indeed, many believe that healthcare systems that have multiple funds split between the 
government and healthcare providers increases the efficiency, productivity, and quality 
of healthcare services because of the competition between the providers. However, the 
use of multiple funds has the potential to cause inequality in the system.  This is because 
each fund can only be used by those who contribute to the fund. For example, if a local 
tax is used to fund healthcare in each locality, those who live in rich regions where the 
cost of living is higher (and which also tend to have a higher proportion of people on 
higher incomes) are more likely to experience better healthcare. The opposite is true for 
those living in poorer regions, such that the system would be unequal. Moreover, 
healthcare systems with a high number of funds will also experience higher aggregate 
administration costs such that, some countries have deliberately reduced the number of 
funds. For example, in Lithuania, the number of regional funds were lowered from 10 to 
5, and from 27 to 7 in the Czech Republic (Murauskiene et al., 2013, Alexa et al., 2015, 
Thomson et al., 2009).  
3.4.2 Private Mechanisms 
 Private Health Insurance 
PHI can be provided via for-profit or non-profit insurance companies. While the former 
is the most widely used internationally, some countries offer the latter to facilitate access 
to healthcare services (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, and UK). Moreover, both types of companies can provide conventional or 




People, as individuals and groups, can obtain PHI directly from the insurance company, 
or via an independent broker, who, in turn, passes the fund to the insurance company to 
operate (see Figure 7). The government has the option to mandate the purchase of PHI, 
and if so mandated, then the regulated choice is best. This is because if everyone is 
included without exception for health or wealth, healthcare insurance providers will 
benefit from the high level of contributions. In addition, if all insurers are obliged to 
accept everyone via open enrolment and community rating, then everyone can secure 
access to the needed healthcare services, and the government might pay for or subsidise 
the premiums for those on lower incomes. If the government fails to obtain both of open 
enrolment and community rating, then coverage might become unaffordable for those 
who are at high risk (the elderly or sick). For example, despite the fact that most of the 
population are wealthy, Switzerland’s experience with an unregulated system left some 
(especially those with health issues) without coverage. Also, the experience of the United 
States with PHI suggests that the reliance on such a mechanism may exacerbate healthcare 
costs, and leave many people without coverage  (Rice et al., 2013, Thomson et al., 2009). 
The government also has the option to allow people to decide if they want to purchase 
PHI. Depending on the country, people may decide to purchase PHI in order to i) fund 
that proportion of healthcare costs that are not covered by the statutory method 
(complementary), ii) fund the incremental cost of better quality healthcare over and above 
that covered by the statutory method (supplementary), or iii) fully fund healthcare costs 
(substitutive). Based on the experience of EU countries, the least common of the above 
options is allowing PHI to be fully substitutive to a compulsory mechanism, such as 
Taxation or SHI. The reason for this is that, if the population are given the choice between 
the two, the rich will be more likely to opt out of the statutory scheme in favour of VHI 
(due to suitability of available packages and/or their wealth) thereby placing a significant 




avoid underfunding the vulnerable group, the government may be required to support the 
healthcare fund with public funds because the vulnerable group will be unwilling/unable 
to make higher payments to cover the shortfall if it arises. 
The reality is that it is very difficult to control PHI because of the high level of risk to 
which the insurance companies are exposed. This risk causes the insurance companies to 
focus on healthy individuals and try to avoid the elderly and people with health issues 
(risk selection). In the case of individual rating, many will be left without health coverage, 
either because no company will accept them (due to age or health status matters), or 
because they cannot afford the insurance premiums and conditions. In such cases, the 
government must intervene by obliging insurance companies to provide open enrolment 
and community rating packages.  
One of the other issues with the PHI is market segmentation, where the companies 
deliberately provide too many package choices mainly to confuse the insurance seeker. 
For instance, the UK government asked the PHI market to provide more explanations and 
to be clearer to customers, but the initiative failed due to the large number of insurance 
providers in the market, and also to the competition. Subsequently, it was observed that 
anyone who wanted to buy a PHI package in UK had 90 different premiums from which 
to choose, ranging from £28.67 to £363.8 per month (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004). In 
Ireland, the number of insurance products has increased from 18 in 2003 to 328 in 2017  
(Mikkers and Ryan, 2014, IHIA, 2017).  
Governments can apply changes to the PHI system until they achieve what is best to 
serves their purposes, to be affordable by population, and to be suitable for the market 
(insurer and healthcare provider). Australia has introduced many changes to improve the 
private healthcare system. However, it is important to note that such changes could 
complicate the system such that individuals may find it more difficult to obtain health 




pressure. For this reason, when public spending on healthcare decreased in EU countries 
in the 1980s, most countries avoided transforming their healthcare systems to PHI (even 
in part). The data showed that the majority of the WE countries maintained the percentage 
of the reliance on the PHI below 5% between 1985 and 2015 (WHO, 2018, Mossialos 
and Thomson, 2004).  
Achieving a good private healthcare system needs government regulations to control the 
market, to make obligations, to provide subsidies and incentives, and to transfer from 
public pools in order to help vulnerable groups. Therefore, before exploring or making 
changes to any of the options available under PHI, an intensive investigation of the way 
the targeted mechanism is designed that takes into consideration the characteristics of the 
system is absolutely vital in order to ensure the sustainability of the system.  
 Medical Savings Accounts 
MSA is a relatively recent phenomenon and is still not widely used. If MSA was to be 
used as the predominant mechanism to fund the healthcare system, it would start with a 
compulsory savings account to cover basic health needs. Another account would be 
created to meet the additional cost of healthcare received if the balance of the main 
savings account runs out. The premiums of the second account are funded through the 
first account and sometimes by the government. An additional supplementary account is 
also created to cover the healthcare cost of vulnerable groups and those who have used 
up all of their credits and eligibility from the first and the second accounts. This 
supplementary account is usually publicly funded. The government can design the system 
as it would be most suitable for the population, and can add as many savings accounts as 
they see fit to achieve the desired objectives (see Figure 7). 
Because there is no pooling or redistribution between the healthy wealthy and the 
unhealthy poor, MSA make the healthcare system more individually based. A benefit of 




minimising moral hazard from both sides, i.e. health seekers will be vigilant to ensure 
that the funds is spent wisely in order to meet after death needs. It also has the benefit of 
reducing third party issues (such as risk selection and market segmentation) and the 
associated administrative costs. If MSA is used to fund healthcare services delivered 
through publicly owned healthcare facilities (such as is the case in SA), introducing this 
mechanism in SA might work to reduce the extra cost of healthcare services arising from 
future unnecessary demand, and to provide Saudi citizens with a source of healthcare 
funding. One of the issues with the MSA is that it needs another mechanism to support it 
(such as Taxation or SHI). This is especially true if the second and the third accounts are 
publicly funded. Direct Taxation might be a suitable choice if this were the case. 
 OOP 
OOP is prevalent in those countries where there is no functioning universal healthcare 
system or in failing economies. It is also commonly used when people are not prepared 
to fund the general healthcare system through additional tax increases or via contributions 
to social insurance plans. Some countries have introduced OOP specifically to fund new 
technology or new way of treatment that is required and ready but needs extra funding. 
OOP is also used to rationalise the use of healthcare resources by increasing user 
awareness of the cost of healthcare services.  
The use of OOP as the predominant mechanism to fund the healthcare system in failing 
economies is likely to mean that those who need healthcare are unable to receive it. This 
is because healthcare services are costly in general, and for specific treatments can be 
extremely expensive, such that they are unaffordable for many individuals. In these 
situations, the use of informal payments is likely to increase and make the system even 
more unequal as healthcare providers target the wealthy and avoid those on low incomes, 
or provide them with a lower quality of service. The experience of Group C countries in 




showed high percentages of the population with no access to healthcare and others using 
significant portions of their incomes (or even borrowing) to fund healthcare.  
Sometimes OOP is introduced to part-fund healthcare over and above that provided by a 
functioning statutory system, and also to control healthcare costs via increasing user 
awareness. OOP can be charged as a percentage or flat fee in the form of a co-payment, 
co-insurance, deductible, reference pricing, or two part tariffs. In many cases, PHI may 
reimburse all or part of the OOP. However, if this is the case, then it is likely to neutralise 
one of the main reasons OOP was introduced in the first instance, i.e. increasing user 
awareness. If the major reason for the use of OOP was to reduce moral hazard then, as an 
alternative, the government could put controls on the healthcare systems in place. For 
instance, the moral hazard from healthcare seekers could be minimised by regulating their 
access to healthcare services. One way of doing this would be to request authorisation for 
treatment (evidence based healthcare), as well as obliging them to use the gatekeeper 
window in the first instance in order to limit access to expensive and potentially 
unnecessary services. 
Most of WE, CEE, and FSU countries set the OOP percentages based on the necessity of 
the service. Usually, therapeutic drugs and preventive services are free or are subjected 
to a lower charge than services used to improve quality of life (such as cosmetic and 
dental services), where both are charged at a high rate in most of the European countries 
(Robinson, 2002). This shows how important it is to establish in advance what the 
system’s priorities are, because otherwise unnecessary services may crowd out treatments 
of primary concern from the public fund. 
The fact that the fifteen WE countries only financed a small percentage of their healthcare 
systems with OOP indicates that they were fully aware of the down side of such a 




demonstrated, overreliance on OOP leads to limited and unaffordable access to healthcare 
services.  
3.4.3 Suitable Options to Fund the Saudi Public Healthcare System 
The main priority for SA in designing a new healthcare funding mechanism is a fund that 
is sustainable and sufficient for the public healthcare system, with moral hazard being of 
less concern. This is because as demonstrated by the data in Chapter 2, despite healthcare 
being free to the Saudi populations, total demand for healthcare services that are provided 
by the Saudi MOH in the period from 2006 to 2015 showed slow growth (MOH, 2015, 
MOH, 2006). For this reason, OOP is not required to fix a problem that does not exist in 
the system. In addition, even in those WE, FSU, and CEE countries where it is used, none 
used OOP as a statutory mechanism, and the experience of some was significantly 
negative.   
This study also excludes SHI as a viable option to fund the Saudi public healthcare sector 
because it mainly targets employers and employees, such that it misses the chance to levy 
contributions from a significant percentage of the population, such as retirees and those 
receiving benefits from different sources from the government (Social Welfare Fund, 
Citizen Account Fund – estimated to reach $16 billion by 2020 – Human Resources 
Development Fund, disability benefit, and studying reward) (Almowaten, 2017). 
Moreover, the introduction of SHI as the statutory mechanism would require significant 
changes to both the healthcare system and the insurance industry in SA. This is because 
a PHI system is already in place to cover private sector employees, such that it would not 
be ideal to transform this infrastructure to implement SHI. Moreover, because the 
proposed mechanism in this study will be voluntary to those who are already entitled to 
health in the private sector, SHI will not be either feasible when there is only one 
employer involved (public sector) (Chapter 4 will discuss the funding plan, where the 




Funding the public healthcare system via Donations and Loans is similarly excluded 
because the reliance of the healthcare system in SA on these mechanisms is negligible 
(less than 0.23% of total healthcare expenditure) (WHO, 2017). Also, these mechanisms 
are not used as a basic (predominant) option elsewhere, where their prevalent is viewed 
as unreliable, because the sustainability of the donor cannot be guaranteed, and in the case 
of loans, they must be repaid.  
The reality is that there are only three suitable mechanisms to fund the Saudi public 
healthcare system — Taxation, MSA, and PHI. This is because the primary objective of 
this study is, from a situation where no statutory financing mechanism currently exists, 
to implement a basic predominant mechanism that raises a sufficient fund to finance the 
public system, these methods are viable. 
Taxation has been very successful in funding public healthcare in many of the EU 
countries, and the proposed Taxation option for SA in this study is direct Taxation (see 
the blue line in Figure 8). In addition, this study proposes that payment of these direct 
taxes is compulsory to receive the MOH healthcare services and that these direct taxes 
will be hypothecated. It is also proposed that these direct taxes would be levied solely 
from individuals (i.e. households and firms would be excluded), because, i) household 
levies can miss the opportunity to collect additional funds from different individuals 
within each family, and ii) firms in SA are already obliged to provide PHI to cover the 
healthcare costs of both their employees and their dependents, such that collecting 
additional taxes from firms to fund the public healthcare system would be unfair. It is also 
proposed that, as is the case with all of the healthcare systems investigated in this study, 
these direct taxes will be levied as a percentage of an individual’s income. All of the 
contributions will be levied by the government and will be used to cover the costs of the 
healthcare services that are provided in the MOH healthcare facilities (see the blue line 










    








MSA has been very successful in funding healthcare services in Singapore, and the 
proposed number of accounts in SA in this study is one. If an individual’s MSA runs out, 
then it is proposed that the MOH intervene to ensure the coverage of any further costs 
(rather than additional MSA, as is the case in Singapore). In this mechanism, the 
contribution will be collected by the MOH from every individual, and will be deposited 
in an account belonging to that individual in the MOH. Each individual’s balance will be 
used to cover his/her healthcare costs in the MOH healthcare facilities (see the green line 
in Figure 8). 
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PHI has been implemented predominantly in US and Switzerland. Based on the 
experience in these countries, a community rated PHI system is proposed. In SA, the 
government will oblige private insurance companies to offer the Saudi population 
community rated packages, with no exclusion (i.e. not group or individual based). The 
healthcare insurance packages offered will be Takaful health insurance, which is 
compliant with Sharia rules. This is because article one in the Law on Supervision of 
Cooperative Insurance Companies that is managed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority (SAMA), states that all of the insurance companies in SA must provide 
insurance policies compliant with Sharia (SAMA, 2004). In addition, no attention will be 
given to whether the company that provides the insurance is for profit or not-for-profit 
company, as long as the healthcare insurance packages offered are Takaful. The fund 
contributions will be collected by the private insurance companies, who in turn will pay 
the subscribers’ healthcare costs in the MOH healthcare facilities (see the red line in 
Figure 8). 
 Conclusion 
This study explores the available healthcare funding mechanisms in place in other 
economies in order to find the most suitable mechanisms that are best aligned with Saudi 
principles. To carry out this task, the healthcare systems of more than thirty countries 
were investigated. After a successful review for these healthcare systems, it was found 
that the majority of the CEE and FSU countries who implemented new funding 
mechanisms to meet the shortage in the public spending on healthcare succeeded in 
safeguarding the sustainability of funding their healthcare systems; public spending on 
healthcare severely declined in those countries which did not. 
In total, six healthcare funding mechanisms were found to be in operation these countries, 
namely: Taxation, SHI, PHI, MSA, OOP, and Donations and Loans. Moreover, it was 




of the Saudi system, with the last one (PHI) being Takaful. SHI, OOP, and donation and 
loans are excluded because, given the way in which the healthcare system is currently 
funded in SA, these are deemed unsuitable to fund the future needs of the Saudi public 
healthcare system. 
However, because healthcare services in SA are currently provided free of charge, it is 
not known whether the Saudi population will be willing to pay for their healthcare 
services into the future. Given the backdrop of the current financial situation in SA as a 
result of failing oil prices, and the financial hardship experienced by the population in the 
past few years as a result, this question is particularly relevant. Furthermore, this study 
proposes three mechanisms to fund the public healthcare system based on the experiences 
of other countries and on what might be suitable in the Saudi context. The preference of 
the Saudi population for these three mechanisms is an additional interesting research 
question. Chapter 4 of this study investigates the willingness of the Saudi population to 
pay for their healthcare services, and explores which of the three proposed mechanisms 













    The Willingness to Pay for the MOH Healthcare 
Services and the Preference to a Set of Funding Mechanisms 
The experience of many CEE and FSU countries following economic turmoil caused by 
civil war and the fall in public revenue from the major sources showed that those which 
established a proper mechanism to best match the government’s fiscal needs to fund and 
the population’s financial situation, have succeeded in implementing a sustainable 
healthcare system. The current economic trends and features of the public healthcare 
system in SA is similar to those of CEE and FSU countries before and during the 1990s. 
Specifically, the economic fallout from decreasing and volatile oil prices, exacerbated by 
the cost of SA’s involvement in the war in Yemen, has slowed the economy and placed 
significant pressure on the public budget. For this reason, as detailed in Saudi Vision 2030 
and as discussed in Chapter 1, the Saudi government is exploring options to diversify 
government expenditure away from a purely oil revenue based system. The focus of this 
thesis is how to fund the public healthcare system — this is especially pressing because 
most of the population are young (67% between 18 and 65 years), such that the only thing 
guaranteed by maintaining the status quo is that public healthcare expenditure will 
continue to increase as the population ages. Chapter 3 explored the healthcare funding 
mechanisms in more than thirty countries worldwide to find which system or 
combinations of systems might be most appropriate for the Saudi system, and proposed 
Taxation, MSA, and PHI Takaful as viable options. This Chapter investigates whether the 
Saudi population are willing to pay for their healthcare and which of these three funding 





 Study Objective 
This part of the study aims to develop a financial strategy, which the Saudi MOH can use 
to minimise its reliance on the public budget in order to reduce the fiscal burden on 
government finances and to ensure the sustainability of the public healthcare system. The 
methods proposed in Chapter 3 as being most suitable (Taxation, MSA and PHI Takaful) 
all require that some of the cost of healthcare is shifted to end users, such that both a WTP 
and a preference investigation are required.  
Specifically, two questions must be answered: 
1. Is the population of Saudi Arabia willing to pay for the healthcare services 
that are provided by the Saudi MOH? 
This question leads to another specific objective, which is identifying the factors that are 
associated with the Saudi population’s WTP. 
2. What funding mechanism does the population of Saudi Arabia prefer among 
the suitable options identified to fund the Saudi MOH? 
This question leads to another specific objective, which is identifying the factors that are 
associated with the Saudi population’s preferences in relation to the healthcare funding 
mechanisms. 
 Study Methodology 
Before answering these questions it is necessary to, ex ante, explain some background 
parameters for the financial strategy developed in this study to fund the Saudi MOH. In 
the first part of this section, the study will discuss how the population of SA will 
participate in the funding mechanism. The second part will show how the most 
appropriate insurance option will be decided. The third part will identify individuals and 
how each type of individual will be part of the insurance plan. Fourth, the study 




4.2.1 Financial Strategy (Insurance Plan) 
The current healthcare system in SA provides every Saudi and short or long term non-
Saudi resident with free access to healthcare services, either via the MOH, the Private 
Sector, or the SDU. However, because those in slice 4, 5, and 6 part A (major) and B 
(dependent) are entitled to double, and in some cases to triple access to healthcare 
services, the MOH incurs extra costs by providing healthcare services to people who are 
already guaranteed free access in the private sector or SDU facilities (see Figure 3). In 
addition, such multi eligibilities may overload and create overuse in MOH facilities and 
cause a shortage of medical personnel leading to MOH services being criticised for the 
lack of available beds, long waiting times, lack of drugs, and the poor attitude of staff 
(Al-Hanawi et al., 2018a, Al-Hanawi et al., 2018b). The result is that the access of those 
who are only eligible to receive healthcare services in MOH facilities (slice 1) is reduced. 
For this reason, the financial strategy that is developed in this study to fund the Saudi 
MOH proposes that: 
1. anyone with mutli eligibility is required to utilise non MOH healthcare facilities. 
For example, MONG soldiers and their dependents who currently have access 
to MOH and MONG healthcare facilities will be restricted to MONG facilities 
only. In other words, everyone in slice 4, 5, and 6 part A or B can access 
healthcare services only in their domain. 
2. if those in slice 4, 5, and 6 part A or B want to maintain their access to healthcare 
services in MOH healthcare facilities, they must subscribe to the healthcare 
insurance mechanism. 
3. if those in slice 2 and 3 part A or B want to obtain access to MOH healthcare 




The first point will decrease the MOH healthcare costs because those in slices 4, 5, and 6 
part A and B will no longer have access to the MOH healthcare facilities. In so doing it 
will increase the access to MOH healthcare facilities of those in slice 1 such that this 
cohort will be more willing to participate in the insurance mechanism. Points two and 
three will provide the MOH with extra funds. 
The beneficiaries of the scheme proposed in this study are any Saudi or non-Saudi 
residents who (depending on their eligibility to healthcare) have a desire either to 
increase, maintain, or obtain access to MOH healthcare services. They should, however, 
be willing to contribute a proportion of their total income to the insurance mechanism. 
4.2.2 The Participation Method 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is widely used to understand the perception of a 
population about participating in funding public healthcare services (Venkatachalam, 
2004). CVM is a survey based hypothetical approach for eliciting people’s value for 
healthcare services (Diener et al., 1998). In general, this technique asks people to reveal 
the value that they are willing to place on healthcare services (Bayoumi, 2004). There are 
two techniques involved in this method, willingness to accept (WTA) and WTP. The 
decision about which method to choose depends on the initial assumption about property 
rights at the point of survey. If rights pre-exist, then WTA is the appropriate method, 
where if there is no right, then WTP is used (Atkinson and Mourato, 2006). WTA asks 
people about the minimum amount that they are willing to accept to forego the benefit 
that they have a right to, or to bear a cost, such as adopting safe disposal, or accepting 
something negative, such as noise or air pollution (Huang et al., 2017, He et al., 2016, 
Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012, da Motta and Ortiz, 2018). WTP asks people about the 
maximum amount that they are willing to pay to gain a new right. This method is 
extensively used in the healthcare, education, transportation, and environmental 




Hanawi et al., 2018b, Carson, 2012). In healthcare studies, it is not required that the 
person being asked is at risk or in need of the service in question (Olsen and Donaldson, 
1998, Bayoumi, 2004). WTP can be used for different purposes such as financing 
healthcare systems, budget allocation decisions, and measuring the value of certain 
aspects of (or attitudes to) healthcare services. Also it can be used to inform policymakers 
of the ways that could be implemented to provide sources of funding to finance healthcare 
systems or healthcare programmes (Bateman et al., 2002, Diener et al., 1998). 
Because group obtain in this study does not have the right to access MOH facilities, it is 
obvious that the WTP is the appropriate method for this cohort. Similarly, because the 
financial strategy developed in this study to fund the Saudi MOH presupposes that the 
rights of group maintain to access MOH healthcare facilities no longer exist, then the 
WTP is also the appropriate method for this cohort. Group increase in this study is being 
asked how much they are willing to pay to improve their access to MOH healthcare 
facilities that would not exist without the implementation of the financial strategy 
proposed in this study, such that WTP is also the appropriate method for this cohort.  
There are many elicitation formats that can be used to conduct a WTP study including 
closed ended, open-ended method, bidding game, payment scale, discrete choice, and 
discrete choice with follow up. Prior literature shows that when researchers try to estimate 
the maximum value that people could place on a given service, some ask respondents in 
two separate stages. The first stage determines whether or not the respondent is willing 
to pay for the proposed idea, and the second asks questions to find out the maximum 
amount that the respondent would be willing to pay (i.e. Yes, No with follow up question). 
For instance, Osiolo (2017) conducted a study to estimate the maximum WTP to improve 
energy in Kenya. The study employed CVM and used a closed ended question (i.e. Yes 
or No) to identify whether or not people would be willing to pay to improve the current 




ended question to identify the maximum amount that the people would be willing to pay 
(Osiolo, 2017). Similarly, Canavari et al (2005) carried out a study to evaluate people’s 
WTP for a regulation that bans pesticides and chemicals from fruit. The respondents were 
first asked if they were willing to pay any amount of money for such a regulation, and 
this was followed by an open ended question regarding the maximum amount that they 
were willing to pay (Canavari et al., 2005). 
Other researchers ask only one question and focus only on whether or not the respondent 
is willing to pay (i.e. a Yes,No answer with no mention of monetary amounts). Oriakhi 
and Onemolease (2012) examined Nigerian rural households’ willingness to participate 
in Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme. The study used the participation 
stage without proceeding to ask about any monetary values (Oriakhi and Onemolease, 
2012).  
Other researchers proceed directly to questions to determine the amount that the 
respondent would be willing to pay (Halstead et al., 1992). This method benefits from 
what is called the double hurdle approach that can be used to deal with the zero responses 
econometrically at two stages. The first stage is called the Participation Equation, where 
the approach deals with the protest zero. This stage assumes that placing zero is a decision 
of unwillingness to pay (NO), otherwise it is taken as a WTP (YES). The second stage is 
called the Consumption Equation, where the approach deals with the genuine zero 
(Halstead et al., 1992).  
Several researchers have used this method to conduct environmental and healthcare WTP 
studies. Bernath and Roschewitz (2008) conducted the bidding game format to examine 
the potential of the theory of planned behavior to explain WTP for the recreational 
benefits of city forests in Zurich. The study used a two part model to identify the 
participation decision initially (Bernath and Roschewitz, 2008). Wang and Mullahy 




willingness to reduce air pollution. In the data analyses, this study used the two part model 
to identify if a person had any positive WTP (Wang and Mullahy, 2006). Moreover, 
Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman (2000) investigated people’s WTP to improve air 
quality using the open ended format. This study also used the two part model (Carlsson 
and Johansson-Stenman, 2000). Focusing on healthcare studies, Frew et al (2001) 
conducted a study to investigate the WTP for the supply of two types of screening for 
colorectal cancer in the UK. The study used the payment scale and open ended formats 
and employed a two part model to identify the consumption equation (Frew et al., 2001). 
Donaldson et al (1998) used open ended data questions on WTP study for maternity care, 
which contained a large zero response. This study was specifically interested in finding 
out if the two part model would perform better than OLS or a standard Tobit model 
(Donaldson et al., 1998). Ryan et al. (2004) developed a study on how people value three 
healthcare interventions, to compare the WTP results that are generated from the payment 
scale and the dichotomous choice formats; this study also controlled the protest and true 
zeros (Ryan et al., 2004). 
The broad literature shows that, depending on the context and the nature of the questions 
being asked, all of the CVM options (the binary question (Yes, No) with and without a 
follow up question, as well as the two-part model) are widely used by researchers to 
identify whether or not respondents are willing to pay. In the healthcare literature, because 
each format has its own strengths and weakness, there is an open debate about the most 
suitable format to measure people’s true WTP (Smith, 2000, Onwujekwe, 2001) such that 
this study must be careful to ensure that the most appropriate method is used to investigate 





 What Elicitation Method is Suitable in the Saudi Context? 
The initial fast reforms introduced to achieve Saudi Vision 2030 (and as discussed in 
Section 1.1.3) have been contentious for the Saudi population. They have no prior 
experience of sharing the cost of the public services which have heretofore been entirely 
covered by the government. In essence, the previous system (where everything was free) 
has been fractured and replaced with one that initially involved “cutting subsidies on fuel, 
electricity, water and sanitation; taxing idle lands, increasing the Ministry of Interior 
services fees, stopping automatic promotions to government employees, and freezing their 
allowances for seven months” (Saudi Vision 2030). In the context of these radical reforms 
and swingeing cuts, it is likely that the Saudi population (who now value their disposable 
wealth more highly than before) might not be receptive to a study proposing a payment 
for MOH healthcare services such that it is necessary that this fundamental question must 
be investigated in the first instance. That is, this study must focus first on investigating 
whether or not the Saudi population are willing to pay for MOH healthcare services 
(Participation), before (if necessary) proceeding to ask about the maximum value that 
they would pay for those services (Consumption). The appropriate method to perform this 
analysis is the closed ended format (Yes, No) without a follow up question.  
4.2.3 The Contribution Method  
There are many different techniques used to measure consumer preferences when faced 
with a set of choices. What these preferences are can be elicited via the contingent 
valuation or the multi-attribute valuation method. The former concentrates more on the 
economic value (estimating the maximum and the minimum) and analyses one attribute 
at a time, whereas the latter pays more attention to consumer preference for goods and 
services, and explores more than one attribute simultaneously (Merino-Castello, 2003). 
The multi-attribute valuation technique is a survey-based method for modelling 




are presented with various alternative descriptions of goods, differentiated by their 
attributes and levels, and are asked to rank, rate, or to choose from various alternatives. 
There are two different types of the multi-attribute valuation; the choice based approach, 
and the preference based approach. The former asks the consumers to choose one from 
several alternatives, while the latter requires individuals to rate (contingent rating) or rank 
(contingent ranking) the alternatives (Merino-Castello, 2003). 
The contingent ranking method is widely used in research studies in the healthcare field 
(Beynon, 2008, Slothuus et al., 2002). For instance, in a 2008 survey, the Health Insurance 
Authority (HIA) in Ireland asked respondents with PHI to rank elements of their cover 
(such as the hospital treatment as a private patient under a consultant, receiving out-
patient treatment as a private patient, and the quality of hospital accommodation) in order 
of importance (HIA, 2008). Foster and Mourato (2000) used contingent ranking to study 
the value of human health and the biodiversity impact associated with the application of 
pesticides. The study asked consumers to rank a conventional loaf of bread against a 
number of alternative loaves, differentiated in terms of price and ecolabels, which 
identified the environmental impacts generated by the underlying production process 
(Foster and Mourato, 2000). In a study to investigate consumer preference for eco-
labelled seafood, Johnston and Roheim (2006) used an experimental design that allowed 
for four different fresh seafood products to be ranked in order of preference. The products 
varied according to three attributes: species, presence or absence of an eco-label, and 
price (Johnston and Roheim, 2006). Avery et al (2004) asked 3,240 highly meritorious 
students to rank a hundred undergraduate programmes in an effort to improve the quality 
of collage applications and to increase the number of admissions (Avery et al., 2004). 
Kim et al (2005) carried out a study to investigate the possible direction of device 
convergence based on consumer preferences for the main attributes of the mobile terminal 




based on some attributes such as type of input equipment, quality of internet, diversity 
compatibility of application programmes, price, and display size (Kim et al., 2005). 
 What Ranking Method is Suitable in the Saudi Context? 
Chapter 3 of this study concluded that three financing mechanisms were suitable for SA 
(i.e. Taxation, MSA, and PHI), each of which has its own attributes and specifications.  
The second objective of this part of the study is to understand population preference for 
these funding mechanisms. Given that the SA population has limited experience of these 
funding mechanisms, a survey that uses a ranking format will be easy to understand and 
complete, and will likely lead to more reliable results. Therefore, the contingent ranking 
method is selected as the most suitable method for this part of the study to quickly 
elucidate individual preferences.  
4.2.4 Explanation of Groups, Eligibilities, and Income 
This part of the study will explain each relevant group of individuals, will define the 
eligibility of these groups to healthcare services in each of the three provisions (MOH, 
SDU and the private sector), and explain how each group will contribute to the financing 
mechanism. In so doing, this part of the study will rely on the classifications detailed in 
Figure 3 in Chapter 1, and on the funding options that were outlined in Figure 8 in Chapter 
3.  
The individuals in this study are defined under five types: i) all employed people from 
public and private sectors, ii) the self-employed people, defined as Saudi citizens who 
work for themselves23, either under contract (such as Uber taxi drivers), or without 
contract (such as farmers and capital investors), iii) all Saudi pensioners from both the 
public and private sectors24, iv) the unemployed and dependent Saudis25 who receive 
                                               
23 Under current legislation non-Saudis cannot be self-employed in SA. 
24 Non-Saudis leave the country at the end of the employment contract. 




social benefits (where benefit is defined as any income received from the government 
from any agency, i.e. social welfare, citizen account, disability benefit, studying reward, 
and human resources development fund benefits),  and v) the unemployed and dependent 
Saudis and non-Saudis26 who do not receive social benefits (no income). 
The financial strategy proposed in this thesis mandates payment from total income (which 
also includes any benefits received from the government). For example, Saudi pensioners 
from the public and private sectors with pension income below a threshold defined by the 
Saudi Social Welfare (SW), receive an additional monthly income from SW. Similarly, 
Saudi public and private employees who receive an income lower than a threshold defined 
by the Citizen’s Account Fund (CAF), also receive an additional monthly income from 
CAF. Another example is employed people who also receive disability benefits. It is noted 
that non-Saudis are ineligible to receive payments from the government such that all of 
their total income is necessarily from employment.  
 Public and Private Employees 
These types of individuals are defined as all publicly employed people who receive 
healthcare services in slice 1, and all the major eligible people (parts A) from the slices 2 
to 6 who are guaranteed free access to healthcare by their employer (see Figure 3). In this 
section the study will discuss how each publicly and privately employed individual will 
contribute to the funding mechanism. 
1. Slice 1; in Taxation and MSA, all of the Saudis and non-Saudis who are publicly 
employed and entitled to healthcare services only inside the MOH healthcare facilities 
will be mandated to contribute a proportion of their total income to the MOH to increase 
their access to the healthcare services that are provided in MOH healthcare facilities. 
                                               
26 Here meaning the unemployed with no social benefits, and the dependent Saudis with no social benefits 





Their access will increase because the eligibilities of those with double or triple access 
will be removed (unless they pay to maintain access)27. In the case of PHI, individuals in 
this category will be mandated to purchase health insurance directly from insurance 
companies, which would then cover their healthcare costs in MOH healthcare facilities 
and guarantee better access. 
2. Slices 2 and 3, Part A; in Taxation and MSA, all the non-Saudis who are eligible to 
healthcare services only in the private sector or in the other governmental healthcare 
facilities will be mandated to contribute a percentage of their monthly income if they want 
to obtain access to healthcare services that are provided by MOH healthcare facilities. In 
the case of PHI, they will be mandated to buy an insurance policy from insurance 
companies, which will give them access to MOH facilities. 
3. Slices 4, 5, and 6 Part A; these slices contain all Saudis who are entitled to healthcare 
services in the MOH because they are Saudis, and also have eligibility in one or both of 
the private sector or other governmental healthcare facilities (i.e. they have double or 
triple eligibility). These categories will not be eligible to free access to MOH healthcare 
facilities because they already have free access to the private sector or other governmental 
healthcare facilities guaranteed by their employer. If anyone in these categories wants to 
maintain his/her access to MOH healthcare services, then he/she must contribute a 
proportion of his/her total income to the MOH if either the Taxation or MSA was the 
funding mechanism. If PHI was the mechanism, then the individuals in these slices have 
to buy health insurance from the open market, which would then be used to cover their 
healthcare costs in MOH facilities. 
                                               





 Self-Employed People 
This type is defined as self-employed Saudis; it is currently illegal for non-Saudis to be 
self-employed in SA. Therefore, this type of individual can belong to the self-employed 
Saudis of slice 1 and also to slice 4, 5, and slice 6 part B. This section explains how each 
self-employed person will contribute to the insurance mechanism. 
1. Slices 1; in Taxation and MSA, all self-employed Saudis who are not entitled to any 
healthcare services other than those provided by the MOH will contribute a proportion of 
their total income to the MOH to increase their access to the healthcare services that are 
provided by the MOH. As previously explained, their access to MOH healthcare facilities 
will increase by minimising the access of slices 4, 5, and 6 to the MOH healthcare 
facilities. If the insurance mechanism is PHI, then every individual in this category must 
purchase health insurance from insurance companies. 
2. Slices 4, 5, and 6 Part B; this slice contains all self-employed Saudis who are 
dependent on someone in slices 4, 5, or 6 part A. Individuals in each category can only 
avail of the healthcare services that are provided by either the private sector or the other 
governmental healthcare facilities. If any person in these slices wants to maintain his/her 
access to the MOH healthcare facilities, then he/she has to pay a proportion of his/her 
total income to the MOH; this is in the case of Taxation or MSA. However, in the case of 
PHI, then the individuals of these three slices must buy an insurance policy. 
 Public and Private Pensioners 
This group contains Saudis only; all non-Saudis must leave the country at the end of their 
contract. Therefore, this category is limited to slice 1 (the Saudi part), and slice 4 part A; 
however, access to free healthcare in private healthcare facilities of the majority of this 
category stops at the end of the employees’ service28. The exception, which is a small 
                                               




percentage, is some employees in senior positions in some companies, where their 
employers continue to fund just the employee and his/her spouse. Slice 5 part A contains 
security and defence pensioners, whose healthcare coverage is lifelong for themselves 
and their dependents. However, this slice excludes University staff, Specialists, and 
ARAMCO since their eligibility stops at the end of the employee’s contract29. Slice 6 part 
A, contains the pensioners either from the private or the SDU from those who have 
lifelong healthcare coverage and have triple access to healthcare. 
1. Slices 1; in Taxation and MSA, all the Saudis pensioners who are entitled to healthcare 
services only in MOH healthcare facilities would be mandated to contribute a proportion 
of their total income to the MOH to increase their access to the healthcare services that 
are provided in MOH healthcare facilities. As before, their access would be improved by 
minimising the eligibilities of all or some of the Saudi citizens who are entitled to double 
or triple access to the healthcare provisions. If PHI was to be implemented as the 
predominant mechanism, then the individuals in this group would have to subscribe to a 
PHI policy. 
2. Slice 4, 5, and 6 Part A; the healthcare access of those in these three slices will be 
limited to their domain if they have lifelong healthcare coverage (otherwise they will be 
in slice 1 of this group), and will no longer have access to MOH healthcare facilities. 
However, if pensioners in these slices want to maintain their access to MOH healthcare 
facilities, then they have to pay a proportion of their income to the MOH in the case of 
either Taxation or MSA. If PHI was the funding option, then those in this category must 
buy health insurance policy. 
                                               
29 There is an exception for employees in high positions, where the employee and his/her spouse’s 




 Unemployed and Dependent Saudis with Social Benefits 
This category contains all those unemployed and dependent Saudis who receive benefits 
from the government. This type of individual is a portion of slice 1 and also slices 4, 5 
and 6 part B. 
1. Slice 1; this category receives free healthcare services inside MOH healthcare facilities 
only. If Taxation or MSA was the predominant mechanism, this category would be 
mandated to pay a part of their total income to obtain better access to their current 
eligibility of healthcare, and this would be facilitated by minimising the eligibility of 
those who are entitled to double or triple access. If the PHI was the predominant 
mechanism, then each individual must purchase PHI. If a person’s total income is low, 
then the MOH will pay part of the premiums. However, if their total income increases, 
then the individual will incur the full cost of the premiums. 
2. Slice 4, 5 and 6, Part B; these types of individuals are guaranteed healthcare services 
in the private sector, the other governmental healthcare facilities, or both, but they can no 
longer access the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH. However, if Taxation 
or MSA was the funding option and the individuals in these categories want to maintain 
their access to MOH healthcare facilities, then they have to contribute a proportion of 
their total income to the MOH. If PHI was the funding option, each individual must 
purchase health insurance and pay the full premiums, unless the total income is low, in 
which case the MOH will share a part of the premium until the individual’s total income 
increases. 
 Unemployed and Dependents with no Social Benefits 
The last type of individuals are summarised in the unemployed and dependents with no 
social benefits of slice 1 and also, part B of slices 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Slice 1 (Saudis) and 




if they are unemployed (because they refused to take a job that was offered by the 
government with no valid reason), if they are dependent on someone who receives an 
income above a threshold defined by the Saudi social funds, or if they own valuable 
assets. Slice 1 (non-Saudis), 2 and 3 part B are the non-Saudis with no income; these are 
the dependents of non-Saudis employed in the public or private sector. If any of these 
dependents are in receipt of income themselves (i.e. necessarily from employment) he/she 
would be included with non-Saudi employees in slice 1, or the major eligible of slice 2 
and 3 (see figure 3). 
1. Slice 1; a proportion of this slice includes those unemployed Saudis, dependent Saudis, 
and dependent non-Saudis who receive no social benefits and are only eligible to free 
access in MOH healthcare facilities. Their access to the MOH healthcare facilities will be 
improved by limiting the healthcare access of those who are in slices 4, 5 and 6 to their 
own domain. In the case of Taxation or MSA, the unemployed and dependents without 
income in this slice will be mandated to pay a percentage of the total income of the person 
on whom they are dependent or to make a contribution from any of their own future total 
income in order to increase their access to the healthcare services that are provided by the 
MOH. In the case of PHI, the MOH will pay a part of the premiums and the rest will be 
incurred by the person on whom they are dependent; should anyone in this slice earn any 
income in the future then they must pay some or all of their own premiums depending on 
the level of their total income. 
2. Slice 2 and 3, Part B; each dependent in slice 2 and 3 part B is entitled to a single 
access inside the domain where the major eligible person works. In Taxation and MSA, 
the dependents in these categories will be asked if they want to obtain additional access 
in MOH healthcare facilities by paying a proportion of the income of the person on whom 
they are dependent or from their own future income if they gain employment in the future. 




remainder would be incurred by the person on whom they are dependent. Should they 
gain employment in the future then those in these categories must pay some or all of their 
premiums depending on their level of total income. 
3. Slice 4, 5 and 6, Part B; the dependents in this category are currently eligible to access 
healthcare in their own domain and, because they are Saudi citizens, additional access in 
MOH healthcare facilities. However, under the financial strategy proposed in this study, 
they will no longer be eligible for the latter. Therefore, in the case of Taxation or MSA, 
this category can choose to maintain their access to MOH healthcare services by paying 
a proportion of the total income of the person on whom they are dependent or from any 
income they themselves may earn in the future. If PHI is the option chosen, then the MOH 
will pay a part of the premiums and the remainder will be incurred by the person on whom 
they are dependent. Should anyone in this slice earn income in the future then they must 
pay some or all of their own premiums depending on the level of their total income. 
 Unusual Situations 
In the event that a Saudi citizen in slice 4, 5 or 6 part A who is only eligible to healthcare 
access inside his/her domain loses his/her job, then this person and his/her dependents 
can retrieve their eligibility in the MOH healthcare facilities, and the contribution to the 
funding mechanism will begin once he/she starts earning income (from any source). 
If a Saudi family was ineligible to receive monthly social welfare income because the 
total income received by the head of household was above a threshold defined by SW, 
then the contribution will be paid from the SW annual compensation if the family 






4.2.5 Study Dimensions 
 
To serve the purpose of this study, a survey was conducted inviting all types of individuals 
who were discussed in the previous section to share their thoughts about the broad 
decision to pay for healthcare services provided by MOH healthcare facilities, and also 
to rank the three health funding options in order of preference. In this section, the study 
will discuss the study sample size, where the study took place, and for how long sampling 
was undertaken. Some demographic classifications for the population of SA will also be 
provided in this section.  
 The Sample 
The WTP of 600 people from the population of SA was investigated, in addition to their 
ranking of the three health funding mechanisms (Taxation, MSA, and PHI). People were 
invited randomly to participate in this study, irrespective of what category of health cover 
they had. The sample included people aged over 18, of both genders. This is because 
children are less likely to understand the historical context and the current global and 
domestic economic situations.  
The study survey took place in Riyadh City, the capital of SA. This city was chosen 
because approximately eight million people live there (a quarter of the total population of 
SA). This proportion is the highest after Makkah (GAFS, 2015). Such a population 
density provided a broad access to people with different characteristics, and diverse levels 
of income. Moreover, Riyadh is considered as the second biggest city in the Kingdom of 
SA after the eastern provinces in terms of land mass, with a total area of approximately 
380 thousand square kilometres (SGS, 2012). This geographic reach encompasses twenty 
provinces, some of which are located close to the city centre (such as Ad Diriyah at 50 
km from Riyadh City centre), and others which are far away (such as Wadi Ad-Dawasir 




Notwithstanding the possibilities that this geographic range presented, only five 
provinces in addition to Riyadh City were selected as sample locations, because this mix 
was sufficient to give a reliable representation of all of the other cities in SA in terms of 
population characteristics as well as the density of public and private healthcare facilities. 
Riyadh was particularly important as a location for targeted sample for this study. This 
was due to the high proportion of adults in the city, which accounted for 5.2 million in 
2015 (68% of total population in Riyadh) (see Table 13). Finally, people were randomly 
selected from public places such as the public squares, parks, and streets in these six 
provinces during the period December 2017-January 2018. This time was chosen because 
Saudi Arabia does not celebrate the Christmas or the New Year.  
Table 13 Riyadh Residents Classifications Based on Age, Gender, and Nationality in 
Millions 
Groups Saudis and non-Saudis Saudis Non-Saudis 
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
 
0-19 
All 10.1 5.2 4.9 7.7 3.9 3.7 2.4 1.3 1.1 
Riyadh 2.5 1.3 1.2 1.8 0.93 0.87 0.69 0.37 0.32 
% 24.6 24.7 24.4 23.4 23.4 23.3 28.3 28.4 28.1 
 
20-64 
All 19.9 11.8 8.0 12.2 6.1 6.1 7.6 5.6 1.9 
Riyadh 5.0 3.1 1.9 2.7 1.4 1.3 2.2 1.6 0.57 




All 0.92 0.52 0.39 0.78 0.42 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.04 
Riyadh 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.006 
% 19.3 20.7 17.6 19.8 21.2 18.0 16.7 18.2 13.5 
 
Total 
All 31.0 17.6 13.3 20.7 10.5 10.2 10.2 7.0 3.1 
Riyadh 7.7 4.5 3.1 4.7 2.4 2.2 2.9 2.0 0.91 
% 24.9 25.7 23.9 22.8 23.2 22.4 29.2 29.4 28.8 
 
Sources: General Authority for Statistics (GAFS, 2015). 
 
 General Indicators for the Saudi population 
This section provides general information about the number of employed people, 
pensioners, unemployed, and those holding PHI in SA in 2015. 
1. Public Employees; there were 1.2 million people employed in the public sector in SA 
at the end 2015, of which 60% are male. This represents 4% of the total population of SA, 




Saudis — non-Saudis account for less than 6% (see Table 14). Most public employees in 
a specifically identified sector work in education (which accounts for 40.6% of, or 
506,500, jobs), followed  by healthcare (12.5% of, or 156,700, jobs) (MCS, 2015). 
Table 14 Publicly Employed People in Saudi Arabia in Thousands30 
Category Number of Employees (in Thousands) 
Total Saudis Non-Saudis 
Type of Job Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Diff Jobs1 424.1 308.6 115.4 423.3 307.9 115.3 0.79 0.7 0.08 
Education 506.5 231 275.5 503.2 228.1 275.1 3.3 2.9 0.42 
Healthcare 156.7 82.9 73.8 107.8 63.7 44 48.9 19.2 29.7 
Academic2 53.2 30.5 22.6 37.3 19.3 18 15.8 11.1 4.6 
Judges 1.4 1.4 0.0 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Prosecution 2.1 2.1 0.0 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Specific3 39.6 39.1 0.56 39.6 39 0.56 0.09 0.09 0.0 
Diplomacy 1.0 0.96 0.08 1.0 0.96 0.08 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TVTC Staff4 8.4 10.4 0.71 7.5 9.6 0.66 0.88 0.84 0.04 
Personnel 54.5 39.5 14.9 54.4 39.5 14.9 0.08 0.08 0.0 
Total 1,248 747 503.7 1,178 711.9 468.7 70 35 34.9 
  
Source: The Saudi Ministry of Civil Services (MCS, 2015). 
Abbreviations: 1Different jobs in different ministries, for example publicly employed administrators in 
MOH and Universities 2Academic universities staff. 3Establishments with specific salaries. 4Academic 
Staff of the Technical Vocational Training Corporation 
 
2. Public Pensioners; by 2015, the total number of public pensioners in SA was 532,100 
(PPA, 2015), 89% of whom are male (472,700). This category represents 1.7% of the 
total population of SA, and approximately 2.5% of those aged over 18. From this 
proportion, the study had access to the 136,600 public pensioners living in Riyadh City. 
These account for a quarter of the total public pensioners in SA, 1.7% of Riyadh’s total 
population, and about 2.6% of whom are aged 18 years and above. 
3. Private Employees; there were more than 10.1 million people employed in the private 
sector in SA in 2015. This number accounts for 32% of the total population of SA, and 
48% of those aged over 18. The majority of those in private employment are non-Saudis, 
who represent 83% of total private sector employees (see Table 15) (GOSI, 2015). 
                                               
30 There was a lack of access to the number of employees in the security and defence sectors, where the 




Table 15 Private Sector Employees based on Nationality and Level of Monthly 
Income in Thousands31 
Category Total Saudis and non-
Saudis 
Saudis Non-Saudis 
Total > $800 < $800 Total > $800 < $80032 Total > $800 < $800 
Total 10,141 2,659 7,481 1,724 1,666 58 8,416 993 7,423 
Riyadh 4,201 1,100 3,101 723 697 26 3,478 403 3,075 
% 41.4 41.4 41.4 42.0 42.0 44.4 41.3 40.6 41.4 
  
Source: General Organisation for Social Insurance, General Authority for Statistics (GOSI, 2015, GAFS, 
2015). 
 
4. Private Pensioners; there were 139,200 private sector pensioners in SA in 2015 
(GOSI, 2015). Only Saudis are eligible to receive social insurance services in SA and 
these are paid from their financial contributions and those of their employer collected by 
GOSI during the employee’s period of service. This number of pensioners’ accounts for 
about 0.4% of total population of SA, and 0.7% of those aged over 18. Moreover, this 
category gave access to 25,800 private pensioners in Riyadh, who account for 18.5% of 
total private pensioners in SA, 0.3% of total population in Riyadh City, and 0.5% of adults 
(GOSI, 2015).   
5. People with Private Health Insurance in Saudi Arabia; the data shows that 10.7 
million people in SA had PHI in 2015 (CCHI, 2015), accounting for 34% of the total 
population. This figure seems low given that the average private sector employee (which 
as discussed previously total 10.1 million) would be expected to have dependents. The 
reasons for this are because i) 73% of the private sector employees are non-Saudis  
receiving an income less than $800 (see Table 15) such that, to avoid  the additional 
housing, education, and other living costs this would entail, they do not bring their 
dependents with them to SA, and ii) as discussed in Chapter 1, some privately employed 
people do not need PHI because they work in the private healthcare sector, and their 
employer must provide cover to them and their dependents directly.  
                                               
31 $800 is the minimum monthly income for Saudis. 
32 Some Saudis are below the minimum monthly income for Saudis because their companies set the 




6. Unemployed Saudis; based on the GAFS unemployment survey, there were 682,300 
unemployed people in SA in 2015 (GAFS, 2015), accounting for 2.2% of the total 
population. The unemployed in SA benefit from the SW, CAF, and/or the human 
resources development fund (HRDF).  If the head of household died while an employee 
or a pensioner, then their unemployed dependents will benefit from GOSI or the public 
pension agency. It is possible to benefit from more than one agency if specific criteria are 
met. A low proportion of unemployed people in SA do not receive any income; indeed 
this would only happen in cases where either the individual did not meet the criteria to 
receive an income from the public agencies or because, for no valid reason, they refused 
to take a job offered to them by the HRDF. 
This study does not classify any further as doing so could lead to duplication. For 
example, if the study classified based on how many dependants benefit from SW and 
GOSI (where the head of household is dead), duplication will arise because the 
beneficiary from the former could also be entitled to benefit from the latter.  
In the sample classification exercise conducted above there was a lack of access to several 
pieces of information. Specifically, there was a lack of access to how many people work 
in university sector from the different public jobs in Table 14. The study also found 
difficulties in ascertaining how many publicly employed people there were in Riyadh 
City. The study provided evidence that showed how many people are covered by PHI in 
SA, but no information was available to help determine whether this was secured from 
private or public employers, or paid for out pocket by individuals. The study could not 
also obtain any data for the security and defence sectors such that it was very hard to 
determine how many dependents each employee has, whether or not these dependents are 
over 18, and who is in Riyadh. These limitations will have no effect on the study 
objectives or results, as the main purpose of this section is just to provide information 




4.2.6 Data Collection 
The data collection was conducted in the form of written documents designed to be filled 
in face-to-face to ensure that every participant would understand the documents, and 
would be able to provide reliable answers. This method was chosen because the other 
available options (such as the telephone interviews) are likely to be biased should the 
researcher select relatives or friends from the available sample. Even though it is likely 
that a researcher would only be able to source a fraction of 600 participants required from 
relatives or friends from the different provinces in Riyadh, this could still introduce 
significant sample bias. Furthermore, using the phone book to source participants would 
be very difficult, because people (especially in the provinces, where people tend to be less 
educated) are reluctant to participate, release, or even to give a consent for financial 
matters to a person over the telephone. In addition, the randomisation is not possible using 
this method because a call to a female in SA from an unknown person is considered (to 
some extent) to be a crime. Using the online method was also excluded because the data 
instrument contains many technical questions, such that many would ignore it, 
discontinue filling it out, or (if they do fill it out) would not fully read the contents such 
that they would give unreliable answers or answer questions they were not required to. 
Although the number of questions and the data provided in the instrument in this study 
was kept to a minimum, the reality is that the Saudi healthcare system is a complex one 
such that the instrument required a lot of explanation that could not be accomplished 
online. For instance, even though the instrument in this study was provided in both Arabic 
and in English, in many cases the person had difficulty reading (due to illiteracy or failing 
eyesight) such that the researcher was required to read and explain the questions and take 
the answers; this would not have been possible to do online. In other cases where a 
participant spoke neither fluent Arabic nor English, the researcher obtained assistance 




 Information Sheet 
The information sheet contains ten sections, some to introduce the study, the objectives, 
the researcher, and others to explain the participant’s task and their rights. The first 
section explains that the researcher is a PhD student and is conducting this study to 
examine various methods to fund healthcare services that are provided by the Saudi 
MOH, and also to investigate the Saudi population’s WTP to improve the level of 
healthcare services that are provided to them. In the second section the participant is 
provided with information about his/her task, what questions he/she will be asked, such 
as background questions, the healthcare coverage that he/she has, and details about some 
financial methods to fund the MOH and what is his/her most and least preferred methods. 
The third section tells the participant that there is no specific reason for selecting him/her, 
because people are selected randomly. The fourth section explains that the participant 
does not have to take part if he/she does not want to. However, if a willingness to 
participate was shown, then a consent form would be given which, when signed indicated 
that the participant had read and understood the information sheet. This part also fully 
explains the participant’s rights to withdraw before or during the survey, to ask for their 
answers to be removed up to a month from the handling and details that, if they do so, the 
removal and destruction of their completed instrument are guaranteed. The fifth section 
tells the participant that the answers will be kept confidential and that no clues to the 
identity will appear in the researcher’s work. The sixth section provides information about 
how the answers will be treated, and to whom the answers will be available. This part 
also guarantees that any extract from the participant’s answers will be entirely anonymous 
and that the answers will be securely stored. The seventh section explains to the 
participant that the overall results will be shown in the researcher’s thesis, which will be 
available to the study supervisors, external examiners, and future students and might be 




in the study, such as time spent and the potential stress to the participant arising from the 
questions asked. It also provides some guidance to participants in case of any distress. 
The ninth section informs the participant that the data collection is approved by the Social 
Research Ethics Committee of University College Cork. The tenth section provides 
contact details for the researcher in the form of telephone number and e-mail address in 
case the participant had any inquiries or wanted to withdraw his/her answers. The contact 
details of the research major supervisor were also provided (see Sample 1 in the 
Appendix). There was one copy of the information sheet given to each participant. This 
was to ensure that they could access any kind of assistance that might be required through 
the contact details provided. In order to ensure best responses that would allow the 
researcher to detect any issues with the pilot instrument, the information sheet did not 
state that it was just a test.  
 Consent Form 
This document contains a declaration from the participant that he/she understood the 
purpose and nature of the study, and his/her participation in the study is voluntary. In 
addition, it documents that the participant has understood his/her rights, and by signing 
the form, the researcher has the right to quote and extract data from the participant’s 
answers. This form has a place for the participant to write his/her name. However, because 
some people in SA are reluctant to identity themselves (especially females according to 
Saudi traditions), this might cause some people to abandon at this stage. To avoid this, 
three options for filling in the name space were provided; the first allows the participant 
to write their first name and their family name. The second allows the participant to write 
the first letter of each of their first name, their father’s name, and their family name (i.e. 
SALEM HADI MUSTANYIR can be written as S-H-M). The third allows the participant 
to use the serial number at the top of each data collection pack instead of their name. In 




consent to quote and extract from their answers. There was also a space for the participant 
to sign the consent form. However, because many people do not feel comfortable 
providing their own signature as they use it for official matters such as banking services, 
two options were given: the participant can either provide his/her signature, or state “I 
participated of my own volition”. Finally, the consent form contains a space to write the 
date of the participation, where the participant cannot request removal of their answers 
after a month from this date. 
Two copies of the consent form were given to each participant to complete; one was taken 
by the researcher, and the other one was retained by the participant. This is so that the 
participant can (within a month from the date of the participation) use the information on 
the consent form to request to withdraw their answers and that the researcher can identify 
and destroy their answers. Also, this form is a document which protects the researcher’s 
rights (see Sample 2 in the Appendix). In order to properly replicate experience of the 
official sample, participants in the pilot were also given two copies of the consent form 
to complete. 
 Data Instrument 
A cross sectional questionnaire was used as the instrument for data collection. The 
structure that was used benefited from the guidelines developed by O’Brien and Gafni 
(1996). Their guidelines comprise of five questions, which are; what questions the study 
want to answer, what measurement is appropriated (WTP or WTA), who forms the study 
sample, what characteristics of healthcare services need to be defined, and what is the 
most appropriated elicitation method format to be used (O'Brien and Gafni, 1996). 
This questionnaire consists of six sections33 as follows:  
                                               
33 The questionnaire consists of six sections. However, to reduce the number of headings and to avoid any 





1. Introduction; this section was included to provide economic facts and data to the 
participant about the current state of the SA economy. Specifically, the introduction gave 
a brief summary of the history of oil prices and Saudi budgets, and introduced the main 
objective of the survey. The primary concern of this section was brevity while at the same 
time providing sufficient background information to elicit genuine and informed 
responses (see Sample 3 in the Appendix). 
2. Participant Background; this section contained ten questions about the demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of the participants. The first two questions concerned 
the gender and age of the participants. Age categories started with 18 to 25 as the first 
category, incremented by ten years up to age 65, then followed by an open category for 
the elderly aged over 65. Any candidates who looked under 18 were eliminated ex ante 
by asking the participant if he/she is over 18 before their contribution started. The third 
question asked about nationality because this study required the involvement of all 
classifications of the population in SA such that all nationalities were invited to participate 
with no exceptions; the choices under nationality were Saudi and non-Saudi. The fourth 
question asked about marital status (single, married, divorced, or widowed). The fifth 
question was to identify the participant’s level of education. There were eight levels of 
education provided, which fall into three categories; the first level of education (primary, 
secondary, and high school), the undergraduate education (diploma and bachelor 
degrees), and the postgraduate education (higher diploma, master’s, and PhD degrees). 
The sixth question asked about job status and this was used to categorise participants into 
two groups; the first includes those in the first category detailed in paragraph two of 
Section 4.2.4, the second includes all those in the remaining four categories in paragraph 
two of Section 4.2.4. The seventh question asked about income level and participants 
were guided to report the total income, including all the government benefits (if any). 




exact total income, the participant was provided with six ranges of incomes. The first 
range was from zero to 3,000 Saudi Riyal (so as to include all the students and 
unemployed people who receive no income) and subsequent ranges incremented by three 
thousand up to 15,000. The final open category includes those who receive a total income 
over 15,000. The eighth question asked whether or not the participant had PHI; if yes then 
a follow on question asked the participant to state the level of cover to which he/she is 
entitled (such as VIP, A, B, or C). However, because insurance companies in SA call 
levels of cover by different names, a blank was provided for the participant to state their 
level of cover instead of selecting from a range of levels. The stated level can then be 
converted to one of the four levels. After the participant states his/her level of cover, a 
follow on question is included asking who provided the Private Health Insurance i.e. 
employer, Out of Pocket, or the person is included in the eligibility of the health insurance 
of one of his family. If the latter is chosen then a further question is included to ascertain 
where the major eligible person works. Question nine asked whether or not the participant 
has any chronic diseases and was included to know how participants with a chronic 
disease(s) would respond to the questions differently to those with no chronic disease. 
The final question asked participants to rate his/her current level of health from excellent 
to poor. Similarly, to question nine, this question was included to ascertain whether 
participants with different levels of self-rated health status responded differently (see 
Sample 3 in the Appendix).  
3. Eligibility to Healthcare; this section was designed to identify each participant’s 
eligibilities to healthcare. The primary concern in this section was to make sure that every 
participant report all the eligibilities that are available to him/her as a major or dependent 
beneficiary. To serve this purpose, there were three questions in this section. These 
questions were carefully designed and sequenced to link to the questions in Section four 




healthcare services outside of the domain of the MOH healthcare facilities (such as the 
private sector, security, defence, university, specialist, or ARAMCO). From the answer 
to this question, it would be identified whether or not the participant was in the first slice 
of Figure 3. If no, then guidance was provided to answer only one of the six questions in 
Section four (below); the guidance was based on whether or not the participant is in 
receipt of income. For example, Saudis and non-Saudis who receive an income were 
guided to answer one question and there was a different question for those in receipt of 
no income. If yes, then the participant would be guided to the second question asking 
whether or not these eligibilities are provided in the private sector. If yes, then the 
participant would be in the second or the fourth slice part A or B. The exact slice is 
identified by answering the questions in Section four (below), where the participant was 
guided to answer only one question. If no, then the stated eligibility must be in the third 
provision (i.e. security, defence, university, specialist, or ARAMCO). Because it is 
possible to have triple eligibility, the third question asks the participant whether or not 
they have any eligibility to healthcare services provided in security, defence, university, 
specialist, or ARAMCO facilities. Based on their answer to this question, participants are 
directed to one specific question in Section four of the data instrument, such that by 
answering that specific question, it would be identified whether the participant is in slice 
3, 5 or 6 part A or B (see Sample 3 in the Appendix).  
It is important to note that every participant was required to answer all three questions in 
this section. In other words, even if a participant answered no to the first question (such 
that it might appear obvious that the answer to questions two and three must also be no), 
they were still required to answer questions two and three. This is because some 
participants might forget that they have an eligibility that they have never used via one of 
their family members. Requiring participants to answer questions two and three is likely 




4. Willingness to Pay; all of the questions in Section three (above) lead the participant to 
answer only one question in this section, even if more than one eligibility is available. 
Saudis and non-Saudis who access healthcare services just in the MOH healthcare 
facilities and who are in receipt of income were guided to answer question one. This 
question investigated whether or not the participant is willing to pay a proportion of 
his/her total income to increase their access to the healthcare services that are provided in 
MOH healthcare facilities. Participants who are not in receipt of income were guided to 
answer question four. This question asks if there is a willingness to contribute a proportion 
of the future total income, or the total income of the person on whom the participant is 
dependent to increase the access to MOH healthcare services. Saudis who are in receipt 
of income and have access to healthcare services outside of MOH healthcare facilities 
answered question two, which investigates their WTP a proportion of their total income 
to keep their access to MOH healthcare services (as an extra access to healthcare 
services). Saudis not in receipt of income and have access to healthcare services outside 
of MOH healthcare facilities answered question five, which asks if there is a willingness 
to contribute part of their future total income or the total income of the person on whom 
they are dependent to maintain their access to the healthcare services that are provided in 
the MOH (as an extra source of healthcare services). Non-Saudis who receive income and 
can access healthcare services outside of MOH healthcare facilities answered question 
three, which investigates whether or not they are willing to pay a percentage of their 
income to obtain access to healthcare services that are provided in MOH healthcare 
facilities. Non-Saudis who receive no income and can access healthcare services outside 
of MOH healthcare facilities answered question six, which asks if they are willing to pay 
a percentage of their future income, or the income of the person on whom they are 
dependent to obtain access to healthcare services that are provided in MOH healthcare 




5. Options for Funding the Saudi Healthcare System; this section was designed to 
discuss the three suggested healthcare funding mechanisms in Figure 8. One of the main 
concerns in this section was to include answers from all the participants, even if they 
answered no in Section four. To do so, the questions in this section were designed to be 
theoretical. The participant’s task in this section was to rank three funding options based 
on which would be the most preferred for them, by indicating 1 as the most preferred 
option, 2 to the second, and 3 to the least preferred option. Taxation and MSA were 
separated from PHI, because the payment method for these two options would be direct 
deductions from the total income, whereas PHI requires payment in form of premiums. 
Therefore, an instruction was provided for the first two options to tell the participant that 
these options suggest direct deductions from total income if the person is employed, a 
pensioner, self-employed, or in receipt of benefit from social welfare, citizen account, 
disability fund, studying reward, or human resources development fund. In addition, this 
part states that if the person is not in receipt of any income, then the deductions would be 
taken from the future income or the total income of the person on whom he/she is 
dependent.  
More information was included on Taxation in order to inform the participant that the 
deducted percentage would be deposited in the MOH account to partially cover the costs 
of all healthcare services. For MSA, it is explained that the deducted percentage would 
be deposited in a personal account belonging to the participant, to cover only his/her 
healthcare costs. Also, the account would be controlled by the MOH, and if the 
participant’s account balance ran out, the MOH would intervene to cover any further 
costs. In addition, in case of death, the remaining fund would go to the participant’s 
family.  
For PHI, this part explains that the participant could purchase the healthcare insurance 




the MOH healthcare facilities. It also states that the health insurance would be compliant 
with Sharia rules, and could be obtained by anyone, regardless of their age or health 
status, and that the price would be based on the whole community’s level of health. 
Moreover, if the person was on a low income, the MOH would pay part of the premiums, 
whereas in case of no income, the MOH would pay part of the premiums and the rest 
would be incurred by the person on whom he/she is dependent (see Sample 3 in the 
Appendix). 
6. Support Services; this part included contact details for two physicians who work in 
King Saud’s Medical City in Riyadh. Each participant was told here that if distress or any 
negative conditions arose during their participation in the study or within a month from 
their contribution, assistance could be sought from one of these two physicians. The 
contact details of the researcher and the major supervisor were also provided, and this 
was to lend more assistance to the participant in relation to the study, their rights, or any 
other inquiries. These contact details were provided in the form of a mobile number from 
SA to answer any inquiry during the period of the sampling, a mobile number from 
Ireland to answer any inquiries after the sampling. E-mail addresses were also provided. 
Details for the Saudi Council of Cooperative Health Insurance were provided if any 
inquiries arose with regard to the healthcare financing options (see Sample 3 in the 
Appendix) 
4.2.7 Conclusion 
This study aims to assess the suitability of a basic healthcare financing mechanism to 
mitigate the fiscal burdens on the MOH to fund healthcare in SA. The solution proposed 
in this study involves individuals paying to increase, maintain, or obtain access to 
healthcare services provided in MOH healthcare facilities. Due to the deterioration in the 
Saudi national budget induced by the decline in oil prices, the financial constraints that 




first part of the study focused on the participation equation to identify whether or not the 
population are willing to pay for the MOH healthcare services. The second part employed 
the contingent ranking method to investigate individual preferences for the three 
healthcare funding options that were selected in this study as being appropriate in the 
Saudi setting. In order to do so, this study provided an overview of the publicly and 
privately employed, pensioners, and the unemployed in SA and also outlined the 
proportion of people who have PHI. A questionnaire was used as the data instrument to 
investigate people’s willingness to pay, and their preferences in relation to all three 
funding options. The study chose Riyadh City with five more provinces as a place for the 
sampling.   
 Study Survey 
4.3.1 Ethical Approval 
In line with UCC rules, ethical approval was required before commencing the data 
collection. On 27th November 2017, all the required documents were submitted to the 
Social Research Ethics Committee (SREC), which were received and a log number was 
given (2017-131). On Monday 18th December, the SREC sent the approval letter (see 
Sample 4 in the Appendix).   
4.3.2 Pilot Study 
On the same day that the ethical approval was received, 10 Arabic questionnaires were 
printed and the pilot study commenced; English versions were also available in case a 
participant did not speak Arabic. The pilot study took place in Riyadh City centre from 
18th December 2017 until 19th December 2017. All the participants were cooperative and 
all the questionnaires were collected, transformed into English versions and then sent to 
the supervisors on the morning of Wednesday, 20th December 2017. The participants’ 




Two Saudi participants did not answer the third question of Section A, and another Saudi 
did not answer either the second or the third question. In fact, Sections A, B, and C 
contained many details and any additional instruction could confuse the participants. To 
deal with this issue, it was decided to ensure that every participant answered all questions 
in Section A before proceeding. Another issue that arose during the pilot study was with 
the word for eligibility (Ahlih in Arabic); most of the participants asked for the meaning 
of this word. Therefore, Arabic literature teachers were asked if there is another word that 
could do the same as this word without affecting the meaning of the sentence. The 
teachers confirmed that this word was appropriate and was the only one that could work 
in the context of Section A. Therefore, it was decided to ensure that every participant 
understood the meaning of this word before commencing Section A. The pilot test showed 
that most of the people read neither the information sheet nor the consent form. In relation 
to the consent form, no one signed the second copy, as they said they did not want it. 
4.3.3 Data Gathering 
It was decided to start collecting data from the provinces furthest from Riyadh first and 
to finish with Riyadh City. To do so, one or two days were devoted for each province 
depending on the size of the province, the collected number of samples, the availability 
of potential participants, and the level of cooperation. The plan was to conduct the 
sampling in 20 days starting in the 21st December 2017, and finishing by the 9th of January 
2018. 600 survey forms were printed in Arabic, and 100 in English were also kept 
available. Each form consisted of 8 pages. Two pages for the information sheet were 
printed on two sides, two copies of the consent form printed on one side, and four pages 





 Ad Dilam 
The first journey was to Ad Dilam, which is about 150 KM away from Riyadh City, and 
about a two hour drive south east of Riyadh (see Table 16). The city is small, with one 
main street called King Abdulaziz and farms on both sides. There are a few grocery shops, 
mosques, petrol stations, schools, public and private PHCs, and one main hospital called 
Prince Salman Ibn Muhammad, which is relatively small. 
People were selected from the street, outside the grocery shops, petrol stations, and the 
healthcare facilities. The people looked nomadic, some were cooperative and filled the 
questionnaire very quickly with some instructions, and others started asking where I 
worked, who sent me, where I am originally from, if I was working for the MOH or the 
MOF. Some people refused to participate because they were busy, others had a very quick 
look at the information sheet and said they could not help. 
At sunset, I was around Prince Salman Ibn Muhammad hospital giving some instructions 
to a participant. Before he started, we were interrupted by an old man who asked if it was 
true that we (Saudis) had to buy PHI to cover our healthcare costs? I was totally shocked 
and pretended that I did not know what was going on. The participant answered the old 
man by asking: “who said that?” The old man replied that people were saying that the 
government had come and asked how people wanted to pay for their healthcare. The 
participant told him that this man (Me) was collecting data for a health insurance study. 
The old man came to me and started to shout and accuse me of taking their money. He 
said that everything had become very expensive and I was coming to take their money. I 
tried to calm him down, but he continued to curse. 
I decided to go back to Riyadh because I was told (and as I experienced) that Ad Dilam 
is a tribal area, and because it was getting late it was likely to become dangerous for me 




what had happened. He told me that the reason for the frustration I experienced was 
because the citizen account that has been implemented to cover increasing costs was not 
a large as people expected, i.e. the majority of people were only paid around $80 but 
social media indicated that most expected that they would receive between $300 and 
$500. People blamed Vision 2030 and expressed themselves in many sensitive ways. This 
news changed my plan. I decided to start sampling in Riyadh City to guarantee a good 
number before a serious incident occurred and/or time ran out. 
Table 16 The Geographical Characteristics of Five Provinces of Riyadh34  
Province 
             
             Character 









Ad Dilam South East 145 KM 110 M 80 
Al Kharj South East 132 KM 106 M 750 
Al Muzahimiyah South West 102 KM 73 M 40 
Al Uyaynah North West  69 KM 57 M 4 
Ad Diriyah West 50 KM   50 M  73 
 
 Riyadh City 
The sampling was continued on the next day. I believed that cooperation in the city would 
be better because it was likely that some Saudis in the city may not receive benefit from 
the CAF (the cause of contention in Ad Dilam), and because of the higher proportion of 
non-Saudis in the city (none of whom benefit from this fund). As expected, the people of 
Riyadh City were more cooperative, but many still refused to participate. A variety of 
people were approached in a variety of public places occupied by both Saudis and non-
Saudis. The females I approached were broadly cooperative and, in order to avoid any 
potential discomfort or misunderstanding, I often tried to invite a group of them to 
participate at the same time (i.e. three or more rather than by single selection). I tried to 
ignore any people loudly discussing any public issues, such as the CAF, the Saudi budget, 
                                               
34 The distance in minutes were counted manually, this is regulated by how busy the roads were. Therefore, 




or any other related issues. The data collection started every day at 8:00 am, and went on 
until 12:00 pm at night. I worked double shifts to minimise the time spent in (and so the 
cost of living associated with working in) Riyadh City. On 31st December 2017, I decided 
to go to Ad Diriyah to collect samples. 
 Ad Diriyah 
Ad Diriyah is the oldest province of Riyadh. It was a short journey to this province to the 
west of Riyadh. There were many schools, public and private organisations, parks, and 
healthcare facilities. People were selected from the public places such as Al Bujairi 
square, outside Prince Sultan PHC, outside Ad Diriyah municipality, and from the streets. 
Contrary to my experience in Ad Dilam, many people in Ad Diriyah approached me to 
ask to participate in the study while I was with other participants. Many gave their full 
names on the consent form, and others provided their phone number and indicated that 
they were willing to receive calls at any time in the future. 
 Al Kharj 
I then decided to collect more samples from Riyadh City. I took this decision because the 
government has already announced that they were about to cut subsidies on energy 
products, such that the price of gasoline octane 91 would increase by 82.6% by 1st January 
2018, and 126.6% for octane 95 (Alarabiya, 2018c). Electricity bills, which were 
previously heavily subsidised by the government, would also increase sharply (Alarabiya, 
2017). Moreover, it had already been announced that the value added tax (VAT) would 
also be introduced on all products on the same date, with the exception of the 
governmental education and healthcare (Alarabiya, 2018e). I thought that it would be 
prudent to not go to any province until the resentment on the streets associated with these 
changes had dissipated. The sampling in Riyadh City progressed slowly for three days 
and on 4th January 2018, I decided to travel to Al Kharj an hour and half drive to the south 




Al Kharj is one of the biggest provinces of Riyadh and has a large military presence —
the General Organisation for Military Production is located there (the only such 
organisation in the Arabian Gulf countries) as is Prince Sultan Air Base (one of the largest 
bases in the world) also the General Administration of the Arms and Ammunition, and 
many military sectors belong to the Ministry of Defence. This province also contains most 
of Almarai’s farms and factories35. The province also has many education facilities (the 
most important being Prince Sattam University) as well as many healthcare facilities, 
such as King Khaled hospital and another three military hospitals. The samples were 
collected outside the military hospital, the armed forces hospital, and also from Al Burj 
Park. Those employed in the military were less cooperative than other participants; they 
pretended that they did not understand, or that they could not read or did not know how 
to answer. Those from the private sector were cooperative and filled the forms in quickly. 
 Al Muzahimiyah 
On 6th January 2018, I travelled 73 KM to the south west of Riyadh to Al Muzahimiyah. 
This province is very small and surrounded by mountains and hills. There are a few 
schools and supermarkets and one small hospital called Al Muzahimiyah general hospital 
and a few PHCs. The samples were collected on the streets and outside the municipality 
building. The people in this region are nomadic but were cooperative. Some were hesitant 
about the signature on the consent sheet, and were guided to write, “I participated of my 
own volition”. Some of them struggled to understand MSA and PHI, and I explained to 
them how each would work. 
 Al Uyaynah 
Al Uyaynah, a one hour drive north west of Riyadh City, was my last destination on 7th 
January 2018. The province is the smallest of those I selected. It has many farms, and has 
                                               




a small number of PHCs and schools. King Abdul-Aziz Military College is located in the 
north of this province. People were invited to participate from the streets, petrol stations, 
and grocery shops. People cooperated with the study and there were no remarkable issues 
observed during the sampling. I then went back to Riyadh City where a few data 
collections remained to be filled in. I started working on those on the 8th and 9th January. 
This totalled 20 days for the data collection as planned. 
 Observations 
During my data collection, no participant took away the information sheet, but all asked 
me to summarise it verbally. Also, no one signed the second copy of the consent form, 
and all refused to retain it. In addition, only a few people read the introduction, with the 
majority proceeding directly to the questions. I had a conversation with the two physicians 
nominated on the information sheet and they informed me that no one had called. Overall, 
I noticed that the elderly, nomadic, soldiers, and people with a low level of education 
were the most resistant to participating. No English data collection version was used, 
because all the non-Arabic speakers asked for the questionnaire to be read, translated, and 
for their answers to be taken down by me. Many non-Saudis stated before participating 
that they were leaving the country because they had been made redundant from a Saudi 
company. 
On the negative side, I was stopped in King Abdul-Aziz airport in Jeddah because of the 
quantity of papers that I had in my hand luggage; I was searched, interrogated, and asked 
for documentation to show that I was a student. I was also asked for the approval for 
collecting these samples, and the data collections were checked. Although uncomfortable 
for me, these investigations were understandable due to the contemporaneous and well-
advertised mission to fight corruption in SA. I also believe that the changes that occurred 
(cuts to energy subsidies and the introduction of VAT) during the data collection period 




however, I do not believe that the timing of this survey was wrong time. This is because 
the Saudi government is reforming the system very quickly such that it could be argued 
that a time period before or after the one chosen for this study might have been even 
worse. 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
This section discussed how the researcher obtained the ethical approval, piloted the data 
collection, and gathered the data. The SREC gave the final approval after three weeks 
from the first submission, and the data collection was pilot tested on 10 participants in the 
centre of Riyadh City. The official sampling was conducted in five provinces in addition 
to Riyadh City. During the sampling, it was found that new governmental rules that were 
applied at the end of December and at the beginning of the New Year had affected 
people’s cooperation to the study. These new rules slowed the pace of sampling and 
caused some additional challenges. The old people, nomadic, and those with a low level 
of education in addition to solders were the least cooperative. As planned, the data 
collection period was 20 days. 
 Study Results 
All the questionnaires were collected with a response rate of 100%. The collected data 
were analysed using STATA 15.1. This section discusses descriptive statistics on the 
participants’ characteristics (Demographic and Socio-Economic). In addition, 
percentages and frequencies will be examined to generate a response profile for the WTP 
to improve the current level of access to healthcare. Also, this chapter will create another 
response profile discussing participants’ rankings of the three selected healthcare funding 




4.4.1 Demographic Characteristics 
 Gender 
The majority of the sample is male, representing 78% of the total sample (see Table 17). 
This is because the access to males was easier than females, and this is due to traditional 
and religious matters, where a conversation with a female requires effort and must be 
carried out with extreme caution. This was explained in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.3.3.2. 
 Age 
The study sample shows that more than 91% of the participants were aged between 18 
and 45, with the majority (about half of the sample) aged from 26 to 35 (see Table 17). 
This was in line with expectations because the majority of Riyadh’s population is young 
(65%), and considering the fact that those younger than 18 were excluded. This increases 
the exposure to the young group to 97%. Moreover, those aged from 26 to 35 were the 
most willing to take a part in the study in comparison to the other groups. 
 Nationality 
Nearly 81% of the participants were Saudis, and the rest were from a variety of different 
nationalities (see Table 17). I observed that it was far easier to access Saudis than non-
Saudis. Also, most of the non-Saudis in SA in general, and in Riyadh in particular, are 
those with a low income (73% of private sector employees in Riyadh (see Table 15)). 
This category are less willing to participate for many reasons, the most obvious of which 
is the language barrier — they do not understand the materials well and are fearful that 
the materials may be prejudicial to them. In addition, non-Saudis in SA are likely to have 
a low level of education, which caused some resistance to participate among this cohort. 
 Marital Status 
 Most of the participants were married and only a small portion were widowed (55% and 
0.07%, respectively) (see Table 17). The high percentage of married participants is 




more likely to marry in their mid-twenties. However, 15% of the study sample is above 
the average marriage age and still single36. 
 Chronic Illness and Health Status 
The study sample shows that 91% of the sample have no chronic diseases, and the 
majority have either excellent or very good health status (60% and 32%, respectively) 
(see Table 17). The reason for overall good health and the low number of participants 
with chronic diseases, is because the majority of Riyadh’s population is young and 
therefore more healthy and less likely to have chronic disease. 
Table 17 Participants’ Demographic Characteristics 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Gender    
 Male 468 78.0 
 Female 132 22.0 
 Total 600 100 
Age    
 18 - 25 162 27.0 
 26 - 35 285 47.5 
 36 - 45 102 17.0 
 46 - 55 39 6.5 
 56 - 65 11 1.8 
 65 < 1 0.2 
 Total 600 100 
Nationality    
 Saudi 485 80.8 
 Non-Saudi 115 19.2 
 Total 600 100 
Marital Status    
 Single 252 42.0 
 Married 333 55.5 
 Divorced 11 1.8 
 Widowed 4 0.7 
 Total 600 100 
Chronic Illnesses    
 Yes 54 9.0 
 No 546 91.0 
 Total 600 100 
Health Status    
 Excellent 360 60.0 
 Very Good 193 32.2 
 Good 39 6.5 
 Fair 7 1.2 
 Poor 1 0.2 
 Total 600 100 
                                               
36 The percentage of those over 26 is 73% and those who are married, divorced, or widowed is 58%, this 




4.4.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics 
 Level of Education 
Table 18 shows that 86% of the participants have either high school or undergraduate 
level of education; the majority of which hold a bachelor degree. For the reason that most 
of the study sample were Saudis and employed (81% for both), the statistics for the whole 
country show that in 2016, 81% of Saudis employed in the public and private sectors had 
a high school certificate, diploma, or a bachelor’s degree (37%, 9.5%, and 34%, 
respectively) such that the sample collected in this study accurately represents the general 
population (GAFS, 2016). 
Table 18 Participants’ Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Level of Education    
 Primary 11 1.8 
 Secondary 14 2.3 
 High School 104 17.3 
 Diploma 104 17.3 
 Bachelor 311 51.8 
 Higher Diploma 15 2.5 
 Master’s 30 5.0 
 PhD 11 1.8 
 Total 600 100 
Employment    
 Employed 487  81.2 
 
 
   
Public Sector 174 35.7 
  Private Sector 230 47.2 
  SDU 83 17.0 







  Self-employed 2 1.8 
  Public Pensioner 3 2.7 
  Private Pensioner 1 0.9 
  Unemployed 45 39.8 
  Student 62 54.9 
  Total 113 100 
 Total 600 100 
Total Monthly Income SR37   
 < 3,000 114 19.0 
 3,000 - 5,999 90 15.0 
 6,000 - 8,999 136 22.7 
 9,000 - 11,999 116 19.3 
 12,000 - 14,999 66 11.0 
 15,000 < 78 13.0 
 Total 600 100 
                                               





The majority of the study sample (Saudis and non-Saudis) are employed (81%). About 
half of those employed are in the private sector, 35% in the public sector, and 17% are 
employed in security, defence, and universities (see Table 18). The high proportion of the 
privately employed participants (47%) is explained by the high percentage of the privately 
employed people in Riyadh, who represent more than 81% of those aged over 18 of 
Riyadh’s population (see Table 13 and 15). Moreover, from those who are not employed, 
95% are students and unemployed, and 5% are self-employed, public and private 
pensioners. 
 Income 
66% of the participants receive monthly income above the Saudi average monthly income 
(SR 6,384) and Riyadh average monthly income (SR 6,380)38 (GAFS, 2017b), where the 
largest share receive income between SR 6,000 and 12,000 (42%) (see Table 18). 
 Private Health Insurance 
The study data indicates that about half of the participants have PHI. This is because 
almost half of the study sample work in the private sector, and are guaranteed PHI from 
their employer. However, as was noted in Part Two, Section 4.2.6.3, the insurance 
companies in SA provide different levels of healthcare insurance, which are named 
differently from one company to another, where the most common range of levels are: 
VIP, A, B, and C. Therefore, to unify and put all the respondents’ levels of health 
insurance in the same range as the common range, the study investigated the PHI 
packages of 10 PHI companies in SA, which are: Al Tawuniya, Bupa, Medgulf, Al Rajhi, 
AXA, Enaya, Walaa, Solidarity, Al Sagr, and the Al Ahlia Cooperative Insurance 
Company39. Moreover, the companies which provided some levels of PHI that are not 
                                               
38 The average monthly income by the end of the first half of 2016. 




well explained were discussed with an insurance broker in Riyadh who provides PHI for 
different insurance companies. Table 19 in the Appendix explains the classifications of 
all the PHI levels of the 10 companies, as well as the unification in the common range. 
The data analyses found that all participants from those who have PHI have reported a 
level of insurance within the PHI levels that are provided in Table 19 in the Appendix. 
Moreover, the figures indicate that the majority of those who have PHI hold either level 
A or B. In addition, 87% of those who hold health insurance received it from their 
employer, 2% bought it out of their own pocket, and 11% were involved in one of their 
family member’s coverage, where most of the major policy holders of the last category 
work in the private sector (87%) (see Table 19). 
Table 19 Participants’ Possession of PHI 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Health Insurance    
 Yes 293 48.8 
 No 307 51.2 
 Total 600 100 
Level of Insurance    
 VIP 47 16.0 
 A 112 38.2 
 B 80 27.3 
 C 54 18.4 
 Total 293 100 
Insurance Provider    
 Employer 255 87.0 
 OOP 6 2.0 
 From Family
40 32 10.9 
 Total 293 100 
Family Major Eligible    
 Public 4 12.5 
 Private 28 87.5 
 Total 32 100 
 
                                               




4.4.3 Eligibility to Healthcare 
 Eligibilities Based on the three Basic Provisions 
The data shows that 85% of the study sample are eligible to receive healthcare services 
in MOH healthcare facilities — this is unsurprising given that 81% of the study sample 
are Saudis. On the other hand, 15% of the participants are not eligible to receive 
healthcare in the MOH healthcare facilities, and to some extent, this is close to the 
percentage of the non-Saudi participants in the study (19%). Moreover, about half of the 
study sample are eligible for healthcare services in the private sector, and this is explained 
by the percentage of the PHI holders. In addition, the data shows that 41% can access the 
other governmental healthcare facilities. However, such a percentage is higher than that 
of those employed in the SDU, which implies that the majority of those guaranteed this 
access is through someone on whom they are dependent (see Table 20). 
Table 20 Participants’ Eligibilities to Healthcare 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Eligible to MOH    
 Yes 507 84.5 
 No 93 15.5 
 Total 600 100 
Eligible to Private Sector    
 Yes 293 48.8 
 No 307 51.2 
 Total 600 100 
Eligible to SDU    
 Yes 249 41.5 
 No 351 58.5 
 Total 600 100 
 
 Eligibilities Based on the Six Slices41 
Data analyses found that the study sample contained all the six healthcare eligibilities that 
are provided by the Saudi healthcare system. Moreover, when the sample was categorised 
based on the six eligibilities, it was found that those who are eligible to healthcare only 
in the MOH represent 23.3% of the study sample, those who can seek healthcare solely 
in private sector represent 15.3%, and there was less than 1% that can only access 
                                               







healthcare in the other governmental healthcare facilities (see Figure 9). Moreover, the 
figures indicate that 27% of the study sample are eligible to healthcare in SDU in addition 
to the MOH, 20% can access healthcare in the private sector in addition to the MOH, and 
13% have triple eligibility. 
Figure 9 Participants’ Eligibilities to Health 
 
1Eligible to healthcare only in MOH. 2Eligible to healthcare only in private sector. 3Eligible to healthcare 
only in SDU. 4Eligible to healthcare in MOH and private sector. 5Eligable to healthcare in MOH and 
SDU. 6Eligible to healthcare in all health provisions. 
  
 Classification of Each Slice 
Further analyses were conducted to know the classification of each slice. It was found 
that the majority of the first slice are Saudis who are employed in the public sector (69%), 
where the rest are split between non-Saudis who are employed publicly and unemployed 
Saudis (see Table 21). Moreover, the analysis points to the fact that 98% of the second 
and the third slices are occupied by the non-Saudis who work in the private sector and 
their dependents, where 1% is represented by the only one non-Saudi participant who is 
employed in SDU sector. Furthermore, the study found that three quarters of the fourth 






are employed publicly and have PHI, and the dependents of the Saudis who are employed 
privately (17% and 9%, respectively). The fifth slice is predominantly (82%) Saudis who 
are employed in SDU sector and their dependents. The remaining 18% comprises Saudis 
who are employed in the public sector and are eligible for the same level of access to 
healthcare. Finally, the sixth slice predominantly consists of the Saudis who work in the 
private sector and are eligible to healthcare in all three provisions; this category represents 
three quarters of the slice, where the remaining quarter is distributed among the Saudis 
who are employed in SDU and public sectors and unemployed Saudis (12%, 5%, and 7%, 
respectively) (see Table 21). 
Table 21 Classifications of the Eligibilities in Figure 9 
                                                                    Surveyed Participants % 
MOH S142    
 Saudis employed in public  97 69.2 
 Non-Saudis employed in public  22 15.7 
 Unemployed Saudis43 21 15.0 
 Total 140 100 
Private Sector S2    
 Non-Saudis employed in private  80 87.0 
 Non-Saudis employed in public with PHI  1 1.0 
 Dependent on Non-Saudis employed in private  11 12.0 
 Total 92 100 
SDU S3    
 Non-Saudis employed in SDU  1 100 
 Total 1 100 
MOH & Private Sector S4    
 Saudis employed in public with PHI  20 16.8 
 Saudis employed in private  88 74.0 
 Dependent on Saudis eligible in private 11 9.0 
 Total 119 100 
MOH & SDU S5    
 Saudis employed in public eligible to SDU  30 18.0 
 Saudis employed in SDU  72 43.4 
 Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU  64 38.6 
 Total 166 100 
MOH, Private, & SDU S6    
 Saudi employed in public eligible to all  4 4.9 
 Saudi employed in private eligible to all  62 75.6 
 Saudi employed in SDU eligible to all  10 12.2 
 Dependent Saudi eligible to all  6 7.3 
 Total 82 100 
                                               
42 Slice 1 
43 In this slice, there are no Saudi dependents, because all Saudis are eligible to free access in the MOH 
healthcare facilities, where in all other slices, the dependents are guaranteed to healthcare because they are 
dependent on someone who is a major eligible to healthcare in the private sector or the SDU. This is the 




4.4.4 Willingness to Pay 
 Overall Willingness to Pay 
The study found that 58.5% of the study participants who have access to healthcare 
services only in MOH healthcare facilities are willing to pay to increase their access. In 
addition, it was found that 53% of the Saudi participants who can access healthcare 
services in the private sector or other governmental healthcare facilities in addition to the 
MOH, or who can access all the three healthcare provisions, are willing to pay to keep 
MOH healthcare services available to them.  
Table 22 Participants’ Overall Willingness to Pay for the MOH Healthcare Services 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Total Willingness to Increase    
 Yes 82 58.6 
 No 58 41.4 
 Total 140 100 
Total Willingness to Maintain     
 Yes 195 53.1 
 No 172 46.9 
 Total 367 100 
Total Willingness to Obtain     
 Yes 55 59.1 
 No 38 40.9 
 Total 93 100 
Overall Willingness     
 Yes 332 55.4 
 No 268 44.6 
 Total 600 100 
 
Furthermore, 59% of non-Saudis who can access healthcare services only in the private 
sector or in the other governmental healthcare facilities are willing to pay to obtain access 
to MOH healthcare services. Thus, it can be seen that the majority of the study participants 
showed a WTP to improve their access to the healthcare services that are provided in the 




 Willingness to Pay Based on the Entitlement to Income 
In this part, the study will show the responses of the participants who receive income in 
comparison to those who do not. This will be presented based on the three major 
classifications (increase, maintain, obtain). 
1. Group increase; the study found 61% of participants who are eligible to healthcare 
only inside the MOH healthcare facilities who are in receipt of income (130 participants) 
are willing to pay a percentage of their total income to increase their access to the 
healthcare services that are provided in MOH healthcare facilities. However, the majority 
of those who have the same level of access and are in receipt of no income (7 out of 10 
participants) have no WTP a percentage of their future total income or the income of the 
person on whom they are dependent to increase their access to the healthcare services that 
are provided in MOH healthcare facilities (see Table 23). 
2. Group maintain; for the Saudi participants with income who are eligible to receive 
healthcare services in the private sector, other governmental healthcare facilities, or both, 
the study figures indicate that 53% are willing to pay a percentage of their total income 
to keep MOH healthcare services available to them. However, for those who have the 
same level of eligibilities but receive no income, it was found that 13 out of 25 participants 
are unwilling to pay a percentage of their future total income or a percentage from the 
income of the person on whom they are dependent to maintain their access to MOH 
healthcare services (see Table 23). 
3. Group obtain; study data shows that 61% of non-Saudis who are eligible to healthcare 
services only in either the private sector or other governmental healthcare facilities of 
those in receipt of income are willing to pay a percentage of their total income to obtain 
access to MOH healthcare facilities. However, the majority of those who have the same 




their future total income or a percentage from the income of the person on whom they are 
dependent to obtain access to MOH healthcare facilities (see Table 23). 
Table 23 Participants’ Willingness to Participate Based on the Entitlement to 
Income 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Willingness to Increase 
(For those with income) 
   
 Yes 79 60.8 
 No 51 39.2 
 Total 130 100 
Willingness to Increase 
(For those with no income)    
 Yes 3 30.0 
 No 7 70.0 
 Total 10 100 
Willingness to Maintain 
(For those with income) 
   
 Yes 183 53.5 
 No 159 46.5 
 Total 342 100 
Willingness to Maintain 
(For those with no income)    
 Yes 12 48.0 
 No 13 52.0 
 Total 25 100 
Willingness to Obtain 
(For those with income) 
   
 Yes 50 61.0 
 No 32 39.0 
 Total 82 100 
Willingness to Obtain 
(For those with no income)    
 Yes 5 45.5 
 No 6 54.5 
 Total 11 100 
 
 Willingness to Pay Based on the Six Slices and Each Slice’s Classification 
The study carried out additional analysis on each slice to identify the WTP of each group. 
In the first slice, it was found that the 66% of Saudis who are employed in public sector 
are willing to pay to increase their access in the MOH healthcare facilities. However, only 
27% of non-Saudis who are employed in the public sector are willing to pay (see Figure 
10 in the Text and Table 20 in Appendix). In contrast, the data shows that the majority of 
non-Saudis who are employed privately are willing to pay to obtain access to healthcare 


















Figure 10 Participants Willingness to Pay Depending on some Socio-Economic 
Charactersitics (The Numerator is Yes, The Denominator is No)  
 
1 Saudis and Non-Saudis eligible to healthcare just in MOH. 2 Non-Saudis eligible to healthcare just in private sector. 3 Non-Saudis 
eligible to healthcare just in SDU. 4 Saudis eligible to healthcare in MOH & private sector. 5 Saudis eligible to healthcare in MOH & 
SDU. 6 Saudis eligible to healthcare in all three provisions. 7 Saudis working in public sector with healthcare insurance. 8 Saudis 
working in private sector. 9 Dependents on Saudis eligible in private sector. 10 Dependents on Saudis eligible in private sector with 
income. 11 Dependents on Saudis eligible in private sector without income. 12 Non-Saudis working in private sector. 13 Non-Saudis 
working in public sector with Private Health Insurance. 14 Non-Saudis dependent on Non-Saudis working in Private Sector. 15 Saudis 
working in public sector and eligible to all. 16 Saudis working in private sector and eligible to all. 17 Saudis working in SDU and 
eligible to all. 18 Dependents on Saudis eligible to all. 19 Dependents on Saudis with income eligible to all. 20 Dependents on Saudis 
with no income eligible to all. 21 Dependents on Saudis working in SDU without income. 22 Dependents on Saudis working in SDU. 
23 Dependents on Saudis working in SDU with income. 24 Saudis working in SDU. 25 Saudis working in public and receiving 
healthcare in SDU. 26 Unemployed without Income receiving healthcare just in MOH. 27 Unemployed with Income receiving 
healthcare just in MOH. 28 Unemployed receiving healthcare just in MOH. 29 Non-Saudis employed in public and receiving 
healthcare just in MOH. 30 Saudis, employed in public and receiving healthcare just in MOH. 
 
In the fourth slice, study analysis indicates that the majority (55%) of Saudis who are 
employed privately are willing to pay to keep the MOH healthcare services available to 
them. However, 60% of the Saudis who are employed in the public sector with PHI are 
unwilling to pay. Moreover, study figures state that most of the Saudis who are employed 
in SDU, as well as their dependents with and without income, are unwilling to pay to 
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On the other hand, 60% of the Saudis who are publicly employed showed a willingness 
to pay. The last slice shows that 66% of the Saudis who are privately employed are willing 
to pay to maintain their access to MOH healthcare services (see Figure 10 in the Text and 
Table 20 in Appendix). 
 Willingness to Pay Based on the Demographic Classification 
Study data shows that the majority of all categories (males and females, Saudis and non-
Saudis, those with chronic diseases and those without, all health status) are willing to pay 
either to increase, maintain, or to obtain access to MOH healthcare services (see Table 21 
in the Appendix). The same is true for all age groups, except for the only participant who 
is aged over 65. Also, the data shows that the majority of all marital status (single, 
married, and widowed) are willing to pay, except for the group of divorced, where only 
five out of eleven showed a WTP. 
 Willingness to Pay Based on the Socio-Economic Classification 
The analysis indicates that the majority of all categories of education are willing to pay 
to increase, maintain, or to obtain access to MOH healthcare facilities except for holders 
of master’s degrees (see Table 22 in the Appendix). Moreover, the majority of participants 
in all income categories showed a WTP, and the same is true for those who have PHI and 
those without, where a majority of those with PHI at all levels (VIP, A, B and C) are 
willing to pay. 
4.4.5 Ranking of the three Funding Options 
 Overall Ranking of the three Funding Options 
The study data shows that the minority (only 8.5%) of participants see Taxation as the 
most suitable insurance mechanism for them to pay to increase, maintain, or to obtain 
healthcare services in MOH healthcare facilities. In addition, it was found that nearly 
39.5% of the participants considered MSA as the most appropriate mechanism to pay for 




shows that 52% of the respondents ranked PHI as the most appropriate insurance 
mechanism. On the other hand, the study found that nearly 15% of participants see MSA 
the least preferable insurance mechanism, and 19% considered PHI unsuitable. However, 
the majority see Taxation as the least preferable insurance option (66%) (see Table 24). 
Table 24 Participants’ ranking to three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms 
Insurance Mechanism  Surveyed Participants % 
Taxation    
 Most preferred  51 8.5 
 Second preferred  151 25.1 
 Least preferred 398 66.3 
 Total 600 100 
Medical Saving Accounts     
 Most preferred  237 39.5 
 Second preferred  275 45.8 
 Least preferred 88 14.7 
 Total 600 100 
Private Health Insurance    
 Most preferred  312 52.0 
 Second preferred  174 29.0 
 Least preferred 114 19.0 
 Total 600 100 
 
The data shows that the PHI had the lowest mean among the three health funding options, 
followed by MSA and then Taxation (1.6, 1.7, and 2.6, respectively). Moreover, the PHI 
median and mode is 1, MSA 2, and 3 for Taxation (see Table 25). 
Table 25 Mean, Median, and Mode of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms 
Insurance Mechanism  Result 
Taxation    
 Mean   2.58 
 Median  3 
 Mode 3 
Medical Saving Accounts     
 Mean   1.75 
 Median  2 
 Mode 2 
Private Health Insurance    
 Mean   1.67 
 Median  1 





 Ranking Based on the six Slices and Each Slice Classification 
The data analyses show that 72% of publicly employed Saudis who are eligible to 
healthcare only in the MOH, and are willing to pay, ranked Taxation as the least preferred 
option. However, 59% see the PHI as the best payment method, and 50% ranked MSA 
second. Moreover, those who are unwilling to pay within this category placed the options 
in the same order, but in different percentages (see Table 23 in the Appendix).  
The data also shows that twelve out of the 16 non-Saudis who are employed publicly and 
are unwilling to pay placed Taxation the last option, where half of this group prefer MSA 
and the other half prefer PHI (see Table 23 in the Appendix). 
Study figures indicate that the majority of non-Saudis who are privately employed and 
eligible to healthcare only in the private sector (who are willing and unwilling to pay) 
ranked Taxation as the least preferred (61%, 84%), ranked PHI as the best mechanism 
(59%, 77%), and MSA as the second funding option (41%, 77%) (see Table 24 in the 
Appendix). 
The figures in Table 26 in the Appendix indicate that nine out of twelve Saudis who are 
employed publicly from those who are eligible to healthcare in the private sector in 
addition to the MOH, and are unwilling to pay, see PHI as the most suitable insurance 
mechanism; eight ranked MSA second, and eight placed Taxation third. Moreover, the 
data shows that half the Saudis who are employed privately, and willing to pay, prefer 
PHI (24 out of 48 participants), and almost half do not prefer Taxation. Furthermore, half 
of those who are unwilling to pay within this category ranked PHI first (21 out of 40 
participants), 22 placed MSA second, and 25 participants ranked Taxation third (see 





Study data states that the Saudis who are employed publicly and eligible to health in the 
other governmental healthcare facilities from who are willing and unwilling to pay ranked 
PHI first, MSA second, and Taxation third (67% and 58% PHI, 55% and 75% MSA, 78% 
and 75% Taxation)44 (see Table 27 in the Appendix). Also the figures show the same 
results for Saudis who are employed in SDU but at different levels of preferences (65% 
and 47% PHI, 56% and 45% MSA, 75% and 62% Taxation). However, the dependents 
on Saudis who are employed in SDU from those with income and willing to pay prefer 
MSA the most, then Taxation, and lastly PHI (74%, 58%, and 47%). The same is true for 
those who are unwilling to pay in this group, but they ranked PHI second and Taxation 
third (71%, 75% and 87%) (see Table 27 in the Appendix). 
The data in Table 28 in the Appendix indicate that 51% of the Saudis who are employed 
privately and eligible to healthcare in all provisions from those who are willing to pay 
ranked MSA first, 39% ranked PHI second, and 63% ranked Taxation third, where 57% 
of those who are unwilling to pay placed PHI first and the same percentage placed MSA 
second, and 71% ranked Taxation third.  
 Ranking Based on the Demographic Classification 
Study figures indicate that males who are willing and unwilling to pay ordered the three 
health financing options in the same way as the majority of the other groups (PHI first, 
MSA second, and Taxation third). Moreover, the figures show that the females placed the 
options in the same order (see Table 29 in the Appendix). 
Table 30 in the Appendix implies that the people who are willing to pay from those aged 
between 18 and 25 favour MSA and see Taxation as the least suitable option (52%, 57%, 
respectively). On the other hand, those who are unwilling to pay from this age range 
ranked the options as the majority of the other categories (53% PHI first, 52% MSA 
                                               





second, and 74% Taxation third). The data states that people aged between 26 and 35 who 
are willing and unwilling to pay have the same preference as the majority of participants 
(54% and 59% PHI first, 45% and 56% MSA second, 68% and 69% Taxation third). Also, 
the figures show that those aged between 36 and 45 and are willing to pay do not prefer 
Taxation (61%), and 56% ranked PHI first. Furthermore, 46% of those who are unwilling 
to pay ranked MSA first, and the same percentage selected PHI first as well, where the 
majority placed Taxation as the last option (68%). For those who are aged between 46 
and 55 and willing to pay, the data shows that the majority prefer PHI the most and 
Taxation the least (56% and 52%, respectively). On the other hand, those who are 
unwilling to pay ranked MSA first and Taxation last (50% and 71%, respectively).  
The data analysis found that the Saudis who are willing and unwilling to pay reported the 
same preference as the majority of other participants but at different levels (48% and 50% 
PHI first, 40% and 48% MSA second, 64% and 67% Taxation third). The same is true for 
the non-Saudis from those who are willing and unwilling (59% and 70% PHI first, 41% 
and 68% MSA second, 61% and 83% Taxation third) (see Table 31 in the Appendix). 
The figures in Table 32 in the Appendix show that the majority of those who are single 
and willing to pay prefer MSA the most and Taxation as the third option (46% and 61%, 
respectively). On the other hand, the majority of those who are unwilling to pay in this 
group placed the options in the same order as the majority of participants (50% PHI first, 
49% MSA second, and 74% Taxation third). Moreover, study analysis observed that most 
married participants who were willing and unwilling to pay placed the funding options in 
the same order as the majority of the other groups, but in different percentages (55% and 
59% PHI first, 43% and 56% MSA second, 66% and 66% Taxation third).  
Study data shows that the majority of people with chronic diseases from those who are 
willing and unwilling to pay selected the options as the majority of the other groups (54% 




Appendix). The same is true for those without chronic diseases from those who are willing 
and unwilling to pay, where the majority ranked the options in the same order (50% and 
55% PHI first, 41% and 52% MSA second, 62% and 70% Taxation third).  
The figures in Table 34 in the Appendix show that half of those in excellent health and 
willing to pay gave the priority to PHI, 40% ranked MSA second, and 68% ranked 
Taxation third. Moreover, those who are unwilling to pay reported the same but at a higher 
level of preference for this order, where 52% ranked PHI first, 50% ranked MSA second, 
and 70% ranked Taxation the last. The same is true for those in very good health status, 
but in varying degrees (53% and 56% PHI first, 41% and 53% MSA second, 56% and 
70% Taxation third). Also for those in good health status, where they showed the same 
response as the majority of the other groups (50% and 68% PHI first, 50% and 63% MSA 
second, 60% and 68% Taxation third).  
 Ranking Based on the Socio-Economic Classification 
The data indicate that the majority of those who hold secondary level of education and 
are willing to pay see Taxation as the second most suitable option and PHI as the least 
suitable, where MSA was seen as the best insurance method (see Table 35 in the 
Appendix). Moreover, the majority of those educated in high school (either the willing 
and unwilling to pay) placed MSA first, PHI second, and Taxation as the last option (61% 
and 60% MSA first, 44% and 50% PHI second, 68% and 73% Taxation third).  
The figures in Table 36 in the Appendix found that the majority of participants of who 
hold a diploma, either from those who are willing or unwilling to pay ranked the three 
funding mechanisms in the same order as the majority of the other groups (54% and 60% 
PHI first, 48% and 62% MSA second, 59% and 74% Taxation third). The same is true for 
those who hold bachelor degree (willing and unwilling to pay), the data shows that the 
majority selected PHI as the best option (54% and 58%), then MSA second (42% and 




Study figures indicate that those who are willing and unwilling to pay of those who hold 
master’s degree favour PHI the most (64% and 81%, respectively), then MSA (57% and 
75%, respectively), and Taxation as the least suitable method (78% and 75%, 
respectively) (see Table 37 in the Appendix). 
The data in Table 38 in the Appendix shows that the majority of participants who are not 
in receipt of income and those who receive income less than SR 3,000 including those 
who are willing and unwilling to pay have ranked MSA as the most suitable option, then 
PHI, and lastly Taxation (57% and 48% MSA first, 36% and 44% PHI second, 62% and 
75% Taxation third). For those in receipt of income between SR 3,000 and 5,999, the data 
shows that half of those who are willing to pay chose MSA as the first insurance method 
and 44% placed Taxation as second. On the other hand, the majority of those who are 
unwilling to pay in this group ranked the options in the same order as the other groups 
(57% PHI first, 52% MSA second, 67% Taxation third). Moreover, the data state that the 
majority of participants who are in receipt of income higher than SR 6,000 have ranked 
the financing options in the same order as the majority of the other groups, but at different 
levels (see Table 38 in the Appendix)  
Study data implies that the majority of people who have PHI from those who are willing 
and unwilling to pay see PHI as the best health insurance mechanism, then MSA as the 
second, and Taxation as the least suitable method (50% and 65% PHI first, 38% and 64% 
MSA second, 59% and 72% Taxation third). The same is true for those who do not have 
PHI from those who are willing and unwilling to pay, but in varying degrees (see Table 






This section gave an overview on the study sample demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. It was indicated that the study sample covered the predominant 
characteristics of the population of SA. The demographic figures showed that most of the 
participants were males, Saudis, aged between 26 and 35, married, having no chronic 
diseases, and in excellent or very good health. Moreover, the socio-economic factors 
indicate that the majority of the respondents have undergraduate education, work for the 
private sector, receive income over the Saudi average income, and a significant proportion 
have PHI. 
In addition, the study found that the majority of participants are willing to pay to increase, 
maintain, or to obtain access to the MOH healthcare facilities. When further analyses 
were conducted, it was found that most of those who are not in receipt of income are 
unwilling to pay to improve their level of access. Also, it was found that the majority of 
those who can access healthcare in the private sector are willing to pay to maintain and 
to obtain access to the MOH healthcare facilities, and this was testament to the high level 
of healthcare services that are provided by the MOH in comparison to the private sector. 
On the other hand, it was noticed that those who are provided with access to healthcare 
in the other governmental healthcare facilities view their employer’s healthcare services 
as sufficient for them. This suggests that this sector provided the highest quality 
healthcare services in SA. 
Finally, when the participants’ preferences for the three healthcare financing options were 
investigated, it was found that the majority prefer PHI and MSA. By a distance, the 






This section will discuss the fundamental findings in the sections dealing with the WTP 
and the ranking of the three funding options and will provide details about the tests and 
model that will be used to test the relationship between the WTP with some demographic 
and socio-economic factors. The same tests (but a different model) will also be used to 
test the relationship between the ranking of the three funding options with the 
demographic and socio-economic factors. 
4.5.1 Willingness to pay 
When the participants’ willingness was divided according to the six slices of eligibilities, 
it was found that the response of slice 2 participants confirms the overall observations in 
Table 22, which indicates that the majority of those who are restricted to healthcare only 
in the private sector or in the other governmental healthcare facilities are willing to pay 
to obtain access to the MOH healthcare services, except for those who are not in receipt 
of income. Moreover, what was found in the overall response of those who want to 
maintain their access to the MOH healthcare services was also confirmed by the response 
of those who represent slice 4 (MOH and private sector), except for the Saudis who are 
employed publicly and are provided with PHI, and the dependents who are not in receipt 
of income. In addition, the same was confirmed by those who represent slice 6 (MOH, 
private sector and SDU), except the Saudis who are employed publicly and eligible to 
health in all three provisions, the Saudis who are employed in the SDU, and unemployed 
Saudis without income. However, the response of those who represent slice 5 (MOH and 
SDU) did not confirm the overall findings, except for the Saudis who are employed 
publicly in this slice. 
This suggests that the healthcare services which are provided by the MOH are better to 
some extent than those which are provided in the private sector, and this was shown in 




the MOH healthcare services, and also by the response of the majority of slice 4 who are 
willing to pay to keep the MOH services available, as well as by the Saudis in slice 6 who 
are employed privately and unemployed with income, who deem the MOH healthcare 
services worth paying for. This provides an indication that the MOH will receive 
financing from the majority (who are willing to pay) who are guaranteed access in the 
private sector, as the MOH services are more attractive to them. Moreover, the rest (the 
Saudis who are not willing to pay) will benefit the MOH by eliminating a significant cost 
from being spent on them, and this will be attained though suspending their access to the 
MOH healthcare facilities, which in turn will reduce the pressure on the MOH healthcare 
facilities and make it more attractive. 
On the other hand, the data indicates that the healthcare services that are provided by the 
other governmental healthcare facilities are better than those which the MOH provide to 
some extent, and this was noticed by the majority agreement of those who represent slice 
5, and some groups of slice 6, where a higher percentage preferred not to keep the MOH 
healthcare services available to them. These findings confirm the common perception that 
the other governmental healthcare facilities come out on top in terms of quality to 
healthcare services in SA. This will lead to a lower financing to the MOH by this category, 
but it will eliminate their access to the MOH, which will reduce a proportion of fund from 
being spent on them. 
Following on the overall observation of Table 22 in terms of those who want to increase 
their access, the majority of slice one confirmed this observation, and see the current 
access to healthcare as insufficient, and seek to apply the proposed plan in the Saudi 
healthcare system to improve their level of access to health. However, the data showed 
that non-Saudis and unemployed Saudis without income see this access as sufficient. This 




access to the MOH healthcare services. As a result, this slice will contribute a significant 
proportion of funding to the MOH. 
In terms of the demographic classification, the study found that males’ WTP is lower than 
females (2% difference). This could be due to traditional facts, where the male in SA 
takes primary responsibility for life’s needs; for example, the family housing, food, 
transportation, and even the entire cost of having a family. On the other hand, the female 
takes lower responsibility in this regard, and, as a result, the males may value money more 
than the females do to some extent, resulting in a lower WTP. 
The findings of this study confirm the fact that a person needs more healthcare services 
as he/she gets older. The study data shows that when people get older, their WTP 
increases as well. For example, it was found that 52% of the participants who are aged 
between 18 and 25 are willing to pay, while about 64% of people aged between 56 and 
65 are willing to pay.  
It was expected that the non-Saudis will have lower WTP than Saudis, and this is because 
the majority of non-Saudis are either receiving income below the Saudi average income, 
or are dependent and in receipt of no income. This reason lowers the non-Saudis’ WTP. 
Moreover, the lower willingness to pay observed by non-Saudis could be due to the reason 
that some of them come to SA to work and make saving and are less likely to look after 
additional healthcare services. 
The single participants showed lower WTP for the reason that the average marriage age 
in SA is 26 years, and the data showed that younger participants have lower WTP than 
older (64% of those aged 56 to 65 are willing to pay in comparison to 52% of those aged 
between 18 and 25), where the majority of the single people fit into the younger 
categories. The same findings confirm the reason for the higher WTP among the married 




The findings of this study contradict the fact that when a person becomes in actual need 
for a product or service, then his/her value on such a product or service will increase. This 
study’s frequencies indicate a higher willingness by those in excellent health and lower 
willingness by those at a lower level of health. In fact, it was expected that people without 
chronic diseases would have a lower WTP than those who had chronic diseases.  
In terms of the socio-economic classification, it is true that the person’s knowledge is an 
important factor to decide whether to pay for a healthcare service or not, and this is due 
to his/her ability to recognise how important the healthcare service is to him/her, and also 
the discernment to evaluate the offered service in comparison to what he/she has in 
relation to what he/she exactly needs. The findings of this study showed that groups in 
the higher level of education have lower WTP in comparison to those in the primary levels 
(moving from the first level to the second, to the third). 
It was expected that people with greater income would have more WTP than those in 
receipt of a low level of income. This is because those who have no or a low level of 
income may value money more than those who receive a higher income. The current 
study found that those who are over than the Saudi average level of income have higher 
WTP in comparison to those with income lower than the average. 
In terms of the possession of PHI, the findings here confirm that the majority of those 
who are entitled to healthcare in the private sector see the services that are provided to 
them as not sufficient and that the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH are 
desirable. Moreover, it was observed that those who have a low level of health insurance 
(level C) are more willing to pay in comparison to those with a high level of PHI (VIP 






4.5.2 Relationship between the Decision to Pay and People’s Characteristics 
This part of the study examines the relationships between the dependent variables (WTP) 
and the respondents’ characteristics. In the literature review, parametric and 
nonparametric tests are employed to find relationships between dependent and 
independent variables (Coolidge, 2012). Moreover, the type of test depends on the nature 
of the variables, whether they are categorical, ordinal, or interval, and also on the 
distribution of the data (normal or non-normal distribution).  
In this study, the dependent variable is categorical in nature as long as it measures 
respondent’s decision to pay or not, and will be coded as zero if a participant is unwilling 
to pay, and 1 if the participant is willing to pay. In addition, the independent variables 
that measure respondents’ demographic and socio-economic characteristics are all 
categorical in nature as well (2 or more categories). Therefore, if the relationships 
between categorical dependent variables and categorical independent variables with two 
or more categories want to be investigated, then the nonparametric Chi square test is 
appropriate (Coolidge, 2012). Chi square is used to identify if there is a significant 
difference between the expected and the observed frequencies. In other words, it tests 
whether the distribution of categorical variables differ from each other. There are three 
assumptions of Chi square, which most of the data satisfies; first, individual observations 
are independent. Second, the dependent variable is categorical. Third, there is a minimum 
of five frequencies in each cell (Coolidge, 2012). If the latter assumption was violated, 
then the Fisher exact test can be employed (Everitt, 1992). However, the Fisher exact test 
does not provide test statistics, and only provides a p-value. 
In the Appendix, Table 40 presents the results of the chi-square and Fisher exact tests. 
The variables that are marked with asterisks are the variables that had less than five 
observations, where the Fisher exact test was performed. 
The figures show that the majority of the independent variables are in line with outcomes 




that there is no significant difference between the variables’ groups and the overall WTP 
(the categorical variables distribution do not differ from the overall), where the majority 
are willing to pay. However, one of the variables that showed a significant difference is 
Slice 5, which showed a p-value of 0.02. This significant p-value rejects the Fisher exact 
test null hypothesis, which states that groups do not differ. In this variable, it was noted 
that 47.6% (79 out of 166 respondents) are willing to pay, where the bulk are not, whereas, 
the majority of the overall are willing to pay (55.4%) (see Table 40 in the Appendix). 
This confirms the findings of the previous section, where one of the characteristic that 
showed a majority of unwillingness to pay was slice 5. Moreover, the Employed variable 
was also found significant at the 10% level (p-value 0.051), and this was due to the major 
difference between the willingness to pay of those who are employed in SDU (45% are 
willing to pay and 55% are not) in comparison to all the employed participants (56% are 
willing to pay and 44% are not). 
4.5.3 Factors Influencing People’s WTP  
This section will outline the factors that affect people’s WTP based on what was found 
in previous studies, then will discuss the econometric model that will be used to 
investigate the factors that influence people’s WTP for the MOH healthcare services. 
Additionally, this part will present the model results, and discuss them. 
 Factors Influencing WTP (Literature Review) 
The literature review show that the factors that are associated with people’s WTP vary 
across studies. Of the demographic factors, some of the previous studies indicate that age 
positively influences WTP. Precisely, younger people are more willing to pay than older 
(Asgary et al., 2004, Basu, 2013, Donfouet et al., 2011, Golinowska and Tambor, 2012, 
Liu et al., 2012, Milligan et al., 2010, Olsen and Donaldson, 1998, Bergmo and 
Wangberg, 2007). In addition, it was found that the WTP is influenced by the health 




Tambor, 2012, Liu et al., 2012). On the other hand, the lower the health status is, the 
lower the WTP is (Baji et al., 2012). 
In terms of the socio-economic factors, some studies provided evidence of the 
relationship between income and WTP. Studies found that people with greater income 
are more willing to pay (Baji et al., 2012, Basu, 2013, Donfouet et al., 2011, Golinowska 
and Tambor, 2012, Milligan et al., 2010, Nosratnejad et al., 2014). Moreover, a positive 
association with education was found. Many studies indicated that when a person’s 
education increases, his/her WTP for healthcare services increases as well (Asgary et al., 
2004, Baji et al., 2012, Nosratnejad et al., 2014). Also it was found that people access to 
healthcare significantly influence their WTP (Asgary et al., 2004). In addition, evidence 
suggests that being insured significantly influences people’s WTP. Nosratnejad found 
that the WTP increased in the insured members of households (Nosratnejad et al., 2014). 
 Econometric Model 
Multivariate analysis will be used in this study to determine which independent variables 
influence respondents’ WTP. The following probit regression will be employed to 
estimate respondents’ decision to pay for the MOH healthcare services.  
 
MODEL 1 
Z* = xiα + ɛi 
Zi = 0 if Zi ≤ 0;  
Zi = 1 if Zi > 0 
 
The participation equation above is assumed to be a probit model where Z indicates a 
binary variable, 1 if the dependent variable is observed and 0 otherwise. xi is a vector of 
the independent variables for the participation equation, and α is a vector of coefficient. 
The error term ɛi assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero, variance equal 
to 1, and correlation coefficient ρ. The probit model is used to find a consistent estimator 




Because the probit model is nonlinear, it is difficult to describe the relationship between 
the variables and their outcome probabilities. Therefore, to facilitate the interpretation of 
the results from the participation equation, the marginal effects at the mean (MEM) will 
be presented. These marginal effects measure the discrete change in all the binary 
explanatory variables in the model (i.e. how the predicted probabilities change as the 
explanatory variables change from 0 to 1) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). For a categorical 
variable the discrete change is computed as following (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): 
 
Xk = Pr(y = 1|X, Xk = 1) – Pr(y =1|X, Xk = 0) 
 
where Xk indicates the explanatory variable, Pr is the probability change, y is the 
dependent variable, and X denotes the other covariates at their means. 
When the probit regression was applied, multi-collinearity arose in the eligibility variable 
(increase was coded 1, maintain 2, and obtain 3- named as Access of Three), the six slices 
variable (named as Access), and Health Status. Also, some categories in Age, Marital 
Status, Health Status, and Access were dropped due to the low observations. Therefore, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was investigated. 
The VIF quantifies the level of multi-collinearity, where if it was not addressed, then it 
would result in large standard errors, and consequently the results would not be accurate 
(Ott, 2015). A VIF of 1 means no collinearity, whereas 10 indicates a significant 
collinearity. When the VIF was applied to the study data, the programme drooped the 
eligibility variable (Access of Three) and the last category of the six slice variable 
(Access), and showed 14.1 average VIF, with high VIF in some variables, such as; Health 
Status, Education, and Income (see Table 41 in the Appendix). Therefore, it was 
necessary to merge some categories of independent variables in a meaningful way that 
predicted the WTP. 
For this reason, the last two categories of the Health Status (fair and poor) were merged 




as following: First level (primary, secondary, and high school), Undergraduate (diploma 
and bachelor), and Postgraduate (higher diploma, master’s, and PhD). Furthermore, the 
Incomes were divided into two categories, one representing those under the average level 
of income in Saudi Arabia (< SR 3,000 and SR 3,000 to 5,999) and another one 
representing those in receipt of income above the average (SR 6,000 <). Moreover, the 
last two Age categories (56 to 65 and 65 <) were merged into one category. The same is 
true for the last two categories of the Marital Status (divorced and widowed), which was 
merged into one category. After these changes, the VIF was applied, and the result shows 
4.01 average VIF (see Table 42 in the Appendix). However, the collinearity appeared in 
the Access and Access of Three variables. Therefore, the Access variable was removed. 
As a result, the collinearity issue resolved with 4.1 VIF (see Table 42 in the Appendix).  
 Results 
The probit regression analyses indicate that the participants’ nationality is highly 
associated with the decision to pay. The figures in Table 26 show a significant p-value 
for this demographic variable (0.00 p-value). Moreover, the marginal effect shows that if 
the participant is Saudi then there is a probability of 45.8% that he/she is more likely to 
be willing to pay than a non-Saudi; in other words, if the participant is Saudi, the 
willingness to pay increases by 45.8% relative to a non-Saudi. In addition, the study data 
showed that a participant’s having PHI or not, highly affects his/her decision to pay (p- 
0.03). The marginal effect shows that the participant who has PHI is 11.9% more likely 
to be willing to pay than one not having PHI (being insured increases WTP by 11.9% 
than not being). Furthermore, the analysis showed a significant relationship between the 
type of eligibility to healthcare (increase, maintain, and obtain) and the decision to pay 
(Maintain p-value 0.00 and Obtain p-value 0.01). The marginal effect indicates that each 
of those who want to maintain their access (in group maintain) to the MOH health 




increase their access (in group increase). Moreover, those who want to obtain access to 
the healthcare services that are provided in the MOH (in group obtain) are 27.9% more 
likely to be willing to pay than those who want to increase their access (in group increase). 
Table 26 Probit Model Results for the Willingness to Pay 
Independent 
Variable 
Observation P-value Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Gender     
 Base Category (Female)    
 Male 0.27 -0.15 -0.05 
Age     
 Base Category (18 - 25)    
 26 - 35 0.75 -0.04 -0.01 
 36 - 45 0.51 0.13 0.05 
 46 - 55 0.10 0.47 0.17 
 56 < 0.74 0.13 0.05 
Nationality     
 Base Category (Non-Saudis)    
 Saudis 0.00*** 1.25 0.45 
Marital Status     
 Base Category (Single)    
 Married 0.90 0.01 0.00 
 Divorced & Widowed 0.68 0.15 0.05 
Education     
 Base Category (First Level)    
 Undergraduate 0.59 -0.07 -0.02 
 Post-graduate 0.63 -0.10 -0.04 
Employment     
 Base Category (Unemployed)    
 Employed 0.95 -0.01 -0.00 
Income     
 Base Category (< Average)    
 6,000 < 0.31 0.16 0.06 
PHI     
 Base Category (Without PHI)    
 With PHI 0.03** 0.30 0.11 
Chronic Disease     
 Base Category (Without)    
 With 0.24 0.22 0.08 
Health Status     
 Base Category (Fair & Poor)    
 Good 0.55 -0.30 -0.12 
 Very Good 0.74 -0.15 -0.06 
 Excellent 0.97 -0.01 -0.00 
Eligibility to Health     
 Base Category (Increase)    
 Maintain 0.00*** -0.42 -0.17 
 Obtain 0.01*** 0.92 0.27 
cons  0.18 -0.81 - 
 





The data outcomes showed significant results at levels between 0.00 and 0.03 which is 
high (<0.05). Moreover, the result of the first demographic variable seems logical, as was 
explained in Section 4.5.1. Usually the non-Saudis who work in SA receive income below 
the Saudi average income ($1,700), where the majority (88% of those who work in the 
private sector) are from those in receipt of income less than $800. In addition, their 
dependents who do not work are not in receipt of benefit from the government. Therefore, 
this gives the priority of those who work and are in receipt of low income to make savings 
and not to pay additional costs to serve their purpose of working in SA, and also their 
dependents who do not work and are not in receipt of income not to pay so as not to put 
a burden on those on whom they are dependent. Consequently, their WTP is lower than 
that of Saudis. 
Moreover, the study result confirmed the findings of the previous studies, where insured 
people are more willing to pay than those who are not. This might be attributed to those 
who hold PHI perceiving that the MOH healthcare services are better than those which 
are provided in the private sector. 
The findings also confirmed the literature that the access to healthcare affects people 
WTP. In addition, the figures showed that people who want to maintain their access to 
the MOH healthcare facilities was affected by those who are eligible to healthcare in the 
other governmental healthcare facilities, where the majority of them are unwilling to pay, 
as they see that their access to these superior healthcare facilities is enough. On the other 
hand, the group of those who are in a position to obtain access to the MOH healthcare 
facilities showed the highest WTP than the other groups. However, these results represent 
a contradiction to the previous result, as this group consists entirely of non-Saudis, where 




After the investigation, it was noted in Table 22 that 59% of those who want 
to obtain access are willing to pay, 58.6% of those who want to increase, and only 53.1% 
of those who want to maintain their access are willing to pay. When further analyses were 
carried out, it was found that the contradiction happened because the nationality variable 
contains one group of only Saudis, and the other one, is purely non-Saudis. However, in 
the eligibility variables, those in group maintain are 100% Saudis, and all those in obtain 
group are 100% non-Saudis as well. Whereas, the increase group contains 84% of Saudis, 
and the rest non-Saudis (16%, 22 participants). Of those 22, there are 16 participants 
(73%) unwilling to pay to increase their access. Consequently, those 22 participants 
changed the dynamic of group increase, bringing down the overall WTP of this group, 
and increasing the overall WTP of group obtain at the same time. 
As a conclusion for the WTP sections, the results of the frequencies suggest that the 
healthcare services that are provided by the MOH are perceived as better than those which 
are provided in the private sector, and this was illustrated from the willingness of those 
who are entitled to healthcare in the private sector to keep or to obtain access to the MOH 
healthcare facilities. On the other hand, the healthcare services that are provided by the 
other governmental healthcare facilities are perceived as better than those of the MOH, 
and this was demonstrated from the response of those who are entitled to healthcare in 
these facilities. In addition, Chi square and Fisher exact tests’ results showed that Slice 5 
and the variable Employed are significantly different. Moreover, the probit model 
findings indicate that Saudis are significantly more willing to pay than non-Saudis; it also 
showed those who hold PHI are more willing to pay in comparison to those who do not. 
Finally, it was found that those who are entitled to healthcare only in the private sector 





4.5.4 Healthcare Funding Mechanisms 
It was clear from the study results that participants tended to have higher preferences for 
the PHI than the other funding mechanisms. The figures showed that the majority of 
participants (312 out of 600 participants) preferred this option to the other options. In 
addition, 237 participants preferred MSA as a first method. However, only 51 participants 
chose Taxation first (see Table 24). 
On the other hand, Taxation was predominantly chosen as the third option (398 
participants). The figures showed fewer people chose MSA as the third option (88 
participants), whereas, 114 participants chose PHI as third option,  
Moreover, the study observed that slightly more than half of those who are willing to pay, 
and who hold PHI, do not see PHI as the most appropriate method for funding their 
healthcare services. Moreover, it was clearly shown that 52% of those who do not have 
PHI do not view PHI as the preferred funding mechanism either. This suggests that about 
half the study sample do not consider PHI as an ideal funding method. 
These facts demonstrate that even if the PHI showed the lowest mean, median, and mode 
among the funding options, it does not mean that it is the best insurance mechanism, and 
this was shown in many cases in this study. First, the mean was very close to MSA mean, 
with a difference of just 0.08 points. Second, 114 participants chose it as the least suitable 
option, where a lower number of participants chose MSA as least suitable option. Third, 
PHI was ranked below first by more than the half of those who currently hold it (from 






4.5.5 Relationship between the Preference and People’s Characteristic 
In Section 4.4.5, Section 4.5.4, and in the Tables from 23 to 39 in the Appendix, the 
demographic and socio-economic variables were discussed. While it seems that most of 
this study’s variables follow the overall ranking of the three health funding mechanisms, 
it was not obvious whether these variables significantly represent the same level of 
ranking or not. Therefore, it was necessary to employ statistical tests on these variables 
to understand their distribution (trend). 
Following on from the information discussed in Section 4.5.2, this part of the study will 
employ Chi square and the Fisher exact tests to discover whether the distribution of the 
categorical variables significantly differ from the overall ranking (test if there are any 
significant differences). The independent variables are the demographic and socio-
economic factors, where the dependent variables are the healthcare funding options 
ranking. Table 43 in the Appendix shows the tests results, where each insurance option 
was tested separately.  
 Taxation 
The data shows that four independent variables indicate significant differences among 
their groups in terms of the level of preference, which are education (p-value 0.00), 
income (p-value 0.04), level of PHI (p-value 0.03), and slice 4 (p-value 0.00) (see Table 
43 in the Appendix). These significant p-values reject the null hypothesis, which states 
that groups do not differ. Generally speaking, as discussed in Section 4.4.5.1, the data 
showed that the majority of the overall participants (66.3%) rank Taxation the least, 25% 
rank it second, and only 8.5% rank it first (see Table 24). However, the education groups 
showed differences ranging from 28.5% (secondary level) to 81.8% (primary level) in 
terms of the last option, between 13.3% (higher diploma and master’s) to 45.4% (PhD) 
as a second option, and from 0.0% (PhD and primary) to 28.5% (secondary level) as the 




differentiated between 53.3% (SR 3,000-5,999) to 74.2% (SR 6,000-8,999), from 18.3% 
(SR 6,000-8,999) to 36.3% (SR 12,000-14,999) as the second option, and between 3% 
(SR 12,000-14,999) and 13.3% (SR 3,000-5,999) as the first option. The data also showed 
that 55.5% of slice four respondents ranked Taxation third, and 36% ranked it second. 
In the level of PHI, the percentages of the participants’ response in terms of the preference 
to the funding mechanisms differ in this variable in comparison to the previous three 
variables, as the percentages of preferences in the previous variables are based on all the 
respondents (600 participants), where in this variable, they are based exclusively on the 
PHI holders (293 participants) (64.8% rank it third, 27% second, and 8.1% ranked it first 
(see Table 39 in the Appendix))45. The data shows that percentages of those who rank 
Taxation third range from 51.8% (level C) to 74.1% (level A), 23.2% (level A) to 33.3% 
(level C) as second, and 2.6% (level A) to 14.8% (level C) for those who ranked it first 
(see Table 43 in the Appendix). 
 Medical Saving Accounts 
Study figures observed nine variables indicating significant p-values in terms of the 
preference for the medical saving accounts. This rejects the null hypothesis, which states 
that groups do not differ. In the previous sections, it was outlined that the majority of 
participants ranked MSA second (45.8%), 40% first, and 14% third (see Table 24). 
However, Chi square and Fisher exact tests’ results showed that the preference 
percentages of eight out of the nine variables are shifting away from these percentages. 
First, nationality (p-value 0.01), the data shows 43.9% of Saudis ranked MSA second and 
53.9% of non-Saudis ranked it second. In addition, 27.8% of non-Saudis ranked it first, 
and 42.2% of Saudis ranked it first. Second, marital status (p-value 0.03), the difference 
in the percentage of those who ranked MSA as the third option ranged between 11.9% 
                                               
45 The overall preference for Taxation based on the 600 participants ranked it third (66.3%), 25% ranked it 
second, and 8.5% ranked it first. Based on the PHI holders who are 293 participants, the preference 




(single) and 27.2% (divorced), between 0.0% (widowed) and 48.6% (married) for who 
ranked it second, and between 35.1% (married) and 75% (widowed) for those who ranked 
it first. Third, Education (p-value 0.00), in this variable the percentages of the groups that 
ranked MSA third ranged between 0.0% (primary level) and 45.4% (PhD), 9% (primary 
level) and 66.6% (higher diploma and master’s) as second, and from 9% (PhD) to 91% 
(primary level) for those who ranked it first. Fourth, employment (p-value 0.00), the data 
showed that 36.3% of the employed participants and 53.1% of those who are not 
employed ranked MSA first. Also, 33.6% of those who are unemployed and 48.6% of 
those who are employed ranked it second. Fifth, Income (p-value 0.04), the participants 
response to MSA ranged between 10.2% (SR 6,000-8,999) and 20% (SR 3,000- 5,999) 
among the groups who ranked it third, 36.8% (< SR 3,000) and 52.5% (SR 15,000 <) as 
second, and between 29.5% (SR 15,000 <) and 52.6% (< SR 3,000) among those who 
placed it first. Sixth, maintain (p-value 0.03), the data indicates that 43% of those who 
want to maintain their access to the healthcare services that are provided in the MOH 
placed MSA first, and the same percentage ranked it as second. Seventh, obtain (p-value 
0.00), study figures show that 23.6% of those who want to obtain access to the healthcare 
services that are provided in the MOH placed MSA first, and 59.1% ranked it second. 
Eighth, slice 2 (p-value 0.00), the data showed that 23.9% of those in slice 2 ranked MSA 
first, and 58.7% as second (see Table 43 in the Appendix). 
Ninth, PHI provider (p-value 0.04), the percentage of the majority of this group differ to 
the other previous eight variables, due to the different overall number of respondents in 
this variable (293 participants) (49.1% placed it second, 35.8% first, and 15% placed third 
(see Table 39 in the Appendix)). The percentages of the participants’ response in these 
variables who ranked MSA third ranged between 6.2% (family) and 33.3% (OOP), from 
0.0% (OOP) to 53.1% (family) for those who ranked it second, and between 34.5% 




 Private Health Insurance 
The data in Table 43 in the Appendix shows thirteen variables had significant p-values. 
This rejects the null hypothesis, which states that groups do not differ. In the previous 
sections, it was discussed that the majority of the study participants ranked PHI first 
(52%), with smaller numbers ranking it second (29%), and third (19%) (see Table 24). 
However, Chi square and the Fisher exact tests observed that the preferences according 
to thirteen variables are significantly different to this ranking (to the overall ranking). 
First, nationality (p-value 0.00), study analyses observed that 49% of Saudis and 64.3% 
of non-Saudis ranked PHI first, and 21% of Saudis and 10.4% of non-Saudis ranked it 
third. Second, marital status (p-value 0.01), the figures showed that the ranking of those 
who placed PHI third ranged between 9% (divorced) and 25% (widowed), 25.5% 
(married) and 75% (widowed) for those who ranked PHI second, and between 0.0% 
(widowed) and 56.7% (married) of those who placed it first. Third, education (p-value 
0.00), marked differences among all the preferences of the categories of this variable were 
observed (first 9% to 90%, second 9% to 72.2%, and third zero to 50%). Fourth, 
employment (p-value 0.00), study analyses found 55.4% of those who are employed and 
37.1% of those who are not ranked PHI first, and 25.4% of the former and 44.2% of the 
latter ranked it second. Fifth variable: income (p-value 0.00), the percentages of those 
who ranked PHI third ranged between 12% (SR 9,000-11,999) and 26.6% (SR 3,000-
5,999), 18.1% (SR 12,000-14,999) and 40.3% (> SR 3,000) for who ranked it second, and 
between 38.5% (> SR 3,000) and 60.2% (15,999 <) for those who placed it first. Sixth, 
PHI (p-value 0.02), the analyses found 56% of those who have PHI and 48.2% of those 
who do not ranked PHI first, and 23.9% of those who hold PHI and 33.8% who do not 
ranked PHI second. Seventh, maintain (p-value 0.01), it was found that the percentage of 
those who want to maintain their access in the MOH and ranked PHI third is 21.8%, 
30.5% ranked it second, and 47.7% ranked it first. Eighth, obtain (p-value 0.00), the data 




PHI as the second option, and 69.9% placed it first. Ninth, slice 2 (p-value 0.00), it was 
observed that 20.6% of participants in this slice ranked PHI second, and 69.5% ranked it 
first. Tenth, slice 4 (p-value 0.00), the percentages of the respondents who ranked PHI 
second in this slice is 17.6%, and 28.5% ranked it third. Eleventh, slice 5 (p-value 0.03), 
it was found that 36.7% of participants in this slice ranked PHI second, and 45.1% ranked 
it first. 
Twelfth, PHI provider (p-value 0.02), as discussed in the previous sections, the 
percentage of the bulk of this group is not the same as other variables because the total 
number of participants in this group is 293 (56% placed it first, 23.8% second, and 20.1% 
placed it third (see Table 39 in the Appendix)). The percentages in the PHI provider 
variable differ between 0.0% (OOP) and 44.4% (family) for those who ranked it third, 
21.9% (employer) and 83.3% (OOP) for those who ranked it second, and 16.6% (OOP) 
and 59.3% (family) for those who ranked it first. Thirteenth, level of PHI (p-value 0.00), 
the percentages of participants who ranked PHI first range between 44.4% (level C) and 
69.6% (level A), between 16.9% (level A) and 33.7% (level B) as second, and between 
13.4% (level A) and 35.1% (level C) as the last option. 
4.5.6 Factors Influencing People’s Preference  
In this section, the study will outline the factors that affect people’s preferences for a set 
of alternatives based on what was found in the literature review, then will discuss the 
econometric model that will be used to examine the factors that influence people’s 
preference for the three health funding mechanisms. This section will also present the 
model results, and then discuss them. 
 Factors Influencing People’s Preferences (Literature Review) 
The previous studies indicate that the factors that affect people’s preferences for a set of 
alternatives differ from one set of options to another, from field to field, and from one 




socio-economic factors such as gender, age, health status, income, education, 
employment, and religion possibly affect the person’s preference depending on what they 
are presented with. Previous studies stated that the person’s preference for a set of 
products or services can also be influenced by whether the person had previous experience 
of the proposed options or not, and whether he/she can discuss the option with another 
person. Studies implied that people’s actual need for the proposed options, the features of 
the product or services, accessibility, trademark, and a swift refund in case of insurance 
schemes all influenced the person’s preference. 
A study was conducted by Churchill et al (2000) to investigate people’s preference for 
depression treatments, such as the anti-depressant medication and psychological 
approaches. The study found that people’s preferences are positively associated with 
gender and their previous experience with the treatments, and negatively associated with 
age (Churchill et al., 2000). Mead et al (1995) developed a study to investigate the impact 
of medical and non-medical factors on the cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
preference of patients to determine which treatments were the most important to patients 
in relation to CPR. The study found that age and health status affected patients’ preference 
(Mead et al., 1995). Chung et al (2008) carried out a study to explore the preference of 
the elderly people to three long term care services, which are: home care, nursing home, 
and community based care. The study found that ethnicity and the need for additional 
healthcare services affect elderly people’s preference to choose among these healthcare 
programmes (Chung et al., 2008). In a study conducted by Dwight et al (2000) to examine 
preferences for treatments among depressed primary care patients, it was found that 
ethnicity, gender, income, and experience significantly influence patients’ preferences 
(Dwight-Johnson et al., 2000). Cohen et al (1992) developed a study to investigate 
hospital patients’ preference for future life sustaining treatments. The study examined if 




treatments. The study found that education, the healthcare discussion with someone, and 
religion significantly affect their preference (Cohen-Mansfield et al., 1992). Wang et al 
(2004) examined the preference of elderly people and their primary family caregivers in 
long-term care arrangements. The study found that the previous experience and education 
significantly affect their preference (Wang et al., 2004). In a study carried out by Singh 
(2011) investigating factors affecting people’s preferences when selecting an insurance 
company for purchasing policy, it found that the product features, accessibility, price, and 
the way of refunding all influence people’s preferences when deciding to choose an 
insurance company (Singh, 2011). Guo et al (2015) examined the long-term preferences 
between different delivery modes. The study found that the preference depends 
significantly on the level of health status and the need for the services (Guo et al., 2015). 
A study was carried out by Janssen and Jager (2001) to explore the dynamics of markets 
from a psychological perspective, to understand the consumer preference when new 
products are introduced. The study implied that the products that are relevant to people’s 
need, and those which quickly satisfy their need are most likely to be selected first 
(Janssen and Jager, 2001). 
 Econometric Model 
In the preference-based approach studies, it was found that the ordered probit is a useful 
model in determining individuals’ preferences for a set of choices in different fields, such 
as healthcare (Marnane and Ching, 2015), nutrition (Aquilani et al., 2015), social science 
(Bönte, 2015), and transportation (Abdel-Aty, 2001). The conventional regression 
methods are not appropriate for the statistical analyses of the discrete and ordinal 
dependent variables, which are the ones used in this study. This is because the linear 
regression (OLS) assumes that the dependent variable is continuous, which would treat 
the difference between 3 and 2 identically to the difference between 2 and 1. However, 




no cardinal significance. Consequently, the linear regression assumption does not exist in 
this study. Therefore, to estimate an econometric relation with ordinal dependent variable 
it was found that the ordered probit model is commonly used and a describable 
measurement in this regard (Borooah, 2002). 
Below is the ordered probit equation. Qi
* is a vector of the dependent variable, which is 
the level of preference (most, second, lowest). xi is a matrix of the independent variables, 
α is a vector of coefficients, and εi is a vector of error terms (Maddala, 1983). 
   Qi
*  xiαi 
It should be noted that the observed yi is determined from yi* using the rule. M denotes 
categories. 
MODEL 2 
 0if Qi 
*1 
1if 1 Qi*   2 




 M if   Qi* 
 
The probabilities of observing each value of y are given by 
 
  Pr(Qi  0| xi, α, )  F (1   xi 'α) 
  Pr(Qi  1| xi, α, )  F (2 xi 'α) F (1 xi 'α) 
  Pr(Qi  2 |xi, α, )  F (3 xi 'α) F (2 xi 'α) 
  …  
  Pr(Qi  M |xi, α, )  F (M xi 'α) 
 




To better explain the level of preference to each health insurance option in terms of the 
independent variables, the marginal effect will be included. The marginal effect will help 
to identify the order of the preference of each participant characteristic exactly. 
Multi-collinearity issues were observed in the eligibility (Access of Three) variable and 
the six slices (Access) variable when the ordered probit regression was applied. Therefore, 
the Access variable was removed. As a result, the multi-collinearity disappeared.  
 Results 
Table 27 present the results of the ordered probit regression. The data shows that gender 
is significant in the Taxation regression (p-value 0.03), and has a negative coefficient, 
which suggests that males are more likely to rank Taxation first, and less likely to rank it 
third. The health status is also significant (p-value 0.04), with a negative coefficient as 
well, that suggests that people in a lower level of health status are more likely to rank 
Taxation first, and less likely to rank it third. 
The marginal effect suggests that for each person added to the males’ group, there is a 
probability of only 3.8% that this person is more likely to rank Taxation first, 6.1% that 
this person is more likely to rank it second, and 10% less likely that he will rank it third, 
compared to females. Moreover, for each unit the health status decreases (moving from 
excellent to poor), there is a probability of 2.3% that this person is more likely to rank 
Taxation first in comparison to healthy people, 3.3% to rank it second, and 5.6% less 
likely to rank it third in comparison to healthy participants (see Table 27). 
Study data shows that education is the only variable that showed a significant result in 
MSA (p-value 0.00) with a positive coefficient. The data indicates that people with a 
higher level of education are more likely to place MSA last, and less likely to rank it first. 




by 8.2% less likely to rank MSA first, 3.5% more likely to place it second, and 4.6% more 
likely to rank it as the last financing option (see Table 27). 
Table 27 Ordered Probit Regression and Marginal Effect 
Options Variable1 p-value Coef2 1st, M Effect 2nd, M Effect% 3rd, M Effect% 
Taxation       
 Gender 0.03** -0.28 3.87 6.16 -10.04 
 Age 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 Nationality 0.44 -0.14 2.04 3.09 -5.13 
 Marital Status 0.44 -0.08 1.22 1.73 -2.96 
 Education 0.66 -0.02 0.32 0.45 -0.77 
 Employment 0.78 0.04 -0.75 -1.04 1.79 
 Income 0.34 0.04 -0.67 -0.95 1.633 
 PHI 0.12 -0.21 3.25 4.55 -7.80 
 Chronic Disease 0.63 0.08 -1.26 -1.89 3.15 
 Health Status 0.04** -0.15 2.34 3.31 -5.66 
 Access to Three 0.15 0.18 -2.73 -3.86 6.59 
MSA       
 Gender 0.31 0.12 -4.75 2.17 2.57 
 Age 0.83 -0.01 0.52 -0.22 -0.29 
 Nationality 0.89 -0.02 0.83 -0.35 -0.47 
 Marital Status 0.26 0.10 -4.21 1.82 2.39 
 Education 0.00*** 0.21 -8.26 3.57 4.69 
 Employment 0.51 0.10 -4.13 1.88 2.24 
 Income 0.94 0.00 0.12 -0.05 -0.07 
 PHI 0.60 0.06 -2.53 1.09 1.43 
 Chronic Disease 0.44 0.12 -4.84 1.88 2.95 
 Health Status 0.15 0.10 -3.91 1.69 2.22 
 Access to Three 0.56 0.06 -2.58 1.11 1.46 
PHI       
 Gender 0.37 0.11 -4.45 1.61 2.84 
 Age 0.85 -0.01 0.47 -0.16 -0.30 
 Nationality 0.53 0.1 -4.32 1.57 2.74 
 Marital Status 0.90 -0.01 0.47 -0.16 -0.30 
 Education 0.00*** -0.18 7.42 -2.56 -4.85 
 Employment 0.48 -0.11 4.63 -1.50 -3.13 
 Income 0.45 -0.03 1.33 -0.46 -0.87 
 PHI 0.41 0.1 -4.16 1.43 2.73 
 Chronic Disease 0.39 -0.14 5.86 -2.21 -3.64 
 Health Status 0.58 0.04 -1.61 0.55 1.05 
 Access to Three 0.06* -0.22 8.94 -3.08 -5.85 
 
Note: *** = significance at 1% level, **=significance at 5% level, *=significance at 10% level. 
Abbreviations: 1 Independent Variable. 2 Coefficient 
On the other hand, study figures show that education is significant (p-value 0.00) in terms 
of the PHI mechanism, and has a negative coefficient. This indicates that participants 
holding a higher level of education are more likely to rank PHI first, and less likely to 




increases, it is 7.4% more likely that PHI is placed first, 2.5% less likely to be placed 
second, and 4.8% less likely to be ranked last (see Table 27). 
For the participants’ level of eligibility to healthcare, the regression showed a significant 
p-value (p-value 0.06), and a negative coefficient, which suggests that participants in 
groups maintain and obtain are more likely to rank PHI first and less likely to rank it last. 
The marginal effects also show that people in groups maintain and obtain are 8.9% more 
likely to rank PHI first in comparison to group increase, 3% less likely to rank it second, 
and 5.8% are also less likely to place it third (see Table 27). 
 Discussion 
The results of the ordered probit regression were expected. This is because these results 
were explained by the frequencies in the tables of the ranking according to the 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, which confirm the regression results. 
For example, the data in Table 29 in the Appendix shows that 9.4% of males prefer 
Taxation as the first option in comparison to females where 5.3% of them prefer Taxation 
first. Moreover, 26% of males prefer this mechanism as second, while 22.7% of females 
prefer it as the second option, and 64.7% of males showed a lower preference to rank 
Taxation third, whereas 72% of females prefer it as the third option. These frequencies 
reflect the ordered probit results exactly, which states that males are more likely to rank 
Taxation first than females. In addition, the marginal effect confirmed that the males 
prefer Taxation as the second option more than the first option (6.1% vs 3.8%) (see Table 
27 in the Text and Table 29 in Appendix).  
The data in Table 34 in the Appendix show that when we move from a higher level of 
health status down to a lower level, the percentage of participants who rank Taxation as 
the best option increases (from 8% excellent to 28.6% fair). However, as a third option 




study regression. Moreover, the marginal effect shows that when people’s level of health 
decreases then they prefer Taxation as the second option more than the first option (3.3% 
vs 2.3%) (see Table 27 in the Text and Table 34 in Appendix). 
The data analysis indicates that people with higher education do not prefer MSA, and this 
was shown in their higher probability to place it third (third 4.6% vs second 3.5%) (see 
Table 27). This was confirmed by the frequencies that are presented in Tables 35, 36, and 
37 in the Appendix. The data in these three Tables showed that 9.3% of the participants 
in the first level of education (primary, secondary, and high school) prefer MSA last, 
15.2% of those with second level of education placed it third, and 23.2% who were highly 
educated placed it as the last insurance mechanism. On these bases and as second choice, 
the preferences of those three groups of education increased from 28.7% to 48.7% to 
62.5%. In addition, the data confirms that participants with higher education have a lower 
preference to rank it first, where 61.2% of those at the first level of education rank it first, 
36.1% of those at the second level of education, and only 14.3% of those with a higher 
level of education prefer it as the first option (see Table 27 in the Text and Tables 35, 36, 
and 37 in Appendix). 
In contrast, those with a higher level of education prefer PHI the most. This is confirmed 
by the data in Tables 35, 36, 37 in the Appendix. The frequencies in these Tables indicate 
that 28.7% of those at the first level of education placed PHI first, 46.5% placed it second, 
and 25.6% ranked it last. Moreover, the preference of those at the second level of 
education increased in terms of the best option to 56.1%, and decreased 25.1% and 18.8% 
in terms of the second and third respectively. In addition, the preference of those at the 
highest level of education increased to 73.2% in respect of the first insurance option, and 
decreased again to 18% and 9% in respect of the second and third (see Table 27 in the 




The regression results indicate that people in groups maintain and obtain prefer PHI the 
most, which was explained by the higher percentage of marginal effect. This was 
observed in the Tables 23, 24, and 26 in the Appendix. The data which confirms the 
regression results are those in slice 1 (increase), those in slice 4 (maintain), and those in 
slice 2 (obtain). The data shows that the preference of participants in slice 4 in terms of 
the PHI as the first option increased in comparison to slice 1, and increased at higher 
percentages in slice 2 (51.4%, 53.8%, and 69.6%, respectively). This could be due to the 
reason that participants in slices 2 and 4 have good experience with PHI in comparison 
to those in slice 1 who do not46. However, the data indicates that people in slices 5 and 6 
who are eligible to healthcare in the other governmental healthcare facilities behaved 
differently to those in slice 4 in terms of the preference to PHI (53.8% of slice 4, 45% of 
slice 5, and 44% of slice 6 preferred PHI), and this could be due to the reason that they 
are eligible to the highest quality level of healthcare services in SA (SDU), which people 
in slice 4 do not have access to (see Table 27 in the Text and from Table 23 to 28 in 
Appendix). 
As a conclusion for the preference sections, the results of the frequencies indicate that 
even if it seems that the PHI is the most preferred option among the majority of 
participants, there is some evidence suggesting that MSA is still another preferred option. 
Moreover, Chi square and Fisher exact tests found four independent variables in Taxation, 
nine in MSA, and thirteen independent variables in PHI are significantly different to the 
overall ranking. Furthermore, the ordered probit regressions indicate to two demographic 
and two socio-economic variables significantly affected people’s preference for the three 
health funding mechanisms which are gender, health status, education, and eligibility to 
healthcare (increase, maintain, and obtain). The findings imply that males prefer 
Taxation more than females and are more likely to rank Taxation as the second funding 
                                               




mechanism. In addition, people with lower levels of self-assessed health have the same 
trend in comparison to those who are healthy, and are also more likely to rank Taxation 
second. Moreover, people with higher education are more likely to rank MSA third and 
PHI first in comparison to people with a low level of education. In addition, it was found 
that participants who want to maintain their access have a higher preference to rank PHI 
first than those who want to increase their access, and those who want to obtain access 
have the highest preference in comparison to those who want to maintain and increase. 
Finally, based on the overall outcomes, it seems that Taxation is by far the least preferable 
of these three funding options, while the PHI and MSA are the most suitable and advisable 
mechanisms to raise funds for the Saudi MOH, as the differences between them are minor. 
 Conclusion 
This study investigated the population of SA’s willingness to participate in raising a fund 
for the Saudi MOH and their preferences for these three health funding mechanisms that 
were found in line with the Saudi setting. This study proposed limiting the MOH 
healthcare services only to those who cannot access healthcare from other provisions, and 
this was to increase their access in return for a monetary contribution. People who are 
provided with access in other provisions would have the right to maintain or to obtain 
access to the MOH facilities for the same level of contribution. The mission started by 
reviewing the literature to develop the best approach to investigate people’s WTP for the 
proposal of this study, and applied the best format to elicit people’s preference for the 
three funding options. Afterwards, a survey was developed to achieve this goal. After 
receiving ethical approval, the researcher travelled to six provinces in Riyadh, the capital 
of SA, in a journey which took more than twenty days to pilot the study documents and 
to do the official sampling on 600 participants. The study targeted public and private 
employees and pensioners, self-employed, dependents and unemployed including those 




were collected at 100% response rate. The majority of the participants were Saudis, males, 
aged between 26 and 35, married, not with chronic diseases, in excellent health, bachelor 
degree holders, privately employed, in receipt of income between SR6,000 – 8,999, and 
half the sample have PHI, of whom the majority had level A. Moreover, 15% of the 
sample do not have access to the MOH, half are eligible to healthcare in the private sector, 
and 41% can access health in SDU. In addition, the majority of participants lay in the fifth 
slice, then the first, followed by the fourth. 
When participants’ WTP was investigated, the data showed that 55% of the sample are 
willing to pay to improve their level of access to healthcare, where those who are in group 
obtain were the most willing to pay, then those who are eligible to healthcare only in the 
MOH. Moreover, the study showed that being in receipt of income or not affects WTP, 
where the majority of those with no income in all the three major groups were unwilling 
to pay. Also, it was found that most non-Saudis of those in slice one are unwilling to pay, 
whereas the bulk of non-Saudis of those in the second slice are willing to pay. In addition, 
the majority of slice four are willing to pay, and similarly with the sixth slice, where most 
of the latter are employed in the private sector. However, the majority of those in the fifth 
slice are unwilling to pay. Moreover, most of the participants according to their 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics were willing to pay to improve their 
level of access to healthcare. This indicates that the healthcare services that are provided 
by the MOH are perceived as being better than those which are provided by the private 
sector. However, they are not seen as superior in comparison to the other governmental 
healthcare facilities. All in all, this implies that the MOH can raise a significant fund from 
those who are eligible to healthcare only in the MOH, the private sector, and those who 
are provided with double eligibilities (MOH and private sector). Moreover, those who 
represent the remaining proportion will forsake their eligibility to healthcare in the MOH, 




and the Fisher exact tests were performed on the study variables, the results confirmed 
the findings of this study, which states that the majority of participants according to their 
eligibilities and characteristics are willing to pay except for those in group five and group 
employed. 
Moreover, when the probit model was employed, it was found that the level of access that 
people have to healthcare services affects their WTP. In addition, the analysis confirmed 
that those who are eligible to healthcare only in the private sector are the most willing to 
pay, then those who want to increase their level of access. However, it was shown that 
those in group maintain are the least willing to pay and this was due to the influence of 
those in slice five. Furthermore, the findings of the probit model showed that those who 
had experience of PHI are more willing to pay; this confirms the findings of the literature 
review, and also confirms the fact that those who are entitled to healthcare in the private 
sector see what is provided in the MOH as necessary and better than what they already 
have. Also, the model confirmed the concept that non-Saudis come to SA to make 
savings, and are less likely to look for quality healthcare. 
When participants’ preferences for the three funding options were investigated, it was 
found that the majority of participants see PHI as the most suitable insurance mechanism 
for them, followed by MSA, where the means of those two options are relatively similar. 
Also, the latter was chosen as the least preferred option at a lower percentage compared 
to the former. However, Taxation reported the highest mean, and was viewed as the least 
preferred option. Furthermore, when the study performed the Chi square and the Fisher 
exact tests to understand the distribution of participants’ preference for these options, it 
was found that four independent variables in Taxation, nine in MSA, and thirteen 
independent variables in PHI are significantly different to the overall ranking. 
Moreover, when the ordered probit regression was conducted on the study variables, it 




confirms the findings of the literature review. Moreover, the analysis found that males 
prefer Taxation more than females and are more likely to rank it as the second funding 
option, and the same is true for those with a lower level of health in comparison to those 
who are healthy. Furthermore, those with higher education are more likely to rank MSA 
third and PHI first in comparison to people with a low level of education. In addition, it 
was found that participants who want to maintain their access have a higher preference 
for ranking PHI first than those who want to increase their access, and those who want to 
obtain access have the highest preference in comparison to those who want to increase 
and maintain their access. 
Finally, this study concludes that the PHI and MSA are the most suitable funding methods 
to raise funds for the Saudi MOH. It also found that most of the participants are willing 
to pay to improve their level of access to healthcare. This study suggests undertaking 
another study to investigate how much the population of SA are willing to pay to raise a 










    The Maximum Willingness to Pay for the 
Healthcare Services that are provided by the Saudi MOH 
In the pricing decision process, it is important to understand consumers’ values for goods 
and services. Scientists find that estimating consumers’ response to prices is an important 
element for developing pricing strategy (Breidert et al., 2006). As discussed in the 
previous sections of this thesis, involving healthcare users to participate in funding the 
healthcare system is widely used among countries to alleviate financial pressure on 
governments. However, it is crucial that healthcare services are delivered to users at prices 
that they are willing to pay. Therefore, understanding the population’s WTP for 
healthcare services is important, for the reason that their response to price will affect the 
level of public financing to healthcare system (Uzochukwu et al., 2010). 
In light of the rapid and continuous changes in the Saudi system in general, which focus 
on reducing the reliance on oil as a main source for the government budget (by 
diversifying the public financial resources strategies incorporating the citizens and 
residents), it was expected that the vast majority of the population of SA would reject the 
proposal to participate in funding the MOH as borne out in the former WTP study. 
However, the findings in that study implied that the majority were willing to participate, 
which was a sign of their readiness for the country-transforming plan. Therefore, this 
study will proceed to assess people’s level of WTP for the healthcare services that are 







 Study Objective 
This study aims to reveal the population of Saudi Arabia’s WTP for the healthcare 
services that are provided by the Saudi MOH, with respect to the developed plan in the 
former study (see Section 4.2.1). To serve the purpose of this study, a question must be 
answered that is: 
What is the maximum value that the population of Saudi Arabia are willing to 
pay for the healthcare services that are provided by the Saudi MOH? 
This question leads to a specific objective, which is identifying the factors that influence 
the Saudi population’s WTP. 
 Study Methodology 
In this section, the study will discuss the valuation method, and then will review the WTP 
previous studies to benefit from the best practice in this regard. In respect of the study 
targeted individuals, study dimensions, and the data collection, the study will follow the 
same approach as the former one, and will only outline the changes that were applied in 
terms of the inclusions and exclusions. 
5.2.1 Valuation Method 
Following on from the former study methodology, this study will build on the financial 
strategy that was developed in Chapter 4, which proposed restricting every person only 
to the healthcare in the sector where he/she is eligible (see Section 4.2.1). Moreover, this 
study will employ the WTP, which is one of the CVMs that was discussed in Section 
4.2.2. In this section, the study will discuss the elicitation formats to find the most 
appropriate one for this study, and then argue the methodological issues, and suggest what 





 Elicitation Format 
To assess the level that people can afford to contribute towards the healthcare services 
that are provided by the MOH, the WTP method will be employed in such a way as to 
elicit the maximum amount that people are willing to pay. In the previous studies, there 
is a debate regarding the suitable elicitation format to measure people’s level of WTP. 
The elicitation format refers to the technique in which the WTP question is asked. The 
most common elicitation formats that exist in the literature review are: the open ended 
question, bidding game, payment scale, discrete choice, and discrete choice with follow 
up question. In this section, the study will discuss each format and decide on the most 
suitable one for this study. 
1. Open Ended Question; in this format, the participant is asked directly to state the 
maximum amount that he/she is willing to pay (Smith, 2000). For instance, one of the 
previous studies asked female respondents about the maximum amount that they are 
willing to pay for a bone density scan (Donaldson et al., 1997). The open-ended question 
was: what is the most you would pay to have the scan? In this case, participants were 
guided to state the maximum amount in the blank space provided. In fact, the open-ended 
questions are easy to analyse and do not require a large sample. However, participants’ 
answers could be unreliable and likely to include a strategic bias (Donaldson et al., 1997, 
Smith, 2000). This kind of bias occurs when participants’ WTP value represents what 
they would like to pay, but not the maximum value (Bergmo and Wangberg, 2007). 
Moreover, the open-ended question does not have a reference value, which makes 
participants estimate the cost and state the value instead of their maximum WTP. 
2. Bidding Game; the bidding game and payment scale formats were developed to 
overcome the aforementioned challenges. The first one offers participants an initial 
amount, which they can accept or reject, and, based on the answer, the bid increases or 




scenario describing the benefit that the participant will be asked to pay for, then the 
participant is asked, for example: would you be willing to pay $X? In case a positive 
answer is given, a higher bid is offered. In contrast, if a negative answer was reported, 
then a lower bid is offered. This format requires face-to-face interviews with participants. 
However, face-to-face interviews are not appropriate if the study targets a large sample 
with a limited timeframe. As with the open ended, the bidding format provides a reference 
value. Despite this advantage, this format is still prone to bias due to the starting point. It 
was found that the last WTP value in this format is influenced by the first bid, which 
means that a higher starting bid leads to a higher WTP value. Therefore, the bidding game 
is likely to produce a high WTP value, and consequently the results are unreliable. 
3. Payment Scale; this format offers participants a range of values, where they choose 
the maximum amount that they are willing to pay. The scale begins at zero, and then 
increments with a blank at the end, to allow the participant to state the WTP value if it 
exceeds the offered values in the scale (Smith, 2000). In comparison to the previous two 
elicitation formats, the payment scale is more representative of real life situations, as it 
gives the respondent different values where he/she can search for the values that best 
represent his/her maximum WTP (Donaldson et al., 1997). 
In the healthcare field, the payment scale format is the most widely used (Diener et al., 
1998). This format provides reference values and decreases the risk of the starting point. 
However, it could be prone to a range or midpoint bias. The first one occurs when the 
values in the range can influence the participants’ WTP (Ryan et al., 2004). The second 
one arises when a participant reveals their maximum WTP by the mid value of the range. 
The range bias can be solved by including a blank option at the end of the range, where 
the midpoint bias can be reduced by making no mid choice (Smith, 2000). It was found 




between the WTP and the ability to pay, which makes the results more reliable 
(Donaldson et al., 1997). 
4. Discrete Choice and Discrete Choice with Follow up; the discrete choice experiment 
includes some choice sets, that contain hypothetical options (two or more), which the 
participant chooses from. Each choice set is explained by some attributes, where each 
include different levels (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008). For example, the participant is 
provided with a scenario to measure his/her WTP for two different hospitals (options: 
hospital X and hospital Y). The scenario includes three attributes, such as travelling time 
to reach the needed healthcare services, the waiting time to meet the doctor, and the cost 
of the healthcare service. Each of these attributes is provided with some levels. For 
example, for the first attribute, travelling time to hospital X is 30 minutes, and 40 minutes 
to hospital Y. The waiting time is 25 minutes in X and an hour in Y. The cost of services 
in X is $1,000 and $600 in Y. Here, the participant makes the decision based on these 
varying attributes, where the discrete choice experiment encourages the participant to 
make trade-offs (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008). 
This format is similar to the payment scale in terms of the realistic representation of the 
real life market as participants are provided with characteristics and price variations 
(Ryan et al., 2004). Moreover, this format provides participants with a good 
understanding of the scenario, which results in a reliable WTP estimate. Furthermore, it 
minimises the strategic bias, and this is due to the limited number of bids. Therefore, 
participants cannot strategically manipulate their WTP estimate (Price, 1989). One of the 
disadvantages of the discrete choice experiment is that the participant is forced to choose 
from the options (this is called Yea-saying), while in practice they may choose none. This 
can result in values which are biased (Ryan et al., 2004). This bias can be reduced by 
allowing participants to choose none of the options. Finally, this format requires a large 




The discrete choice with follow up is the same as the previous format, with follow up 
question to enhance the information that is generated. Depending on the answer to the 
first question, this format provides more bids upward if the participant accepted, or 
downward if he/she rejected the first bid. 
 Methodological Issues 
There are some methodological issues, which had to be addressed before conducting the 
WTP study. Three of the methodological effects that could arise when conducting CVM 
studies are: the ordering effects, embedding effects, and protest zeros (Fonta et al., 2010, 
Stewart et al., 2002). In this section, the study will discuss each of these methodological 
issues, and outline how they will be addressed. 
1. Ordering Effects; the ordering effect occurs when a study aims to estimate the WTP 
values for more than one healthcare service. This refers to the order in which the scenarios 
are presented to participants (Drummond et al., 2015, Stewart et al., 2002). Stewart et al 
(2002) tested the existence of the order effect for three healthcare services that are: the 
increase in pain relieving treatment for cancer patients, the increase in the number of heart 
operations, and the increase in community care services. The researchers examined if the 
WTP values change when the services were presented in different sequences to 
participants. The study sample was divided into two, where each sample was given the 
healthcare services in a different order. The researchers found that the mean of the WTP 
values for the three healthcare services was different in both samples, where it should be 
consistent between the two samples (Stewart et al., 2002). The researchers suggested that 
this kind of issue occurs due to what is called “the fading glow” in the literature review. 
The fading glow is when participant acquires moral satisfaction from the contribution to 
the scenarios that are presented (Stewart et al., 2002). The first healthcare service in the 
order usually acquires the majority of the moral satisfaction. The researchers added that 




valuation for the rest of the order becomes lower. Also the authors suggest that this occurs 
as participants feel that they met their social obligation once they state their contribution 
for the first healthcare service in the sequence (Stewart et al., 2002). 
This type of methodological issue is not of concern in the current study. This is because 
this study aims to estimate the maximum WTP for the healthcare services that are 
provided by the Saudi MOH in total. Therefore, there are no specific healthcare services 
or programmes that this study targets. 
2. Embedding Effects; the embedding effect occurs when participants’ WTP for a good 
is not different from the participants’ WTP for the overall good from which the identified 
good is part (Bateman et al., 1997, Carthy et al., 1998, Boyle et al., 1994, Morrison, 2000). 
In other words, participants value a broader or narrower policy package than the one 
intended by the researcher (Price, 1989). Researchers suggest that providing details 
describing what participants are requested to value can potentially alleviate the 
embedding effect (Price, 1989). 
For the same reason that was mentioned in the previous section, participants’ valuation 
in this study is unlikely to be affected by the embedding effect, and this is due to the fact 
this study aims to estimate the maximum WTP value for the entire healthcare services 
that are provided by the MOH, and not for specific healthcare services, and this will be 
explained clearly in the question that each participant is required to answer.  
3. Protest Zeros; protest zeros occur when participants simply do not respond and when 
participants report zero value for a good which they actually value (Remonnay, 2008). 
The previous studies proposed some reasons for such behaviour. When participants are 
asked about their maximum WTP, some of them consider placing a value on a public 
good or service as unethical, while others argue that public services should be provided 




genuine zero in the WTP is considered as a challenge. Usually, researchers use debriefing 
techniques to distinguish the protest zeros from the genuine ones (Fonta et al., 2010). For 
example, Fonta et al (2010), in one of their WTP studies, added these options: cannot pay 
due to lack of income, and the scheme is not important for me to identify protest zeros. 
The protest zeros do not reflect preference as they have no economic value (Lindsey, 
1994). But they are likely to occur in the WTP studies, where a suitable approach is 
required to be adopted to address it. One of the most commonly used approaches to deal 
with this issue is to remove the protest responses. However, this results in sample 
selection bias. Another solution is to address them in the analysis. The health economics 
literature proposes the double hurdle approach as the best way to address genuine and 
protest zeros (Halstead et al., 1992). The econometric analysis uses a two-part model to 
address this issue and to control selection bias (this was outlined in Section 4.2.2, and will 
be discussed more in the coming sections). 
 The Decided Elicitation Format 
There is much debate regarding the most appropriate elicitation format in terms of the 
WTP studies. In the literature review, many studies compared the elicitation formats in 
the healthcare field (Frew et al., 2004, Ryan et al., 2004). Frew et al (2004) compared the 
bidding game with the open-ended and payment scale. They found that the WTP values 
for colorectal cancer screening were higher in the bidding game format than the open-
ended and payment scale. The researchers found significant differences in the WTP 
values when participants were offered different starting bids, whereas, the open-ended 
and the payment scale were not affected by the starting point bias, as much as the bidding 
game was. Moreover, they found that the open-ended question is difficult to answer and 
may cause a hasty valuation. Also, this format raises concerns regarding validity, as it 
does not reflect real life situations. However, the payment scale alleviates this issue due 




or starting point bias associated with the payment scale. The researchers used initial and 
amended payment scales with different ranges, and found no significant difference in the 
WTP values between both scales. This confirms that the starting point and the mid-point 
bias are not issues in the payment scale. The previous studies indicate that the open-ended 
format should be avoided when conducting WTP studies (Arrow et al., 1993, Donaldson 
et al., 1997, Johannesson et al., 1991). Moreover, the discrete choice experiment is subject 
to Yea-saying bias, and if participants are provided with the choice “none”, it still 
generates little information to understand participants’ maximum WTP values as is the 
case with the open-ended format. Finally, the discrete choice with or without follow up 
are appropriate when more than one option or many attributes are provided.  
Based on the evidence in previous studies, and for the reason that the population in SA 
has no experience with participation in funding the public sector (recently VAT was 
introduced), especially in the healthcare services, the payment scale will be used in this 
study as a format to measure the population of Saudi Arabia’s maximum value that they 
are willing to pay for the healthcare services that are provided by the Saudi MOH. This 
format will provide the population of SA with reference values that: are easy to 
understand and opt out of, include zero and blank choice, provide results that are more 
reliable, generate additional information, minimise bias, shorten the sampling period, 
reduce the cost of sampling, and are also able to overcome the other disadvantages that 
were experienced from the other elicitation formats. 
5.2.2 Willingness to Pay Literature Review 
There is a large variation in WTP studies in the healthcare field in general in terms of 
studies’ objectives, population, elicitation formats, and analysis method (Baker et al., 
2008, Diener et al., 1998). While it seems that there is no standard approach for designing 
the WTP studies, reviewing the previous studies and acknowledging best practice 




that were provided in Section 5.2.1.1, this part will draw more details from the literature 
reviews that were outlined in Sections 4.2.2, and 4.5.3.1, and will also include more 
literature from the health insurance and healthcare areas. This part will outline each 
study’s aim, elicitation format, method of analysis, and result. By the end of this section, 
the study will discuss the findings of these literature reviews. 
 Health Insurance Literature Review 
Shimamura et al (2018) conducted a study to explore factors associated with people’s 
WTP for family based health insurance covering the whole family in central Vietnam. 
This study employed an open-ended technique and performed multivariate regression. It 
was found that the household head having health insurance, a higher level of education, 
and wealth impact positively on the WTP (Shimamura et al., 2018). Nosratnejad et al 
(2014) carried out a study to estimate the WTP for health insurance in Iran to suggest an 
affordable SHI; the study used the double-bounded discrete choice format, and applied 
interval regression analysis. The findings indicate that people with a higher level of 
education and income are more willing to pay. Also, it was found that the WTP increases 
among insured people, and decreases as the family size increases (Nosratnejad et al., 
2014). Ghosh and Mondal (2011) developed a study to assess the WTP for health 
insurance among the urban poor in Mumbai. The study conducted double-bounded 
dichotomous choice format and applied multivariate regression. It was found that 
households who have morbid conditions and had an experience with inpatient admission 
(past hospitalisation experience) are more willing to pay for health insurance. Also, it was 
found that households with higher income within the urban poor are more willing to pay. 
Furthermore, the study found that people who had severe illnesses that required high 
expenditure were more willing to pay (Ghosh and Mondal, 2011). Ichoku et al (2010) 
carried out a study to assess the WTP of rural Nigerians for one aspect of the nation’s 




and performed OLS regression on the data. They found that WTP is positively associated 
with households’ size, wealth, level of education, and their trust in the management of 
the proposed scheme (Ichoku et al., 2010). Onwujekwe et al (2009) developed a study to 
investigate people’s WTP for Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) in Nigeria. 
The study used the bidding game as the elicitation format, and conducted OLS regression. 
This study found that males and people with higher education are more willing to pay, 
and those who had an experience with Out of Pocket payment for healthcare are less 
willing to pay, while those who had previously paid for healthcare using any health 
insurance mechanism are more willing to pay (Onwujekwe et al., 2009). Lofgren et al 
(2008) conducted a study to investigate Vietnamese’ WTP for health insurance among a 
rural population in northern Vietnam. This study implemented the bidding game 
technique and performed interval regression. The findings of this study imply that nearly 
half the sample are unwilling to pay, also it was found that higher income, healthcare 
need, and level of education are associated with a higher WTP, where age is not (Lofgren 
et al., 2008). In the same year, Ataguba et al (2008) developed a study to investigate the 
WTP of rural households for a community health payment scheme in Nigeria. This study 
used a payment scale alongside the dichotomous choice as the elicitation format, 
Heckman’s 2 step was employed, with applying probit regression on the participation 
step, and OLS (Including the Inverse Mills’ Ratio) on the consumption step. Study results 
indicate that female-headed households, educationally disadvantaged, and poor people 
have lower WTP (Ataguba et al., 2008). Also, in the same year, Lang and Lai (2008) 
carried out a study to investigate people’s WTP to sustain the current National Health 
Insurance programme in Taiwan and to extend that programme to cover long-term care 
services. The study employed closed ended format, and applied Logistic regression to 
analyse the WTP. The study findings implied that higher income and education are 




for an individual. Also it was found that need for healthcare services significantly impact 
people’s WTP (Lang and Lai, 2008). Dror et al (2007) conducted a study to estimate the 
maximum WTP among rural and bottom of the pyramid (BoP- i.e. those on low income 
who represent the majority) in India, to find the major determinants that influence their 
choice. This study used the bidding game technique, and performed linear multiple 
regression. The result showed that people who are covered by micro health insurance 
units (MIUs) are more willing to pay than those who are not. The same is true for people 
with: higher income, education, experience of high healthcare costs, and for males (Dror 
et al., 2007). In the same year, Barnighausen et al (2007) developed a study to assess the 
maximum WTP for basic health insurance (BHI) in Wuhan City in China. The study used 
the payment scale and performed multiple regression. It was found that a higher level of 
income increases people’s WTP for BHI, and the same is true for the increase in the 
healthcare expenditure incurred previously. Also the study found that being a migrant, or 
not having permanent employment decrease the WTP (Bärnighausen et al., 2007). Asgary 
et al (2004) conducted a study to estimate the demand and the WTP for health insurance. 
The study used bidding game technique, and applied OLS regression. The study found 
that age, level of education, healthcare facilities, access to healthcare services, and 
healthcare needs significantly influence people’s WTP for health insurance (Asgary et 
al., 2004). Hengjin et al (2003) carried out a study to investigate people’s WTP for a 
CBHI scheme. This study employed the bidding game as the elicitation format and 
applied Logistic and OLS regression. The study found that people with higher income, 
higher education, younger people, and males are more willing to pay (Dong et al., 2003). 
Asenso et al (1997) conducted a study to assess the willingness of households in the 
informal sector of Ghana to join and pay premiums for a proposed National Health 
Insurance scheme. The study employed the bidding game and applied an ordered probit 




the level of WTP increases. In addition, the study found that households with a higher 
level of health expenditure or people who find healthcare cost difficult to contain are 
likely to pay more. In addition, it was found that males and people with a higher level of 
education are willing to pay more (Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997). 
 Healthcare Literature Review 
Alhanawi et al (2018) developed a study to assess the value and importance of 
improvement in the quality of public healthcare services in Saudi Arabia (investigate the 
WTP for improvement to quality of public healthcare services). The study employed the 
double-bounded dichotomous choice with follow up question, and used partial Tobit 
regression with marginal effect. The study found that people with higher income are more 
willing to pay for improvement to quality of public healthcare services (Al-Hanawi et al., 
2018b). Liu et al (2012) carried out a study in Hong Kong to estimate patients’ maximum 
WTP for primary healthcare services. The study employed a payment scale, benefited 
from the two-stage model to address selection bias, and conducted OLS regression. The 
study found that age negatively impacts patients’ WTP. In addition, it was found that 
income and better health status increase WTP (Liu et al., 2012). Havet et al (2012) 
conducted a study to estimate the WTP for home blood transfusions and to analyse 
determinants of their choice. This study used the bidding process as an elicitation format, 
and Tobit and truncated regression. Long home-hospital distance, poor quality of life, and 
previous experience of home care were the determinants of patients’ WTP (Havet et al., 
2012). Baji et al (2012) developed a study to elicit consumers’ preference of the choice 
of healthcare providers for outpatient service (visit to specialist) and inpatient services 
(planned surgery). The study conducted the discrete choice experiment, and applied 
binary probit regression with random effects. The study found that people with higher 
education and income are willing to pay more (Baji et al., 2012). Bergmo and Wangberg 




their general practitioner. The study used the open-ended method, conducted Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient, Mann-Whiteny test, and Logistic regression. It was found that 
more than half the sample were willing to pay, and it was found that patients who already 
had electronic access revealed lower WTP than those without (Bergmo and Wangberg, 
2007). Olsan and Donaldson (1998) developed a study to investigate people’s WTP for 
increased earmarked Taxation for a helicopter ambulance service, more heart operations, 
and more hip replacements. A payment scale was used as an elicitation format, and OLS 
regression was applied to the study data. It was found that education and age negatively 
affect the WTP (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998). 
 Discussion 
In terms of the factors that affected people’s WTP, the findings of this section’s literature 
review confirm the findings of Section 4.5.3.1 literature review. This section shows that 
almost all the health insurance studies confirm that higher level of income and education 
are associated with a higher WTP. Moreover, Lofgren et al (2008), and Hengjin et al 
(2003) confirmed that younger people are willing to pay more than older people. Also, 
Shimamura et al (2018), Onwujekwe et al (2009), as well as Dror et al (2007) confirmed 
that being insured with a health policy, is associated with a higher WTP. Furthermore, 
the literature in this section added more demographic and socio-economic factors such as 
the fact that males, those who are employed, and people in need of healthcare are more 
willing to pay. The same is true for those who had experience with inpatient admission, 
severe illness that required high expenditure, and incurring higher healthcare costs. In 
contrast, people with a larger family size and migrants are less willing to pay. Also, it was 
found that the trust in the management of the proposed scheme has an impact on WTP. 
With regard to the elicitation format and the method of analysis, the previous studies in 
this section used different elicitation formats and methods of analysis. Out of the five 




and the last one applied multiple regression. In addition, two out of four studies that 
conducted an open-ended technique performed Logistic regression, another one used 
probit regression, and the last one multiple regression. Moreover, three studies employed 
a double bounded technique, and used three different types of regression (Interval, 
Multivariate, and Tobit regression). Furthermore, seven studies conducted the bidding 
game format, four of which applied OLS regression, where three applied three different 
analysis methods (Interval, Order Probit, and Tobit regression). 
In addition to the guidance for choosing the elicitation format that were discussed in the 
previous section, the literature in this part indicates that researchers should employ the 
format that best helps them to achieve the study objectives, in terms of suitability for the 
sample characteristics, and ease of comprehension of questions to guarantee reliable 
responses. Moreover, it was noted that the analysis methods differed even in studies that 
used the same elicitation format, and this implies that the analysis method is employed 
based on the variables’ characteristics. For instance, different ways of presenting the 
answers will require different analysis methods, and this is based on whether the type of 
answers fit the requirements of the analysis method or not. In the coming sections, the 
reasons for choosing specific analysis methods for the current study will be outlined, 
where the decision will be based on the payment scale format that was decided on as the 
elicitation format for this study. 
5.2.3 Targeted Individuals 
This study is targeting the same five types of individuals who were targeted in the former 
study (see Section 4.2.4). In addition, the classifications for the targeted individuals in the 
former study, which are based on their eligibilities to healthcare, were the same in this 
study (i.e. three groups; increase, maintain, and obtain, and six slices). Likewise for the 
contribution techniques that were discussed in the same section (e.g. people in slice one 




services that are provided by MOH etc.). Furthermore, the same external suggestions that 
were outlined in Section 4.2.4.6 were included in this study. 
5.2.4 Study Dimensions 
This study followed the same approach that was used in the former study in respect of the 
data collection. A survey was conducted to share thoughts and decisions of the individuals 
who were defined in the previous section to fund the MOH. In addition, this study targeted 
the same sample size, and included only those who are aged 18 and above from both 
genders. Moreover, the study was held in Riyadh City in the same six provinces where 
the former study took place. This was to make the current study consistent with the former 
one, and systematic in terms of the processing. Furthermore, the study sampling was 
carried out in the summer of 2018. This period was chosen to avoid a gap in the research 
and to keep the work ongoing. 
5.2.5 Data Collection 
The data collection took the form of written documents and was designed to be filled in 
face-to-face as the former study to ensure that participants would understand their task to 
guarantee reliable answers. Moreover, the documents were provided in Arabic and 
English, and the same approach that was followed in the former study was implemented 
in case a participant is neither an Arabic or English speaker (see Section 4.2.6). Moreover, 
this study used the same information sheet that was used in the former study (minor 
change to the question that is required to be answered as it is different to the former study) 
(see Section 4.2.6.1) and the same consent form (see Section 4.2.6.2). With respect to the 
data instrument: participant background, eligibility to healthcare, and support services 
sections were the same. However, changes were made to the introduction and WTP 
sections, where the options for funding the Saudi MOH were removed as it is not targeted 




In this part, the study will outline the changes that were added to the data instrument’s 
introduction and WTP sections. 
 Introduction 
The introduction of the current study gave a brief of the sharp decreases in oil prices and 
deficits in the Saudi budgets in the past four years, and how this could threaten the 
sustainability of the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH. This section 
informed participants that a study was carried out last year to investigate the willingness 
of the population of SA to contribute to funding the Saudi MOH to ensure the 
sustainability of the provided healthcare services and to attain a better level of healthcare, 
where the results showed that the majority were willing to pay. Therefore, this study is 
attempting to estimate the maximum value that people are willing to pay.  
 Willingness to Pay  
This section provided participants with six questions, where each question was designed 
to be answered by specific categories of individuals. The determinants of these questions 
were outlined in Section 4.2.6.3 and were the same in this study. Moreover, participants 
were guided to the relevant question to be answered based on their answers to the 
questions of the eligibility to healthcare section. Furthermore, in this study the design of 
each question changed from asking whether participants are willing to participate to 
asking about their maximum WTP value instead.  
The values that this study offered to participants to estimate their maximum WTP were 
decided based on the two primary objectives of this thesis, which are: 
1. Implementing a basic healthcare insurance mechanism.  
2. Raising funds for the Saudi MOH, to ensure the sustainability of their 




To achieve the first objective, this study investigated the early percentages that seven 
countries with old healthcare systems started with when they began levying contributions. 
The countries are Australia, USA, Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, France, and 
Austria. These countries are using major health funding mechanisms such as: Taxation, 
SHI, and PHI. Moreover, to implement the second objective, it was estimated how much 
these percentages could raise for MOH to ensure the sustainability of its healthcare 
services. This section will start by presenting the contribution percentages in the seven 
countries, estimate how much funding such percentages could rise for the Saudi MOH, 
and then show the order and number of choices in the payment scale. 
1. Australian Healthcare System; in 1975, the Australian government established 
Medibank (national health insurance not for profit owned by the government) to be 
administrated by the health insurance commission. The initial percentage that the 
Medibank started with was 1% mandatory on income, which was then raised to 1.5% after 
the Medicare was introduced in 1984 (Healy et al., 2006). 
2. US Healthcare System; in 1965, the US government introduced Medicaid and 
Medicare. Medicaid provides healthcare coverage for people with low income, which is 
fully funded by the government. Medicare provides healthcare coverage for older people 
and those with severe disability. This programme is funded from four sources which are: 
employer and employee, where each mandatorily pays tax of 1.45% (2.9% from both), 
the government, and the last source is the self-employed, where they have to pay the full 
percentage (2.9%) (Rice et al., 2013).  
3. German Healthcare System; the German health healthcare system is considered the 
oldest system using SHI. In 1885, the percentage of contribution paid by employee and 
employer was 2% (2:1). Up to 1992, the total percentage rose to 12.7% (1:1). After two 
years, the percentage rose to 13.2%, and to 13.5% after another two years. This equal 




proportion became 8.2% with the employer pay 7.3% of the pre-taxed income (Busse and 
Blümel, 2014).     
4. Netherlands Healthcare System; the PHI in Netherlands is compulsory. In 2011, the 
average price of the basic healthcare plan was €1,199 and €1,158 by 2015 on a yearly 
basis. In 2011, when the government started tracking down uninsured people, the 
National Healthcare Institute were authorised to purchase a one year PHI standard plan 
for those who failed to be insured within six months from the first notice (€99 in 2015 
and €122.3 in 2016 on monthly basis) (Kroneman et al., 2016). This is equal to 2.48% of 
the average monthly income of 201647 (OECD, 2018b). 
5. French Healthcare System; the French healthcare system was almost exclusively 
funded through contributions by the employers and employees. Between 1992 and 1997, 
the level of contribution was 6.8% of gross earnings for employees, and 12.8% for 
employers. In 2013, the employer contribution rose to 13.1% (Chevreul et al., 2015).  
6. Switzerland Healthcare System; in Switzerland, by 2013 there were 61 health 
insurance companies. These companies provide various coverage plans of mandatory 
health insurance (MHI). In 2015, it was estimated that the median monthly premium was 
SW.FR406 ($429). This is equal to about 12% of the average monthly income (Pietro et 
al., 2015). 
7. Austria Healthcare System; in Austria, the contribution level is regulated by law, and 
cannot be set by the health insurance funds. Up to 2017, the health insurance contribution 
was 7.65% of the base income. The contribution rate is nearly the same between employer 
and employee (50.6% by employee and 49.4% by employer) (Bachner et al., 2018).  
 
                                               




When the percentage of people’s contributions to the healthcare systems in different 
countries was investigated, it was found that the percentages ranged between 1% and 
12%. In fact, some of the percentages rose recently due to some systems being old and a 
series of changes that were applied. For example, the contribution in Germany has 
increased 1.9% in about 20 years, and the contribution has risen to 12% in Switzerland in 
the past three years. This suggests that the percentages should start at a low level in SA, 
taking into consideration that the Saudi government is entirely transforming the whole 
system, which focuses mainly on diversifying the government resources, and this may 
push the government to introduce further tax in addition to what they have already started. 
Therefore, the lower the contribution is, the more acceptable the participation will be. 
Based on the data discussed above, and the available information, if the employed people 
in the private and public sector and pensioners contributed 5% of their income, the MOH 
would reduce their reliance on the government general budget by 74% (12,041 Thousand 
employees and pensioners by the end of 2015 × $1,700 the average monthly income by 
the beginning of 2016 × 12 month × 5% contribution ÷ $16.6 Billion the MOH 2015 
budget). Where if the contribution is 10%, this will exceed what the MOH needs, and 
result in a diversion to the second primary objective of this thesis, which focuses on 
raising funds, not covering the whole, or collecting extra funds. Moreover, the 74% of 
reduction was theoretically calculated based on the available information, which 
represents the income (not the total income) of only a third of the population of SA. 
However, the employees of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and National Guards were 
not included, nor were the rest of the Saudi population who is entitled to income from the 
government agencies’ funds that were discussed previously. Furthermore, this calculation 
was taken from the theoretical side, as some people will be unwilling to pay, where they 
might see that their current access to healthcare is sufficient. This will result in an indirect 





Based on the data that were discussed in the previous sections, the payment scale was 
designed to be incremented by 1%. However, due to the fact that some people’s maximum 
WTP might lie within the decimals of the percentages (for example 2.3%), the scale 
values were designed with such ranges (for example 3% or more and less than 4%). 
Moreover, so as not to bias the scale by restricting participants from choosing a 
percentage over 1%, a zero value was added to the scale. In addition, the scale included 
six positive values to eliminate the risk of the midpoint bias. Also, the last option was for 
those who have maximum WTP exceeding 5%, and this was to eliminate the range bias. 
Subsequently, the payment scale that was used in this study was: zero, more than zero 
and less than 1%, 1% or more and less than 2%, 2% or more and less than 3%, 3% or 
more and less than 4%, 4% or more and less than 5%, 5% or more (see Sample 5 in the 
Appendix). 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
After it was found that the majority of the population of SA are willing to contribute to 
raising a fund for the MOH, this study investigates the maximum value that they are 
willing to pay. This study discussed the elicitation formats and outlined the pros and cons 
of each, as well as what methodological issues may arise in this regard. It was decided to 
employ the payment scale with values based on two factors: the experience of countries 
with an old healthcare system, and how much funding a given percentage may raise for 
the MOH. Moreover, a broad vision of the elicitation formats and statistical analysis 
methods were included in this section to benefit from the best practice of the WTP 
previous studies. Furthermore, this study is targeting the same individuals as the former 




 Study Survey 
5.3.1 Ethical Approval 
On the 27th February 2018, the SREC was contacted to inquire whether an ethical 
approval for the second study is required, as the data collection is almost the same as the 
one in the former study. They informed that a new application had to be submitted, 
briefing the changes. On 8th March, all the documents were submitted to the SREC. On 
22nd March, the final ethical approval was received (see Sample 6 in the Appendix). 
5.3.2 Pilot Study 
On 12th May 2018, I travelled to Riyadh, and by the next day I printed 10 Arabic 
questionnaires, and a few English versions in case a participant did not speak Arabic, then 
I started the pilot study. The same approach as the former study was followed. I 
introduced myself to participants and tried not to say anything unless I was asked. The 
piloting took two days, which was held in Riyadh City. No specific questions or new 
observations were noticed except that some participants used their phones’ calculators to 
check the amount of money that the provided percentages equated to their total income. 
All participants were cooperative, and all the questionnaires were filled, collected, 
transformed into English versions, and then sent to the supervisors on 15th May, which 
was the last day before Ramadan. We investigated participants’ answers and discussed 
whether any major observation was noticed. The same behaviour of participants in the 
previous piloting test was observed. It was found that most people did not read the 
information sheet or the consent form, where people just asked for a general idea of the 
information sheet and the consent form, and then signed only one copy of the latter. It 
was found that all questionnaires were filled in correctly, where only one participant was 




5.3.3 Data Gathering 
On 18th May, I received the final decision from my supervisor to start the official 
sampling. I followed the same plan as the former study, by devoting two to three days for 
provinces outside Riyadh City, and this plan was dependent on several factors: the 
province size, the collected number of questionnaires, the availability of the potential 
participants, and participants’ cooperation. I was planning to finish the sampling in 20 
days (more or less) for different reasons; first, it is Ramadan month, and people would be 
less cooperative in the last 10 days of this month, for the reason that they devote the 
majority of their time to prayer, as they are considered as the most precious days in this 
month. Second, working days would be missed by the end of Ramadan, as the government 
agencies start Eid Al Fitr holiday this year on 7th June, which is 23rd of Ramadan, and 13th 
June for private sector (29th of Ramadan). Third, in the last few days of Ramadan, people 
also become busier in preparing themselves for Eid Al Fitr, which takes four days as a 
celebration after Ramadan. 
The targeted time for the sampling was 10:00 am every day, as the working hours in 
Ramadan are lower (five working hours in the public sector, and six in the private sector), 
which start at 10:00 am. In addition, in this study I decided to start from the furthest 
province as I did in the former study. On 19th May, I took all the copies, informed the 
physicians that I was travelling and told them that they may receive a call from 
participants, and I started my first trip. 
 Ad Dilam 
On 19th May, I travelled to Ad Dilam in the early morning in order to encounter employees 
and people in the early hours of the day, before the temperature increases. I tried to change 
the places where I took my sample from in the former study, to avoid any tribal issues. I 
started sampling in King Abdullah Road, where there are a lot of public and private 




fasting, but were receptive to participate. The sampling was processed more slowly as the 
temperature became higher. By midday, I recognised that the temperature rose to over 55 
degrees Celsius, and I noticed that people disappeared. I decided to go back to Riyadh 
City, and wait until sunset (Iftar Time), when people can start eating. At 8:00 pm I 
travelled back to Ad Dilam, where in the meantime people had taken a rest as the body 
gets tired after Iftar, and also people can pray the usual Ramadan prayer, which starts at 
8:00 pm and takes from an hour to an hour and a half. I arrived in Ad Dilam, and invited 
people to participate from the same locations as in the morning. People looked better at 
this time and more active. Usually, people at Ramadan stay awake up to an hour before 
the dawn (Al Fajr time), where people start fasting. I had two days in Ad Dilam, where I 
sampled during the day up to 1:00 pm, and at night from 10:00 pm until 3:00 am. During 
this period, a good number was collected. 
 Al Kharj, Al Muzahimiyah, Al Uyaynah and Ad Diriyah 
The same plan was followed in the other four provinces, which are outside Riyadh City, 
where two visits were undertaken to each. The provinces with lower traveling distance 
afforded the chance to collect more samples. All the areas where I experienced resistance 
from participants in the former study were ignored, as well as the areas where I was 
informed that they may contain risk. The sampling during the day was extremely difficult, 
but I was insistent to include it as a part of the sampling for the reason that many people 
who may show up during the day, may not appear at night; especially old people, those 
with specific illness, public and private employees, and visitors to public and private 
agencies and facilities, which close at night. I spent eight days in these four provinces, 





 Riyadh City 
The rest of the sampling period was spent in Riyadh City, where the majority of the 
population reside. The same sampling approach was followed. People were happy to 
participate in all places. Broad access to people was attained, where many places were 
occupied by Saudis and non-Saudis. However, it was recognised that in the last few days 
of the sampling plan, it slowed as fewer people appeared. By 7th June, all the required 600 
questionnaires had been collected. 
5.3.4 Conclusion 
This section discussed how the ethical approval was obtained, how the data collection 
was piloted, and the way in which the data was collected. In addition, this study followed 
the same steps as the former one with regard to the data collection. Moreover, the study 
benefited from the previous experience in each step, which facilitated the work 
processing. The ethical approval was obtained in a shorter period than the former study. 
The piloting study took two days, where the questionnaires were filled in correctly, and 
no issues or misunderstandings were observed. The data collection took 20 days in 
Ramadan, where the processing was undertaken in two shifts: one in the morning and the 
other one at night to ensure that all people categories were involved. Finally, the sampling 
was held in the same six provinces where the former study took place, and the targeted 
number was achieved.  
 Study Results 
All Questionnaires were collected with a 100% response rate. The STATA 15.1 package 
was used to analyse the collected data. In this section, the study will present participants’ 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics and will discuss them in relation to what 
was found in the former study. Moreover, the percentages and frequencies will be 
examined in order to generate another profile for the WTP to improve people’s access to 




5.4.1 Demographic Characteristics 
The majority of the study sample was males, who represent 74% of the total sample (see 
Table 28). This percentage is almost the same as the former study (74% vs 78%, 
respectively), and this was attributed to the broad access to males as explained previously. 
Moreover, the study data shows that over 88% of participants are aged between 18 and 
45, where the most are aged between 26 and 35. This comes in line with the former study, 
where almost the same frequencies were observed.  
Table 28 Participants’ Demographic Characteristics 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Gender    
 Male 443 74.0 
 Female 157 26.0 
 Total 600 100 
Age    
 18 - 25 126 21.0 
 26 - 35 273 45.5 
 36 - 45 131 21.8 
 46 - 55 54 9.0 
 56 - 65 11 1.8 
 65 < 5 0.8 
 Total 600 100 
Nationality    
 Saudi 434 72.3 
 Non-Saudi 166 27.7 
 Total 600 100 
Marital Status    
 Single 238 39.7 
 Married 337 56.2 
 Divorced 13 2.2 
 Widowed 12 2.0 
 Total 600 100 
Chronic Illnesses    
 Yes 48 8.0 
 No 552 92.0 
 Total 600 100 
Health Status    
 Excellent 346 57.7 
 Very Good 186 31.0 
 Good 58 9.7 
 Fair 8 1.3 
 Poor 2 0.3 
 Total 600 100 
 
In addition, Table 28 indicates that 72% of the study sample are Saudis, and the rest are 
from different nationalities. This follows the same pattern as in the former study, where 




of the study materials. However, the response rate of non-Saudis in this study was higher 
relative to the former one (28% vs 19%, respectively). Furthermore, a relatively higher 
response rate from married, divorced, and widowed people was reported in comparison 
to the former one (56% vs 55%, 2.2% vs 1.8%, and 2% vs 0.7%, respectively) (see Table 
17 and 28). Specifically, a greater response from married participants was anticipated due 
to the fact that the majority of the study sample was older than the average marriage age 
in SA (mid-twenties). However, 18% of those above the average marriage age are still 
single in comparison to 15% in the former study, which is likely to occur. The data shows 
that people without chronic diseases represent the majority of the study sample, with 
almost the same response rate as the former study (91%) (see Table 28). Finally, nearly 
every percentage in each health status is the same as the former study. 
 Methodological Considerations 
Sampling in SA is different to other countries, such as in Europe. This is because SA is 
ruled by Islamic principles and traditions which prohibit gender mixing without utmost 
necessity, which makes a contact with a female subject to questioning and potential 
prosecution. In addition, the provinces where the sampling was undertaken comprise 
tribes and nomadic people who are usually less educated and highly conservative and 
religious (sticking with the fundamentals of Islam). Therefore, they are very strict in the 
case of gender mixing. These categories are prevalent in Ad Dilam, Al Muzahimiyah, and 
Al Uyaynah. In fact, this study was aware of all these constraints and barriers which may 
expose the researcher to risks and potential harm. However, because these categories are 
prevalent in many areas over the country, an inclusion to the sample was necessary to 
ensure randomisation and a good representation of the population of SA. 
Other methodological options were considered to facilitate the sampling procedures and 
to reduce the researcher’s exposure to risks; such as telephone interviews. However, such 




would be very difficult due to Islamic and traditional constraints which would make the 
researcher select males to avoid any judicial sanctions that may result of calling females, 
as a call to a female in SA from an unknown person is considered to some extent to be a 
crime. Moreover, the issue of low levels of education is likely to make the sampling end 
up with a highly educated sample due to an expected refusal from those less educated to 
participate, release, or even to give a consent for financial matters to a person over the 
telephone. Therefore, the randomisation is not possible through telephone interviews, 
which is likely to bias the study sample. 
The online option was also considered. However, because the study questionnaire 
contains technical questions, many people are likely to ignore them, or may discontinue 
answering them, and even if they answered them in full may do so without a full reading 
and understanding, such that they would give unreliable answers or answer questions they 
were not required to answer. In addition, the number of questions and data provided in 
the questionnaire were kept to a minimum. However, the reality is that the Saudi 
healthcare system is complex, such that it needs a lot of explanation that could not be 
accomplished online. Moreover, this approach excludes those with reading difficulty due 
to illiteracy or failing eyesight, those who do not have internet access, and also those who 
do not speak Arabic or English who might need assistance from someone who speaks 
their language. Therefore, the online option is likely to deliver unreliable data, and might 
bias the sample due to dismissing different categories of the population. 
The inclusion of females to the study sample was broadly difficult and was performed 
with extreme caution. Therefore, to avoid any discomfort or misunderstanding from 
females or from other people in the same location, females were invited in groups at the 
same time (more than three). Moreover, it was very important not to start by introducing 
myself to them as when I approach males (unless they specifically asked about my 




study for a project and needs your help to share your thought which could benefit the 
whole country. Also, when presenting details about the study, it was very important not 
to mention my contact details, as females in SA are highly sensitive to this point. 
However, if they needed the contact details, they could be found in the information sheet. 
It is true that with all these efforts to include females to the study, and the attempt to 
change locations within each province even at different times each day to ensure 
randomisation and a good representation of the population, the percentage of the females 
in the study was low. However, the truth is that the Islamic principles and the Saudi 
traditions oblige males to take the full responsibility to provide life’s needs to their 
families; for example, the family housing, food, transportation, and even the entire cost 
of having a family, whereas the females take lower responsibility in this regard. 
Therefore, females are more likely to stay at homes as they are provided with all life’s 
needs, and are less likely to be in public places where the study sampling was required 
and authorised by the SREC to take place. In addition, the attempt to obtain permission 
to conduct the sampling in specific organisations in order to approach females may bias 
the sampling, as there would then be a focus on employed females. In addition to this 
bias, sampling from organisations may make the mission more difficult because females 
are strictly segregated from males in the workplace, where they are always placed in 
specific areas restricted to them. Moreover, employed females in SA represent less than 
17% of total jobs in 2018 (GAFS, 2018a), such a percentage also makes approaching 
females in organisations hard taking into account that this percentage should be even 
lower as it does not include the security and defence employees where the vast majority 
of jobs are held by males in this sector. 
Based on the Islamic principles, Saudi traditions, population statistics and according to 
the proposal of this thesis, those who will pay for the MOH healthcare services are more 




thesis, although low, may be better to represent the category of those who actually will 
take the responsibility to pay, who are most likely to be males. Moreover, it was expected 
that such females percentages (22% in the former study and 26% in the second study) or 
even lower would stand in a study in SA. According to a willingness to pay study 
conducted by Al-Hanawi et al (2018) in Jeddah, the percentage of the females in this 
study was less than 13% (Al-Hanawi et al., 2018b). Al-Aboudi et al (2016) investigated 
the association between knowledge and attitude with health-related quality of life among 
patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus in Riyadh, in which the female proportion was less 
than 23% (Al-Aboudi et al., 2016). In addition, Al Ghobain et al (2011) estimated the 
prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease among smokers in SA. The 
percentage of females in this study was less than 11% (Al Ghobain et al., 2011). 
One way that was considered to better access females was to hire females to conduct part 
of the sampling. However, this would require significant effort to recruit groups of 
females in each province to do the sampling, where a refusal is highly expected because 
of traditions, the high degree of conservativism and low levels of education in some 
provinces. Also, a refusal is expected because the sampling will be conducted in public 
places and includes the day period where the weather is extremely hot, such that would 
be very difficult for females to do, particularly during Ramadan. Moreover, those females 
would need sessions in each province to ensure that they can perform the sampling 
properly which would be very hard to do in some provinces. All these challenges would 
lengthen the sampling period, which would result in a longer stay in Riyadh, and so extra 
funding for the researcher himself and a budget to fund those females recruited to do the 
sampling. 
5.4.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Study data shows that 86% of the sample comprises those who have either high school or 




degree (see Table 29). This is attributed to the higher number of people employed in 
public and private sectors who hold one of these three levels of education. Moreover, a 
high percentage of employed people were reported in this study, where the majority were 
those who are privately employed, and this is due to the high percentage of the privately 
employed people in Riyadh. Moreover, 88% of the unemployed are students and people 
without jobs.  
Table 29 Participants’ Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Level of Education    
 Primary 15 2.5 
 Secondary 13 2.2 
 High School 81 13.5 
 Diploma 100 16.7 
 Bachelor 333 55.5 
 Higher Diploma 12 2.0 
 Master’s 41 6.8 
 PhD 5 0.8 
 Total 600 100 
Employment    
 Employed 527  87.8 
 
 
   
Public Sector 176 33.4 
  Private Sector 287 54.5 
  SDU 64 12.1 







  Self-employed 3 4.1 
  Public Pensioner 5 6.8 
  Private Pensioner 1 1.4 
  Unemployed 36 49.3 
  Student 28 38.4 
  Total 73 100 
 Total 600  100 
Total Monthly Income SR   
 < 3,000 108 18.0 
 3,000 - 5,999 92 15.3 
 6,000 - 8,999 129 21.5 
 9,000 - 11,999 89 14.8 
 12,000 - 14,999 82 13.7 
 15,000 < 100 16.7 
 Total 600 100 
 
Furthermore, study figures show that 66% of the study sample are those in receipt of 
income above the Saudi average monthly income (SR 6,384), and approximately the same 




In addition, the data indicates that more than half of the study sample have PHI, and this 
is because of the high percentage of privately employed people. This response rate, is 
higher than that which was reported in the former study (52.5% vs 48.8%). Also, the data 
implies that the majority of the privately insured participants are at level A, with exactly 
the same percentage as the former study (38%) (see Table 19 and 30). 
Table 30 Participants’ Possession of Private Health Insurance 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Health Insurance    
 Yes 315 52.5 
 No 285 47.5 
 Total 600 100 
Level of Insurance    
 VIP 37 11.7 
 A 119 37.8 
 B 73 23.2 
 C 86 27.3 
 Total 315 100 
Insurance Provider    
 Employer 300 95.2 
 OOP 0 0.0 
 From Family 15 4.8 
 Total 315 100 
Family Major Eligible    
 Public 1 6.7 
 Private 14 93.3 
 Total 15 100 
 
5.4.3 Eligibility to Healthcare 
 Eligibilities Based on the three Basic Provisions 
The figures show that 79% of the study sample are eligible to access healthcare in the 
MOH healthcare facilities, and this is due to the high percentage of Saudis in this study. 
This percentage is slightly lower to what was observed in the former study (84.5%). 
Moreover, more than half the sample are entitled to healthcare in the private sector, and 
this is attributed to the high percentage of participants who are privately employed. 
However, a lower response was reported by this group in the former study (48.8%). In 
addition, more than a third of respondents are eligible to healthcare in other governmental 
healthcare facilities. This figure exceeded the number of participants who are employed 




secured though their relatives. The same scenario was detected in the former study, but 
with a higher response rate of those who are eligible to healthcare in SDU (41.5%) (see 
Table 31 and Table 20). 
Table 31 Participants’ Eligibilities to Healthcare 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Eligible to MOH    
 Yes 472 78.7 
 No 128 21.3 
 Total 600 100 
Eligible to Private Sector    
 Yes 315 52.5 
 No 285 47.5 
 Total 600 100 
Eligible to SDU    
 Yes 221 36.8 
 No 379 63.2 
 Total 600 100 
 
 Eligibilities Based on the Six Slices 
The study figures indicate that all the six eligibilities to healthcare in the Saudi healthcare 
system were involved in this study. It was found that the largest group of the study sample 
are those who can access healthcare solely in the MOH, who represent 27% of the sample. 
This percentage is higher than that which was found in the former study (23.3%). 
Moreover, a higher response was observed in this study by those who are eligible to 
healthcare only in the private sector relative to the former one (21% vs 15.3%, 
respectively), and the same is true for those who are eligible to healthcare only in SDU 
(0.3% vs 0.2%, respectively) (see Figure 11 and Figure 9).  
In addition, a lower response was reported by those who are entitled to access in the MOH 
and private sector (15.2% vs 19.8%, respectively), in the same way as those who are 
guaranteed access to the MOH and the other governmental healthcare facilities (20.2% 
vs 27.7%, respectively). On the other hand, the number of participants who are eligible 
to healthcare in all provisions is higher in comparison to the former study (16.3% vs 







 Figure 11 Participants’ Eligibilities to Health 
 
1Eligible to healthcare only in MOH. 2Eligible to healthcare only in private sector. 3Eligible to healthcare 
only in SDU. 4Eligible to healthcare in MOH and private sector. 5Eligible to healthcare in MOH and SDU. 
6Eligible to healthcare in all health provisions. 
 
 Classification of Each Slice 
When further analyses were conducted, it was found that 63% of the first slice are Saudis 
and 22.8% non-Saudis employed publicly. This implies a lower response from the first 
group and higher from the second in comparison to the former study (63% vs 69.2, and 
22.8% vs 15.7%, respectively). Also, it was found that 13.6% of this slice are unemployed 
Saudis, and only one dependent on a non-Saudi. Moreover, only one participant of the 
second slice is a dependent on non-Saudi employed in the private sector, where the rest 
are non-Saudis employed privately. This indicates a lower percentage for the former, and 
a higher for the latter compared to the former study (0.8% vs 12%, and 99.2% vs 87%, 
respectively). In addition, the third slice contains two non-Saudi participants who are 
employed in SDU, where the former study contained only one participant in this slice. 
Furthermore, the majority of the fourth slice is represented by Saudis who are employed 






the private sector, and only one dependent on a Saudi is eligible to healthcare privately. 
These percentages are different to what was observed in the former study (74%, 16.8%, 
and 9%, respectively). Furthermore, the Saudis who are employed in the public sector 
and eligible to healthcare in the other governmental healthcare facilities in addition to the 
MOH represent 19% of the fifth slice, 46.3% are those who are employed in SDU, and 
34.7% are dependents on Saudis employed in SDU. These percentages mirror the former 
study to some extent. Finally, the majority of the last slice is occupied by Saudis who are 
privately employed, who represent 81.6% of this slice, 6.1% by Saudis who are employed 
publicly, the same percentage by Saudis who are employed in SDU, and also the same by 
unemployed Saudis (6.1%). These figures are different to what was found in the former 
study (75.6%, 4.9%, 12.2%, and 7.3%, respectively) (see Table 32). 
Table 32 Classifications of the Eligibilities in Figure 11  
                                                                    Surveyed Participants % 
MOH S1    
 Saudis employed in public  102 63.0 
 Non-Saudis employed in public  37 22.8 
 Unemployed Saudis 22 13.6 
 Dependent on Non-Saudis employed in public 1 0.6 
 Total 162 100 
Private Sector S2    
 Non-Saudis employed in private  125 99.2 
 Dependent on Non-Saudis employed in private  1 0.8 
 Total 126 100 
SDU S3    
 Non-Saudis employed in SDU  2 100 
 Total 2 100 
MOH & Private Sector S4    
 Saudis employed in public with HI  8 8.8 
 Saudis employed in private  82 90.1 
 Dependent on Saudis eligible in private  1 1.1 
 Total 91 100 
MOH & SDU S5    
 Saudis employed in public eligible to SDU  23 19.0 
 Saudis employed in SDU  56 46.3 
 Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU  42 34.7 
 Total 121 100 
MOH, Private, & SDU S6    
 Saudi employed in public eligible to all   6 6.1 
 Saudi employed in private eligible to all   80 81.6 
 Saudi employed in SDU eligible to all   6 6.1 
 Dependent Saudi eligible to all   6 6.1 





5.4.4 Willingness to Pay (Participation) 
 Overall Willingness to Pay 
The study found that the majority of the study sample are willing to pay to improve their 
level of access to the healthcare services that are provided by the Saudi MOH (as indicated 
by the percentage whose willingness to pay was greater than zero). The figures indicate 
that almost three quarters of this study are willing to pay, while 55.4% was reported in 
the former study. Moreover, it was found that people in group increase as well as those 
in group obtain were more likely to be WTP relative to what was observed by people in 
these categories in the former study (61.7% vs 58.6%, and 64.8% vs 59.1%, respectively). 
However, a significant percentage of WTP was reported by those in group maintain in 
comparison to the former study (81.3% vs 53.1%) (see Table 33 and Table 22). 
Table 33 Participants’ Overall Willingness to Pay for the MOH Healthcare Services 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Total Willingness to Increase    
 Yes 100 61.7 
 No 62 38.3 
 Total 162 100 
Total Willingness to Maintain     
 Yes 252 81.3 
 No 58 18.7 
 Total 310 100 
Total Willingness to Obtain     
 Yes 83 64.8 
 No 45 35.2 
 Total 128 100 
Overall Willingness     
 Yes 435 72.5 
 No 165 27.5 
 Total 600 100 
 
 Willingness to Pay Based on the Entitlement to Income 
The study data implies that participants who are in receipt of income tend to be more 
likely to express a willingness to pay than those with no income in both studies. Figures 
indicate that those who are in groups increase or obtain and are in receipt of income have 
relatively the same level of WTP in comparison to what was observed by those who were 




those in group increase who have no income, there is a similar response (33% vs 30%). 
The only participant in group obtain in this study who has no income is unwilling to pay, 
where six out of eleven participants in the former study were unwilling to pay. In addition, 
this study observed a higher level of willingness by those in group maintain of those in 
receipt of income relative to the former one (82% vs 53%), and nearly the same 
percentage from those with no income (see Table 34 and Table 23). 
Table 34 Participants’ Willingness to Participate Based on the Entitlement to 
Income 
  Surveyed Participants % 
Willingness to Increase 
(For those With Income) 
   
 Yes 96 64.0 
 No 54 36.0 
 Total 150 100 
Willingness to Increase 
(For those With No Income)    
 Yes 4 33.3 
 No 8 66.7 
 Total 12 100 
Willingness to Maintain 
(For those With Income) 
   
 Yes 248 82.1 
 No 54 17.9 
 Total 302 100 
Willingness to Maintain 
(For those With No Income)    
 Yes 4 50.0 
 No 4 50.0 
 Total 8 100 
Willingness to Obtain 
(For those With Income) 
   
 Yes 83 65.4 
 No 44 34.6 
 Total 127 100 
Willingness to Obtain 
(For those With No Income)    
 Yes 0 0.0 
 No 1 100 






 Willingness to Pay Based on the Six Slices and Each Slice’s Classification 
When additional analysis was conducted to identify the WTP of groups within each slice, 
it was found that three quarters of Saudis who are employed publicly and entitled to 
healthcare only in slice one are willing to pay. This level of WTP is higher in comparison 
to the same group in the former study (75% vs 66%, respectively). On the other hand, 
only a third of non-Saudis who are employed publicly are willing to pay. This is higher 
than what was reported by the same group in the former study, where only a quarter was 
willing to pay (see Figure 12 in the Text and Table 44 in Appendix). 
The study figures indicate that two thirds of non-Saudis who are privately employed are 
willing to pay, where nearly the same level was reported by the same category of the 
former study (see Figure 12 in the Text and Table 44 in Appendix). Moreover, it was 
found that almost three quarters of the Saudis who are employed privately from those 
entitled to healthcare in slice four are willing to pay. This percentage is different to what 
was observed in the same categories in the former study (72% vs 54%, respectively). 
The study found a significant difference between the levels of WTP of all groups in slice 
five in comparison to the same groups in the former study. The study figures indicate that 
82.6% of the Saudis who are publicly employed and entitled to healthcare in SDU are 
willing to pay, where 60% was reported by the same group of the former study. Moreover, 
78% of the Saudis who are employed in SDU are willing to pay, whereas 44% were 
willing to pay in the former study. In addition, 94% of the Saudi dependents of those with 
income are willing to pay, where 44% in the former study were willing to pay (see Figure 
12 in the Text and Table 44 in Appendix). 
The data found that the level of WTP by the Saudis who are employed privately and 
eligible to healthcare in all the three healthcare provisions is higher than the same group 



















Figure 12 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Depending on some Socio-Economics 
Charactersitics (The Numerator is Yes, The Denominator is No)  
 
1 Saudis and Non-Saudis eligible to health just in MOH. 2 Non-Saudis eligible to health just in private sector. 3 Non-Saudis eligible 
to health just in SDU. 4 Saudis eligible to health in MOH & private sector. 5 Saudis eligible to health in MOH & SDU. 6 Saudis 
eligible to health in all three provisions. 7 Saudi work in public sector with health insurance. 8 Saudi work in private sector. 9 
Dependent on Saudi eligiable in private sector without income. 10 Non-Saudi work in private sector. 11 Non-Saudi dependents on 
Non-Saudi work in Private Sector. 12 Saudi work in public sector and eligible to all. 13 Saudi work in private sector and eligible to 
all. 14 Saudi work in SDU and eligible to all. 15 Saudi dependent with income eligible to all. 16 Dependent on Saudi work in SDU. 
17 Dependent on Saudi work in SDU without income. 18 Dependent on Saudi work in SDU with income. 19 Saudi work in SDU. 20 
Saudi work in public and recive health in SDU. 21 Unemployed Non-Saudi recive health just in MOH. 22 Unemployed Saudi without 
Income recive health just in MOH. 23 Unemployed Saudi with Income recive health just in MOH. 24 Unemployed Saudi recive health 
just in MOH. 25 Non-Saudi, employed in public and recive health just in MOH. 26 Saudi, employed in public and recive health just 
in MOH. 
 
 Willingness to Pay Based on the Demographic Classification 
The study figures indicate that the majority of participants are willing to pay according to 
each demographic characteristic, with 58% minimum WTP, which was observed by non-
Saudis. This high level of WTP was found to be higher than what was observed in the 
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 Willingness to Pay Based on the Socio-Economic Classification 
Study data shows a significant level of WTP by participants in all socio-economic 
characteristics, with a minimum level of 61% by those who hold secondary level of 
education. This level of WTP is considered higher than that in the former study, except 
for those who hold secondary level of education and those with PHI level C (see Tables 
46 and 22 in the Appendix). 
5.4.5 Willingness to Pay (Consumption) 
 Overall Willingness to Pay 
The study data shows that 27% of the study sample selected zero, 20% are willing to pay 
between 1% and 2%, 13.5% between zero and 1%, and a similar percentage are willing 
to pay more than 5%. When further analysis was carried out, it was found that 38% of 
participants who are eligible to access healthcare only in the MOH selected zero and 22% 
are willing to pay between zero and 1%. In addition, it was found that a quarter of those 
who can seek healthcare in the private sector or other governmental healthcare facilities 
in addition to the MOH, or those who can access all the three healthcare provisions, are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 18% chose zero and a similar percentage are willing 
to pay more than 5%, where 14% are willing to pay between 2% and 3%. Moreover, more 
than a third of those who can access healthcare services only in the private sector or in 
the other governmental healthcare facilities selected the first choice (zero), 16% willing 
to pay between 1% and 2%, and 15% willing to pay between 2% and 3% (see Table 35). 
Table 35 Participants’ Levels of Willingness to Pay Based on their Eligibilities 
 Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Willing to Increase  162 62 36 20 11 8 14 11 
 % 38.3 22.2 12.3 6.8 4.9 8.6 6.8 
         
Willing to Maintain  310 58 39 79 45 13 19 57 
 % 18.7 12.6 25.5 14.5 4.2 6.1 18.4 
         
Willing to Obtain  128 45 6 21 19 15 8 14 
 % 35.2 4.7 16.4 14.8 11.7 6.3 10.9 
         
Overall Willingness 600 165 81 120 75 36 41 82 




 Maximum Willingness to Pay Based on the Entitlement to Income 
Figures in Table 36 indicate that more than a third of those in group increase of those in 
receipt of income chose zero, and nearly a quarter are willing to pay between zero and 
1%. Two thirds of those who are not in receipt of income chose zero, and a quarter are 
willing to pay between zero and 1%. Moreover, a quarter of those in group maintain of 
those in receipt of income are willing to pay up to 2%, 18% over 5%, 15% up to 3%, and 
18% chose zero. However, half of those with no income selected zero and a quarter were 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%. In addition, more than a third of those in group obtain 
of those in receipt of income selected the first choice (zero), and 16% are willing to pay 
up to 2%, where the only non-Saudi dependent in this group chose zero (see Table 36). 
Table 36 Participants’ Maximum Willingness to Pay Values Based on the 
Entitlement to Income 
 Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Willing to Increase 
(For those With Income) 150 54 33 20 11 8 13 11 
 % 36.0 22.0 13.3 7.3 5.3 7.8 7.3 
Willing to Increase 
(For those Without Income) 12 8 3 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 66.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 
Willing to Maintain 
(For those With Income) 302 54 38 77 45 13 19 56 
 % 17.9 12.6 25.5 14.9 4.3 6.3 18.5 
Willing to Maintain 
(For those Without Income) 8 4 1 2 0 0 0 1 
 % 50.0 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 
Willing to Obtain 
(For those With Income) 127 44 6 21 19 15 8 14 
 % 34.6 4.7 16.5 15.0 11.8 6.3 11.0 
Willing to Obtain 
(For those Without Income) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 Maximum Willingness to Pay Based on the Six Slices and Each Slice’s 
Classification 
The data indicates that more than a third of the first slice selected zero, and nearly a 
quarter are willing to pay between zero and 1%. When additional analysis was conducted, 
it was found that a quarter of Saudis who are employed publicly and can access healthcare 
only in the MOH chose zero, 19% are willing to pay between zero and 1%, and 17% are 




publicly employed chose zero, and nearly a third are willing to pay between zero and 1% 
(see Table 47 in the Appendix). Moreover, In the second slice, it was found that a third 
of non-Saudis chose zero, 17% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 15% between 
2% and 3% (see Table 48 in the Appendix). 
The data shows that more than a quarter of slice four chose zero, and nearly a quarter are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%. Moreover, further analysis indicates that 28% of those 
who are privately employed and eligible to healthcare in this slice selected the first option, 
26% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 15% are willing to pay more than 5% 
(see Table 49 in the Appendix). 
Study figures imply that more than a quarter of slice five are willing to pay between 1% 
and 2%, and nearly a quarter are willing to pay more than 5%. When more analysis was 
performed, it was found that more than a quarter of the Saudis who are employed in the 
public sector and eligible to healthcare in SDU in addition to the MOH are willing to pay 
between 1% and 2%, 22% are willing to pay more than 5%, and 17% selected zero. 
Moreover, the figures indicate that 29% of the Saudis who are employed in SDU are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 27% are willing to pay more than 5%, and 21% chose 
zero. In addition, it was found that more than a quarter of the dependents with income are 
willing to pay between 2% and 3%, nearly a quarter are willing to pay between 1% and 
2%, 20% between zero and 1%, and 17% more than 5% (see Table 50 in the Appendix). 
The data shows that more than a quarter of slice six are willing to pay between 1% and 
2%, 18% more than 5%, and 17% are willing to pay between 2% and 3%. Further analysis 
indicates that a quarter of those who are employed privately in this slice are willing to 
pay between 1% and 2%, 20% are willing to pay more than 5%, and 16% between 2% 




 Maximum Willingness to Pay Based on the Demographic Classification 
The data shows that a quarter of males selected zero, 20% are willing to pay between 1% 
and 2%, and 15% are willing to pay more than 5%. On the other hand, a third of females 
chose zero, 21% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 18% between zero and 1%. 
In terms of nationality, 23% of Saudis are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 22% 
chose zero; whereas, 42% of non-Saudis selected zero, and 13% are willing to pay 
between 1% and 2% (see Table 52 in the Appendix).  
The data shows that more than a quarter of those who are aged between 18 and 25 are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 20% put zero, and 17% are willing to pay more than 
5%. Moreover, a third of those aged between 26 and 35 selected zero, and 19% are willing 
to pay between 1% and 2%. In addition, it was found that more than a quarter of those 
aged between 36 and 45 chose zero, and 14% are willing to pay between 1% and 2% (see 
Table 52 in the Appendix). 
The study figures show that more than a quarter of single participants selected the first 
option, and 21% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%. Of those who are married, more 
than a quarter chose zero, and 19% are willing to pay between 1% and 2% (see Table 52 
in the Appendix). 
The data shows that a quarter of those with chronic diseases are willing to pay between 
1% and 2%, 17% between zero and 1%, and the same percentage are willing to pay more 
than 5%. On the other hand, it was found that 29% of those without chronic diseases 
selected zero, and 20% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%. Moreover, the study 
figures indicate that 31% of those in excellent health status chose zero, and 22% are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%. Moreover, 20% of those in very good health status 
put zero, 17% are willing to pay between 2% and 3%, 16% are willing to pay between 
zero and 1%, and the same percentage are willing to pay between 1% and 2% (see Table 




 Maximum Willingness to Pay Based on the Socio-Economic Classification 
The study figures show that a third of those who hold first level of education selected 
zero, 16% are willing to pay between zero and 1%, and the same percentage are willing 
to pay between 2% and 3%. When further analysis was conducted, it was found that a 
third of who have high school education selected zero, 20% are willing to pay between 
zero and 1%, and 17% between 2% and 3%. Furthermore, the data indicates that more 
than a quarter of those who have second level of education put zero, and 22% are willing 
to pay between 1% and 2%. When further analysis was performed, it was found that a 
third of the diploma holders are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 20% chose zero, and 
15% are willing to pay between zero and 1%. Moreover, 29% of those with a bachelor 
degree selected zero, and 18% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%. In addition, it was 
found that nearly a quarter of those who hold third level of education are willing to pay 
more than 5%, 21% selected zero, and 17% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%. 
Further analysis was conducted and showed that more than a quarter of the master’s 
degree holders chose zero, and nearly a quarter are willing to pay more than 5% (see 
Table 53 in the Appendix). 
The data indicates that a third of those who are in receipt of income less than the Saudi 
average monthly income chose zero, and 18% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%. 
When more analysis was carried out, it was found that more than a third of participants 
without income or those in receipt of income less than the Saudi monthly minimum 
selected zero, 16% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and another 16% are willing 
to pay between 2% and 3%. Moreover, the data figures show that nearly a quarter of those 
in receipt of income over the Saudi average monthly income selected zero, and 21% are 
willing to pay between 1% and 2%. The additional analysis indicated that nearly a quarter 
of those with income between 6,000 and 8,999 Saudi Riyals chose zero, and 22% are 




in receipt of income over 15,000 Saudi Riyals are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 
20% are willing to pay more than 5%, and another 20% selected zero (see Table 53 the 
in Appendix). 
The figures show that more than a quarter of participants who have PHI selected zero, 
and 22% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%; whereas, 29% of those who do not have 
PHI chose zero, 18% are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 17% are willing to pay 
between zero and 1%. Moreover, it was found that a third of those who have VIP PHI are 
willing to pay more than 5%, and 19% would pay between 2% and 3%. More than a 
quarter of those who hold level A are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, and 23% 
selected zero. In addition, nearly a third of those who have level B are willing to pay 
between 1% and 2%, and 23% chose zero. Finally, more than a third of level C holders 
put zero, and 16% are willing to pay between 2% and 3% (see Table 54 in the Appendix). 
5.4.6 Participants’ Average Willingness to Pay 
In this section, the study will outline the average maximum WTP values based on the 
three major eligibilities to healthcare, groups across the six slices, and demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics. However, for the reason that this study used ranges of 
values to determine people’s maximum WTP, the average maximum WTP will be 
calculated using the formula of the mean for grouped data, which starts by finding the 
midpoint of each range, then to be multiplied by the frequencies of the corresponding 
ranges (number of people selected each option), then the sum of the results is divided by 
the total number of participants who are WTP. Nevertheless, due to the reason that the 
last option in the payment scale that was used in the study was an open-ended option (5% 






This study also calculated the average with the last option being set at 8%. This 
percentage was chosen based on people level of contribution in a group of countries with 
long established healthcare systems, which are Germany, Austria, Netherlands, and 
Singapore (see Sections 5.2.5.2 and 3.3.8). The outcomes of this part is shown in Table 
55 in the Appendix. 
In addition, Table 55 in the Appendix shows the results using another calculation for the 
average, which was based on the order of the options. For example, it multiplies the 
number of participants who chose the first option by one, and the participants who chose 
the second option by 2 and so on, then to be divided by the total number of participants 
in the same group. 
When the average was calculated in these three ways, the second method yielded figures 
that were approximately 0.3 percentage points higher than the first method, while the third 
method yielded results that were approximately 0.5 percentage points higher than the first 
method. However, the relativities remained the same in most cases. Therefore, the results 
that will be presented in this section will be the one that was calculated based on the first 
method. 
 Overall Average 
The data shows that the overall average maximum WTP values of all participants is 2.7%. 
In addition, the data indicates that the average of those who are eligible to healthcare only 
in the MOH is about 2.3%. Moreover, the figures imply that the average was higher for 
those who can access healthcare in the private sector or other governmental healthcare 
facilities in addition to the MOH, or those who can access all the three healthcare 
provisions (2.7%). In addition, the average of all those who can access healthcare only in 
the private sector or the other governmental healthcare facilities is 3%, which is 




 The Average Based on the Six Slices and Each Slice’s Classification 
Study figures indicate that the overall average maximum WTP by all participants of slice 
one is about 2.3%. When further analysis was conducted, it was found that the average 
for all Saudis who are employed publicly is 2.5%, where the average was very low among 
the non-Saudis in this slice who are publicly employed (0.8%). In addition, the data shows 
that the average among non-Saudis who are privately employed was nearly 3%, and the 
average for Saudis who are privately employed and eligible to healthcare in the private 
sector in addition to the MOH was 2.6% (see Table 55 in the Appendix). 
In slice five, the overall average WTP is 2.9%. The further analysis on this slice’s data 
indicates that the average of those who are publicly employed and eligible to healthcare 
in SDU in addition to the MOH was 3.2%, and 3.1% for those who are SDU employed. 
Also, in this slice, it was found that the average for dependents who are eligible to 
healthcare in SDU of those with income was 2.5%. In addition, the overall average of 
slice six is 2.8%. The figures show that the average for those who are privately employed 
is 2.9% (see Table 55 in the Appendix). 
 The Average Based on the Demographic Classification 
Study figures indicate that the average maximum WTP by males is higher than that of 
females (2.8% vs 2.2%, respectively). Moreover, the data shows that Saudis’ average is 
the same as non-Saudis (2.7%). In addition, it was found that the highest average 
maximum WTP among age groups is for those aged between 36 and 45 (2.9%). Moreover, 
the data indicates that those who are married have the highest average among marital 
status groups (2.8%). Furthermore, it was found that those with chronic diseases have a 
higher average WTP than those without (2.8% vs 2.7%, respectively). Additionally, those 
who have very good health status have the highest average among health status groups 
(2.7%), with the exception of the group with fair self-reported health status, which 




 The Average Based on the Socio-Economic Classification 
Study data shows that the overall average maximum WTP by those in the first level of 
education is 2.4%, 2.7% of participants at the second level of education, and 3.1% by 
those holding one of the third level of education degrees. Moreover, the figures imply that 
the overall average for those who are in receipt of income less than the average monthly 
income is 2.5%, and 2.7% for those receiving income higher than the monthly average 
income. Furthermore, the figures indicate that those who hold PHI showed a higher 
average than those without (2.7% vs 2.6%) (see Table 55 in the Appendix).  
5.4.7 Conclusion 
This section outlined the study sample characteristics, where it was found that data 
covered all the expected features. Moreover, the figures implied that participants’ 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics are broadly similar to those in the 
former study, which suggests that both study samples are representative of the targeted 
population. The demographic results showed that the majority of participants were males, 
Saudis, aged between 26 and 35, married, having no chronic diseases, and in excellent or 
very good health. Moreover, the socio-economic characteristics implied that most of the 
respondents are bachelor degree holders, employed, in receipt of income higher than the 
Saudi monthly average, and more than the half of the sample are privately insured. In 
addition, this study data indicates that the differences in the responses in terms of the 
basic three eligibilities to healthcare varied within a rate of 5 percentage points up or 
down in comparison to the former study. 
Furthermore, the study found that the majority of participants are willing to pay to 
increase, maintain, or to obtain access to the MOH healthcare facilities. When further 
analysis was conducted, it was found that participants who are in receipt of income tend 
to have more WTP than those with no income. Also, there was a similar level of WTP by 




However, a significant level of WTP was reported by those in group maintain in this 
study. In addition, when the WTP of groups within each slice was investigated, a higher 
level of WTP was observed by almost all groups within the six slices of this study 
compared with the former one. Furthermore, this study showed that the majority of 
participants are willing to pay according to each demographic and socio-economic 
characteristic, with a level of WTP higher than what was seen in the former study. 
Moreover, the consumption figures indicate that the majority of participants who are 
willing to pay in groups maintain and obtain, are willing to pay between 1% and 2%, 
where those in group increase are willing to pay between zero and 1%. Also, the same 
percentages were shown when they were grouped based on the entitlement to income. 
Moreover, it was found that the majority of the answers lay between the first, second, 
third and the seventh choices, with more weight on the first and the third. This indicates 
that the payment scale design overcame the midpoint bias. Finally, the data showed that 
the average maximum WTP value is 2.7% for the whole sample. 
 Discussion  
This section will discuss the fundamental findings of the study results, and will compare 
them with what was found in the former study, then will provide details about the tests 
and models that will be used to test the relationship between the WTP with the 
demographic and socio-economic factors.  
5.5.1 Willingness to Pay (Participation) 
The data in this study shows that nearly three quarters of the participants are willing to 
contribute to raising a fund for the MOH to improve their current level of access to 
healthcare services. This level of willingness is very much higher than what was observed 
in the former study, which was attributed to the fact that the former study sampling was 
simultaneous with a raft of changes to the Saudi system, such as: introducing tax (VAT) 




up of the citizen’s account (which was found to be limited to specific categories of people 
who met the funding criteria, and actually provided a relatively low level of funding). All 
these factors put the Saudi citizens under pressure, and as a result affected the attitude, 
cooperation, and decision of many to contribute to raising a fund for the MOH in the 
previous study; whereas, during the sampling of the second study, it was recognised that 
the pressure was released due to the introduction of the royal grant of the King of Saudi 
Arabia to offset the rising cost of living. The stated grant includes $267 monthly payments 
for one year starting at the end of January 2018 to be given to the civil and military 
personnel, and at a lower level to the public and private pensioners, as well as social 
security beneficiaries and students (Alarabiya, 2018f). In addition, hundreds of the middle 
and large size private companies have cooperated and followed the royal decree (Argaam, 
2018). Therefore, this grant compensated people, and put them back to the same previous 
living conditions, which encouraged them to reveal their genuine opinion. 
Moreover, the result of the former study showed a level of willingness exceeding half the 
sample size in spite of the financial pressures that were caused by the change in the Saudi 
system. This indicator suggests that an improvement to the current access to healthcare 
services was required, while taking into account that the groups and categories that 
showed a minority acceptance for the proposal of the previous study were highly affected 
by the reforms to the Saudi system. This became clearer when people received the royal 
grant, which has offset the fiscal damage that was caused by the reforms to the system, 
where participants showed significant WTP, and a desire to implement what is proposed 
to them. 
One of the reasons for the high level of WTP among participants is the payment scale, 
which gave participants a chance to compare and evaluate the opportunity to improve the 
current level of access to healthcare with the level of contributions that are provided to 




range offered in the designed scale), equates to about $17 per month for someone on the 
average income in SA. This amount ($17) accounts for small proportion of the royal grant 
(which is $267 per month), and is considered very low in comparison to the size of benefit 
that will be guaranteed. This was highly attractive for many categories of people, 
especially those who thought carefully, which led to a high acceptance.  
The data shows that the responses from all categories across the six slices are in line with 
the overall responses from the major three eligibilities to healthcare, except for non-
Saudis who are publicly employed and entitled to healthcare only in the MOH, as well as 
Saudis without income. This confirms the same findings in the former study, which 
showed a minority of WTP by these two categories. Moreover, the level of WTP in this 
study is more consistent with the overall WTP than what was observed by the former 
study, where the latter showed about eight categories with a minority willingness.  
The figures indicate that non-Saudis who are restricted to healthcare only in the private 
sector showed a greater desire to obtain access to the MOH healthcare services than what 
was observed in the former study, as well as Saudis who are entitled to healthcare in the 
private sector in addition to the MOH, who view the MOH healthcare services as 
desirable. This confirms the findings of the former study, and emphasises that the 
healthcare services that are provided by the MOH are perceived as better and more 
attractive to healthcare seekers than what is provided by the private sector. 
In this study, what was found from the responses of those who are eligible to healthcare 
in the other governmental healthcare facilities in addition to the MOH was different to 
what was found in the former study. This slice, which dragged down the overall WTP of 
group maintain and the overall WTP in the former study, showed a different orientation 
in the current study. This could be due to several factors: first, the decision of participants 
in this slice could be greatly affected by the royal grant. Second, different locations and 




given them a chance to contribute an amount of money that represents little in terms of 
monetary value to them, but means a lot in terms of the benefits derived. However, the 
first two factors are more likely to be the reason, because the last one is unlikely as slice 
5 showed one of the highest average WTP among other slices. 
In the former study, a small majority (52%) of those who are eligible to healthcare in the 
other governmental healthcare facilities were willing to pay, despite the fact that these 
facilities provide the highest quality of healthcare services, and are universally agreed as 
the best healthcare facilities in SA. The findings of this study show an even larger 
majority (85%) of these people willing to pay, which raised uncertainty as to whether 
quality was the main reason. 
Therefore, further investigations were carried out on the available data from the MOH, 
and the other governmental healthcare facilities. It was found that the hospitals of the 
latter represent only 9% of the total number of hospitals in SA by the end of 2016, 
compared with 58% of hospitals that are MOH hospitals. Moreover, SDU hospitals’ beds 
represent 16% of the total, whereas the hospitals’ beds in the MOH represent 59% of the 
total. In addition, the number of physicians in SDU represents 19% of the total physicians 
in SA, where physicians in the MOH represents 48% of the total. Furthermore, the 
distribution of the other governmental healthcare facilities is centralised, and not as vast 
as the MOH. For example, in Najran City, in the south of SA, the MOH provides their 
healthcare services for nearly six hundred thousand people throughout about one hundred 
healthcare facilities (68 PHCs, 11 hospitals, one medical centre, one diabetes centre, 7 
dialysis centres, 2 dental centres, one rehabilitation centre, one central laboratory, 4 Anti-
smoking clinics, one forensic centre, and two preventive centres at the entrance) (MOH, 
2016, GAFS, 2017a). On the other hand, there are only three other governmental 




defence, where one of the latter is PHC). This data implies that the access to these 
facilities is incomparable to what the MOH provides. 
In terms of the demographic classification, this study found that males are more willing 
to pay than females, and this contradicts the findings of the former study. However, 
because males in Saudis Arabia take responsibility for most of life’s needs, they were 
greatly affected by the reforms to the Saudi system in the former sampling, whereas by 
acquiring the royal grant, they had more willingness to benefit from the proposal of this 
study, where they showed higher willingness to participate than females. Moreover, with 
exception to the group of participants aged between 18 and 25, who showed the highest 
willingness to participate, older age brackets are more willing to pay to some extent. This 
confirms the findings of the former study, and the fact that people need more healthcare 
services as they get older. In addition, it was found that non-Saudis are less willing to 
participate than Saudis. This confirms the findings of the former study, since non-Saudis 
have lower salaries and tend to save money. In addition, more willingness of married 
participants than those who are single was observed as in the former study, also 
participants with chronic disease were found to be more willing to pay in both studies. 
Finally, this study found that people in very good and good health status are more willing 
to pay than those in excellent health status.   
According to the socio-economic classification, this study showed a higher willingness 
to participate by people with a higher level of education, where the opposite was 
perceived in the former study (moving from the first level to the third). This could be 
attributed to the capability to evaluate their current access to healthcare service, and the 
willingness to pay as was explained previously. Moreover, those in receipt of income 
above the average monthly income are more willing to participate than those who fell 
below. This confirms the fact that people with higher income are more willing to pay, and 




that the affordability and the availability of income is one of the important reasons to take 
a decision to participate or to refuse. This was clear from the former study, where people 
with a higher income were still willing to participate in spite of the raft of changes that 
were applied to the Saudi system, which reduced people’s disposable income. Finally, 
those who have PHI are more willing to pay than those who do not, and this confirms the 
same findings of the former study, and also suggests that people with experience in the 
private sector see the MOH healthcare services as essential. 
 WTP at Times of Austerity and Government Generosity (Prosperity) 
The WTP results in the former study showed that the majority of the study sample were 
willing to pay notwithstanding that they were hit by the austerity measures that the 
government adopted since April 2016, where the WTP responses in the second study were 
significantly higher, impacted by the generosity of the government, which recompensated 
people through a royal grant. Both of these WTP scenarios are representative to their own 
circumstances. However, to design sustainable and persistent healthcare policy, it is 
suggested for decision makers in SA or in other countries experiencing (or having plans 
to apply in the future) austerity measures to take the former WTP scenario (55.4% WTP) 
into account more than the second one (72.5% WTP) when designing healthcare policy 
that might involve people incurring part of their healthcare costs. This is because in SA, 
there is more than a decade ahead for Vision 2030, which is still reviewing the Saudi 
system (public and private) in order to cut unnecessary spending and to raise different 
sources of funding, such as increasing the energy prices (Alarabiya, 2018a). Moreover, 
the royal grant which created a more prosperous climate was planned to be only for the 
year of 2018 due to the remarkable shock among the Saudi citizens that year, and was just 
renewed in 2019, where it is highly possible not to be continued in coming budgets 




The two WTP scenarios in this research provided a great experience for policy makers at 
national and international levels, which are expected to impact their future decisions that 
concern obtaining funds. For example, the WTP scenario during the austerity period 
would make policy makers design (or reform) healthcare policies more cautiously and to 
build on intensive investigation of the current and future economic trends at national and 
global levels (e.g. a further drop in oil prices or costly military intervention) in addition 
to any current or future governmental planned reforms. Therefore, it will make them think 
of policies (i.e. financial contribution) that are more likely to be accepted and match the 
government need or to develop cost containment policies so as not to face great resistance 
from the population. These should all strengthen the design of healthcare policies. On the 
other hand, the experience of the WTP during the more prosperous period would make 
policy makers prudent and aware that imposing a financial contribution at a time of 
prosperity (specifically at a high percentage because the economy is flourishing) may be 
resisted more if economic downturns followed, despite the government being in great 
need to raise funds (i.e. pre and post 2008 crisis, pre and post 2014 oil prices drop or at 
time of the Saudi royal grant and after stopping it).  
Therefore, it is suggested that the decision makers in SA or in other countries with similar 
austerity and prosperity experience should consider a lower percentage than the average 
maximum WTP (2.7%) that was found in the second scenario. Evidence in this regard 
comes from the Irish healthcare system which shows that notwithstanding the country’s 
deep and long GDP decline compared to what SA had recently (-10% between 2008 and 
2010 in Ireland vs -0.87% only in 2017 in SA (Thomas et al., 2012, SAMA, 2018)), the 
government in 2009 increased the healthcare levy from 2% to 4% on earnings up to 
€75,036, and from 2.5% to 5% on earnings above this level (the health levy was subsumed 




that the Irish population have long experience with sharing costs of many public services 
compared with Saudis.  
Another example from a long established healthcare system is Greece, where the 
economy contracted between 3% and 7% in the period from 2009 to 2012 (Maresso et 
al., 2015). Nonetheless, the pensioners’ contribution rate to SHI increased only 1.45% to 
be 4% in 2013, and what is more important is that the levy increased gradually between 
2011 and 2013 (Economou et al., 2015). Evidence from a developing country such as 
Hungary where the economy contracted 6.7% in 2009 shows that the government 
increased the SHI levy by only 1 percentage point in 2011 (from 6% to 7%) (Maresso et 
al., 2015). An example from the prosperity period in Europe (between 2000 and 2007) is 
the German healthcare system experience, where the government increased employees’ 
SHI share 0.9 percentage points in 2005 (Busse and Blümel, 2014, Stock et al., 2006). 
These experiences suggest that relatively modest changes are feasible and that significant 
increases in payment rates for citizens should be approached with caution.  
If policy makers in SA or in other countries with similar austerity or prosperity experience 
see imposing new (or increasing the existing) financial contributions as unreasonable 
decisions, then further funds could be attained through containing healthcare costs. For 
example, at a time of prosperity, the Belgian government introduced a number of reforms 
between 2002 and 2005 to control public spending over drugs with more focus on generic 
drugs (Janssen et al., 2016), Latvia reduced the number of sickness funds in 2002 (which 
reduced administrative costs) (Mitenbergs et al., 2012a), and the Italian government set 
strict rules between 2001 and 2004 on regions’ healthcare spending with a continuous 
monitoring to improve their financial spending (Ferré et al., 2014). On the other hand, at 
times of austerity, Greece, Portugal, Romania and Georgia centralised the procurement 
of medical supplies for more negotiation power and to reduce administrative costs 




Berdzuli, 2017), and Croatia appointed a group of hospitals with the best procurement 
history to purchase supply for other hospitals (Džakula et al., 2014). In addition, there 
was a focus on generic drugs in the Netherlands, Hungary, Greece, Romania and Portugal 
to obtain savings (Thomson et al., 2015, Gaal, 2011, Kaitelidou and Kouli, 2012, Maresso 
et al., 2015, Barros, 2012). Moreover, Greece, Portugal and Romania implemented e-
prescription systems to control spending and contain costs (Fragkoulis, 2012, Barros, 
2012, Maresso et al., 2015). Furthermore, countries such as Romania and Greece merged 
hospitals (Mitenbergs et al., 2012a, Houston et al., 2011), Latvia merged public health 
agencies (i.e. Health Payment Centre with the Centre of Health Economics) (Mitenbergs 
et al., 2012a), and Georgia closed underutilized facilities (Richardson and Berdzuli, 
2017). In addition, Italy, Ireland and Hungary reduced number of hospital beds and 
Ireland also closed wards (Ferré et al., 2014, Burke et al., 2014a, Richardson and Berdzuli, 
2017). 
5.5.2 Willingness to Pay (Consumption) 
In terms of the maximum values that people are willing to pay, when all participants were 
involved, the data shows that the first choice (zero) was chosen the most. However, when 
only those who are willing to pay are included, the range from 1% to 2% was the most 
frequently chosen, then 5% and above, then from zero to 1%. Moreover, study figures 
indicate that people in group maintain are willing to pay more than those in group 
increase to keep their access to the MOH available. This shows how valuable the 
healthcare services that are provided by the MOH are. The same is true for the people 
from group obtain, who showed more WTP to guarantee a chance to access the MOH 
facilities, similarly in terms of the slices, where groups within slices two, four, five, and 
six are willing to pay more than groups in the first slice.  
The study figures indicated that among 21 demographic categories of those who are 




and 2%, where three of the rest contained a few participants, and the last group is for 
those in very good health status, where 16% chose to pay between zero and 1%, the same 
percentage chose to pay between 1% and 2%, and the same percentage chose to pay 
between 2% and 3%. In respect of the socio-economic groups, the data shows that the 
third choice (1% to 2%) was also selected most frequently among the socio-economic 
groups of those who are willing to pay (12 out of 20 groups). 
The average maximum WTP value was 2.7% among those who are willing to fund the 
MOH to receive better access to healthcare in return. This percentage would reduce the 
MOH budget burden by up to 40% ($6.6 Billon), taking into consideration that this was 
calculated based on the public and private employees and pensioners, who represent only 
a third the population of Saudi Arabia. More funds will be attained from the other two 
thirds, taking into account that the budget will be cut as some people may prefer to keep 
their current access. In addition, the data figures indicate that moving from incomes below 
the monthly average income to incomes above this average, and from lower level of 
education to higher, the average maximum WTP value increases. The same holds true for 
those who have PHI. This is also the case when moving from group increase to maintain 
to obtain, females in comparison to males, single to married, and those without chronic 
disease to those with. 
5.5.3 Relationship between the Decision to Pay and Participants’ Characteristics 
This part of the study will investigate the relationship between participants’ WTP for the 
healthcare services that are provided by the MOH healthcare facilities and their 
demographic and socio-economic factors. In a similar way to the previous study, this part 
of this study will apply Chi square and the Fisher exact tests to test the relationship 
between participants’ WTP and their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 




The variables that are marked with asterisks are the variables that had categories less than 
five, where the Fisher exact test was performed.  
The data shows eleven independent variables, where each is significantly different to the 
overall WTP. First, age (p-value 0.03), it was observed that the percentage of those who 
are willing to pay ranged between 66.6% and 100%, where the overall WTP is 72.5% 
(see Table 56 in the Appendix). Second, nationality (p-value 0.00), the percentage of the 
Saudis who are willing to pay is 78%, where 58% of non-Saudis are willing. Third, 
chronic diseases (p-value 0.00), the data shows that 71% of those who do not have chronic 
diseases are willing to pay, while 90% of those who have chronic disease are willing to 
pay. Fourth, fifth, and sixth represent groups increase (p-value 0.00), maintain (p-value 
0.00), and obtain (p-value 0.03). The data indicates that the percentages of those who are 
willing to pay in these three groups differ between 8% up to 11% in comparison to the 
overall. For instance, the difference between the percentage of those who are willing to 
pay of group increase in comparison to the overall is 11% (61.7% versus 72.5%). Group 
maintain is 9% (81.3% versus 72.5%). Group obtain is 8% (64.8% versus 72.5%). The 
seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth comprise slice 1 (p-value 0.00), slice 2 (p-value 0.04), 
slice 5 (p-value 0.00), and slice 6 (p-value 0.00). The data showed that the willingness to 
pay in these four slices varied between 8% and 15% in comparison to overall. For 
example, the difference between those who are willing to pay in slice 1 in comparison to 
the overall is 11% (61.7% versus 72.5%). Slice 2 is 8% (65% versus 72.5%). Slice 5 is 
10% (82.6% versus 72.5%). Slice 6 is 15% (87.7% versus 72.5%). The last variable is the 
level of PHI; this variable is different to the other variables because the total participants 
who hold PHI is 315 participants. Therefore, the overall percentage of those who are 
willing and unwilling to pay changed (willing 74.2%, unwilling 25.8%). The data showed 
that the percentage of those who are willing to pay changed between 2% to 12% relative 




The Chi square and Fisher exact test results showed significant differences between these 
independent variables in comparison to the overall response in terms of the WTP. This 
provides a good understanding of the sample distribution, which might be difficult to 
understand by only referring to the frequencies in the previous sections. Moreover, the 
data showed that the response of the participants in half of the characteristics (11 out of 
23 variables) did not come in line with the overall response. The data showed that three 
of the demographic and almost all of the socio-economic factors are different to the 
overall response, given the fact that all participants’ responses showed a high WTP. This 
is different to the results of the former study, which observed two variables were 
significantly different to the overall responses (slice 5 and those employed). 
5.5.4 Relationship between Values and Participants’ Characteristics 
This section will investigate the relationships between participants’ maximum WTP 
values for the healthcare services that are provided in the MOH and participants 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In this section, only participants who 
are willing to pay (WTP > zero) will be included. The dependent variables here are 
continuous in nature, which measure participants’ WTP. The independent variables are 
the participants’ demographic and socio-economic factors. In the literature review, 
depending on the nature of the variable, parametric and non-parametric tests are 
performed on data to test for significant relationships. The parametric tests assume the 
variables are normally distributed. Therefore, in this study normality of the dependent 
variables was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test in Stata (see Sample 7 in the Appendix). 
The p-value for the continuous dependent variable is significant (levels of WTP p-value 
0.00). Therefore, the study rejects the hypotheses that the continuous dependent variable 
is normally distributed. Consequently, non-parametric tests are appropriate. Mann 
Whitney is a non-parametric test that measures whether there is a significant difference 




about normality and is therefore appropriate to compare the continuous dependent 
variable and the categorical independent variables in this study. Moreover, the Kruskal-
Wallis test is used to assess the relationship between the continuous dependent variable 
and the categorical independent variables that have more than two groups. The data 
satisfies the Kruskal-Wallis assumption that the observations are independent 
(Schlotzhauer, 2007). 
Tables 57 and 58 in the Appendix show the results of the Mann Whitney and Kruskal-
Wallis tests. These two tables present the variables categories, observations, the rank sum, 
and the p values. In addition, they present the z test statistic for the former, and Chi square 
for the latter. 
The results of Mann Whitney test shows that gender (z = -3.099 p = 0.00), group increase 
(z = 3.246, p = 0.00), group obtain (z = -2.248, p = 0.02), slice 1 (z = 3.246, p = 0.00), 
and slice 2 (z = -2.083, p = 0.03) impact the amount that participants are willing to pay 
for the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH. 
Moreover, Kruskal-Wallis test results shows that education (χ2 = 15.55, p = 0.02), 
employed (χ2 = 6.14, p = 0.04), unemployed (χ2 = 13.62, p = 0.00), level of PHI (χ2 
= 22.04, p = 0.00), three eligibilities (Access of Three) (χ2 = 12.09, p = 0.00), six slices 
(Access) (χ2 = 15.52, p = 0.00) also impact the amount that participants are willing to 
pay for the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH.  
5.5.5 Factors Affecting Peoples’ WTP 
This section will investigate the factors that affect participants’ willingness to participate 
and to pay for the healthcare services that are provided by the MOH. To do so, this section 
will outline the econometric models that will be employed to serve this purpose. 




 Econometric Model 
This study used multivariate analysis to identify the factors that influence participants’ 
WTP. To do so, a joint process was employed. The first step involves whether the 
participant is willing to pay or not. The second step includes participants’ decision on the 
maximum value that they are willing to pay. Therefore, a two-part model is suitable for 
identifying what participants are willing to pay for the healthcare services that are 
provided by the MOH. In the first part of this model, a probit regression will be used to 
estimate participants’ decision to pay (participation equation) (the same as what the 
former study used in Section 4.5.3.2). The second part will use OLS regression to estimate 
the factors that are associated with the maximum amount that participants are willing to 
pay (consumption equation). This model is appropriate as it predicts the actual response, 
and does not make inferences regarding parameters, but predicts the conditional means 
(Duan et al., 1983, Manning et al., 1987). 
The participation equation and the marginal effects equation are the same as employed 
previously. For the consumption equation, Y is a continuous variable and represents 
participants’ maximum WTP value. wi is a vector for the independent variables. The error 
terms in the model μi is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, variance = 1, 
and correlation coefficient ρ. Also, the two decisions are independent when ρ = 0 and the 
two equations can be estimated separately (Fonta et al., 2010).  
MODEL 3 
Y* = wiα + μi 
Yi = Y*if Zi = 1  
Yi not observed if Zi = 0 
For the reason that the second part of this model (OLS) is focusing on estimating the 




only the positive WTP values will be included (WTP > zero). Consequently, this part 
might include selection bias (O’donnell et al., 2008). This could be due to the fact that 
the participants’ decisions to pay is not a random process as they are made by them. 
Therefore, participants who are willing to pay constitute self-selected sample and not 
random sample. Accordingly, the selection bias needs to be addressed. This issue is 
solved by the inverse mills ratio (IMR), which is generated using probit coefficient and 
included in the OLS regression to control the selection bias (Heckman, 1976). 
The last equation λ(xiα) = ϕ(xiα)|Φ(xiα) is the inverse mills ratio, σ is the standard 
deviation and ϕ and Φ are the standard normal density and standard normal function 
(Fonta et al., 2010). 
INVERSE MILLS RATIO  
E (Yi|Zi = 1, w) = wiβ + ρσλ (xiα) 
The first step of the model is used to find a consistent estimator of α. Then the second α 
value is used to construct the mills lambda (λ). In the second step, λ is included as a 
regressor in the consumption equation allowing the parameters to be consistently 
estimated using OLS. 
In respect of the participation equation, the dependent variable is binary in nature, which 
was generated from the continuous variable and coded as 0 if the participant is not willing 
to pay, and 1 if WTP > 0 was reported. Moreover, the explanatory variables that will be 
included in this model are all the variables that were included in the former study (see 
Section 4.5.3.2). 
With regards to the consumption equation, the dependent variable includes only the 
positive WTP values. The explanatory variables that will be included in this part are the 




When the probit regression was performed, multi-collinearity occurred in the three 
eligibilities variable (Access of Three), the six slices variable (Access). Also, some 
categories in age, and education were dropped due to the low observations. Therefore, the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was conducted, which indicated to 8.4 average VIF (see 
Table 59 in the Appendix). Also, some variables showed high VIF. For this reason, the 
same categories within Health Status, Education, Income, Marital Status, and Age that 
were merged in the former study, were also merged in the same way. Afterwards, the VIF 
was applied, and the results showed that it was reduced (3.7 average VIF). However, the 
collinearity rose again in the Access and Access of Three variables. Therefore, the Access 
variable was excluded, and as a result, the collinearity resolved with 3.9 average VIF (see 
Table 60 in the Appendix).  
 Results 
Tables 37 and 38 presents the results of the two-part model, which was used to identify 
the factors that influence participants’ decision and the maximum value that they are WTP 
for the MOH healthcare services (participation and consumption equations). 
The probit regression shows significant p-value for nationality (p-value 0.00), which 
indicates that the participant’s nationality influences the decision to pay. The marginal 
effect points to a 48% probability that Saudis are more likely to pay than non-Saudis, 
which means that there is a 48% increased likelihood that a Saudi will be WTP compared 
with a non-Saudi. The regression indicates that the participant’s education significantly 
influences his/her decision to pay. The figures show that when a participant’s education 
increases, then he/she is more likely to be willing to pay (second level of education p-
value 0.01, third level of education p-value 0.01). Moreover, the marginal effect indicates 
that if a participant holds a diploma or bachelor degree, then he/she is 14.6% more likely 
to be willing to pay than if he/she holds one of the first level of education certificates 




educated (higher diploma, master’s, or PhD), then the likelihood of his/her WTP increases 
by 19.7% relative to those in the first level of education. Study results show that chronic 
diseases is also one of the factors that influences participants’ decision to pay (p-value 
0.00). The marginal effect interprets that participants with chronic disease are 19% more 
likely to pay than those who do not have a chronic disease.  
Table 37 Probit Model Results for the Willingness to Pay (Second Study) 
Independent 
Variable  
Observation P-value Coefficient Marginal 
Effect 
Gender     
 Base Category (Female)    
 Male 0.70 -0.06 -0.01 
Age     
 Base Category (18 - 25)    
 26 - 35 0.03** -0.37 -0.11 
 36 - 45 0.61 -0.12 -0.03 
 46 - 55 0.93 0.02 0.00 
 56 < 0.82 0.10 0.02 
Nationality     
 Base Category (Non-Saudis)    
 Saudis 0.00*** 1.38 0.48 
Marital Status     
 Base Category (Single)    
 Married 0.90 0.01 0.00 
 Divorced & Widowed 0.38 0.32 0.09 
Education     
 Base Category (First Level)    
 Undergraduate 0.01*** 0.42 0.14 
 Post-graduate 0.01*** 0.6 0.19 
Employment     
 Base Category (Unemployed)    
 Employed 0.23 0.30 0.10 
Income     
 Base Category (< Average)    
 6,000 < 0.74 -0.05 -0.01 
PHI     
 Base Category (Without PHI)    
 With PHI 0.19 -0.25 -0.07 
Chronic Disease     
 Base Category (Without)    
 With 0.00*** 0.79 0.19 
Health Status     
 Base Category (Fair & Poor)    
 Good 0.76 0.14 0.03 
 Very Good 0.26 0.52 0.16 
 Excellent 0.85 0.08 0.05 
Eligibility     
 Base Category (Increase)    
 Maintain 0.01*** 0.45 0.16 
 Obtain 0.00*** 1.31 0.36 
cons  0.01 -1.38 - 
 




In addition to these factors, the study found that people’s level of access to healthcare 
significantly influences their decision to pay (Maintain p-value 0.01, Obtain p-value 
0.00). The marginal effect indicates that if a person is in group maintain, he/she is 16.8% 
more likely to pay relative to people in group increase, and if a person is in group obtain, 
he/she is 36.7% more likely to pay for the MOH healthcare services than people in group 
increase. Finally, the regression shows significant p-value for those who are aged 
between 26 and 35 (p-value 0.03). The marginal effect interprets that a person aged 
between 26 and 35 is 11.9% less likely to pay than people aged between 18 and 25 (see 
Table 37). 
The OLS regression (see Table 38) shows that gender significantly affects the values that 
participants are willing to pay (p-value 0.07), which indicates that males are willing to 
pay more than females. In addition, the data implies that nationality influences the value 
that participants place on the MOH healthcare services (p-value 0.02). This suggests that 
Saudis are more willing to pay relative to non-Saudis. Moreover, the data shows that 
education significantly affects the level of payment that people are willing to pay. The 
data shows that people who hold diploma or bachelor degrees (second level of education) 
are more willing to pay comparative to those who hold primary, secondary, or high school 
level of education (first level of education) (p-value 0.03). In addition, those who hold 
PhD, master’s, or higher diploma (third level of education) are willing to pay more 
relative to those in the first level of education (p-value 0.00). Also, the regression shows 
that employment significantly affects the level that people are willing to pay (p-value 
0.07). The results indicate that employed people are willing to pay more than those who 
are not. Furthermore, it was found that having PHI influences the percentage that people 
are willing to pay (p-value 0.00). The data shows that people who hold PHI are willing to 





Table 38 OLS and Ordered Probit Regression’s Results for the Willingness to Pay 
Independent 
Variable 
Observation OLS P-V Coef1 O-Probit P-V Coef 
Gender      
 Base Category (Female)     
 Male 0.07* 0.41 0.09* 0.23 
Age      
 Base Category (18 - 25)     
 26 - 35 0.05** -0.81 0.11 -0.44 
 36 - 45 0.30 -0.37 0.47 -0.15 
 46 - 55 0.14 -0.62 0.23 -0.30 
 56 < 0.79 -0.16 0.94 0.02 
Nationality      
 Base Category (Non-Saudis)     
 Saudis 0.02** 3.42 0.00*** 2.84 
Marital Status      
 Base Category (Single)     
 Married 0.09* 0.37 0.12 0.20 
 Divorced & Widowed 0.17 0.76 0.24 0.38 
Education      
 Base Category (First Level)     
 Undergraduate 0.03** 0.92 0.03** 0.62 
 Post-graduate 0.00*** 1.61 0.00*** 1.04 
Employment      
 Base Category (Unemployed)     
 Employed 0.07* 0.76 0.04** 0.55 
Income      
 Base Category (< Average)     
 6,000 < 0.59 -0.13 0.26 -0.16 
PHI      
 Base Category (Without PHI)     
 With PHI 0.00*** -0.93 0.00*** -0.61 
Chronic Disease      
 Base Category (Without)     
 With 0.10* 1.02 0.13 0.62 
Health Status      
 Base Category (Fair & Poor)     
 Good 0.83 0.15 0.94 -0.03 
 Very Good 0.34 0.78 0.47 0.37 
 Excellent 0.88 0.10 0.92 -0.03 
Eligibility      
 Base Category (Increase)     
 Maintain 0.00*** 1.23 0.00*** 0.87 
 Obtain 0.00*** 4.24 0.00*** 3.48 
cons  0.24 -3.55 - - 
Inverse mills ratio  0.16 2.79 0.21 1.71 
 
Note: *** = significance at 1% level, **=significance at 5% level, *=significance at 10% level. 
Abbreviations: 1 Coefficient. 
Moreover, it was found that having chronic disease influences people maximum 
willingness to pay (p-value 0.10). The figures imply that those who have chronic diseases 
are willing to pay more than those who do not. In addition, the regression indicates that 




results indicate that people who are in group maintain are willing to pay more than those 
in group increase (p-value 0.00). Also, people in group obtain are willing to select values 
higher than those in group increase (p-value 0.00). Finally, the data shows significant p-
values for those who are aged between 26 and 35, and those who are married (p-value 
0.05 and 0.09, respectively). The results imply that those aged between 26 and 35 are 
WTP less than those who are aged between 18 and 25, and those who are married are 
WTP more than those who are single (see Table 38). 
 Discussion 
Study analysis found five factors influencing people’s decision to participate, and nine 
factors influencing the level of payment that they are willing to pay for the healthcare 
services that are provided by the MOH. The binary probit and OLS regressions confirmed 
that nationality is one of the factors that influences people’s willingness to pay as is the 
case in the probit regression in the former study (see Section 4.5.3.3). Moreover, the 
marginal effects for both studies (in terms of the decision to pay) are almost the same 
(current study 48% and 45.8% in the former study), where both show that Saudis are more 
likely to pay compared with non-Saudis. Moreover, this finding confirms the reason that 
was mentioned in the former study, which justifies this by the fact that the majority of 
non-Saudis have low income, and come to work in SA to save money. In addition, the 
findings of this study confirm the previous studies related to education, whereby when 
people’s education increases, their WTP increases. The findings of this study indicate 
significant p-values for education, where both regressions confirm that when the level of 
education increases, the decision to pay (participation) and the level of contribution 
(consumption) are more likely to increase. 
The significant p-value for employment confirms the findings of the literatures, which 
seems to be logical that an employed person would be more willing to pay relative to 




entitled to a low compensation from the Saudi government, and would value the money 
more than the employed people. The same is true for the gender, where many of the WTP 
studies indicate that males are more willing to pay than females. This is attributed to the 
fact that the majority of jobs in SA are occupied by males. Therefore, females who are 
less widely employed, or could be unemployed and in receipt of low compensations from 
the social welfare, citizen’s account, or the HRDF are willing to pay less than males. 
In terms of PHI, the data indicate that fewer of those who have PHI are willing to pay 
higher percentages compared to those who do not have PHI. The data in Table 54 in the 
Appendix indicates that 9.0% of those who have PHI chose the sixth option and 18% 
chose the last option compared to 10% of those who do not have PHI chose the sixth and 
19% chose the last option. This explains the OLS regression, which stated that people 
who have PHI are willing to pay less than those who do not. Moreover, this study found 
that those with chronic diseases are more willing to participate and to pay than those 
without. Surprisingly, the findings of the literature review suggest that healthy people are 
more willing to pay than the less healthy. 
For people aged between 26 and 35, the data showed that 66.7% of this category are 
willing to pay, which is the lowest percentage among the other age categories, whereas 
80% of those aged between 18 and 25 are willing to pay, and this is the highest percentage 
excluding those aged above 65 years, where there are only 5 participants in this category. 
Moreover, the figures in Table 52 in the Appendix shows that more than 31% of those 
aged between 18 and 25 are willing to pay values higher than 4% compared to 25% of 
those aged between 26 and 35. This confirms the findings of the previous studies, where 
it was found that younger people are more willing to pay than older. In addition, the 
figures in Table 52 in the Appendix indicate that higher percentages of married 
participants are willing to pay higher values in comparison to single people (40% of 




The findings of this study also indicate that people in groups maintain and obtain are 
more willing to pay than people in group increase, where people in group obtain are the 
most willing compared with the other groups. These findings were explained by the 
marginal effects of the probit regression, which show a probability of 16% that people in 
group maintain are more likely to pay relative to group increase, and a probability of 36% 
that people in group obtain are more likely to pay than people in group increase. This 
concludes that people in group obtain are the most willing to pay. Also in the OLS 
regression, people in group maintain are willing to pay higher values in comparison to 
people in group increase, and people in group obtain are the most willing to pay 
(coefficient 1.23 and 4.24, respectively). These findings confirm what was shown by the 
previous studies that the access to healthcare services affects people’s WTP. 
Moreover, the results of the probit regression confirm the former study, where both 
showed that people in group obtain are the most willing to pay for the healthcare services 
that are provided by the MOH. However, the current study found that people in group 
maintain are more willing than people in group increase, while the former study found 
that people in group maintain are the least willing to pay in comparison to the other 
groups. The difference between two studies results could be due to the period of sampling, 
where the former study was conducted at a time when the government introduced VAT, 
increased the fuel and electricity prices, and introduced the citizens’ account, which 
turned out to be much lower than expected. In contrast, in the second period of sampling, 
the government increased its employees’ and pensioners’ salaries to meet the price 
increases, as many companies of the private sector did. This could also be attributed to 
the fact that participants in this study were provided with payment scale to choose from. 
One of the other reasons could also be the demographic and socio-economic differences 




This study observed that Saudis are more willing to participate and to pay than non-
Saudis. However, people in group obtain, which consists purely of non-Saudis, are more 
willing to participate and to pay than people in group increase. This same contradiction 
appeared in the former study, which occurred due to the same reason. Data analysis found 
that 76.5% of people in group increase are Saudis, and the rest are non-Saudis (38 
participants), of whom, 25 participants (66%) are unwilling to pay. Therefore, those 
participants brought down the overall WTP of group increase, and raised the overall WTP 
of group obtain due to the reason that a significant percentage of non-Saudis who are 
unwilling to pay are not included in this group. This confirms that the non-Saudis who 
are eligible to healthcare only in the MOH find their current access to healthcare 
satisfactory for their needs. 
For the reason that the last option that was used in the payment scale was an open-ended 
option (5 <), this option could be categorical rather than continuous. Given the presence 
of uncertainty in the nature of the order of the payment scale used in this study, it was 
necessary to perform a robustness test on the participation part figures to investigate the 
degree to which a different model would function correctly and give the same significant 
results as the OLS that was used initially, and also how these estimates to the payment 
scale (that the last option is continuous or categorical) could be sensitive to changing the 
model. 
The OLS model assumes that the dependent variable is continuous (the difference 
between 1 and 2 is equal to the difference between 2 and 3). However, because some 
uncertainties arose regarding the nature of the payment scale that the last option could be 
categorical rather than continuous, this was addressed using the ordered probit regression, 
which is used specifically to deal with the variable that is categorical and ordered, that 




When the ordered probit model was performed on the consumption part, the results 
showed that both models (OLS and ordered probit) are broadly similar, where most of the 
variables that were found significant in the OLS regression, were also found to be 
significant when the ordered probit model was used, with three more variables found to 
be significant in the OLS (those aged between 25 and 35, married participants, and those 
with chronic diseases), and these few additional results were due to the different 
assumptions of each model, which is likely to occur. Finally, the overall results are robust, 
and show that the majority of the variables are similarly significant in both models (see 
Table 38). 
As a conclusion, this study attributed the significant increase in participants’ decision to 
participate in comparison to the former study primarily to the royal grant that offset the 
rises in living costs. Also, the study attributed the reason to the payment scale that gave 
the audience a chance to compare the proposal’s benefits to their maximum willingness 
to pay. Moreover, the study emphasises that quality could be a primary reason for those 
who are eligible to healthcare in the other governmental healthcare facilities, but only for 
those who have broad access to them, while those living in places limited to such access 
would value the MOH healthcare services and consider them desirable. In addition, this 
study confirmed the findings of the former study that people with access to the private 
sector find the MOH healthcare services desirable. Furthermore, the study findings 
indicate that the average maximum WTP would enable the MOH to reduce the reliance 
on the government budget by up to 40%, by taking into account that more would be raised, 
as this percentage was estimated based on the contribution of a third of the population of 
SA. Moreover, Chi square and Fisher exact tests indicated that eleven factors are 
significantly different from the overall distribution. In addition, Mann Whitney and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests found eleven factors have a significant association between 




Furthermore, the two-part model indicated that nationality affected people’s decision to 
participate as is the case in the participation part in the former study, and the current study 
added that nationality influences the maximum level that people are willing to pay. 
Moreover, it was found that when people’s education increases, the likelihood of 
participation and maximum amount people are willing to pay increase as well, and the 
same is true for those who have chronic diseases. It was also found that males are willing 
to pay more than females, employed compared to unemployed, and married relative to 
single, whereas people who have PHI are willing to pay less than those who do not, and 
those aged between 26 and 35 are less willing to participate and to pay than those aged 
between 18 and 25. In addition, it was found that people who are in group maintain are 
more willing to participate and to select higher values to pay than people in group 
increase, and those in group obtain are the most willing to participate and to select higher 
values to pay. This confirmed the findings of the former study, which stated that people 
in group obtain are the most willing to participate. However, it contradicted the findings 
in terms of group maintain, and this was attributed to the royal grant, payment scale, and 
the different sample. Finally, it should be noted that the majority of the significant results 
that were presented in the consumption stage which were based on the OLS regression 
were also found significant using the ordered probit model, which indicate that the study 
results were reasonably robust. 
 Conclusion 
This study investigated the population of Saudi Arabia’s maximum WTP for the 
healthcare services that are provided by the MOH through adopting the same proposal 
plan as the former study (in Chapter 4). Moreover, this study benefited from the literature 
review to develop the best approach to attain the pursued objective, and to eliminate the 
occurrence of any methodological issues. In addition, from the previous experiences of 




payment scale that is in line with the primary objective of this thesis, which focuses on 
developing a basic funding model to raise funds for the Saudi MOH. Furthermore, the 
study targeted the same population as the former study, used the same data collection with 
few changes to the data instrument, followed the same sampling technique, and had the 
same sample size from the same places where the former sampling took place. 
When the collected data was analysed, it was found that the sample characteristics were 
very similar to the former study, which indicated that both samples are representative of 
the target population. In fact, the former study findings indicated that more than half the 
sample agreed to participate in raising a fund for the MOH to attain better access to 
healthcare, in spite of the raft of reforms that the Saudi government introduced during the 
sampling. A few months after the announcement of the royal grant that was introduced at 
the beginning of this year (2018) to offset the rise in living costs, this study sampling was 
conducted. At that time, people had almost reverted back to the same previous living 
conditions as before the reforms that caused damage to people’s living conditions. 
Subsequently, people revealed their actual level of WTP, where nearly three quarters were 
found to be willing to pay. In addition, when contributors were given the payment scale, 
which allowed them to evaluate the benefits that they would attain from this proposal, 
and compare it to the percentage in the scale, the situation became different. 
Moreover, this study confirmed the findings of the previous study that people with 
experience of healthcare in the private sector, see the access to the MOH healthcare 
facilities as desirable. Also, with respect to those with experience of healthcare in the 
other governmental healthcare facilities, it is true that a significant proportion of them in 
the former study were unwilling to participate, and this was attributed to the reputation of 
the high quality of the healthcare services that are provided in this sector. However, when 
further investigation was carried out on the former study and matched with what was 




access to such facilities. However, due to the centralisation, limited number, and 
unreachable access to these facilities by a significant number of the seekers, the MOH 
services were seen as desirable. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study showed that people who are able to access 
healthcare outside the MOH are willing to pay higher values than those who can access 
healthcare only in the MOH. In addition, the data showed that a level of contribution 
between 1% and 2% were selected most often by those who are willing to contribute to 
raising the fund, then above 5%, and then from zero to 1%. Moreover, the overall average 
maximum WTP suggest that the Saudi MOH could levy up to 2.7% as the maximum level 
of contribution at the current time. Such a percentage would reduce the reliance on the 
government general budget by up to 40%, by taking into consideration that these 
estimates were based on a third of the population of SA, and extra funding is attainable 
from the other two thirds. 
When statistical analyses were performed on the study data to find whether there are 
demographic and socio-economic factors associated with participants’ decision as well 
as the maximum WTP, the study showed that people with higher education are willing to 
participate and to pay more than those in lower levels of education. The same is true in 
terms of Saudis relative to non-Saudis and people with chronic disease comparative to 
those without, whereas people aged between 26 and 35 are less willing to participate and 
to pay than those aged between 18 and 25. Moreover, it was found that having PHI 
negatively affects people’s maximum WTP, whereas being male, married, or employed 
positively affect the maximum WTP. Finally, this study found that the level of access that 
people have also influences their decision to participate and the maximum values that 
they are willing to pay. It was found that those who are in group obtain are the most 
willing to participate and to pay; this confirms the findings of the former study. Also, 




group increase are the least. The difference in the response of those in group maintain in 
this study to the former one could be due to the stabilisation in people’s living conditions, 




















    Conclusion 
This Chapter will give an overview of what this research was about, then will summarise 
the methodology of each topic. Afterwards, this Chapter will present the major findings 
of each topic. Moreover, recommendations for the MOH and the contribution of this 
research will be presented, then the limitation and the recommendations will be outlined. 
At the end, a conclusion will summarise the major points of this Chapter. 
 An Overview 
This research explored funding options for the Saudi healthcare system. The main 
objectives of this research as set out in Section 1.4 were achieved by investigating the 
MOH books, exploring literature in relation to other countries’ experiences with funding 
options, as well as designing two specifically constructed questionnaires to collect 
primary data from the population of Saudi Arabia. This research examined four main 
topics in the Saudi healthcare system and, consequently, generated four datasets. The first 
topic explored the drivers for the sharp increases in the Saudi MOH budgets over the past 
ten years at macro and micro levels. The second topic investigated the various funding 
mechanisms in other countries, and which are suited to the Saudi society model and its 
needs. The third topic conducted a survey which investigated the Saudi population’s 
willingness to participate to raise a fund for the Saudi MOH in return for improving their 
current level of access to healthcare services. It also determined which healthcare funding 
mechanism is most preferred. The fourth topic was concerned with understanding the 
population of Saudi Arabia’s willingness to fund their healthcare services. This part also 
conducted a survey to collect data from the Saudi population to estimate the most that 
they would be willing to pay to raise a fund for the MOH. 
 Research Methodologies 
This section summarises the methodologies that were employed to attain the four studies’ 




6.2.1 The First Topic 
Topic one reviewed the previous studies that were carried out to find the major drivers of 
the increases in healthcare spending in different countries. Moreover, all the MOH 
healthcare services, and financial resources were investigated relying on ten statistical 
books representing the Saudi MOH activities covering the period from 2006 to 2015. 
More data was collected from ten statistical books from the Saudi General Authority for 
Statistics (GAFS), ten statistical books from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), and ten annual reports from the Saudi Ministry of Finance (MOF). All these 
sources of data were searched in depth by examining each healthcare service that was 
provided by the MOH with the relevant budget to find out the reasons behind the increases 
in the MOH healthcare expenditure. 
6.2.2 The Second Topic 
Topic two reviewed the healthcare funding mechanisms in more than thirty countries 
from different continents to find the possible methods for raising a fund for the Saudi 
MOH. The reasons for implementing a new financing method, and the degree of the 
success were investigated. Evidence was brought from countries that have long-
established, stable, and successful healthcare systems, and from countries who 
implemented approaches to overcome a fiscal deterioration. Specifically, this topic 
reviewed the healthcare funding experience of the Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), and Western Europe (WE) countries, as well as the United States, 
Australia, Switzerland, and Singapore. Afterwards, this topic investigated each of these 
healthcare funding options in line with the Saudi context and needs to find the possible 
funding options for SA. 
6.2.3 The Third Topic 
This topic developed a questionnaire to investigate the population of SA’s willingness to 




the MOH healthcare facilities, as well as investigating their preference for the funding 
mechanisms that are in line with the Saudi context. The study relied on the literature 
review to develop the best WTP elicitation and preference formats that could help to 
achieve the objectives of this study given the current situation in SA. Therefore, closed 
ended (Yes, No) questions were employed to investigate people’s willingness to 
participate, and the contingent ranking method to investigate people’s preference for the 
funding options. The Chi square and Fisher exact tests were performed on the willingness 
to participate and the ranking to understand the data distribution. Moreover, for the former 
part of the study, a probit model was employed to identify the factors that affect people’s 
willingness to participate, and an ordered probit model was used for the latter to 
understand the factors that affect people’s preference for the healthcare funding 
mechanisms. 
6.2.4 The Fourth Topic 
Finally, topic four developed a questionnaire to investigate the population of SA’s 
maximum WTP for improving their level of access to the healthcare services that are 
provided by the Saudi MOH. The questionnaire was based on the literature review and 
the previous experiences of other countries with old healthcare systems to develop the 
best data collection instrument that could implement the most reliable answers from 
participants. Therefore, a payment scale was employed as the elicitation method, and a 
two-part model was applied to the study data. For the first part of this model, Chi square 
and Fisher exact tests were applied to understand the data distribution, then a probit 
regression was performed to identify the factors that affect people’s willingness to 
participate. For the second part, Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted 
to test if there was a significant difference between study groups, then OLS regression 
was performed to find the factors that are associated with the maximum amount that 




to make sure that the study results are robust, and this is because the last option that was 
used in the payment scale was an open-ended option. 
 Research Findings  
6.3.1 The Findings of the First Study 
Having successfully completed a review of the previous studies, thirteen reasons were 
found to have significantly affected healthcare spending in different countries. However, 
when the available sources of data were investigated, no data was accessible in relation 
to medical technology, drugs, smokers’ visits, and the misuse of healthcare resources. 
After the other nine reasons were inspected, it was found that the MOH budgets more 
than doubled without inflation. Also, the average increase in the total population of SA 
was 3% per annum during the time under investigation, and the Saudi citizens who 
consume more than 90% of the MOH healthcare services grew just 2% per annum on 
average. Moreover, the proportion of elderly people in SA was found to be one of the 
lowest among 62 countries distributed over four continents. In addition, total patient visits 
increased only 0.83% per annum on average, which was inconsistent with the sharp 
increases in the MOH budgets. The same is true for the foreign patient visits, which were 
relatively low in comparison to the increases in the MOH budgets. Furthermore, the 
patient visits to chronic disease clinics decreased -2% on average, and showed decreases 
in all the investigated years except in 2012. 
Moreover, it was found that one Medical City and six cardiology centres were inaugurated 
during the investigated period; however, all these were opened before 2011, and they 
cannot explain the increases in the MOH budgets, due to the fact that the cost of 
construction is incurred by budgets of previous years. In addition, the data indicated to 
significant variations between the increase in the number of physicians and the MOH 
budgets, except in 2012. Furthermore, the designation of Dr. Abdulla Al Rabeaa in 2009 




increase in the MOH budgets; however, the budgets already increased by similar 
percentages in 2007 and 2009 in the period of Dr. Hamad Al Mana.  
These findings suggest that all the reasons that researchers found significantly affected 
the increases in healthcare spending globally, do not clearly explain the sharp and 
continuous increases in the Saudi MOH budget. Therefore, this research continued 
investigating at micro level to include what healthcare services, activities, and items the 
MOH spent money on throughout the past ten years. 
The study found that the projects budget trebled during the period of investigation, to 
account for more than 9% of the MOH total budget on average. When the numbers of 
healthcare facilities were analysed alongside the projects budget, it was found that both 
grew significantly, but at different levels. Moreover, the study found that Primary 
Healthcare Centres (PHCs) are unlikely to explain the sharp increases in the projects 
budget, and this is attributed to the fact that up to 80% of them are rented and funded from 
other budgets, and also for the reason that such type of healthcare facilities require less 
funding in comparison to hospitals and Medical Centres (MCs). 
In contrast, it seems that the hospitals which are entirely owned by the government had 
the biggest portions of the projects budget throughout the ten years. However, due to the 
reason that the healthcare facilities funding process is based on the stage of completion 
in construction, the entire cost of the new healthcare facilities that open every year cannot 
be accounted for by the MOH projects budget every year. Moreover, it was observed that 
there was a higher focus from the MOH on the expansion of eight hospitals’ departments, 
which are: the general, internal medicine, intensive care, paediatric, surgery, isolation, 
OB & Gyn, and psychiatry & neurology. However, it was noticed that the size of hospitals 
does not reflect the increases in CAPEX, but it indicates which departments and 




Furthermore, the data found that the growth in the total number of healthcare facilities 
slowed in the last four years of the period under investigation in all three types of 
healthcare facilities. This was attributed to the slow growth in the total Saudi budget, 
which affected the MOH budget as well. All these downward trends were a result of the 
plummet in oil prices from $124.64 per barrel in 2012 down to $30.74 in 2015. 
When the salaries and the operations and maintenance budgets were investigated, they 
were found to have increased significantly in the past ten years, where the first one trebled 
to represent almost half of the MOH budget, and the second one increased fivefold to 
represent a quarter of the budget on average. 
The data showed that manpower numbers came in line with the increases in manpower’s 
salaries, and operation and maintenance budgets. Also, it was observed that the changes 
in numbers of manpower were concurrent with the changes in the number of healthcare 
facilities. This implied that the high increases in all types of manpower occurred as a need 
to recruit more employees to occupy the new healthcare facilities. In addition, it was 
found that the 19 hospitals and 83 PHCs, which were completed in 2009, increased the 
number of healthcare practitioners by a half, and the number of technicians, 
administrators, and workers by about three quarters in 2009 and 2010. Sharp increases 
were seen also in 2012 and 2013 after the opening of 150 PHCs, 21 hospitals, and 61 
MCs, which encouraged the MOH to hire more staff. 
Such increases in the number of healthcare facilities induced the MOH to spend $5.10 on 
staff salaries of those who are employed directly though the Ministry of Civil Service 
(MOCS) on average, and $5.50 on the operative and maintenance programmes including 
their employees for each US dollar that it spends on the CAPEX. Also, it creates a need 
to employ 103 persons directly by MOCS on average, and about 181 healthcare 
practitioners from MOCS and the operative companies for every new healthcare facility 




In addition, it was found that the 5% per annum increases in the salaries of the public 
sector for the period between 2009 and 2011 to meet the high living costs, were found to 
be an insignificant reason for the increases in the manpower salaries’ budget, and the 
same is true for the decreases in the number of manpower. Furthermore, the data found 
that the number of healthcare practitioners who were recruited between 2009 and 2010 is 
much higher than those who were recruited between 2012 and 2014 (45,938 vs 39,897, 
respectively), and this was attributed to the larger size of the 25 hospitals that were opened 
between 2009 and 2010 in comparison to the 25 hospitals opened between 2012 and 2014 
(10,804 vs 9,026 beds). Moreover, the data shows that the psychiatric, OB & GYN, 
isolation, surgery, paediatric, intensive care, internal medicine, and general departments 
which had the highest expansion in healthcare facilities led to a significant increase in the 
number of physicians who work in these departments. 
After investigating the frequent expenditure budgets, it was found that they trebled in the 
period under investigation, to represent 15% of the MOH budgets on average. Moreover, 
when healthcare activities were analysed alongside these budgets, the only activities that 
realistically explained the increases in frequent expenditure budgets were the laboratory 
investigations and treatment abroad. In addition, healthcare facilities’ preparations and 
furnishing items were also found to be another reason, due to the concurrent changes with 
the year prior to the inauguration of healthcare facilities, especially in the cases of the 
medical centres and hospitals. 
The data analysis found repeated declines in total patient visits in some years and declines 
in patient visits per capita in most of the years under investigation. Specifically, visits to 
PHCs and to chronic diseases clinics reported average decreases, whereas visits to 
hospitals almost doubled, with significant increases cited in musculoskeletal diseases, 




In addition, it was found that the malaria and dengue fever are the only two among 38 
communicable diseases that increased significantly. From the medical activities, it was 
found that x-rays increased considerably, and number of served meals in 2015 trebled 
comparing to 2014, and more than quadrupled comparing to 2006. On the supervision 
activities side, samples of food investigated and food destroyed in kilograms are the only 
activities that showed increases, but at low levels. On the side of the awareness and 
educational activities, all increased on average, but similar levels were noted in some 
years, which could be attributed to reporting reasons. However, all these increases cannot 
entirely explain the increases in the frequent expenditures budgets, as they were not in 
line with the changes in these budgets, and some account for only minor costs. Moreover, 
the data found that the major driver for these increases cannot be attributed to the petty 
cash expenses nor to the payment for the PHCs buildings’ rents, which accounted for 
relatively low costs. 
Actually, the reason that the changes in the MOH healthcare activities cannot fully 
explain the increases in the frequent expenditure budgets is that these budgets have not 
been prepared based on demand expectations. This was evident from the absence of the 
correlation in the data between the frequent expenditures’ budgets and the total number 
of healthcare practitioners, the total manpower who are employed directly by MOCS, 
total population, the Saudi population in the same year or one year later, or with patient 
visits per capita. Also, it was observed that there was no relation between the number of 
patient visits and the increases in the number of healthcare facilities, healthcare providers, 
nor with the manpower who are employed directly by MOCS. On the other hand, the 
frequent expenditure budgets responded to the changes in the MOH and the Saudi total 
budgets. 
When the healthcare services that were provided in Al Hajj season were investigated, it 




seasonal units, which represents a low cost. On the other hand, most of the increases in 
the number of hospitals occur with reference to permanent units, which represent about 
10% of the increases in total MOH hospitals during the ten years. Moreover, the increases 
in the number of beds represent 8.4% of the total increase in the same period, which was 
due to expansions in the existing hospitals. 
In addition, in spite of the significant increases in the number of physicians, nurses, 
administrators, and allied health personnel, technicians and others, they are still very low 
in comparison to total manpower. Consequently, they represent an insignificant 
percentage of the increase in the salaries and operative and maintenance budgets. 
Furthermore, the patient visits and the inpatient cases account for a negligible fraction of 
the total patient visits and inpatient cases. Therefore, they represent an insignificant 
percentage of the frequent expenditures’ budget. 
It was found that the total vaccinations given to pilgrims did not correlate with the 
increase in the frequent expenditures’ budget in any year. In addition, the investigations 
found that the seasonal PHCs and hospitals which require a short preparation period, 
showed an insignificant correlation with the historical changes in the number of pilgrims 
or with the number of patient visits in the same year or the year prior, as is the case with 
the changes in the amount of manpower in all specialities, except for the sum of the allied 
health personnel, technical personnel, and others who partially matched the number of 
pilgrims in the year prior. Also no correlation was found between the changes in the 
seasonal healthcare facilities with the projects budget, nor the frequent expenditures 
budget. However, it exists between the changes in the salaries and operation and 
maintenance’s budgets with manpower in all specialities. 
Finally, this part showed that the historical demand for healthcare services was not given 
any priority when the MOH financial needs were set, but rather on the Saudi economic 




MOH four budgets. Therefore, this study concludes that the primary reason for the 
continuous increases in the MOH budget over the ten years under investigation was due 
to the weak strategy used to estimate the actual budgets for financing the MOH.   
6.3.2 The Findings of the Second Study 
After reviewing the healthcare systems of more than thirty counties around the world, it 
was found that CEE and FSU counties which had a deterioration in their economies in 
general, and their healthcare system in particular, who implemented a financial strategy 
to meet such parlous situation, have safeguarded the sustainability of their healthcare 
services, especially those which implemented suitable methods to their systems. 
However, those who did not, experienced sharp decreases in public spending on 
healthcare. 
In addition, it was found that Taxation and SHI play a significant role in funding the 
healthcare systems of the WE countries. These two funding mechanisms showed 
stabilised share of the total spending on healthcare in the past two decades of these 
countries. Moreover, USA, Australia, Switzerland, Netherlands, and Germany showed a 
good experience with the regulated PHI, where it was noticed that the regulated PHI 
increased the number of insured people. In addition, MSA had great success in ensuring 
the stability of funding the Singaporean healthcare system, but is still not widely used. 
Furthermore, it was found that many of the WE countries rely on OOP for less than 20% 
in funding their healthcare systems, and more than 35% in many of the FSU and CEE 
countries. It was also found that few countries rely on funding healthcare through 
Donations and Loans. 
When all these six healthcare funding mechanisms (Taxation, SHI, PHI, MSA, OOP, 
Donations and Loans) were investigated in line with the Saudi context and needs, it was 




the PHI being Takaful. Also, the SHI, OOP, donation and loans were excluded as they 
are not suitable for the Saudi healthcare system. 
6.3.3 The Findings of the Third Study 
After the study conducted a survey to investigate people’s willingness to pay to improve 
their level of access according to the proposal of this study, as well as their preferences 
for the funding options that were found suitable for the Saudi system, the data showed 
that 55% of participants are willing to pay to improve their level of access to healthcare, 
where those who are in group obtain were the most willing to pay, then those who are 
eligible to healthcare only in the MOH. Moreover, the study showed that most of those 
who are in receipt of no income in all the three major groups were unwilling to pay. Also, 
it was seen that most non-Saudis of those eligible to healthcare only in the MOH are 
unwilling to pay, whereas the majority of those who are eligible to healthcare only in the 
private sector are willing to pay. 
When participants’ WTP was investigated based on their eligibilities to healthcare, it was 
found that the majority of those who are eligible to healthcare only in the MOH see that 
their current access to healthcare is not enough and they want to increase it. Also, those 
in the second slice (non-Saudis eligible to healthcare only in the private sector) and the 
fourth slice (Saudis eligible to healthcare in the MOH and the private sector) as well as 
those who are employed privately and unemployed with income in the sixth slice (Saudis 
eligible to healthcare in all provisions) see the healthcare services that are provided in the 
MOH as desirable for them. However, it was observed that the majority of those who are 
guaranteed access in the other governmental healthcare facilities in addition to the MOH 
viewed the healthcare services which are provided via their employers as sufficient for 
them (i.e. they were unwilling to pay). This implies that the healthcare services that are 




sector. However, it seems that what is provided by other governmental healthcare 
facilities is perceived as the best. 
It was found that most participants according to their demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics were willing to pay to improve their level of access to healthcare except 
for those aged above 65 and those who have a master’s degree. On the whole, these 
findings indicate that the MOH can raise a fund from a large proportion of the population 
of SA, and those are summarised in the majority of those who are eligible to healthcare 
only in the MOH, the private sector, and those who are eligible to healthcare in the private 
sector in addition to the MOH. In addition, those who are representing the remaining 
groups will reduce the demand on the MOH healthcare services, which will improve the 
access of those who are willing to pay. 
When the Chi square and Fisher exact tests were performed on the study variables, the 
results confirmed the findings of this study, which state that the majority of participants, 
depending on their eligibilities and characteristics, are willing to pay except for those in 
slice five (Saudis eligible to healthcare in the MOH and SDU) and those employed.  
The probit model results showed that those who are eligible to healthcare only in the 
private sector are the most willing to pay (to obtain access to the MOH facilities), then 
those who want to increase their level of access. However, it was shown that those in 
group maintain are the least willing to pay and this was due to the influence of those in 
slice five. This also confirms the findings that were observed in the overall WTP. The 
outcomes of the probit model also found that Saudis are more willing to participate than 
non-Saudis. This came in line with the concept which states that non-Saudis come to SA 
to make savings, and as a result are less likely to spend more money to receive better 
healthcare. This situation does not apply if nationalities were mixed into different 
divisions, as is the case in group increase which contains both categories of nationality. 




WTP. This confirms the fact that those who are entitled to healthcare in the private sector 
see that what is provided in the MOH is necessary and better than what they already have. 
When the study analysed participants’ preference for the three healthcare funding options 
that were found suitable for the Saudi setting, it was found that PHI was the most 
preferred, MSA second, then Taxation. Moreover, it was obvious that the first two 
methods were similar in terms of participants’ preference for them, where both showed 
almost the same mean. In addition, both appeared as the last option by few participants. 
In contrast, Taxation was far from the other two mechanisms due to the high mean and 
the fact that it was chosen as the last option by the majority of the study sample.  
The Chi square and Fisher exact tests’ results showed that four independent variables in 
Taxation (education, income, level of PHI, and slice 4), nine variables in MSA 
(nationality, marital status, education, employment, income, maintain, obtain, slice 2, and 
PHI provider), and thirteen variables in PHI (nationality, marital status, education, 
employment, income, PHI, maintain, obtain, slice 2, slice 4, slice 5, PHI provider, and 
the level of PHI) are significantly different to the overall ranking.  
When the ordered probit regressions were conducted on the study variables, it was found 
that those at a lower level of health prefer Taxation more than those at higher levels and 
are more likely to rank Taxation as the second funding option. Exactly the same was 
found for males, who had the same trend relative to females. Moreover, people with a 
higher level of education are more likely to rank MSA third and PHI first in comparison 
to people with a low level of education. In addition, it was found that participants who 
want to maintain their access have a higher preference to rank PHI first than those who 
want to increase their access, but those who want to obtain access were found to have the 





6.3.4 The Findings of the Fourth Study 
After study data instruments were collected and analysed, it was found that the sample 
characteristics of the second survey were almost the same as the first one’s, this suggests 
that both data sets are representative of the target population. The data analysis showed 
that almost three quarters of the study sample were willing to pay. This percentage was 
significantly high compared to what was observed in the former study. 
In fact, the data collection was conducted a few months after the announcement of the 
royal grant to offset the rise in living costs. In between this announcement and the data 
collection, people’s living conditions had stabilised and almost returned to the same level 
as before the introduction of VAT, and the rise in fuel and electricity prices. Therefore, 
people revealed their actual WTP. This suggests that the system reforms (either negative 
or positive to people’s living conditions) significantly affected people’s willingness to 
pay. Moreover, it was obvious in both studies that what people were presented with is 
crucial and essential, given the current global and domestic economic conditions. 
Moreover, when people were given a chance to reveal their maximum WTP based on 
well-conceived payment scale, people showed their real WTP, as they were able to 
compare what they are willing to pay to what they would receive in return. 
The findings of this study confirmed what was found by the former one, that those with 
experience with PHI, and those who are eligible to healthcare only in the private sector 
see that the healthcare services that are provided by the Saudi MOH are desirable. This 
study’s findings also confirmed that those who are provided with healthcare only in the 
MOH see their current access as insufficient, and view the improvement as necessary. 
However, for those who are eligible to healthcare in the other governmental healthcare 
facilities, the findings of this study surprisingly contradicted what was observed in the 
former one. It was speculated in the former study that the high percentage of 




healthcare in the top quality healthcare facilities in SA. Nevertheless, uncertainty was 
raised as to whether quality was the main reason or not, as this group in the current study 
showed a high WTP. 
After further analyses were conducted, it was found that the other governmental 
healthcare facilities represent only 9% of all healthcare facilities in SA, compared with 
58% of hospitals that are MOH hospitals. In addition, these facilities provide 16% of the 
total beds in all provisions, whereas the hospitals’ beds in the MOH represent 59% of the 
total. Furthermore these facilities provide their healthcare services relying on only 19% 
of the total physicians in SA, where physicians in the MOH represents 48% of the total. 
Moreover, there was a lack of access to other governmental healthcare facilities over the 
cities in SA due to the nature of distribution. This is evident from a data for the number 
of these healthcare facilities, which was obtained from one city in the south of SA called 
Najran where nearly 600 thousand people live. In this city it was found that only three 
other governmental healthcare facilities exist, where one of them is PHC. In contrast, 
about 100 healthcare facilities owned by the MOH provide healthcare services there (68 
PHC, 11 hospitals, one medical centre, one diabetes centre, 7 dialysis centres, 2 dental 
centres, one rehabilitation centre, one central laboratory, 4 Anti-smoking clinics, one 
forensic centre, and two preventive centres at the entrance). This suggests that there is a 
significant difference in terms of accessibility to what the MOH provide relative to the 
other governmental healthcare facilities.  
The study found that the majority of participants (according to all their demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, and almost all groups within the six slices) are willing to 
pay, except non-Saudis who are publicly employed and eligible to healthcare only in the 
MOH. This category confirms the findings of the former study that non-Saudis who are 
publicly employed see that the healthcare services which are provided by the MOH are 




The overall figures for participants’ WTP showed that those in group obtain had a higher 
WTP than those in group increase. This is exactly the same as what occurred in the former 
study, where the unwillingness of non-Saudis who are publicly employed and eligible to 
healthcare only in the MOH brought down the overall WTP of the group increase. 
Moreover, this study’s findings confirmed what was concluded in the former study in 
terms of the willingness of those who have no income, where both studies found that 
people who have no income are less willing to pay than those who receive income in all 
the three major groups. 
The data showed that among those who are willing to contribute, the majority are willing 
to pay between 1% and 2%, then above 5%, and then from zero to 1%. Moreover, it was 
found that the average level of WTP was 2.7%, which suggests that the Saudi MOH could 
minimise the reliance on the government budget by up to 40%. These estimates were 
based on public and private employees’ and pensioners’ average income, who represent 
only a third of the population of SA, where extra funding is possible from the other two 
thirds. 
When the Chi square and Fisher exact tests were employed in the participation part of the 
study, it was found that the WTP of eleven independent variables are significantly 
different to the overall (age, nationality, chronic diseases, slice 1, slice 2, slice 5, slice 6, 
level of PHI, groups increase, maintain, and obtain). In addition, after performing the 
Mann Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests on the consumption part, the results showed that 
gender, education, employed, unemployed, level of PHI, three eligibilities (as one 
variable), six slices (as one variable), group increase, group obtain, slice 1, and slice 2 
significantly influence the amount that participants are willing to pay for the healthcare 
services that are provided by the MOH. 
After the study performed the probit model and the OLS regression, it was found that 




maximum WTP value increases. The same is true for Saudis relative to non-Saudis and 
people having chronic diseases comparing to those without. In addition, it was found that 
males are willing to pay more than females, and the same is true for married people 
relative to singles, and employed comparing to unemployed. Furthermore, it was found 
that a person having PHI is less WTP than one who does not and a person aged between 
26 and 35 is less willing to participate and to pay than one who is aged between 18 and 
25. Moreover, it was found that access to healthcare significantly influences people’s 
WTP decision, and the maximum amount that they are willing to pay. Specifically, it was 
found that those in group obtain are the most willing to pay, then those in group maintain. 
The first finding confirms what was observed in the former study, but the second one 
contradicts it. However, this was perhaps due to the fact that the royal grant that was 
introduced at the beginning of this year stabilised people living conditions. This could 
also be attributed to the fact that people were provided with reference prices to opt out of, 
and for the reason that people with different demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics were involved in this study. Finally, the ordered probit model showed 
broadly the same results as those shown by the OLS, and this indicates that the study 
results were reasonably robust. 
 Recommendations for the MOH 
The primary recommendation of this study is that the Saudi MOH should suspend the 
MOH eligibility of those in slices 4, 5, and 6, and require them to utilise the non-MOH 
healthcare facilities in which they are entitled to free healthcare. This will reduce the 
consumption of the MOH resources and will increase the access of those in slice 1 to the 
MOH healthcare facilities. In so doing, the MOH healthcare services will be improved as 
there would be a focus on a smaller proportion of the population rather than on those in 




This thesis proposes mandating those in slice 1 to pay for their healthcare because, as a 
result of the reforms suggested here, their access to the MOH facilities will improve. It 
also proposes a voluntary subscription for the rest of the slices where those in slices 4, 5, 
and 6 must pay to maintain their access to MOH healthcare facilities. The same is 
proposed for those in slices 2 and 3, who must pay to obtain access to MOH healthcare 
facilities. 
In the event that a major eligible Saudi citizen in slices 4, 5 or 6 loses his/her job, then 
this person and his/her dependents can retrieve their eligibility in the MOH healthcare 
facilities, and the payments will begin once he/she starts earning income from any source. 
According to the financial policy designed in this research, it is proposed to give those 
who only have access to MOH facilities improved access to those facilities by removing 
the access entitlements from those with multiple eligibilities. However, those who will 
no longer have access to MOH facilities would also be given the option of regaining such 
access if they are willing to pay extra for it. Therefore, the main beneficiaries of this 
policy are any Saudi or non-Saudi who is publicly or privately employed or a pensioner, 
self-employed, a dependent or unemployed either with or without financial benefits. 
The MOH has the option to implement either the PHI Takaful or MSA as a funding 
mechanism, as both were found to be suitable to the Saudi context and shown to be 
favoured by the population of SA in surveys . 
If the MOH chooses MSA, this study proposes the following: 
 Each individual’s contributions will be deposited in a personal account belonging 
to him/her to cover their healthcare costs in MOH healthcare facilities. 
 The account will be maintained by the MOH, and in case of death the remaining 




 The proposed number of accounts at this stage is one basic fund for the entire 
system, within which every subscriber would have his/her own account without 
the need for catastrophic accounts or multiple accounts. 
 If an individual’s MSA runs out, then it is proposed that the MOH intervene to 
ensure the coverage of any further costs rather than creating additional protections 
such as catastrophic accounts. 
 The contributions to MSA will be deducted directly as a percentage of individuals’ 
total income. 
 If an individual is employed or a pensioner, this percentage will be deducted from 
the salary plus any other income or benefits received from the government. 
 If not employed or pensioner, the percentage will be deducted from whatever 
income they receive (i.e. self-employment income, social welfare, citizen account, 
human resources development fund, disability benefits, or studying rewards). 
 If an individual is unemployed and not in receipt of any benefits, then the 
percentage will be deducted from the total income of the person on whom they 
are dependent. 
If the choice were to be PHI, the following is proposed: 
 Individuals will purchase health insurance directly from insurance companies, 
which in turn will cover their healthcare costs in the MOH healthcare facilities. 
 The health insurance will be compliant with Sharia rules (Takaful). 
 The PHI can be obtained by any person no matter his/her age or health status. 
 The PHI is priced based on the whole community level of health. 
 If an individual receives a low income (less than $800 where the majority of social 
funds compensate for less than this amount), the MOH pays a part of the 




he/she pays the full cost.  This will be based on a sliding scale depending on the 
person’s income and on the cost of the community rated PHI that will be decided 
between the MOH and the PHI companies. 
 In case an individual receives no income, the MOH pays a part of the premiums 
and the rest by the person on whom they are dependent. 
 Once those receiving no income start earning in the future, then they must pay 
some or all of their own premiums depending on the level of their total income. 
Both WTP scenarios (at time of austerity and prosperity) in this thesis are right and 
representative to their own circumstances. However, it is proposed that the MOH take the 
former WTP scenario (more than half the sample were WTP) into consideration more 
than the second one (three quarters were WTP) at this time. This is because there is still 
more than ten years ahead for the Saudi Vision 2030 which are expected to be full of 
reforms, such as increasing the energy prices again (Alarabiya, 2018a), and the possibility 
to stop the royal grant, which was planned to be only for the year of 2018, where it was 
just renewed in 2019, such that, it might be not in place in the coming years (Alarabiya, 
2018d). Therefore, this thesis proposes that the MOH consider a percentage even lower 
than the average maximum WTP (2.7%). 
The MOH as a supervisory and monitoring organisation of the Saudi healthcare system 
should assist the other governmental healthcare facilities and the private sector on the 
administrative side through facilitating the procedures to attain new licenses to run 
healthcare activities or the expansions to other healthcare specialities. An assistance 
should also be provided on the financial side, such as supporting their position to obtain 
loans from the government or banks. Such an assistance is necessary to enhance the 
investments in these two provisions because the demand on their healthcare services will 
increase, as Saudis with multi-eligibilities will be mandated to utilise healthcare services 




This thesis proposes that the Saudi MOH should take into account the historical demand 
for healthcare services and activities when estimating the future required budgets, also 
the proportion of people who will be eligible to healthcare in the MOH under the proposed 
changes (in other words excluding those who will no longer have eligibility to the MOH 
facilities), and the demographic projections for this cohort as well as the likely revenue 
that would be raised from this cohort. This would allow the MOH to better plan for how 
much funding it would require from the government general budget. 
It is also proposed that the MOH stop building more healthcare facilities, and to reduce 
the percentage of the rented PHCs considering the actual demand within each city and the 
proportion of people eligible to healthcare in the MOH within each city and the changes 
in their ages. 
The same is proposed for the MOH manpower, where the MOH should stop hiring more 
staff, and limit the renewal of contracts for people who work for the MOH for a specified 
duration. This must be implemented based on the demand for healthcare services and the 
proportion of people eligible to healthcare in the MOH within each city, and also based 
on changes to their ages. On these bases, it is also proposed to redistribute the MOH 
existing staff to other cities. 
Finally, this thesis proposes to shift new applicants and those with non-renewed contracts 
to the private sector and the other governmental healthcare facilities, subject to there 
being capacity in the latter sectors for these people. 
 Research Contributions 
This research contributes to the literature by examining the WTP and the preference for 
a set of funding mechanisms of a population that have limited experience with 
participation in funding public services. Moreover, this research examined the WTP and 




budget and are provided almost free of charge. In addition, this research examined the 
WTP and preferences at a time when system reforms have negatively affected people’s 
living conditions. It also examined the WTP at a time when reforms have positively 
affected people’s living conditions. Moreover, this research applied the WTP to a unique 
healthcare system that is free of charge and delivered through different provisions and 
eligibilities that do not exist in other healthcare systems. Furthermore, this study’s 
contribution comes at a critical time for the government, when the general budgets have 
been reporting deficits, and the government is in the process of implementing a reforming 
vision to diversify public resources. Also, this research designed a survey and created 
new data sets at different periods, which might be useful to future researchers and policy 
makers.  
This research has added to the literature in stating that the current financing for the Saudi 
public healthcare system is set mainly based on the oil prices trend, which funds the bulk 
of the country’s general budget, and there is no clear plan that has yet been implemented 
to regulate the financial resources of the public healthcare system. This research also 
examined the option of reducing the burden on the Saudi MOH by removing the 
automatic entitlement to people who are already guaranteed free access from other 
provisions. 
This research has added to the literature that PHI and MSA are much preferred as basic 
funding mechanisms among the population of a developing country and emerging market. 
Also, this research confirmed the findings of the literature that gender, health status, and 
education affect people’s preference, and this research added that the level of access that 
people have to a set of healthcare provisions also affects their preferences. 
This research also confirmed the findings of the previous studies that the level of access 
to healthcare that people have, having PHI, education, employment, marital status, age, 




citizen or a foreigner affects his/her WTP. This research also added that people with 
chronic diseases are more willing to pay than those without.  
The results in this thesis regarding people’s responses to different healthcare funding 
mechanisms, and their willingness to take responsibility for funding their healthcare 
services have generated an important policy contribution to the Saudi government 
especially at this time when the government is trying to find other sources for the general 
budget than oil. This research also provided recommendations to the Saudi MOH for how 
to achieve its aims under the Vision 2030. 
 Research Limitations and Future Recommendations 
This research investigated the WTP and the preference for a set of funding options in six 
provinces of the capital of SA. Further research could include more cities from different 
destinations over the country. Perhaps, future studies could include a larger sample.  
This study suggests that the Saudi MOH should estimate the future required budgets based 
on the historical demand for healthcare services and activities, and on the population 
growth rate while taking into consideration the fact that most of the Saudi population are 
now young (67% on average), and they will require extra healthcare services in the future. 
This study also suggests that the MOH stop building more healthcare facilities, and reduce 
the percentage of the rented PHCs based on the actual demand within each city. In 
addition to this, the MOH should stop hiring more staff, and limit the renewal of contracts 
for people who work for the MOH for a specified duration. Instead, new applicants and 
those with non-renewed contracts should be shifted to the other two healthcare provisions. 
Also, this thesis recommends the redistribution of existing staff to other cities based on 
the actual demand for healthcare services. 
The government authority should implement the proposal of this thesis by reducing the 




other two provisions, and to urge the introduction of either the PHI or MSA as a basic 
funding mechanism, as there are many risky indicators surrounding the healthcare system 
currently. Moreover, the government authorities should prioritise levying low 
percentages initially so as not to garner unnecessary funds, and also to give a chance to 
other public services to benefit from any further tax plans envisaged for the future. 
 Conclusion 
This research has investigated the reasons for the increases in the Saudi MOH budgets in 
the period from 2006 to 2015 at macro and micro levels. By reviewing previous studies 
that investigated the reasons for the increases in healthcare system spending globally, as 
well as the investigation of the MOH, SAMA, MOF, and GAFS books and reports, the 
research found none of the reasons that affected other countries healthcare systems were 
the case in SA, but rather the increases were primarily due to the Saudi economic 
conditions which are mainly based on oil price trends.  
In the second study, the healthcare funding mechanisms existing in other economies were 
explored to find which are in line with the Saudi context and needs. By a thorough review 
of more than 30 healthcare systems, there are six options in operation, of which three 
were found to be suitable for the Saudi public system: PHI, MSA, and Taxation. 
Afterwards, a specifically designed questionnaire was developed to collect data about the 
population of SA’s willingness to contribute to funding their healthcare, and their 
preferences for the healthcare funding options which were aligned to the Saudi setting 
and needs. The results found that the majority of the population prefer PHI and MSA, and 
it was found that gender, health status, education and people’s level of access to 
healthcare affect people’s preferences. Moreover, the results indicated that the majority 
were willing to participate, and implied that having PHI, being a citizen, and the level of 




In the last study, another questionnaire was designed to investigate people’s maximum 
WTP for their healthcare services. The results implied that the majority are willing to pay, 
and it was found that they are willing to pay up to 2.7% on average of their total income. 
Also it was found that gender, being a citizen, chronic disease, employment, having PHI, 
age, marital status, education, and the level of access to healthcare all affect people’s 
WTP. 
In conclusion, this research suggests that involving the population of SA to contribute a 
percentage based on their willingness to pay to fund their healthcare through PHI or MSA, 
and restricting the MOH services only to those who are willing to pay, is a feasible plan 
for the Saudi MOH to start raising funds to ensure the sustainability of the public 
healthcare services.     
It is hoped that this research will inspire future studies in this evolving method of 
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  Saudi GDP Government Ministry of Health 
 IF%1 Saudi GDP I or D% Total B I or D% MH B I or D% MH GDP MH T B 
05 0.7         
06 2.2 353.6  88.7  5.2  1.4 5.9 
07 4.1 373.7 5.7 98.4 11.0 5.9 13.4 1.6 6.0 
08 9.9 444.5 18.9 112.0 13.7 6.2 6.2 1.4 5.6 
09 4.1 364.4 -18.0 107.5 -3.9 6.6 6.5 1.8 6.2 
10 3.8 429.8 17.9 117.4 9.2 7.6 14.1 1.7 6.5 
11 3.7 526.2 22.4 121.5 3.5 8.3 9.5 1.6 6.8 
12 2.9 556.3 5.7 139.4 14.7 9.5 13.9 1.7 6.8 
13 3.5 548.2 -1.4 161.0 15.4 10.6 12.2 1.9 6.6 
14 2.7 536.4 -2.1 162.2 0.74 11.3 6.6 2.1 7.0 
15  447.6 -16.5 158.9 -2.0 11.5 1.2 2.57 7.2 




Abbreviations: 1Inflation. 2Average inflation. 
Table 3 Saudi Population in Millions 
 T P1 % I D SC2 % ID NO3 % ID 
06 23.6   17.2   6.4   
07 24.2 2.3 0.56 17.6 2.5 0.43 6.5 2.0 0.13 
08 24.8 2.3 0.56 18.1 2.4 0.42 6.6 2.1 0.14 
09 25.3 2.2 0.56 18.5 2.3 0.42 6.8 2.0 0.13 
10 27.1 6.9 1.70 18.7 0.89 0.16 8.4 23.4 1.50 
11 28.3 4.5 1.20 19.4 3.7 0.69 8.9 6.4 0.54 
12 29.1 2.8 0.81 19.8 2.2 0.43 9.3 4.2 0.38 
13 29.9 2.7 0.79 20.2 2.1 0.42 9.7 3.9 0.37 
14 30.7 2.5 0.77 20.7 2.1 0.43 10.0 3.5 0.34 
15 31.5 2.4 0.75 21.1 2.0 0.42 10.3 3.2 0.32 
 Av 3.2 0.87 Av 2.2 0.43 Av 5.5 0.44 
 
Sources: 2015 Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015.  
Abbreviations: 1Total Population. 2Saudi Citizens. 3Non-Saudis. 
                                               
48 This table has the same sources and abbreviations as in Table 1 in the Text. 
Y Number of Pages Number of Tables Investigated 
06 337 63 
07 336 63 
08 340 62 
09 340 51 
10 356 52 
11 342 54 
12 248 52 
13 267 54 
14 248 62 





Table 4 Demand on Healthcare, Foreign and Chronic Diseases’ Visits 
 P V1 %2 I D3 F V4 % I D C V5 % I D 
06 61.8   5.3      
07 58.8 -4.8 -2.9 4.9 -7.3 -0.39    
08 65.3 10.9 6.4 5.3 8.9 0.43 5.2   
09 65.9 1.0 0.65 5.1 -3.9 -0.21 4.9 -5.3 -0.28 
10 66.3 0.62 0.41 5.4 5.9 0.30 4.8 -2.8 -0.14 
11 65.9 -0.61 -0.40 5.8 6.7 0.36 4.7 -2.1 -0.10 
12 65.2 -1.1 -0.72 6.2 7.8 0.45 4.9 3.7 0.17 
13 64.6 -0.95 -0.62 6.3 0.71 0.04 4.6 -5.5 -0.27 
14 63.3 -2.0 -1.2 6.2 -0.42 -0.026 4.6 -0.21 -0.009 
15 66.0 4.35 2.7 6.7 7.9 0.50 4.5 -1.3 -0.06 
 Av 0.83 0.47 Av 2.9 0.16 Av -1.9 -0.09 
 DIB6 % I D BD7 % I D NV8 % I D 
06 403.8   121.0   328.0   
07 399.6 -1.0 -4.1 120.0 -0.83 -1.0 353.3 7.7 25.3 
08 413.9 3.5 14.2 126.1 5.0 6.1 338.3 -4.2 -14.9 
09 405.2 -2.1 -8.6 133.8 6.1 7.7 329.3 -2.6 -8.9 
10 426.6 5.2 21.3 128.3 -4.1 -5.5 338.3 2.7 8.96 
11 434.3 1.8 7.6 127.7 -0.47 -0.65 362.9 7.2 24.6 
12 453.0 4.3 18.7 154.5 20.9 26.7 411.1 13.2 48.1 
13 466.0 2.8 13.0 152.1 -1.5 -2.3 390.5 -5.0 -20.5 
14 477.2 2.4 11.2 178.8 17.5 26.6 435.0 11.4 44.5 
15 660.2 38.3 183.0 233.8 30.7 54.9 579.5 33.2 144.4 
 Av 6.1 28.4 Av 8.1 12.5 Av 7.0 27.9 
 HYP9 % I D HR10 % I D RH11 % I D 
06 301.4   145.9   127.1   
07 300.1 -0.43 -1.2 157.6 8.0 11.6 137.8 8.4 10.7 
08 309.5 3.1 9.3 160.7 1.9 3.11 132.9 -3.5 -4.8 
09 312.2 0.87 2.7 163.7 1.8 3.04 132.7 -0.15 -0.26 
10 312.3 0.03 105 167.4 2.2 3.70 140.3 5.7 7.61 
11 328.8 5.2 16.4 169.4 1.1 2.0 147.3 4.9 7.02 
12 361.9 10.0 33.1 173.7 2.5 4.23 149.8 1.7 2.52 
13 361.1 -0.22 -0.77 161.3 -7.1 -12.3 144.8 -3.3 -5.0 
14 389.2 7.7 28.0 168.9 4.7 7.6 147.5 1.8 2.72 
15 525.6 35.0 136.3 201.2 19.1 32.2 203.9 38.2 56.3 
 Av 6.8 24.9 Av 3.8 6.13 Av 5.9 8.53 
 
Sources: Ministry of Health MOH 2006-2015 
Abbreviations: 1Total Patient Visits in Millions. 2Change as a percentage. 3Change as 
Figure 4Foriegner Patient Visits in Millions. 5Patient Visits to PHCs’ Chronic Clinics in 
Millions. 6Diabetes mellitus Visits in Thousands. 7Blood diseases Visits in Thousands. 
8Nervous system diseases Visits in Thousands. 9Hypertension diseases Visits in 
Thousands. 10Coronary heart diseases Visits in Thousands. 11Rheum & other heart diseases 












Table 5 Specialised Hospitals and Number of Physicians 
 CR1 % I D ON2 % I D MC3 % I D PH4 % I F DF 
06 3   3   5   21.2    
07 4 33.3 1 3 0.0 0 5 0.0 0 22.6 10.2 2.1 -.79 
08 4 0.0 0 3 0.0 0 5 0.0 0 24.8 11.0 2.4 -.34 
09 6 50.0 2 4 33.3 1 6 25.0 1 25.8 9.1 2.2 -1.2 
10 6 0.0 0 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 31.5 23.8 6.1 -.47 
11 9 50.0 3 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 33.9 8.5 2.7 -.22 
12 9 0.0 0 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 35.8 6.2 2.1 -.26 
13 9 0.0 0 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 37.8 6.5 2.3 -.28 
14 9 0.0 0 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 38.4 3.7 1.4 -.84 
15 9 0.0 0 4 0.0 0 6 0.0 0 41.2 8.1 3.1 -.34 
 Av 12.9 0.6 Av 0.03 0.11 Av 2.5 0.11 Av 9.7 2.7 (.53) 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015)  
Abbreviations: 1Cardiology Centres. 2Oncology Centres. 3Medical Cities. 4Total number of 
physicians in thousands considering the offsetting. 
 
Table 6 The Ministers of the Saudi Ministry of 
Health in the Period from 2006 to 2015 
 Minister Name Designating Date 
06 Hamad Al Mana  
07 Hamad Al Mana  
08 Hamad Al Mana  
09 
 
Hamad Al Mana  
Abdulla Al Rabeaa 14/02/2009 
10 Abdulla Al Rabeaa  
11 Abdulla Al Rabeaa  
12 Abdulla Al Rabeaa  
13 Abdulla Al Rabeaa  
14 
 
Abdulla Al Rabeaa  
Adel Fakeh (Temporary) 21/04/2014 
Mohamad Al Hizae 08/12/2014 
15 
 
Ahmad Al Khateeb 29/01/2015 
Mohamad AlShik (Temporary) 11/04/2015 






Figure 1 GCC, Middle East, Arabic, Asian, and OPEC Countries’ Spending on Health in the Last Ten Years on Average49 
 
Sources: World Health Organisation (WHO) 
                                               
49 This Figure shows the performance of the GCC, Middle East, Arabic, Asian, and OPEC countries that spent more than the Saudi government on healthcare in any of the three 
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Figure 2 Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar Spending on Health in the Last Ten Years 
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Figure 3 GCC, Middle East, Arabic, and OPEC Countries’ Population Ages in the Last Ten Years on Average 
 



















Figure 4 Asian Countries’ Population Ages in the Last Ten Years on Average 
 

















Table 7 Average Annual Increases in Number of Hospitals50 
 G H1 I D O&P2 I D E&E3 I D C&F4 I D P&O5 I D 
06 163  20  4  4  29  
07 168 6 20 0 4 0 4 0 29 0 
08 174 6 20 0 4 0 4 0 29 0 
09 185 17 21 1 4 0 5 1 29 0 
10 188 4 21 0 4 0 6 1 30 1 
11 192 6 21 0 4 0 6 0 28 0 
12 201 9 21 0 4 0 5 0 28 0 
13 211 10 22 1 4 0 4 0 27 1 
14 214 4 21 0 4 0 4 0 27 0 
15 218 4 22 1 4 0 3 0 27 0 
 Av 7.33 Av 0.33 Av 0 Av 0.22 Av 0.22 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1General hospitals. 2OBS and Gyn & paediatric. 3Eye & ENT. 4Chest & Fever. 
5Psychiatric, Convalescence, Leprosy & Rehabilitation. 
 
 
Table 8 Average Annual Increase in Number of Hospitals’ beds in Thousands of Units 
 G1 I D Og2 I D In3 I D Sr4 I D Or5 I D U6 I D F7 I D P8 I D 
06 4.6  4.8  4.6  4.3  1.1  .45  .08  3  
07 4.1 .63 4.8 0.0 4.7 .01 4.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 .45 0.0 .08 0.0 3 0.0 
08 4.4 .30 4.8 0.0 4.7 0.0 4.3 0.0 1.1 0.0 .45 0.0 .08 0.0 3 0.0 
09 5.3 1.9 3.9 .13 5.0 .86 3.9 .27 1.5 .37 .48 .13 .08 .01 3.3 .40 
10 5.4 1.1 4.2 .27 4.6 .05 3.6 .04 1.5 .06 .50 .04 .11 .04 3.2 .03 
11 5.0 .62 4.1 .06 4.6 .34 3.4 .18 1.4 .04 .48 .03 .13 .04 3.4 .21 
12 6.3 1.4 4.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 3.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 .48 0.0 .13 0.0 3.4 0.0 
13 8.7 2.7 4.3 .20 5.2 .68 4.0 .54 1.4 .04 .45 .01 .12 0.0 3.3 .10 
14 8.9 .94 4.4 .09 5.4 .27 4.3 .38 1.4 .04 .44 .01 .13 .01 3.4 .13 
15 7.9 .34 4.6 .23 6.2 .86 4.8 .57 1.5 .06 .46 .02 .13 0.0 3.4 .03 
 Av 1.1 Av .11 Av .34 Av .22 Av .07 Av .03 Av .01 3 .10 
 P9 I D Ic10 I D E11 I D O12 I D C13 I D S14 I D B15 I D Iso16 I D 
06 4.5  1.5  .43  .80  .60  .04  .26  393  
07 4.5 .02 1.5 0.0 .43 0.0 .79 0.0 .61 .01 .04 0.0 .26 0.0 399 6.0 
08 4.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 .43 0.0 .79 0.0 .61 0.0 .04 0.0 .26 0.0 399 0.0 
09 2.9 .01 3.5 2.0 .57 .18 .75 .06 .58 .13 .06 .03 .28 .07 741 501 
10 4.2 1.2 3.3 .12 .61 .06 .80 .06 .78 .20 .12 .07 .29 .02 752 98 
11 4.8 .69 3.1 .12 .59 .03 .77 .03 .80 .06 .14 .03 .28 .04 1,003 265 
12 4.8 0.0 3.1 0.0 .59 0.0 .77 0.0 .80 0.0 .14 0.0 .28 0.0 1,003 0.0 
13 4.8 .28 3.2 .18 .56 .02 .76 .02 .45 .01 .11 .01 .29 .02 1,049 147 
14 5.1 .28 3.1 .05 .57 .02 .76 .01 .45 .07 .14 .03 .28 0.0 1,158 120 
15 4.8 .10 3.6 .47 .55 .01 .77 .01 .49 .06 .14 .01 .28 0.0 1,199 73 
 Av .29 Av .33 Av .03 Av .02 Av .06 Av .02 Av .02 Av 134 
 
Sources: (MOH-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1General Beds. 2OBS and Gyn. 3Internal medicine. 4Surgery. 5Orthopedics. 6Urology. 7Faciodental. 
8Psychiatry & Neurology. 9Paediatrics. 10Intensive care units. 11ENT. 12Ophthalmology. 13Chest & Fever. 14Skin. 
15Burns and Plastics. 16Isolation. 
 
                                               





Table 9 The Average Annual Increases or Decreases in Medical Centres 
 Dental I D Rehab I D Lab1 I D Lab2 I D Smok3 I D Forensic I D 
06 19  11  3  22  42  18  
07 19 0 12 1 3 0 22 0 43 2 18 0 
08 20 1 13 1 8 5 25 3 31 3 18 0 
09 20 0 14 1 9 1 25 0 36 9 18 0 
10 30 10 15 2 9 0 25 0 38 3 19 1 
11 31 2 15 1 10 1 23 1 55 19 19 0 
12 32 1 11 1 11 1 23 0 56 3 19 0 
13 32 0 19 8 10 0 23 0 62 17 20 1 
14 35 3 18 0 10 0 25 3 53 12 20 0 
15 35 0 16 1 10 0 22 0 53 0 20 0 
 Av 1.9 Av 1.8 Av 0.9 Av 0.78 Av 7.56 Av 0.22 
 Card4 I D Onc5 I D Dia6 I D Dyl7 I D T.B I D Others I D 
06 3  3  0  116  2  3  
07 4 1 3 0 0 0 116 0 2 0 4 1 
08 4 0 3 0 0 0 115 0 3 1 3 0 
09 6 2 4 1 0 0 117 2 4 1 1 0 
10 6 0 4 0 0 0 119 2 2 0 0 0 
11 9 3 4 0 0 0 120 1 2 0 0 0 
12 9 0 4 0 20 0 143 23 0 0 0 0 
13 9 0 4 0 20 2 144 4 0 0 0 0 
14 9 0 4 0 21 1 146 7 0 0 0 0 
15 9 0 4 0 21 0 146 0 0 0 0 0 
 Av 0.6 Av 0.11 Av 0.33 Av 4.33 Av 0.22 Av 0.11 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Central laboratories. 2Laboratories at entry points. 3Anti-smoking. 4Cardiology centres. 5Oncology 
centres. 6Diabetes centres. 7Dialysis centres. 
 
Table 10 Number of Technicians, Administrators and Workers in Thousands 
 Total1 I % I F2 D F3 T &A4 I % I F D F W5 I % I F D F 
06 60    17.3    42.6    
07 60 12.4 7.4 -7.4 18.9 22.0 3.8 -2.1 41 8.5 3.6 -5.2 
08 63.8 20.8 12.5 -8.6 26.3 44.2 8.3 -1 37.5 10.0 4.1 -7.5 
09 77.3 26.5 16.9 -2.4 31.8 25.8 6.7 -0.24 45.5 27.1 10.1 -2.1 
10 89 32.8 25.3 -13.5 40.8 32.2 10.2 -1.1 48.1 33.2 15.1 -12.4 
11 99.1 21.8 19.4 -9.3 44.2 10.6 4.3 -0.98 54.8 31.3 15.1 -8.4 
12 115.2 22.1 21.9 -5.8 61.7 39.6 17.5 0.0 53.5 8.1 4.4 -5.8 
 Av 22.7 17.2 -7.8 Av 29.0 8.5 -0.93 Av 19.7 8.7 -6.9 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total technicians, administrators and workers. 2Increases as figures. 3Decreases as figures. 









Table 11 Number of Physicians Who Work in Hospitals in All Specialities and Levels 
 T.S1 I D R2 I D C3 I D GE.S4 I D R I D C I D 
09 8,370  6,994  2,722  1,960  51  3  
10 11,470 3,100 7,976 982 3,288 566 2,790 830 0.0 -51 1 -2 
11 13,014 1,544 8,670 694 3,491 203 2,221 -569 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1 
12 13,506 492 8,812 142 3,948 457 3,188 967 2 2 11 11 
13 14,195 689 9,264 452 4,278 330 2,173 -1,015 13 11 0.0 -11 
14 14,141 -54 9,281 17 4,439 161 3,079 906 162 149 23 23 
15 15,312 1,171 9,490 209 4,591 152 3,237 158 46 -116 9 -14 
 Av 1,157 Av 416 Av 312 Av 213 Av -1 Av 1 
 IN.S5 I D R I D C I D SU.S6 I D R I D C I D 
09 931  603  241  344  681  267  
10 938 7 637 34 252 11 1,407 1,063 725 44 311 44 
11 1,206 268 707 70 255 3 1,650 243 827 102 302 -9 
12 1,111 -95 687 -20 281 26 1,340 -310 789 -38 337 35 
13 1,235 124 642 -45 268 -13 1,505 165 781 -8 354 17 
14 1,189 -46 782 140 339 71 1,272 -233 816 35 325 -29 
15 1,341 152 791 9 335 -4 1,347 75 815 -1 330 5 
 Av 68 Av 31 Av 16 Av 167 Av 22 Av 11 
 OR.S7 I D R I D C I D UR.S8 I D R I D C I D 
09 217  338  106  91  190  54  
10 221 4 375 37 118 12 75 -16 203 13 67 13 
11 270 49 426 51 131 13 95 20 241 38 83 16 
12 257 -13 433 7 127 -4 84 -11 232 -9 83 0.0 
13 291 34 449 16 158 31 94 10 252 20 98 15 
14 265 -26 459 10 164 6 81 -13 225 -27 97 -1 
15 299 34 453 -6 161 -3 80 -1 228 3 103 6 
 Av 14 Av 19 Av 9 Av -2 Av 6 Av 8 
 CA.S9 I D R I D C I D NE.S10 I D R I D C I D 
09 20  33  30  48  45  45  
10 3 -17 22 -11 31 1 52 4 71 26 48 3 
11 10 7 47 25 55 24 84 32 70 -1 60 12 
12 5 -5 44 -3 61 6 67 -17 83 13 75 15 
13 18 13 54 10 66 5 83 16 104 21 92 17 
14 5 -13 43 -11 91 25 78 -5 90 -14 101 9 
15 6 1 43 0.0 98 7 86 8 91 1 106 5 
 Av -2 Av 2 Av 11 Av 6 Av 8 Av 10 
 PL.S11 I D R I D C I D EN.S12 I D R I D C I D 
09 37  63  27  87  230  75  
10 31 -6 61 -2 32 5 96 9 246 16 87 12 
11 34 3 73 12 40 8 115 19 278 32 89 2 
12 32 -2 60 -13 48 8 98 -17 272 -6 109 20 
13 38 6 71 11 38 -10 122 24 307 35 118 9 
14 40 2 63 -8 50 12 107 -15 291 -16 111 -7 
15 45 5 64 1 50 0.0 121 14 291 0.0 113 2 
 Av 1 Av 0.2 Av 4 Av 6 Av 10 Av 6 
 OP.S13 I D R I D C I D OB.S14 I D R I D C I D 
09 132  240  185  617  671  190  
10 142 10 261 21 150 -35 628 11 741 70 228 38 
11 170 28 278 17 155 5 829 201 877 136 271 43 
12 217 47 274 -4 179 24 705 -124 824 -53 266 -5 
13 251 34 293 19 183 4 887 182 864 40 303 37 
14 149 -102 288 -5 190 7 805 -82 807 -57 286 -17 
15 160 11 284 -4 183 -7 905 100 823 16 284 -2 






Cont’d Table 11 
 CA.S15 I D R I D C I D CH.S16 I D R I D C I D 
09 39  143  71  46  131  41  
10 75 36 161 18 117 46 40 -6 129 -2 33 -8 
11 173 98 191 30 130 13 52 12 149 20 45 12 
12 123 -50 212 21 168 38 38 -14 141 -8 38 -7 
13 217 94 252 40 149 -19 60 22 156 15 44 6 
14 149 -68 217 -35 150 1 42 -18 148 -8 47 3 
15 167 18 211 -6 166 16 43 1 141 -7 46 -1 
 Av 21 Av 11 Av 16 Av -0.5 Av 2 Av 0.8 
 SK.S17 I D R I D C I D NL.S18 I D R I D C I D 
09 29  179  53  40  57  34  
10 41 12 184 5 55 2 22 -18 36 -21 43 9 
11 50 9 215 31 69 14 65 43 114 78 51 8 
12 40 -10 202 -13 71 2 44 -21 37 -77 47 -4 
13 55 15 218 16 80 9 25 -19 40 3 71 24 
14 35 -20 204 -14 86 6 50 25 40 0.0 47 -24 
15 43 8 201 -3 91 5 47 -3 40 0.0 53 6 
 Av 2 Av 4 Av 6 Av 1 Av -3 Av 3 
 PH.S19 I D R I D C I D RD.S20 I D R I D C I D 
09 10  79  13  67  259  89  
10 7 -3 94 15 24 11 75 8 273 14 117 28 
11 20 13 77 -17 28 4 116 41 322 49 150 33 
12 10 -10 67 -10 33 5 102 -14 362 40 179 29 
13 27 17 76 9 23 -10 126 24 415 53 182 3 
14 6 -21 53 -23 37 14 122 -4 427 12 183 1 
15 7 1 52 -1 42 5 128 6 461 34 192 9 
 Av -0.5 Av -4.5 Av 5 Av 10 Av 34 Av 17 
 LB.S21 I D R I D C I D AN.S22 I D R I D C I D 
09 22  346  74  187  505  104  
10 20 -2 380 34 121 47 194 7 553 48 169 65 
11 36 16 433 53 118 -3 266 72 634 81 191 22 
12 26 -10 489 56 138 20 232 -34 617 -17 234 43 
13 39 13 508 19 153 15 248 16 655 38 225 -9 
14 21 -18 516 8 157 4 242 -6 655 0.0 237 12 
15 26 5 534 18 170 13 244 2 670 15 238 1 
 Av 0.7 Av 31 Av 16 Av 10 Av 28 Av 22 
 PY.S23 I D R I D C I D PD.S24 I D R I D C I D 
09 14  59  17  774  826  333  
10 56 42 94 35 45 28 838 64 819 -7 338 5 
11 39 -17 97 3 48 3 1,088 250 866 47 396 58 
12 51 12 106 9 40 -8 1,098 10 982 116 386 -10 
13 60 9 89 -17 32 -8 1,295 197 1,043 61 540 154 
14 73 13 83 -6 41 9 1,266 -29 1,020 -23 549 9 
15 79 6 96 13 40 -1 1,388 122 1,026 6 592 43 
 Av 11 Av 6 Av 4 Av 102 Av 33 Av 43 
 PT.S25 I D R I D C I D FR.S26 I D R I D C I D 
09 150  184  50  0.0  65  5  
10 170 20 232 48 66 16 0.0 0.0 67 2 8 3 
11 176 6 197 -35 83 17 0.0 0.0 67 0.0 8 0.0 
12 216 40 273 76 86 3 0.0 0.0 67 0.0 8 0.0 
13 228 12 295 22 92 6 0.0 0.0 68 1 10 2 
14 208 -20 275 -20 103 11 0.0 0.0 74 6 11 1 
15 237 29 270 -5 111 8 0.0 0.0 75 1 11 0.0 






Cont’d Table 11 
 FM.S27 I D R I D C I D EG.S28 I D R I D C I D 
09 46  48  22  326  113  20  
10 58 12 56 8 21 -1 1,234 908 143 30 39 19 
11 584 526 77 21 32 11 1,557 323 183 40 42 3 
12 645 61 85 8 36 4 1,651 94 188 5 75 33 
13 836 191 145 60 33 -3 1,812 161 190 2 86 11 
14 758 -78 135 -10 62 29 1,697 -115 191 1 90 4 
15 795 37 138 3 66 4 1,839 142 205 14 94 4 
 Av 125 Av 15 Av 7 Av 252 Av 15 Av 12 
 IU.S29 I D R I D C I D NR.S30 I D R I D C I D 
09 79  71  38  80  79  28  
10 315 236 265 194 102 64 197 117 161 82 63 35 
11 403 88 288 23 107 5 271 74 172 11 74 11 
12 484 81 188 -100 139 32 269 -2 189 17 85 11 
13 633 149 194 6 102 -37 287 18 212 23 83 -2 
14 661 28 186 -8 110 8 267 -20 199 -13 90 7 
15 805 144 196 10 114 4 279 12 199 0.0 83 -7 
 Av 121 Av 21 Av 13 Av 33 Av 20 Av 9 
 PC.S31 I D R I D C I D BO.S32 I D R I D C I D 
09 7  72  40  9  45  7  
10 29 22 77 5 40 0.0 7 -2 46 1 44 37 
11 37 8 91 14 49 9 10 3 56 10 43 -1 
12 35 -2 81 -10 51 2 6 -4 8 -48 38 -5 
13 49 14 83 2 60 9 31 25 28 20 44 6 
14 51 2 77 -6 73 13 13 -18 2 -26 44 0.0 
15 59 8 90 13 73 0.0 13 0.0 2 0.0 48 4 
 Av 9 Av 3 Av 6 Av 0.7 Av -7 Av 7 
 GT.S33 I D R I D C I D ED.S34 I D R I D C I D 
09 4  28  23  6  21  18  
10 6 2 30 2 31 8 21 15 31 10 42 24 
11 10 4 35 5 42 11 30 9 38 7 53 11 
12 5 -5 32 -3 40 -2 44 14 45 7 71 18 
13 24 19 66 34 62 22 62 18 53 8 55 -16 
14 10 -14 32 -34 44 -18 65 3 46 -7 59 4 
15 13 3 46 14 44 0.0 72 7 52 6 61 2 
 Av 2 Av 3 Av 4 Av 11 Av 5 Av 7 
 OG.S35 I D R I D C I D VL.S36 I D R I D C I D 
09 0.0  9  8  0.0  5  6  
10 14 14 35 26 45 37 10 10 40 35 17 11 
11 16 2 56 21 55 10 11 1 35 -5 21 4 
12 23 7 72 16 84 29 9 -2 34 -1 25 4 
13 15 -8 54 -18 66 -18 13 4 39 5 32 7 
14 13 -2 76 22 81 15 13 0.0 47 8 35 3 
15 17 4 76 0.0 84 3 14 1 48 1 32 -3 








Cont’d Table 11 
 DY.S37 I D R I D C I D OE.S38 I D R I D C I D 
09 845  294  79  1,106  231  326  
10 930 85 380 86 142 63 728 -378 348 117 241 -85 
11 1,032 102 416 36 147 5 288 -440 37 -311 68 -173 
12 982 -50 414 -2 156 9 269 -19 221 184 143 75 
13 1,096 114 425 11 184 28 260 -9 130 -91 192 49 
14 1,099 3 458 33 205 21 210 -50 94 -36 121 -71 
15 1,153 54 478 20 221 16 217 7 254 160 147 26 
 Av 51 Av 31 Av 24 1,106 -148 Av 4 Av -30 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total residents. 2Total registrars. 3Total consultants. 4General. 5Internal medicine. 6Surgery. 
7Orthopedics. 8Urology. 9Cardiothoracic. 10Neurosurgery. 11Plastic surgery. 12E.N.T. 13Ophthalmology. 
14OBS/GYN. 15Cardiology. 16Chest diseases. 17Skin & Venereology. 18Neurology. 19P.H. and Tropical M. 
20Radiology. 21Laboratory. 22Anesthesia. 23Physical medicine. 24Pediatrics. 25Psychiatric. 26Forensic. 27Family 
medicine. 28Emergency. 29Intensive care units. 30Nephrology. 31Plastic surgery. 32Blood diseases. 
33Gastroenterology. 34Endocrinology. 35Oncology. 36Vascular surgery. 37Dentistry. 38Other. 
 
































06 33,288   2,738   995   2,741   10,950   
07 29,741 -10.6 -3,546 2,873 4.9 135 979 -1.7 -16 2,930 6.9 188 10,961 0.11 11 
08 30,730 3.3 989 2,726 -5.1 -147 880 -10.0 -98 2,983 1.8 52 11,055 0.85 93 
09 32,055 4.3 1,324 2,666 -2.2 -60 866 -1.5 -13 3,100 3.9 116 10,892 -1.47 -162 
10 33,026 3.0 971 2,725 2.2 59 771 -11.0 -95 3,084 -0.5 -15 10,492 -3.7 -400 
11 33,025 0.0 -1.3 2,646 -2.9 -78 731 -5.2 -40 3,168 2.7 84 10,194 -2.8 -298 
12 32,313 -2.1 -712 2,480 -6.3 -166 724 -0.86 -6 3,082 -2.7 -86 10,046 -1.4 -147 
13 32,974 2.0 661 2,352 -5.1 -127 716 -1.2 -8 3,137 1.8 55 9,354 -6.9 -692 
14 31,740 -3.7 -1,234 2,204 -6.3 -148 699 -2.2 -16 3,100 -1.2 -37 8,872 -5.1 -481 
15 30,719 -3.2 -1,020 2,010 -8.7 -193 674 -3.5 -24 3,221 3.9 121 8,409 -5.2 -463 
 Av -0.78 -285 Av -3.2 -80 Av -4.1 -35 Av 1.8 53 Av -2.8 -282 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total number of visits to general clinics. 2Total number of visits to dental clinics. 3Total number of visits to 













Table 13 Number of Hospitals’ Visits by Type of Disease in Thousands 
 Total1 I D DIB2 I D BD3 I D NV4 I D Eye5 I D ENT6 I D 
06 11,134  403.8  121  328.0  907.3  859.3  
07 11,390 255.9 399.6 -4.1 120 -1.0 353.3 25.3 978.4 71.1 842.8 -16.4 
08 11,657 267.3 413.9 14.2 126.1 6.1 338.3 -14.9 1,086 107.9 835.5 -7.3 
09 11,393 -264 405.2 -8.6 133.8 7.7 329.3 -8.9 1,103 16.7 829.1 -6.3 
10 11,427 33.4 426.6 21.3 128.3 -5.5 338.3 8.96 1,135 32.5 727.8 -101.2 
11 11,459 32.7 434.3 7.6 127.7 -0.65 362.9 24.6 1,055 -79.8 769.6 41.7 
12 11,672 212.5 453 18.7 154.5 26.7 411.1 48.1 1,267 211.5 803.2 33.6 
13 11,435 -237 466 13.0 152.1 -2.3 390.5 -20.5 1,233 -33.7 750.6 -52.6 
14 12,075 639.7 477.2 11.2 178.8 26.6 435.0 44.5 1,435 201.8 794.6 44.0 
15 16,474 4,399 660.2 183 233.8 54.9 579.5 144.4 1,873 437.7 1,081 286.9 
 Av 593.3 Av 28.4 Av 12.5 Av 27.9 Av 107.3 Av 24.6 
 HYP7 I D HR8 I D RH9 I D CH10 I D DG11 I D Skin12 I D 
06 301.4  145.9  127.1  709.7  624.3  696.1  
07 300.1 -1.2 157.6 11.6 137.8 10.7 691.7 -18.0 612.4 -11.8 707.5 11.4 
08 309.5 9.3 160.7 3.11 132.9 -4.8 649.6 -42.0 588.5 -23.9 709.0 1.52 
09 312.2 2.7 163.7 3.04 132.7 -0.26 620.7 -28.8 593.7 5.18 699.7 -9.33 
10 312.3 105 167.4 3.70 140.3 7.61 543.6 -77.1 598.2 4.51 684.2 -15.5 
11 328.8 16.4 169.4 2.0 147.3 7.02 520.9 -22.6 581.8 -16.4 688.5 4.28 
12 361.9 33.1 173.7 4.23 149.8 2.52 471.2 -49.7 537.8 -43.9 705.1 16.6 
13 361.1 -0.77 161.3 -12.3 144.8 -5.0 428.4 -42.7 524.7 -13.0 679.6 -25.4 
14 389.2 28.0 168.9 7.6 147.5 2.72 456.2 27.8 542.0 17.3 704.1 24.4 
15 525.6 136.3 201.2 32.2 203.9 56.3 619.3 163.0 746.8 204.7 968.3 264.2 
 Av 24.9 Av 6.13 Av 8.53 Av -10.0 Av 13.6 Av 30.2 
 MUS13 I D OB14 I D OL15 I D UN16 I D IFT17 I D G18-51 I D 
06 983  1,157  842.8  448.8  216.6  2,261  
07 1,029 46.8 1,195 38.1 797.4 -45.4 465.4 16.6 132.4 -84.2 2,467 206.7 
08 1,038 8.21 1,198 3.09 830.5 33.1 480.0 14.6 99.7 -32.6 2,624 156.9 
09 1,022 -15.4 1,190 -7.63 808.3 -22.1 478.7 -1.34 91.4 -8.3 2,477 -147.2 
10 1,055 32.6 1,217 26.5 789.6 -18.7 487.2 8.52 78.9 -12.4 2,595 117.4 
11 1,089 34.0 1,223 6.28 725.9 -63.7 487.1 -0.09 130.7 51.7 2,615 20.2 
12 1,093 4.07 1,314 90.8 720.3 -5.63 487.8 0.71 76.3 -54.3 2,490 -124.7 
13 1,066 -27.0 1,249 -65.5 672.9 -47.4 477.3 -10.5 68.2 -8.08 2,525 35.1 
14 1,095 28.6 1,329 80.6 719.2 46.3 489.9 12.6 76.1 7.8 2,635 109.7 
15 1,512 417.1 1,805 476.1 974.3 255.0 677.2 187.3 101.1 25.0 3,710 1,075 
 Av 58.7 Av 72.04 Av 14.6 Av 25.3 Av -12.8 Av 161 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total patient visits to hospitals. 2Diabetes mellitus. 3Blood diseases. 4Nervous system diseases. 5Eye 
diseases. 6ENT diseases. 7Hypertension diseases. 8Coronary heart diseases. 9Rheum & other heart diseases. 10Chest 
diseases. 11Diseases of digestive system. 12Skin and subcutaneous tissue diseases. 13Musculo-skeletal diseases. 14OBS. 





                                               
51 General patient visits include the visits to primary care clinics, emergency, ICU, paediatric, internal 




Table 14 Number of Cases Reported Communicable Disease 
 Total1 I D Co2 I D Wp3 I D Te4 I D Mr5 I D Vs6 I D Ml7 I D 
06 74,693  10  34  18  1,278  31  807  
07 82,907 8,214 4 -6 68 34 21 3 2,864 1586 41 10 4,648 3,841 
08 88,334 5,427 7 3 30 -38 13 -8 1,491 -1373 32 -9 158 -4,490 
09 63,271 -25,063 4 -3 26 -4 10 -3 2,333 842 17 -15 81 -77 
10 50,024 -13,247 6 2 0.0 -26 4 -6 1,941 -392 8 -9 334 253 
11 47,154 -2,870 1 -5 11 11 14 10 2,788 847 7 -1 262 -72 
12 44,587 -2,567 5 4 6 -5 14 0.0 3,406 618 8 1 294 32 
13 38,850 -5,737 3 -2 0.0 -6 10 -4 2,513 -893 13 5 252 -42 
14 31,495 -7,355 0.0 -3 1 1 2 -8 2,305 -208 11 -2 154 -98 
15 29,427 -2,068 0.0 0.0 11 10 1 -1 2,620 315 4 -7 219 65 
 Av -5,029 Av -1.1 Av -2.6 Av -1.9 Av 149.1 Av -3 Av -65.3 
 CH8 I D Rb9 I D Ms10 I D M11 I D Mn12 I D Mi13 I D OM14 I D 
06 43,070  23  79  22  28  6  361  
07 47,691 4,621 32 9 32 -47 13 -9 29 1 3 -3 283 -78 
08 60,007 12,316 15 -17 31 -1 7 -6 25 -4 4 1 270 -13 
09 31,402 -28,605 13 -2 138 107 6 -1 17 -8 0.0 -4 317 47 
10 18,118 -13,284 35 22 45 -93 3 -3 18 1 0.0 0.0 228 -89 
11 19,469 1,351 0.0 -35 26 -19 6 3 12 -6 1 1 242 14 
12 18,704 -765 18 18 64 38 4 -2 3 -9 1 0.0 215 -27 
13 10,934 -7,770 66 48 37 -27 2 -2 3 0.0 3 2 293 78 
14 8,204 -2,730 23 -43 18 -19 4 2 2 -1 1 -2 189 -104 
15 5,980 -2,224 5 -18 3 -15 6 2 5 3 3 2 171 -18 
 Av -4,121 Av -2 Av -8.4 Av -1.8 Av -2.6 Av -0.3 Av -21.1 
 BR15 I D Ti16 I D Gu17 I D Ts18 I D EX19 I D Ec20 I D SA21 I D 
06 3,997  293  105  8  1,070  14  1,572  
07 4,194 197 281 -12 93 -12 6 -2 1,312 242 12 -2 1,894 322 
08 3,447 -747 269 -12 121 28 4 -2 1,265 -47 6 -6 1,292 -602 
09 4,803 1356 316 47 36 -85 5 1 1,170 -95 0.0 -6 1,372 80 
10 4,460 -343 324 8 0.0 -36 6 1 1,305 135 1 1 1,393 21 
11 3,942 -518 292 -32 0.0 0.0 12 6 1,231 -74 1 0.0 1,394 1 
12 3,661 -281 295 3 0.0 0.0 7 -5 1,022 -209 7 6 1,141 -253 
13 3,264 -397 224 -71 0.0 0.0 10 3 876 -146 0.0 -7 1,045 -96 
14 3,110 -154 119 -105 0.0 0.0 11 1 807 -69 0.0 0.0 1,186 141 
15 3,233 123 149 30 0.0 0.0 11 0.0 841 34 1 1 775 -411 
 Av -84.9 Av -16 Av -11 Av 0.3 Av -25.4 Av -1.4 Av -88.6 
 AM22 I D Sl23 I D Ku24 I D D25 I D CU26 I D Bi27 I D Lp28 I D 
06 2,907  149  0.0  2  3,602  515  22  
07 3,645 738 154 5 0.0 0.0 3 1 3,286 -316 370 -145 20 -2 
08 3,311 -334 188 34 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3 2,321 -965 699 329 23 3 
09 3,064 -247 121 -67 59 0.0 1 1 2,549 228 282 -417 15 -8 
10 2,852 -212 93 -28 81 22 0.0 -1 4,129 1,580 120 -162 5 -10 
11 1,985 -867 54 -39 93 12 2 2 1,951 -2,178 168 48 19 14 
12 2,173 188 67 13 58 -35 0.0 -2 1,464 -487 254 86 3 -16 
13 1,819 -354 35 -32 59 1 8 8 1,988 524 320 66 8 5 
14 2,378 559 24 -11 70 11 2 -6 2,190 202 117 -203 7 -1 
15 1,884 -494 24 0.0 60 -10 4 2 1,490 -700 159 42 0.0 -7 






Cont’d Table 14 
 HA29 I D HB30 I D HC31 I D U32 I D PL33 I D DG34 I D OC35 I D 
06 2,631  4,264  2,964  691  2,576  1,544  0.0  
07 1,383 -1,248 4,501 237 2,776 -188 192 -499 2,566 -10 490 -1,054 0.0 0.0 
08 1,678 295 5,066 565 2,733 -43 255 63 2,653 87 913 423 0.0 0.0 
09 1,258 -420 5,020 -46 2,487 -246 220 -35 2,779 126 3,350 2,437 0.0 0.0 
10 616 -642 4,854 -166 2,448 -39 82 -138 2,989 210 3,526 176 0.0 0.0 
11 321 -295 4,494 -360 2,328 -120 85 3 2,641 -348 3,302 -224 0.0 0.0 
12 310 -11 4,609 115 2,340 12 108 23 2,577 -64 1,749 -1,553 0.0 0.0 
13 236 -74 4,259 -350 1,577 -763 34 -74 2,447 -130 6,512 4,763 0.0 0.0 
14 128 -108 4,323 64 1,686 109 6 -28 2,336 -111 2,081 -4,431 0.0 0.0 
15 126 -2 3,486 -837 1,327 -359 9 3 2,505 169 4,312 2,231 0.0 0.0 
 Av -278.3 Av -86 Av -182 Av -76 Av -7.9 Av 307.6 Av 0.0 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total cases. 2Cholera. 3Whooping cough. 4Tetanus neonatorum. 5Malaria. 6Visceral leishmaniosis. 7Measles. 
8Chickenpox. 9Rubella 10Mumps. 11Meningococcal meningitis.  12Meningitis pneumococcal.  13Meningitis, haemophilus. 
14Other meningitis. 15Brucellosis. 16Typhoid & Paratyphoid. 17Guillian Barre syndrome. 18Tetanus, other forms. 19Extra 
pulmonary Tuberculosis. 20Echinococcosis hydatid. 21Salmonellosis. 22Amoebic dysentery. 23Shigellosis.  24Khurma Fever. 
25Diphtheria  26Cutaneous leishmaniosis. 27Bilharzial. 28Leprosy. 29Hepatitis A. 30Hepatitis B.  31Hepatitis C.  32Unspecified 
hepatitis. 33Pulmonary tuberculosis. 34Dengue fever. 35Other communicable diseases like Poliomyelitis, Cong Rubella, Rift 




Table 15 Total Number of Inpatients, Surgeries, Deliveries, Laboratory Cases, X-ray Patients, Physiotherapy Patients, Served Meals, and Cases 


















































06 1,432   376   248   106.5   4.6   795   15.8   .57   
07 1,640 14.5 207 409 8.8 33 255 3.1 7.8 102.7 -3.5 -3.7 5.0 8.0 0.37 801 0.8 6.2 15.8 -0.4 -0.06 1.5 174.4 1.0 
08 1,612 -1.7 -27 425 3.8 15 259 1.4 3.6 122.2 18.9 19.4 5.1 1.9 0.09 744 -7.1 -57 16.9 7.2 1.1 .67 -57.7 -.91 
09 1,655 2.6 42 444 4.3 18 261 0.9 2.2 131.2 7.4 9.0 5.3 3.3 0.17 772 3.8 28 17.8 5.2 0.88 .86 28.3 .19 
10 1,700 2.7 45 450 1.3 6 265 1.4 3.8 142.5 8.6 11.2 5.6 5.4 0.29 811 5.0 38 19.1 7.4 1.3 .67 -21.9 -.18 
11 1,700 0.0 -0.6 441 -2.0 -9 256 -3.3 -8.9 144.7 1.5 2.1 6.0 8.6 0.48 750 -7.5 -61 20.2 5.5 1.0 .72 7.9 .05 
12 1,686 -0.8 -13 451 2.3 10 266 3.9 10 155.6 7.5 10.9 6.3 4.6 0.28 757 1.0 7.3 20.2 0.2 0.04 .89 23.7 .17 
13 1,701 0.8 14 462 2.5 11 269 1.2 3.2 150.9 -3.0 -4.7 6.7 5.0 0.31 762 0.6 4.8 20.9 3.5 0.72 .89 0.0 0.0 
14 1,699 -0.1 -1.7 485 4.9 22 262 -2.7 -7.0 156.3 3.6 5.4 6.3 -5.3 -0.35 692 -9.1 -69 21.1 0.7 0.15 3.4 288.3 2.5 
15 1,705 0.4 6.5 504 3.9 18 247 -5.9 -15 157.2 0.5 0.84 6.6 4.3 0.27 526 -24 -166 68.2 223 47.1 3.8 10.7 .37 
 Av 2.06 30 Av 3.3 14 Av 0.0 0.1 Av 4.6 5.6 Av 4.0 0.21 Av -4.0 -29 Av 28 5.8 Av 50.4 .36 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total number of inpatient cases. 2Increase or decrease as cases. 3Total number of surgeries. 4Total number of deliveries. 5Total cases investigated in laboratories in millions. 
6Total number of patients who had x-rays in millions. 7Total number of physiotherapy patients. 8Total number of meals served to nurses, patients, and their company in millions. 9Cases 








Table 16 Visits to Sources of Water Supply and Public Pleases, Investigated Samples of Water and Food, and Food Destructed in 
Kg and Litres in Thousands 
 TWP1 I D V2 WS3 I D V PPL4 I D V TIS5 I D S6 SW7 I D S S F8 I D S TFD9 I D  Kg10 I D Kg LITRE I D Lit 
06 255.8  94.4  161.3  71.0  44.2  26.7  57.9  31.2  26.6  
07 256.7 0.85 87.7 -6.7 168.9 7.5 69.5 -1.4 40.9 -3.3 28.6 1.8 125.7 67.7 25.1 -6.14 100.2 73.9 
08 262.3 5.6 94.9 7.2 167.3 -1.6 77.5 7.9 43.9 2.9 33.5 4.9 52.3 -73.3 33.4 8.3 18.9 -81.6 
09 255.5 -6.7 91.1 -3.8 164.4 -2.8 81.7 4.2 40.7 -3.1 41.0 7.4 28.7 -23.6 20.4 -12.9 8.2 -10.6 
10 252.3 -3.1 106 14.6 146.5 -17.8 81.2 -0.49 46.0 5.2 35.2 -5.7 46.0 17.3 27.2 6.7 18.8 10.6 
11 230.7 -2.1 89.0 -16.7 141.7 -4.8 97.9 16.6 48.4 2.3 49.5 14.3 39.4 -6.6 26.1 -1.1 13.3 -5.5 
12 229.1 -1.5 77.8 -11.1 151.3 9.5 73.9 -24.0 39.6 -8.7 34.2 -15.3 41.5 2.1 23.6 -2.4 17.9 4.6 
13 245.1 15.9 77.8 -0.01 167.3 15.9 65.9 -7.9 29.8 -9.8 36.0 1.8 30.6 -1.0 19.4 -4.2 11.2 -6.6 
14 207.5 -37.6 80.0 2.2 127.4 -39.8 68.2 2.3 34.6 4.7 33.5 -2.4 76.9 46.2 27.4 8.0 49.5 38.2 
15 225.0 17.5 71.3 -8.7 153.6 26.2 65.5 -2.7 33.2 -1.3 32.2 -1.3 65.0 -11.8 48.2 2.0 16.8 -32.7 
 Av -3.42 Av -2.5 Av -0.85 Av -0.6 Av -1.2 Av 0.61 Av 0.791 Av 1.8 Av -1.0 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total visits to sources of water supply and public places. 2Increase or decrease in number of visits. 3Total visits to water supply. 4Total visits to public 
places. 5Total investigated samples of water and food. 6Increases or decrease in samples investigated. 7Number of samples of water investigated. 8Number of samples 








Table 17 Total Number of Lectures, Meetings, Booklets, Newsletters, Posters, and Leaflets in Thousands52 
 TL1 IDF2 IN3 IDF OUT4 IDF TM5 IDF IN IDF OUT IDF BL6 IDF AN7 IDF PS8 IDF LLT9 IDN 
06 73.6  52.4  21.2  7.3  4.5  2.7  70.2  229.1  46.8  411.3  
07 88.7 15.0 55.8 3.4 32.8 11.6 11.9 4.5 6.9 2.3 4.9 2.2 152.6 82.3 872.1 642.9 106.6 59.7 1,445.3 1.0 
08 88.7 0.0 55.8 0.0 32.8 0.0 11.9 0.0 6.9 0.0 4.9 0.0 152.6 0.0 872.1 0.0 106.6 0.0 1,445.3 0.0 
09 91.5 2.7 60.1 4.3 31.3 -1.5 17.6 5.7 7.8 0.94 9.7 4.8 402.5 249.9 1,886 1,014 825.2 718.5 3,521.9 2.0 
10 89.7 -1.7 50.8 -9.3 38.8 7.5 15.0 -2.6 8.6 0.73 6.4 -3.3 663.7 261.1 1,601 -285 528.7 -296 1,632.0 -1.8 
11 71.9 -18 49.6 -1.2 22.2 -16 6.9 -8.0 3.3 -5.3 3.6 -2.7 157.0 -506 1,006 -595 91.1 -437 700.7 -0.93 
12 114 42.1 49.7 0.14 64.2 41.9 7.0 0.04 4.6 1.3 2.3 -1.3 103.9 -53.1 479.9 -526 85.9 -5.1 801.7 0.10 
13 114 0.0 49.7 0.0 64.2 0.0 7.0 0.0 4.6 0.0 2.3 0.0 103.9 0.0 479.9 0.0 85.9 0.0 801.7 0.0 
14 274.2 160 249 199 24.9 -39 12.4 5.4 6.9 2.3 5.5 3.1 195.7 91.8 926.4 446.5 158.9 73 3,546.1 2.7 
15 274.2 0.0 249 0.0 24.9 0.0 12.4 0.0 6.9 0.0 5.5 0.0 195.7 0.0 926.4 0.0 158.9 0.0 3,546.1 0.0 
 Av 22.2 Av 21.8 Av 0.40 Av 0.57 Av 0.26 Av 0.31 Av 13.9 Av 77.4 Av 12.4 Av 0.34 
  
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total number of lectures. 2Increase or decrease in total number of lectures as a figures. 3Number of lectures held inside healthcare facilities. 4Number of lectures 
held out healthcare facilities. 5Total number of meetings. 6Total number of booklets printed. 7Total number of announcements (newsletters) printed. 8Total number of posters 
printed. 9Total number of leaflets printed in thousands.
                                               




Table 18 Total Healthcare Facilities, Manpower, Patient Visits and Vaccination in AL Hajj 
Season 
 T H1 I D T Ph2 I D T Vis3 I D T Pil4 I D T Phy5 I D T Ad6 I D 
06 19  132  824.9  2,378  1.8  1.5  
07 19 0 127 -5 838.9 13.9 2,454 75.6 2.0 0.14 1.7 0.20 
08 18 -1 133 6 1,038 199.6 2,408 -45.4 3.5 1.5 3.2 1.54 
09 21 3 157 24 916.4 -122.1 2,313 -95.5 3.7 0.21 3.3 0.09 
10 20 -1 150 -7 998.3 81.8 2,789 476.1 4.0 0.22 4.2 0.93 
11 21 1 154 4 924.3 -73.9 2,927 138.3 4.0 0.05 4.2 -0.05 
12 23 2 154 0 806.9 -117.3 3,161 233.8 3.6 -0.42 3.9 -0.25 
13 23 0 154 0 690.3 -116.5 1,980 -1,181 4.1 0.53 4.4 0.52 
14 25 2 158 4 571.4 -118.8 2,085 104.9 4.3 0.17 4.9 0.42 
15 22 -3 177 19 538.8 -32.6 1,952 -132.4 4.5 0.18 5.2 0.35 
 Av 0.33 Av 5 Av -31.7 Av -47.3 Av 0.29 Av 0.41 
 P H7 I D P Ph8 I D T P V9 I D PR10 I D T Nu11 I D T IP12 I D 
06 12  27  469.3  273.1  3.4  10.8  
07 12 0 26 -1 549.6 80.2 319.1 46.0 3.6 0.20 10.0 -0.77 
08 11 -1 34 8 683.5 133.9 303.0 -16.1 5.8 2.14 9.5 -0.52 
09 14 3 38 4 653.6 -29.8 410.0 106.9 6.2 0.41 8.7 -0.82 
10 13 -1 35 -3 683.8 30.1 435.5 25.5 6.6 0.38 9.6 0.92 
11 14 1 42 7 621.1 -62.6 365.7 -69.7 6.8 0.26 9.5 -0.15 
12 15 1 42 0 592.2 -28.9 427.9 62.1 6.3 -0.48 7.7 -1.77 
13 15 0 42 0 511.0 -81.1 286.5 -141.3 6.8 0.45 3.5 -4.24 
14 17 2 44 2 400.4 -110.6 331.0 44.4 6.6 -0.21 3.8 0.36 
15 14 -3 44 0 426.9 26.5 282.9 -48.0 7.4 0.83 6.8 3.03 
 Av 0.22 Av 1.9 Av -4.7 Av 1.0 Av 0.44 Av -0.44 
 S H13 I D S Ph14 I D THV
15 I D PL16 I D T AP17 I D T B18 I D 
06 7  105  355.6  0.0  2.9  3.8  
07 7 0 101 -4 289.3 -66.3 440.9  3.1 0.14 3.9 0.18 
08 7 0 99 -2 354.9 65.6 491.1 50.1 4.7 1.62 3.6 -0.30 
09 7 0 119 20 262.7 -92.2 458.1 -33.0 4.5 -0.21 3.6 -0.03 
10 7 0 115 -4 314.4 51.7 463.4 5.3 4.7 0.22 3.4 -0.16 
11 7 0 112 -3 303.1 -11.3 532.8 69.3 6.0 1.28 3.4 0.0 
12 8 1 112 0 214.6 -88.4 516.4 -16.3 6.0 0.02 4.4 0.97 
13 8 0 112 0 179.2 -35.3 430.4 -86.0 6.2 0.16 4.4 0.0 
14 8 0 114 2 171.0 -8.2 361.4 -69.0 8.1 1.92 4.5 0.15 
15 8 0 133 19 111.9 -59.1 324.9 -36.4 9.1 0.95 5.5 0.93 
 Av 0.11 Av 3.1 Av -27.0 Av -14.5 Av 0.68 Av 0.19 
 
Sources: (MOH, 2006-2015) 
Abbreviations: 1Total hospitals. 2Total primary healthcare centers. 3Total visits in thousand. 4Total pilgrims in 
thousand. 5Total physicians in thousand. 6Total administrators in thousand. 7Permanent hospitals. 8Permanent 
primary healthcare centers. 9Total visits to primary healthcare centers in thousands. 10Prophylactic vaccination in 
thousands. 11Total nurses in thousand. 12Total inpatient cases in thousands. 13Seasonal hospitals. 14Seasonal primary 
healthcare centers. 15Total visits to hospitals in thousand. 16Poliomyelitis vaccination in thousands. 17Total Allied 




Table 19 Private Health Insurance Based on the Common Divisions in Saudi Arabia53 
                     Level of 
PHI Company 
VIP A B C 
Al Tawuniya Diamond Platinum, Gold Silver Silver is the lowest 
Bupa Diamond Gold Silver Bronze, Blue, White, Green, Basic 
Medgulf VIP A B C 
Al Rajhi VIP+, VIP AAA, AA, A BBB, BB, B C+, CCC, CC 
AXA VVIP, VIP A B C, D, E 
Enaya Diamond Gold Silver Bronze, Classic 
Walaa VIP A B C, Raha+, Raha, C-LTD 
Solidarity VVIP, VIP+, VIP A B C 
Al Sagr VIP A B C-Direct, C-Restricted 

















                                               
53 Note: these divisions are based on the most common range of levels in SA, which are VIP, A, B, then 
C, and based on the common strengths by each level in comparison to the other levels. For example, 
Diamond level at Al Tawuniya is known as the same as Diamond at Bupa. However, the actual strength of 
each level, which is set based on the actual benefits that are provided by each level, is not 100% the same, 
which means that Diamond level at Al Tawuniya could be higher or lower than the one at Bupa, and the 
same is true with the silver level by Al Tawuniya, which might be equal to level C by Medgulf, and so on. 
This crossover is determined by the network of healthcare facilities that are covered by each level (which 
cannot be the same from company to another), the number of healthcare services that are covered by the 
level, the OOP, and the maximum limit of coverage by the level. Moreover, unifying the levels by 
investigating how many healthcare services are covered by each level to find which level  matches from 
the other companies is not practical due to the high number of healthcare facilities in SA (5000 in total), 





Table 20 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on the Classification of the Six Slices 
MOH W2P1 % 
Saudis employed in public Yes 64 66.04 
 No 33 34.0 
Non-Saudis employed in public Yes 6 27.3 
 No 16 72.7 
Unemployed Saudis WI2 Yes 9 81.8 
 No 2 18.2 
Unemployed Saudis WOI3 Yes 3 30.0 
 No 7 70.0 
Private Sector Total 140 23.35 
Non-Saudis employed in private Yes 49 61.3 
 No 31 38.8 
Non-Saudis employed in public with HI Yes 1 100 
 No 0 0.0 
Dependent on Non-Saudis employed in private Yes 5 45.5 
 No 6 54.5 
SDU Total 92 15.3 
Non-Saudis employed in SDU Yes 0 0.0 
 No 1 100 
MOH & Private Sector Total 1 0.2 
Saudis employed in public with HI Yes 8 40.0 
 No 12 60.0 
Saudis employed in private Yes 48 54.5 
 No 40 45.5 
Dependent on Saudis eligible in private WI Yes 8 88.9 
 No 1 11.1 
Dependent on Saudis employed in private WOI Yes 1 50.0 
 No 1 50.0 
MOH & SDU Total 119 19.8 
Saudis employed in public eligible to SDU Yes 18 60.0 
 No 12 40.0 
Saudis employed in SDU Yes 32 44.4 
 No 40 55.6 
Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU WI Yes 19 44.2 
 No 24 55.8 
Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU WOI Yes 10 47.6 
 No 11 52.4 
MOH, Private, & SDU Total 166 27.7 
Saudis employed in public eligible to all Yes 1 25.0 
 No 3 75.0 
Saudis employed in private eligible to all Yes 41 66.1 
 No 21 33.9 
Saudis employed in SDU eligible to all Yes 5 50.0 
 No 5 50.0 
Unemployed Saudi WI eligible to all   Yes 3 75.0 
 No 1 25.0 
Unemployed Saudi WOI eligible to all   Yes 1 50.0 
 No 1 50.0 
 Total 82 13.7 
3 
Abbreviations: 1Willingness to Pay. 2With income. 3Without income. 4The percentage of Saudis employed in 
public who reported yes to the total Saudis employed in public. 5The percentage of those eligible to healthcare only 






Table 21 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on Demographic Characteristics 
  W2P % 
Gender     
 Male Yes 257 54.9 
  No 211 45.1 
 Female Yes 75 56.8 
  No 57 43.2 
  Total 600 100 
Age     
 18 - 25 Yes 85 52.5 
  No 77 47.5 
 26 - 35 Yes 154 54.0 
  No 131 46.0 
 36 - 45 Yes 61 59.8 
  No 41 40.2 
 46 - 55 Yes 25 64.1 
  No 14 35.9 
 56 - 65 Yes 7 63.6 
  No 4 36.4 
 65 < Yes 0 0.0 
  No 1 100 
  Total 600 100 
Nationality     
 Saudi Yes 271 55.9 
  No 214 44.1 
 Non-Saudi Yes 61 53.0 
  No 54 47.0 
  Total 600 100 
Marital Status     
 Single Yes 133 52.8 
  No 119 47.2 
 Married Yes 190 57.1 
  No 143 42.9 
 Divorced Yes 5 45.5 
  No 6 54.5 
 Widowed Yes 4 100 
  No 0 0.0 
  Total 600 100 
Chronic Illness     
 With Yes 33 61.1 
  No 21 38.9 
 Without Yes 299 54.8 
  No 247 45.2 
  Total 600 100 
Health Status     
 Excellent Yes 202 56.1 
  No 158 43.9 
 Very Good Yes 105 54.4 
  No 88 45.6 
 Good Yes 20 51.3 
  No 19 48.7 
 Fair Yes 4 57.1 
  No 3 42.9 
 Poor Yes 1 100 
  No 0 0.0 






Table 22 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  W2P % 
Education     
 Primary Yes 6 54.5 
  No 5 45.5 
 Secondary Yes 12 85.7 
  No 2 14.3 
 High School Yes 56 53.8 
  No 48 46.2 
 Diploma Yes 54 51.9 
  No 50 48.1 
 Bachelor Yes 174 55.9 
  No 137 44.1 
 Higher Diploma Yes 9 60.0 
  No 6 40.0 
 Master’s Yes 14 46.7 
  No 16 53.3 
 PhD Yes 7 63.6 
  No 4 36.4 
  Total 600 100 
Income     
 < 3,000 Yes 58 50.9 
  No 56 49.1 
 3,000 - 5,999 Yes 48 53.3 
  No 42 46.7 
 6,000 - 8,999 Yes 83 61.0 
  No 53 39.0 
 9,000 - 11,999 Yes 67 57.8 
  No 49 42.2 
 12,000 - 14,999 Yes 35 53.0 
  No 31 47.0 
 15,000 < Yes 41 52.6 
  No 37 47.4 
  Total 600 100 
Insurance     
 With  Yes 171 58.4 
   No 122 41.6 
  PHI Level     
 VIP Yes 28 59.5 
    No 19 40.4 
   A Yes 57 50.9 
    No 55 49.1 
   B Yes 49 61.2 
    No 31 38.7 
   C Yes 37 68.5 
    No 17 31.5 
 Without Yes 161 52.4 
  No 146 47.6 









Table 23 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms for Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare Only in the MOH 
   Taxation M S Accounts1 P H Insurance2 
W2P Total M P3 S P4 L P5 M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Saudis employed in  Yes 64 3 15 46 23 32 9 38 17 9 
public % 66.0 4.7 23.4 71.9 35.9 50.0 14.1 59.4 26.6 14.1 
 No 33 2 10 21 14 14 5 17 9 7 
 % 34.0 6.1 30.3 63.6 42.4 42.4 15.2 51.5 27.3 21.2 
 Both 97 5 25 67 37 46 14 55 26 16 
 % 100 5.2 25.8 69.1 38.1 47.4 14.4 56.7 26.8 16.5 
Non-Saudis employed  Yes 6 3 1 2 1 1 4 2 4 0 
in public % 27.3 50.0 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 66.7 33.3 66.7 0.0 
 No 16 0 4 12 8 7 1 8 5 3 
 % 72.7 0.0 25.0 75.0 50.0 43.8 6.3 50.0 31.3 18.8 
 Both 22 3 5 14 9 8 5 10 9 3 
 % 100 13.6 22.7 63.6 40.9 36.4 22.7 45.5 40.9 13.6 
Unemployed Saudis  Yes 9 0 2 7 6 3 0 3 4 2 
WI % 81.8 0.0 22.2 77.8 66.7 33.3 0.0 33.3 44.4 22.2 
 No 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 % 18.2 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 50 
 Both 11 1 3 7 6 4 1 4 4 3 
 % 100 9.1 27.3 63.6 54.5 36.4 9.1 36.4 36.4 27.3 
Unemployed Saudis  Yes 3 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 
WOI % 30.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 33.3 66.7 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 
 No 7 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 
 % 70.0 42.9 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 42.9 28.6 42.9 28.6 
 Both 10 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 
 % 100 40.0 20.0 40.0 30.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 40.0 30.0 
All Unemployed Yes 12 1 2 9 7 5 0 4 5 3 
 % 57.1 8.3 16.7 75.0 58.3 41.7 0.0 33.3 41.7 25.0 
 No 9 4 3 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 
 % 42.9 44.4 33.3 22.2 22.2 33.3 44.4 33.3 33.3 33.3 
 Both 21 5 5 11 9 8 4 7 8 6 
 % 100 23.8 23.8 52.4 42.9 38.1 19.0 33.3 38.1 28.6 
All Eligible Only to  Yes 82 7 18 57 31 38 13 44 26 12 
MOH % 58.6 8.5 22.0 69.5 37.8 46.3 15.9 53.7 31.7 14.6 
 No 58 6 17 35 24 24 10 28 17 13 
 % 41.4 10.3 29.3 60.3 41.4 41.4 17.2 48.3 29.3 22.4 
 Both 140 13 35 92 55 62 23 72 43 25 
 % 100 9.3 25.0 65.7 39.3 44.3 16.4 51.4 30.7 17.9 
 











Table 24 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms of Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare Only in Private Sector 
   Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Non-Saudis  Yes 49 3 16 30 17 20 12 29 13 7 
employed in private % 61.3 6.1 32.7 61.2 34.7 40.8 24.5 59.2 26.5 14.3 
 No 31 3 2 26 4 24 3 24 5 2 
 % 38.8 9.7 6.5 83.9 12.9 77.4 9.7 77.4 16.1 6.5 
 Both 80 6 18 56 21 44 15 53 18 9 
 % 100 7.5 22.5 70.0 26.3 55.0 18.8 66.3 22.5 11.3 
Non-Saudis employed Yes 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
in public with PHI % 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 
 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Both 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 % 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 
Dependent on Non-  Yes 5 0 0 5 1 4 0 4 1 0 
Saudis employed in  % 45.5 0.0 0.0 100 20.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 0.0 
Private Sector No 6 0 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 0 
 % 54.5 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 
 Both 11 0 0 11 1 10 0 10 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 9.1 90.9 0.0 90.9 9.1 0.0 
All Eligible Only in  Yes 55 3 17 35 18 24 13 34 14 7 
Private Sector % 59.8 5.5 30.9 63.6 32.7 43.6 23.6 61.8 25.5 12.7 
 No 37 3 2 32 4 30 3 30 5 2 
 % 40.2 8.1 5.4 86.5 10.8 81.1 8.1 81.1 13.5 5.4 
 Both 92 6 19 67 22 54 16 64 19 9 
 % 100 6.5 20.7 72.8 23.9 58.7 17.4 69.6 20.7 9.8 
 
Table 25 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms of Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare Only in SDU 
   Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Non-Saudis employed Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
in SDU % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 No 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 % 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 
 Total 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 










Table 26 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms of Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare in The MOH & Private Sector 
   Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Saudis employed in Yes 8 1 3 4 2 3 3 5 2 1 
public with PHI % 40.0 12.5 37.5 50.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 62.5 25.0 12.5 
 No 12 1 3 8 2 8 2 9 1 2 
 % 60.0 8.3 25.0 66.7 16.7 66.7 16.7 75.0 8.3 16.7 
 Both 20 2 6 12 4 11 5 14 3 3 
 % 100 10.0 30.0 60.0 20.0 55.0 25.0 70.0 15.0 15.0 
Saudis employed in Yes 48 5 20 23 19 19 10 24 9 15 
private % 54.5 10.4 41.7 47.9 39.6 39.6 20.8 50.0 18.8 31.3 
 No 40 3 12 25 16 22 2 21 6 13 
 % 45.5 7.5 30.0 62.5 40.0 55.0 5.0 52.5 15.0 32.5 
 Both 88 8 32 48 35 41 12 45 15 28 
 % 100 9.1 36.4 54.5 39.8 46.6 13.6 51.1 17.0 31.8 
Dependent on Saudis Yes 8 0 5 3 5 1 2 3 2 3 
eligible in private % 88.9 0.0 62.5 37.5 62.5 12.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 
WI No 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 % 11.1 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 
 Both 9 0 5 4 5 2 2 4 2 3 
 % 100 0.0 55.6 44.4 55.6 22.2 22.2 44.4 22.2 33.3 
Dependent on Saudis Yes 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
eligible in private % 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 
WOI No 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
 Both 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
All Dependents Yes 9 0 5 4 5 2 2 4 2 3 
 % 81.8 0.0 55.6 44.4 55.6 22.2 22.2 44.4 22.2 33.3 
 No 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 
 % 18.2 0.0 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
 Both 11 0 5 6 6 3 2 5 3 3 
 % 100 0.0 45.5 54.5 54.5 27.3 18.2 45.5 27.3 27.3 
All Eligible in MOH Yes 65 6 28 31 26 24 15 33 13 19 
and Private Sector % 54.6 9.2 43.1 47.7 40.0 36.9 23.1 50.8 20.0 29.2 
 No 54 4 15 35 19 31 4 31 8 15 
 % 45.4 7.4 27.8 64.8 35.2 57.4 7.4 57.4 14.8 27.8 
 Both 119 10 43 66 45 55 19 64 21 34 












Table 27 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms of Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare in The MOH & SDU 
   Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Saudis employed Yes 18 0 4 14 6 10 2 12 4 2 
in public eligible % 60.0 0.0 22.2 77.8 33.3 55.6 11.1 66.7 22.2 11.1 
to SDU No 12 2 1 9 3 9 0 7 2 3 
 % 40.0 16.7 8.3 75.0 25.0 75.0 0.0 58.3 16.7 25.0 
 Both 30 2 5 23 9 19 2 19 6 5 
 % 100 6.7 16.7 76.7 30.0 63.3 6.7 63.3 20.0 16.7 
Saudis employed  Yes 32 1 7 24 10 18 4 21 7 4 
in SDU % 44.4 3.1 21.9 75.0 31.3 56.3 12.5 65.6 21.9 12.5 
 No 40 5 10 25 16 18 6 19 12 9 
 % 55.6 12.5 25.0 62.5 40.0 45.0 15.0 47.5 30.0 22.5 
 Both 72 6 17 49 26 36 10 40 19 13 
 % 100 8.3 23.6 68.1 36.1 50.0 13.9 55.6 26.4 18.1 
Dependent on  Yes 19 3 11 5 14 0 5 2 8 9 
Saudis employed % 44.2 15.8 57.9 26.3 73.7 0.0 26.3 10.5 42.1 47.4 
in SDU WI No 24 1 2 21 17 4 3 6 18 0 
 % 55.8 4.2 8.3 87.5 70.8 16.7 12.5 25.0 75.0 0.0 
 Both 43 4 13 26 31 4 8 8 26 9 
 % 100 9.3 30.2 60.5 72.1 9.3 18.6 18.6 60.5 20.9 
Dependent on  Yes 10 1 1 8 6 3 1 3 6 1 
Saudis employed % 47.6 10.0 10.0 80.0 60.0 30.0 10.0 30.0 60.0 10.0 
in SDU WOI No 11 1 1 9 5 6 0 5 4 2 
 % 52.4 9.1 9.1 81.8 45.5 54.5 0.0 45.5 36.4 18.2 
 Both 21 2 2 17 11 9 1 8 10 3 
 % 100 9.5 9.5 81.0 52.4 42.9 4.8 38.1 47.6 14.3 
All Dependents Yes 29 4 12 13 20 3 6 5 14 10 
 % 45.3 13.8 41.4 44.8 69.0 10.3 20.7 17.2 48.3 34.5 
 No 35 2 3 30 22 10 3 11 22 2 
 % 54.7 5.7 8.6 85.7 62.9 28.6 8.6 31.4 62.9 5.7 
 Both 64 6 15 43 42 13 9 16 36 12 
 % 100 9.4 23.4 67.2 65.6 20.3 14.1 25.0 56.3 18.8 
All Eligible in  Yes 79 5 23 51 36 31 12 38 25 16 
MOH and % 47.6 6.3 29.1 64.6 45.6 39.2 15.2 48.1 31.6 20.3 
SDU No 87 9 14 64 41 37 9 37 36 14 
 % 52.4 10.3 16.1 73.6 47.1 42.5 10.3 42.5 41.4 16.1 
 Both 166 14 37 115 77 68 21 75 61 30 












Table 28 The ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms of Participants who are 
Eligible to Healthcare in all Three Healthcare Provisions 
   Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Saudis employed in  Yes 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
public eligible to all % 25.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 
 No 3 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 
 % 75.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 33.3 66.7 66.7 0.0 33.3 
 Both 4 1 2 1 0 2 2 3 0 1 
 % 100 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 
Saudis employed in  Yes 41 5 10 26 21 15 5 15 16 10 
private eligible to all % 66.1 12.2 24.4 63.4 51.2 36.6 12.2 36.6 39.0 24.4 
 No 21 1 5 15 8 12 1 12 4 5 
 % 33.9 4.8 23.8 71.4 38.1 57.1 4.8 57.1 19.0 23.8 
 Both 62 6 15 41 29 27 6 27 20 15 
 % 100 9.7 24.2 66.1 46.8 43.5 9.7 43.5 32.3 24.2 
Saudis employed in  Yes 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 
SDU eligible to  % 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
all No 5 1 0 4 1 3 1 3 2 0 
 % 50.0 20.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 60.0 20.0 60.0 40.0 0.0 
 Both 10 1 0 9 6 3 1 3 7 0 
 % 100 10.0 0.0 90.0 60.0 30.0 10.0 30.0 70.0 0.0 
Unemployed Saudi  Yes 3 0 0 3 1 2 0 2 1 0 
WI eligible to all % 75.0 0.0 0.0 100 33.3 66.7 0.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 
 No 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 % 25.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 
 Both 4 0 0 4 1 3 0 3 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 25.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 0.0 
Unemployed Saudi  Yes 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
WOI eligible to all % 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
 No 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
 Both 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
All Unemployed Yes 4 0 0 4 2 2 0 2 2 0 
 % 66.7 0.0 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
 No 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 
 % 33.3 0.0 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
 Both 6 0 0 6 3 3 0 3 3 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
All Eligible in all  Yes 51 5 10 36 28 18 5 18 23 10 
three provisions % 62.2 9.8 19.6 70.6 54.9 35.3 9.8 35.3 45.1 19.6 
 No 31 3 7 21 10 17 4 18 7 6 
 % 37.8 9.7 22.6 67.7 32.3 54.8 12.9 58.1 22.6 19.4 
 Both 82 8 17 57 38 35 9 36 30 16 









Table 29 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Gender 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Male Yes 257 20 75 162 109 101 47 128 81 48 
 % 54.9 7.8 29.2 63 42.4 39.3 18.3 49.8 31.5 18.7 
 No 211 24 46 141 72 114 25 115 51 45 
 % 45.1 11.4 21.8 66.8 34.1 54.0 11.8 54.5 24.2 21.3 
Both 468 44 121 303 181 215 72 243 132 93 
 % 100 9.4 25.9 64.7 38.7 45.9 15.4 51.9 28.2 19.9 
Female Yes 75 6 21 48 30 34 11 39 20 16 
 % 56.8 8.0 28.0 64.0 40.0 45.3 14.7 52.0 26.7 21.3 
 No 57 1 9 47 26 26 5 30 22 5 
 % 43.2 1.8 15.8 82.5 45.6 45.6 8.8 52.6 38.6 8.8 
Both 132 7 30 95 56 60 16 69 42 21 
 % 100 5.3 22.7 72.0 42.4 45.5 12.1 52.3 31.8 15.9 
Male & Female Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 
















Table 30 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Age 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
18 - 25 Yes 85 9 27 49 44 32 9 32 26 27 
 % 52.5 10.6 31.8 57.6 51.8 37.6 10.6 37.6 30.6 31.8 
 No 77 7 13 57 29 40 8 41 24 12 
 % 47.5 9.1 16.9 74 37.7 51.9 10.4 53.2 31.2 15.6 
 Both 162 16 40 106 73 72 17 73 50 39 
 % 100 9.9 24.7 65.4 45.1 44.4 10.5 45.1 30.9 24.1 
26 - 35 Yes 154 11 38 105 59 69 26 84 47 23 
 % 54.0 7.1 24.7 68.2 38.3 44.8 16.9 54.5 30.5 14.9 
 No 131 12 29 90 41 74 16 78 28 25 
 % 46.0 9.2 22.1 68.7 31.3 56.5 12.2 59.5 21.4 19.1 
 Both 285 23 67 195 100 143 42 162 75 48 
 % 100 8.1 23.5 68.4 35.1 50.2 14.7 56.8 26.3 16.8 
36 - 45 Yes 61 3 21 37 24 23 14 34 17 10 
 % 59.8 4.9 34.4 60.7 39.3 37.7 23.0 55.7 27.9 16.4 
 No 41 3 10 28 19 17 5 19 14 8 
 % 40.2 7.3 24.4 68.3 46.3 41.5 12.2 46.3 34.1 19.5 
 Both 102 6 31 65 43 40 19 53 31 18 
 % 100 5.9 30.4 63.7 42.2 39.2 18.6 52.0 30.4 17.6 
46 - 55 Yes 25 2 10 13 9 8 8 14 7 4 
 % 64.1 8.0 40.0 52.0 36.0 32.0 32.0 56.0 28.0 16.0 
 No 14 1 3 10 7 6 1 6 5 3 
 % 35.9 7.1 21.4 71.4 50.0 42.9 7.1 42.9 35.7 21.4 
 Both 39 3 13 23 16 14 9 20 12 7 
 % 100 7.7 33.3 59.0 41.0 35.0 23.1 51.3 30.8 17.9 
56 - 65 Yes 7 1 0 6 3 3 1 3 4 0 
 % 63.6 14.3 0.0 85.7 42.9 42.9 14.3 42.9 57.1 0.0 
 No 4 2 0 2 1 3 0 1 1 2 
 % 36.4 50.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 
 Both 11 3 0 8 4 6 1 4 5 2 
 % 100 27.3 0.0 72.7 36.4 54.5 9.1 36.4 45.5 18.2 
65 < Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 No 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
 Both 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
All Ages Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 









Table 31 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Nationality 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Saudi Yes 271 20 78 173 120 110 41 131 83 57 
 % 55.9 7.4 28.8 63.8 44.3 40.6 15.1 48.3 30.6 21.0 
 No 214 22 49 143 85 103 26 107 62 45 
 % 44.1 10.3 22.9 66.8 39.7 48.1 12.1 50.0 29.0 21.0 
 Both 485 42 127 316 205 213 67 238 145 102 
 % 100 8.7 26.2 65.2 42.3 43.9 13.8 49.1 29.9 21.0 
Non-Saudi Yes 61 6 18 37 19 25 17 36 18 7 
 % 53.0 9.8 29.5 60.7 31.1 41.0 27.9 59.0 29.5 11.5 
 No 54 3 6 45 13 37 4 38 11 5 
 % 47.0 5.6 11.1 83.3 24.1 68.5 7.4 70.4 20.4 9.3 
 Both 115 9 24 82 32 62 21 74 29 12 
 % 100 7.8 20.9 71.3 27.8 53.9 18.3 64.3 25.2 10.4 
All Nationalities Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 
 % 100 8.5 25.2 66.3 39.5 45.8 14.7 52.0 29.0 19.0 
 
 
Table 32 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Marital Status 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Single Yes 133 12 40 81 62 52 19 59 41 33 
 % 52.8 9.0 30.1 60.9 46.6 39.1 14.3 44.4 30.8 24.8 
 No 119 9 22 88 50 58 11 60 39 20 
 % 47.2 7.6 18.5 73.9 42.0 48.7 9.2 50.4 32.8 16.8 
 Both 252 21 62 169 112 110 30 119 80 53 
 % 100 8.3 24.6 67.1 44.4 43.7 11.9 47.2 31.7 21.0 
Married Yes 190 12 53 125 73 82 35 105 55 30 
 % 57.1 6.3 27.9 65.8 38.4 43.2 18.4 55.3 28.9 15.8 
 No 143 15 33 95 44 80 19 84 30 29 
 % 42.9 10.5 23.1 66.4 30.8 55.9 13.3 58.7 21.0 20.3 
 Both 333 27 86 220 117 162 54 189 85 59 
 % 100 8.1 25.8 66.1 35.1 48.6 16.2 56.8 25.5 17.7 
Divorced Yes 5 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 0 
 % 45.5 20.0 40.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 60.0 40.0 0.0 
 No 6 1 0 5 4 2 0 1 4 1 
 % 54.5 16.7 0.0 83.3 66.7 33.3 0.0 16.7 66.7 16.7 
 Both 11 2 2 7 5 3 3 4 6 1 
 % 100 18.2 18.2 63.6 45.5 27.3 27.3 36.4 54.5 9.1 
Widowed Yes 4 1 1 2 3 0 1 0 3 1 
 % 100 25.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 
 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Both 4 1 1 2 3 0 1 0 3 1 
 % 100 25.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 
All Marital Status Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 




Table 33 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Chronic Illness 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
With Yes 33 2 8 23 13 13 7 18 12 3 
 % 61.1 6.1 24.2 69.7 39.4 39.4 21.2 54.5 36.4 9.1 
 No 21 4 3 14 7 10 4 10 8 3 
 % 38.9 19.0 14.3 66.7 33.3 47.6 19.0 47.6 38.1 14.3 
 Both 54 6 11 37 20 23 11 28 20 6 
 % 100 11.1 20.4 68.5 37.0 42.6 20.4 51.9 37.0 11.1 
Without Yes 299 24 88 187 126 122 51 149 89 61 
 % 54.8 8.0 29.4 62.5 42.1 40.8 17.1 49.8 29.8 20.4 
 No 247 21 52 174 91 130 26 135 65 47 
 % 45.2 8.5 21.1 70.4 36.8 52.6 10.5 54.7 26.3 19.0 
 Both 546 45 140 361 217 252 77 284 154 108 
 % 100 8.2 25.6 66.1 39.7 46.2 14.1 52.0 28.2 19.8 
With & Without Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 


















Table 34 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Health Status 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Excellent Yes 202 13 52 137 90 81 31 99 69 34 
 % 56.1 6.4 25.7 67.8 44.6 40.1 15.3 49.0 34.2 16.8 
 No 158 16 31 111 60 80 18 82 47 29 
 % 43.9 10.1 19.6 70.3 38.0 50.6 11.4 51.9 29.7 18.4 
 Both 360 29 83 248 150 161 49 181 116 63 
 % 100 8.1 23.1 68.9 41.7 44.7 13.6 50.3 32.2 17.5 
Very Good Yes 105 9 37 59 40 43 22 56 25 24 
 % 54.4 8.6 35.2 56.2 38.1 41.0 21.0 53.3 23.8 22.9 
 No 88 6 20 62 33 47 8 49 21 18 
 % 45.6 6.8 22.7 70.5 37.5 53.4 9.1 55.7 23.9 20.5 
 Both 193 15 57 121 73 90 30 105 46 42 
 % 100 7.8 29.5 62.7 37.8 46.6 15.5 54.4 23.8 21.8 
Good Yes 20 3 5 12 7 10 3 10 5 5 
 % 51.3 15.0 25.0 60.0 35.0 50.0 15.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 
 No 19 2 4 13 4 12 3 13 3 3 
 % 48.7 10.5 21.1 68.4 21.1 63.2 15.8 68.4 15.8 15.8 
 Both 39 5 9 25 11 22 6 23 8 8 
 % 100 12.8 23.1 64.1 28.2 56.4 15.4 59.0 20.5 20.5 
Fair Yes 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 
 % 57.1 25.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 25.0 
 No 3 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 
 % 0.5 33.3 0.0 66.7 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 66.7 0.0 
 Both 7 2 1 4 3 2 2 2 4 1 
 % 100 28.6 14.3 57.1 42.9 28.6 28.6 28.6 57.1 14.3 
Poor Yes 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 % 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 
 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Both 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 % 100 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 0.0 0.0 
All Health Status Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 











Table 35 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
the First Level of Education 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Primary Yes 6 0 2 4 6 0 0 0 4 2 
 % 54.5 0.0 33.3 66.7 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.7 33.3 
 No 5 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 4 2 
 % 45.5 0.0 0.0 100 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 80.0 40.0 
 Both 11 0 2 9 10 0 0 0 8 4 
 % 100 0.0 18.2 81.8 90.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 72.7 36.4 
Secondary Yes 12 3 6 3 6 3 3 3 3 6 
 % 85.7 25.0 50.0 25.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 50 
 No 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 
 % 14.3 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 
 Both 14 4 6 4 6 5 3 4 3 7 
 % 100 28.6 42.9 28.6 42.9 35.7 21.4 28.6 21.4 50.0 
High School Yes 56 3 15 38 34 16 6 19 25 12 
 % 53.8 5.4 26.8 67.9 60.7 28.6 10.7 33.9 44.6 21.4 
 No 48 5 8 35 29 16 3 14 24 10 
 % 46.2 10.4 16.7 72.9 60.4 33.3 6.3 29.2 50.0 20.8 
 Both 104 8 23 73 63 32 9 33 49 22 
 % 100 7.7 22.1 70.2 60.6 30.8 8.7 31.7 47.1 21.2 
Total of First Level Yes 74 6 23 45 46 19 9 22 32 20 
 % 57.4 8.1 31.1 60.8 62.2 25.7 12.2 29.7 43.2 27.0 
 No 55 6 8 41 33 18 3 15 28 13 
 % 42.6 10.9 14.5 74.5 60.0 32.7 5.5 27.3 50.9 23.6 
 Both 129 12 31 86 79 37 12 37 60 33 
 % 100 9.3 24.0 66.7 61.2 28.7 9.3 28.7 46.5 25.6 
 
Table 36 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to the 
Second Level of Education 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Diploma Yes 54 8 14 32 17 26 11 29 14 11 
 % 51.9 14.8 25.9 59.3 31.5 48.1 20.4 53.7 25.9 20.4 
 No 50 5 8 37 15 31 4 30 11 9 
 % 48.1 10.0 16.0 74.0 30.0 62.0 8.0 60.0 22.0 18.0 
 Both 104 13 22 69 32 57 15 59 25 20 
 % 100 12.5 21.2 66.3 30.8 54.8 14.4 56.7 24 19.2 
Bachelor Yes 174 7 54 113 72 74 28 95 46 33 
 % 55.9 4.0 31.0 64.9 41.4 42.5 16.1 54.6 26.4 19.0 
 No 137 12 33 92 46 71 20 79 33 25 
 % 44.1 8.8 24.1 67.2 33.6 51.8 14.6 57.7 24.1 18.2 
 Both 311 19 87 205 118 145 48 174 79 58 
 % 100 6.1 28.0 65.9 37.9 46.6 15.4 55.9 25.4 18.6 
Total of Second  Yes 228 15 68 145 89 100 39 124 60 44 
Level % 54.9 6.6 29.8 63.6 39.0 43.9 17.1 54.4 26.3 19.3 
 No 187 17 41 129 61 102 24 109 44 34 
 % 45.1 9.1 21.9 69.0 32.6 54.5 12.8 58.3 23.5 18.2 
 Both 415 32 109 274 150 202 63 233 104 78 






Table 37 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
the Third Level of Education 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
Higher Diploma Yes 9 3 0 6 0 6 3 6 3 0 
 % 60.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 0.0 66.7 33.3 66.7 33.3 0.0 
 No 6 1 2 3 2 4 0 3 0 3 
 % 40.0 16.7 33.3 50.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 
 Both 15 4 2 9 2 10 3 9 3 3 
 % 11.6 26.7 13.3 60.0 13.3 66.7 20.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 
Master’s Yes 14 2 1 11 3 8 3 9 5 0 
 % 46.7 14.3 7.1 78.6 21.4 57.1 21.4 64.3 35.7 0.0 
 No 16 1 3 12 2 12 2 13 1 2 
 % 53.3 6.3 18.8 75.0 12.5 75.0 12.5 81.3 6.3 12.5 
 Both 30 3 4 23 5 20 5 22 6 2 
 % 100 10.0 13.3 76.7 16.7 66.7 16.7 73.3 20.0 6.7 
PhD Yes 7 0 4 3 1 2 4 6 1 0 
 % 63.6 0.0 57.1 42.9 14.3 28.6 57.1 85.7 14.3 0.0 
 No 4 0 1 3 0 3 1 4 0 0 
 % 36.4 0.0 25.0 75.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 100 0.0 0.0 
 Both 11 0 5 6 1 5 5 10 1 0 
 % 100 0.0 45.5 54.5 9.1 45.5 45.5 90.9 9.1 0.0 
Total of Third  Yes 30 5 5 20 4 16 10 21 9 0 
Level % 53.6 16.7 16.7 66.7 13.3 53.3 33.3 70.0 30.0 0.0 
 No 26 2 6 18 4 19 3 20 1 5 
 % 46.4 7.7 23.1 69.2 15.4 73.1 11.5 76.9 3.8 19.2 
 Both 56 7 11 38 8 35 13 41 10 5 
 % 100 12.5 19.6 67.9 14.3 62.5 23.2 73.2 17.9 8.9 
Total of All Levels Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 139 30 144 73 52 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 51.9 11.2 53.7 27.2 19.4 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 274 88 311 174 116 














Table 38 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to Income 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
< 3,000 Yes 58 4 18 36 33 19 6 21 21 16 
 % 50.9 6.9 31.0 62.1 56.9 32.8 10.3 36.2 36.2 27.6 
 No 56 6 8 42 27 23 6 23 25 8 
 % 49.1 10.7 14.3 75.0 48.2 41.1 10.7 41.1 44.6 14.3 
 Both 114 10 26 78 60 42 12 44 46 24 
 % 100 8.8 22.8 68.4 52.6 36.8 10.5 38.6 40.4 21.1 
3,000 - 5,999 Yes 48 7 21 20 24 13 11 17 14 17 
 % 53.3 14.6 43.8 41.7 50.0 27.1 22.9 35.4 29.2 35.4 
 No 42 5 9 28 13 22 7 24 11 7 
 % 46.7 11.9 21.4 66.7 31.0 52.4 16.7 57.1 26.2 16.7 
 Both 90 12 30 48 37 35 18 41 25 24 
 % 100 13.3 33.3 53.3 41.1 38.9 20.0 45.6 27.8 26.7 
Lower than Average Yes 106 11 39 56 57 32 17 38 35 33 
 % 52.0 10.4 36.8 52.8 53.8 30.2 16.0 35.8 33.0 31.1 
 No 98 11 17 70 40 45 13 47 36 15 
 % 48.0 11.2 17.3 71.4 40.8 45.9 13.3 48.0 36.7 15.3 
 Both 204 22 56 126 97 77 30 85 71 48 
 % 100 10.8 27.5 61.8 47.5 37.7 14.7 41.7 34.8 23.5 
6,000 - 8,999 Yes 83 5 15 63 30 42 11 48 26 9 
 % 61.0 6.0 18.0 75.9 36.1 50.6 13.3 57.8 31.3 10.8 
 No 53 5 10 38 21 29 3 27 14 12 
 % 39.0 9.4 18.9 71.7 39.6 54.7 5.7 50.9 26.4 22.6 
 Both 136 10 25 101 51 71 14 75 40 21 
 % 100 7.4 18.4 74.3 37.5 52.2 10.3 55.1 29.4 15.4 
9,000 - 11,999 Yes 67 5 18 44 29 26 12 33 23 11 
 % 57.8 7.5 26.9 65.7 43.3 38.8 17.9 49.3 34.3 16.4 
 No 49 4 7 38 11 30 8 34 12 3 
 % 42.2 8.2 14.3 77.6 22.4 61.2 16.3 69.4 24.5 6.1 
 Both 116 9 25 82 40 56 20 67 35 14 
 % 100 7.8 21.6 70.7 34.5 48.3 17.2 57.8 30.2 12.1 
12,000 - 14,999 Yes 35 1 12 22 12 16 7 22 7 6 
 % 53 2.9 34.3 62.9 34.3 45.7 20.0 62.9 20.0 17.1 
 No 31 1 12 18 14 14 3 16 5 10 
 % 47.0 3.2 38.7 58.1 45.2 45.2 9.7 51.6 16.1 32.3 
 Both 66 2 24 40 26 30 10 38 12 16 
 % 100 3.0 36.4 60.6 39.4 45.5 15.2 57.6 18.2 24.2 
15,000 < Yes 41 4 12 25 11 19 11 26 10 5 
 % 52.6 9.8 29.3 61.0 26.8 46.3 26.8 63.4 24.4 12.2 
 No 37 4 9 24 12 22 3 21 6 10 
 % 47.4 10.8 24.3 64.9 32.4 59.5 8.1 56.8 16.2 27.0 
 Both 78 8 21 49 23 41 14 47 16 15 
 % 100 10.3 26.9 62.8 29.5 52.6 17.9 60.3 20.5 19.2 
Higher than Average Yes 226 15 57 154 82 103 41 129 66 31 
 % 57.1 6.6 25.2 68.1 36.3 45.6 18.1 57.1 29.2 13.7 
 No 170 14 38 118 58 95 17 98 37 35 
 % 42.9 8.2 22.4 69.4 34.1 55.9 10.0 57.6 21.8 20.6 
 Both 396 29 95 272 140 198 58 227 103 66 
 % 100 7.3 24.0 68.7 35.4 50.0 14.6 57.3 26.0 16.7 
Total of All Levels Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 






Table 39 Participants’ ranking of three Healthcare Funding Mechanisms according to 
Possession of Private Health Insurance 
  Taxation M S Accounts P H Insurance 
W2P Total M P S P L P M P S P L P M P S P L P 
With Yes 171 14 55 102 72 66 33 85 50 36 
 % 58.4 8.2 32.2 59.6 42.1 38.6 19.3 49.7 29.2 21.1 
 No 122 10 24 88 33 78 11 79 20 23 
 % 41.6 8.2 19.7 72.1 27.0 63.9 9.0 64.8 16.4 18.9 
 Both 293 24 79 190 105 144 44 164 70 59 
 % 100 8.2 27.0 64.8 35.8 49.1 15.0 56.0 23.9 20.1 
Without Yes 161 12 41 108 67 69 25 82 51 28 
 % 52.4 7.5 25.5 67.1 41.6 42.9 15.5 50.9 31.7 17.4 
 No 146 15 31 100 65 62 19 66 53 27 
 % 47.6 10.3 21.2 68.5 44.5 42.5 13.0 45.2 36.3 18.5 
 Both 307 27 72 208 132 131 44 148 104 55 
 % 100 8.8 23.5 67.8 43.0 42.7 14.3 48.2 33.9 17.9 
With & Without Yes 332 26 96 210 139 135 58 167 101 64 
 % 55.3 7.8 28.9 63.3 41.9 40.7 17.5 50.3 30.4 19.3 
 No 268 25 55 188 98 140 30 145 73 50 
 % 44.7 9.3 20.5 70.1 36.6 52.2 11.2 54.1 27.2 18.7 
 Both 600 51 151 398 237 275 88 312 174 114 

















Table 40 Summary of Chi 2 and Fisher Exact Tests 




Gender*     0.766 
 
- 
  Male 257 211 468 
 Female 75 57 132 
Total  332 268 600 








 18 - 25 85 77 162 
 26 - 35 154 131 285 
 36 - 45 61 41 102 
 46 - 55 25 14 39 
 56 - 65 7 4 11 
 65 < 0 1 1 
Nationality*     0.603 
 
- 
  Saudi 271 214 485 
 Non-Saudi 61 54 115 






 Single 133 119 252 
 Married 190 143 333 
 Divorced 5 6 11 
 Widowed 4 0 4 












 Primary 6 5 11 
 Secondary 12 2 14 
 High School 56 48 104 
 Diploma 54 50 104 
 Bachelor 174 137 311 
 Higher Diploma 9 6 15 
 Master’s 14 16 30 
 PhD 7 4 11 
Employment*     0.464 
 
- 
  Employed 273 214 487 
 Unemployed 59 54 113 






 Public Sector 98 76 174 
 Private Sector 138 92 230 
 SDU 37 46 83 
Total  273 214 487 








 Self-Employed 2 0 2 
 Public Pensioner 2 1 3 
 Private Pensioner 1 0 1 
 Student 33 29 62 
 Unemployed 21 24 45 







Cont’d Table 40 
Independent Variable W2P unW2P Overall P-value Chi2 
Statistic 








 < 3,000 58 56 114 
 3,000 - 5,999 48 42 90 
 6,000 - 8,999 83 53 136 
 9,000 - 11,999 67 49 116 
 12,000 - 14,999 35 31 66 
 15,000 < 41 37 78 
PHI*     0.163 
 
- 
  With 171 122 293 
 Without 161 146 307 








 VIP 28 19 47 
 A 57 55 112 
 B 49 31 80 
 C 37 17 54 
Total  171 122 293 






 Employer 146 109 255 
 Family 20 12 32 
 OOP 5 1 6 
Total  171 122 293 
Chronic 
Disease* 




 With 33 21 54 
 Without 299 247 546 








 Excellent 202 158 360 
 Very Good 105 88 193 
 Good 20 19 39 
 Fair 4 3 7 
 Poor 1 0 1 
Increase*     0.384 
 
- 
  Increase 82 58 140 
 Otherwise 250 210 460 
Maintain*     0.179 
 
- 
  Maintain 195 172 367 
 Otherwise 137 96 233 
Obtain*     0.430 
 
- 
  Obtain 55 38 93 
 Otherwise 277 230 507 
Slice 1*     0.384 
 
- 
  MOH 82 58 140 
 Other Provisions 250 210 460 
Slice 2*     0.364 
 
- 
  Private Sector Only 55 37 92 





Cont’d Table 40 
Independent Variable W2P unW2P Overall P-value Chi2 
Statistic 
Slice 3*     0.447 
 
- 
  SDU Only 0 1 1 
 Other Provisions 332 267 599 
Slice 4*     0.918 
 
- 
  MOH & Private 
Sector 
65 54 119 
 Other Provisions 267 214 481 
Slice 5*     0.022 
 
- 
  MOH & SDU 79 87 166 
 Other Provisions 253 181 434 
Slice 6*     0.190 
 
- 
  All Three Provisions 51 31 82 
 Other Provisions 281 237 518 
 
*The dependent variable that violated the assumptions of Chi2, which requires minimum of five 
observations in each cell. Therefore, Fisher exact test was performed. 
 
Note: if the variable does not show Total, this means that the total of those who are willing is 332, 


















Table 41 Variance Inflation Factor before Merging Categories 
Independent Variable  Observation VIF 1/VIF 
Gender Base Category (Female)   
 Male 1.26 0.79 
Age Base Category (18 - 25)   
 26 - 35 2.40 0.41 
 36 - 45 2.43 0.41 
 46 - 55 2.07 0.48 
 56 - 65 1.42 0.70 
 65 < 1.15 0.87 
Nationality Base Category (Non-Saudis)   
 Saudis 6.52 0.15 
Marital Status Base Category (Single)   
 Married 1.56 0.64 
 Divorced  1.19 0.84 
 Widowed 1.22 0.81 
Education Base Category (Primary)   
 Secondary 2.63 0.38 
 High School 11.78 0.08 
 Diploma 12.11 0.08 
 Bachelor 20.39 0.04 
 Higher Diploma 3.05 0.32 
 Master 4.97 0.20 
 PhD 2.76 0.36 
Employment Base Category (Unemployed)   
 Employed 5.0 0.20 
Income Base Category (< 3,000)   
 3,000 - 5,999 4.42 0.22 
 6,000 - 8,999 5.98 0.16 
 9,000 - 11,999 5.51 0.18 
 12,000 - 14,999 4.29 0.23 
 15,000 < 4.78 0.20 
PHI Base Category (Without PHI)   
 With PHI 3.67 0.27 
Chronic Disease Base Category (Without)   
 With 1.17 0.85 
Health Status Base Category (Poor)   
 Fair 8.28 0.12 
 Good 39.45 0.02 
 Very Good 138.62 0.00 
 Excellent 152.63 0.00 
Access Base Category (Slice 1)   
 Slice 2 7.32 0.13 
 Slice 3 1.15 0.86 
 Slice 4 2.10 0.47 
 Slice 5 2.03 0.49 
 Slice 6 omitted - 
Access of Three Base Category (Increase)   
 Maintain omitted - 
 Obtain omitted - 








Table 42 Variance Inflation Factor after Merging Categories  
Independent Variable  Observation VIF1 1/VIF VIF2 1/VIF 
Gender Base Category (Female)     
 Male 1.18 0.85 1.17 0.85 
Age Base Category (18 - 25)     
 26 - 35 2.22 0.45 2.19 0.45 
 36 - 45 2.25 0.44 2.23 0.44 
 46 - 55 1.78 0.56 1.78 0.56 
 56 < 1.27 0.79 1.27 0.79 
Nationality Base Category (Non-Saudis)     
 Saudis 6.07 0.16 6.06 0.16 
Marital Status Base Category (Single)     
 Married 1.55 0.64 1.55 0.64 
 Divorced & Widowed 1.18 0.84 1.18 0.84 
Education Base Category (First Level)     
 Undergraduate 1.53 0.65 1.53 0.65 
 Postgraduate 1.59 0.63 1.57 0.63 
Employment Base Category (Unemployed)     
 Employed 2.11 0.47 2.09 0.47 
Income Base Category (< Average)     
 6,000 < 2.11 0.47 2.10 0.47 
PHI Base Category (Without PHI)     
 With PHI 3.54 0.28 1.88 0.53 
Chronic Disease Base Category (Without)     
 With 1.13 0.88 1.12 0.88 
Health Status Base Category (Fair & Poor)     
 Good 5.70 0.17 5.70 0.17 
 Very Good 17.65 0.05 17.65 0.05 
 Excellent 19.05 0.05 19.36 0.05 
Access Base Category (Slice 1)   excluded  
 Slice 2 6.91 0.14   
 Slice 3 1.07 0.93   
 Slice 4 2.06 0.48   
 Slice 5 1.90 0.52   
 Slice 6 omitted -   
Eligibility Base Category (Increase)     
 Maintain omitted - 2.25 0.44 
 Obtain omitted - 6.23 0.16 
Mean VIF  4.01  4.15  
 







Table 43 Summary of Chi 2 and Fisher Exact Tests for the Healthcare Funding Options 
Independent Variable 
 
Taxation Medical Savings Accounts Private Health Insurance 
1st1 2nd2 3rd3 Total P-V4 Chi25 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 
Gender*      0.21 -     0.59 -     0.52 - 
  Male 44 121 303 468 181 215 72 468 243 132 93 468 
 Female 7 30 95 132 56 60 16 132 69 42 21 132 
 Total 51 151 398 600 237 275 88 600 312 174 114 600 
Age      0.26 12.27     0.23 12.8     0.37 10.8 
 18 - 25 16 40 106 162 73 72 17 162 73 50 39 162 
 26 - 35 23 67 195 285 100 143 42 285 162 75 48 285 
 36 - 45 6 31 65 102 43 40 19 102 53 31 18 102 
 46 - 55 3 13 23 39 16 14 9 39 20 12 7 39 
 56 - 65 3 0 8 11 4 6 1 11 4 5 2 11 
 65 < 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Nationality*      0.46 -     0.01 -     0.00 - 
 Saudi 42 127 316 485 205 213 67 485 238 145 102 485 
 Non-Saudi 9 24 82 115 32 62 21 115 74 29 12 115 
Marital Sta6*      0.61 -     0.03 -     0.01 - 
 Single 21 62 169 252 112 110 30 252 119 80 53 252 
 Married 27 86 220 333 117 162 54 333 189 85 59 333 
 Divorced 2 2 7 11 5 3 3 11 4 6 1 11 
 Widowed 1 1 2 4 3 0 1 4 0 3 1 4 
Education      0.00 31.27     0.00 57.48     0.00 57.1 
 Primary 0 2 9 11 10 1 0 11 1 8 2 11 
 Secondary 4 6 4 14 6 5 3 14 4 3 7 14 
 High School 8 23 73 104 63 32 9 104 33 49 22 104 
 Diploma 13 22 69 104 32 57 15 104 59 25 20 104 
 Bachelor 19 87 205 311 118 145 48 311 174 79 58 311 
 Higher D 4 2 9 15 2 10 3 15 9 3 3 15 
 Master’s 3 4 23 30 5 20 5 30 22 6 2 30 
 PhD 0 5 6 11 1 5 5 11 10 1 0 11 
Employment*      0.67 -     0.00 -     0.00 - 
 Employed 40 126 321 487 177 237 73 487 270 124 93 487 




Cont’d Table 43 
Independent Variable 
 
Taxation Medical Savings Accounts Private Health Insurance 
1st1 2nd2 3rd3 Total P-V4 Chi25 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 
Employed*      0.68 -     0.93 -     0.31 - 
 Public S7 13 44 117 174 60 85 29 174 101 45 28 174 
 Private S 20 65 145 230 85 112 33 230 125 53 52 230 
 SDU 7 17 59 83 32 40 11 83 44 26 13 83 
 Total 40 126 321 487 177 237 73 487 270 124 93 487 
Unemployed      0.31 9.35     0.22 10.57     0.60 6.39 
 Self-Emp8 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 
 Public Pen9 0 1 2 3 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 3 
 Private Pen 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 Student 8 16 38 62 33 19 10 62 21 27 14 62 
 Unemployed 3 6 36 45 23 18 4 45 19 21 5 45 
 Total 11 25 77 113 60 38 15 113 42 50 21 113 
Income      0.04 18.94     0.04 18.93     0.00 24.68 
 < 310 10 26 78 114 60 42 12 114 44 46 24 114 
 3 - 5,911 12 30 48 90 37 35 18 90 41 25 24 90 
 6 - 8,912 10 25 101 136 51 71 14 136 75 40 21 136 
 9 - 11,913 9 25 82 116 40 56 20 116 67 35 14 116 
 12 - 14,914 2 24 40 66 26 30 10 66 38 12 16 66 
 15 - <15 8 21 49 78 23 41 14 78 47 16 15 78 
PHI*      0.59 -     0.18 -     0.02 - 
 With 24 79 190 293 105 144 44 293 164 70 59 293 
 Without 27 72 208 307 132 131 44 307 148 104 55 307 
Level of PHI*      0.03 -     0.10 -     0.00 - 
 VIP 4 12 31 47 17 22 8 47 26 13 8 47 
 A 3 26 83 112 31 67 14 112 78 19 15 112 
 B 9 23 48 80 35 30 15 80 36 27 17 80 
 C 8 18 28 54 22 25 7 54 24 11 19 54 






Cont’d Table 43 
Independent Variable  
 
Taxation Medical Savings Accounts Private Health Insurance 
1st1 2nd2 3rd3 Total P-V4 Chi25 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 
PHI Provd16*      0.13 -     0.04 -     0.02 - 
 Employer 23 72 160 255 88 127 40 255 144 56 55 255 
 Family 0 6 26 32 13 17 2 32 19 9 4 32 
 OOP 1 1 4 6 4 0 2 6 1 5 0 6 
 Total 24 79 190 293 105 144 44 293 164 70 59 293 
Chronic D17*      0.56 -     0.46 -     0.2 - 
 With 6 11 37 54 20 23 11 54 28 20 6 54 
 Without 45 140 361 546 217 252 77 546 284 154 108 546 
Health Sta      0.21 10.7     0.23 10.5     0.28 9.72 
 Excellent 29 83 248 360 150 161 49 360 181 116 63 360 
 Very Good 15 57 121 193 73 90 30 193 105 46 42 193 
 Good 5 9 25 39 11 22 6 39 23 8 8 39 
 Fair 2 1 4 7 3 2 2 7 2 4 1 7 
 Poor 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Increase*      0.90 -     0.77 -     0.87 - 
 Increase 13 35 92 140 55 62 23 140 72 43 25 140 
 Otherwise 38 116 306 460 182 213 65 460 240 131 89 460 
Maintain*      0.62 -     0.03 -     0.01 - 
 Maintain 32 97 238 367 160 158 49 367 175 112 80 367 
 Otherwise 19 54 160 233 77 117 39 233 137 62 34 233 
Obtain*      0.36 -     0.00 -     0.00 - 
 Obtain 6 19 68 93 22 55 16 93 65 19 9 93 
 Otherwise 45 132 330 507 215 220 72 507 247 155 105 507 
Slice 1*      0.90 -     0.77 -     0.87 - 
 MOH 13 35 92 140 55 62 23 140 72 43 25 140 
 Other Prov18 38 116 306 460 182 213 65 460 240 131 89 460 
Slice 2*      0.37 -     0.00 -     0.00 - 
 Private S  6 19 67 92 22 54 16 92 64 19 9 92 





Cont’d Table 43   
Independent Variable  
 
Taxation Medical Savings Accounts Private Health Insurance 
1st1 2nd2 3rd3 Total P-V4 Chi25 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 1st 2nd 3rd Total P-V Chi2 
Slice 3*      1.00 -     1.00 -     1.00 - 
 SDU  0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
 Other Prov 51 151 397 599 237 274 88 599 311 174 114 599 
Slice 4*      0.00 -     0.85 -     0.00 - 
 MOH & P-S19 10 43 66 119 45 55 19 119 64 21 34 119 
 Other Prov 41 108 332 481 192 220 69 481 248 153 80 481 
Slice 5*      0.60 -     0.10 -     0.03 - 
 MOH & S20 14 37 115 166 77 68 21 166 75 61 30 166 
 Other Prov 37 114 283 434 160 207 67 434 237 113 84 434 
Slice 6*      0.58 -     0.34 -     0.20 - 
 All Prov 8 17 57 82 38 35 9 82 36 30 16 82 
 Other Prov 43 134 341 518 199 240 79 518 276 144 98 518 
 
Abbreviations: 1Most preferred. 2Second Preferred. 3Third preferred. 4P-Value. 5Chi2 statistics. 6Marital Status. 7Sector. 8Self-employed. 9Public pensioner. 10 < SR 3,000. 
11SR 3,000 - 5,999. 12SR 6,000 - 8,999. 13SR 9,000 - 11,999. 14SR 12,000 - 14,999. 15SR 15,000 <. 16PHI provider. 17Chronic diseases. 18Other provisions. 19MOH & private 
sector. 20MOH & SDU. 
*The dependent variable that violated the assumptions of Chi2, which requires minimum of five observations in each cell. Therefore, Fisher exact test was performed. 




Table 44 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on the Classification of the Six Slices 
Eligibility W2P1 % 
MOH    
Saudis employed in public Yes 76 74.54 
 No 26 25.5 
Non-Saudis employed in public Yes 13 35.1 
 No 24 64.9 
Unemployed Saudis WI2 Yes 7 63.6 
 No 4 36.4 
Unemployed Saudis WOI3 Yes 4 36.4 
 No 7 63.6 
Unemployed Non-Saudis Yes 0 0.0 
 No 1 100 
 Total 162 27.05 
Private Sector    
Non-Saudis employed in private Yes 82 65.6 
 No 43 34.4 
Dependent on Non-Saudis employed in private Yes 0 0.0 
 No 1 100 
 Total 126 21.0 
SDU    
Non-Saudis employed in SDU Yes 1 50.0 
 No 1 50.0 
 Total 2 0.3 
MOH & Private Sector    
Saudis employed in public with HI Yes 7 87.5 
 No 1 12.5 
Saudis employed in private Yes 59 72.0 
 No 23 28.0 
Dependent on Saudis employed in private WOI Yes 0 0.0 
 No 1 100 
 Total 91 15.2 
MOH & SDU    
Saudis employed in public eligible to SDU Yes 19 82.6 
 No 4 17.4 
Saudis employed in SDU Yes 44 78.6 
 No 12 21.4 
Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU WI Yes 33 94.3 
 No 2 5.7 
Dependent on Saudis employed in SDU WOI Yes 4 57.1 
 No 3 42.9 
 Total 121 20.2 
MOH, Private, & SDU    
Saudis employed in public eligible to all Yes 6 100 
 No 0 0.0 
Saudis employed in private eligible to all Yes 70 87.5 
 No 10 12.5 
Saudis employed in SDU eligible to all Yes 4 66.7 
 No 2 33.3 
Unemployed Saudi WI eligible to all   Yes 6 100 
 No 0 0.0 
 Total 98 16.3 
 
Abbreviations: 1Willingness to Pay. 2With income. 3Without income. 4The percentage of Saudis employed in 
public who reported yes to the total Saudis employed in public. 5The percentage of those eligible to healthcare only 






Table 45 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on Demographic Characteristics 
  W2P % 
Gender     
 Male Yes 329 74.3 
  No 114 25.7 
 Female Yes 106 67.5 
  No 51 32.5 
  Total 600 100 
Age     
 18 - 25 Yes 101 80.2 
  No 25 19.8 
 26 - 35 Yes 182 66.7 
  No 91 33.3 
 36 - 45 Yes 96 73.3 
  No 35 26.7 
 46 - 55 Yes 43 79.6 
  No 11 20.4 
 56 - 65 Yes 8 72.7 
  No 3 27.3 
 65 < Yes 5 100 
  No 0 0.0 
  Total 600 100 
Nationality     
 Saudi Yes 339 78.1 
  No 95 21.9 
 Non-Saudi Yes 96 57.8 
  No 70 42.2 
  Total 600 100 
Marital Status     
 Single Yes 171 71.8 
  No 67 28.2 
 Married Yes 245 72.7 
  No 92 27.3 
 Divorced Yes 10 76.9 
  No 3 23.1 
 Widowed Yes 9 75.0 
  No 3 25.0 
  Total 600 100 
Chronic Illness     
 With Yes 43 89.6 
  No 5 10.4 
 Without Yes 392 71.0 
  No 160 29.0 
  Total 600 100 
Health Status     
 Excellent Yes 238 68.8 
  No 108 31.2 
 Very Good Yes 148 79.6 
  No 38 20.4 
 Good Yes 42 72.4 
  No 16 27.6 
 Fair Yes 6 75.0 
  No 2 25.0 
 Poor Yes 1 50.0 
  No 1 50.0 






Table 46 Participants’ Willingness to Pay Based on Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  W2P % 
Education     
 Primary Yes 10 66.7 
  No 5 33.3 
 Secondary Yes 8 61.5 
  No 5 38.5 
 High School Yes 55 67.9 
  No 26 32.1 
 Diploma Yes 80 80.0 
  No 20 20.0 
 Bachelor Yes 236 70.9 
  No 97 29.1 
 Higher Diploma Yes 11 91.7 
  No 1 8.3 
 Master’s Yes 30 73.2 
  No 11 26.8 
 PhD Yes 5 100 
  No 0 0.0 
  Total 600 100 
Income     
 < 3,000 Yes 70 64.8 
  No 38 35.2 
 3,000 - 5,999 Yes 63 68.5 
  No 29 31.5 
 6,000 - 8,999 Yes 98 76.0 
  No 31 24.0 
 9,000 - 11,999 Yes 63 70.8 
  No 26 29.2 
 12,000 - 14,999 Yes 61 74.4 
  No 21 25.6 
 15,000 < Yes 80 80.0 
  No 20 20.0 
  Total 600 100 
Insurance     
 With  Yes 234 74.3 
   No 81 25.7 
  PHI Level     
 VIP Yes 32 86.5 
    No 5 13.5 
   A Yes 91 76.5 
    No 28 23.5 
   B Yes 56 76.7 
    No 17 23.3 
   C Yes 55 64.0 
    No 31 36.0 
 Without Yes 201 70.5 
  No 84 29.5 








Table 47 Slice 1 Levels of Willingness to Pay  
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Saudis employed in public 102 26 19 17 11 8 11 10 
 % 25.5 18.6 16.7 10.8 7.8 10.8 9.8 
         
Non-Saudis publicly employed 37 24 11 1 0 0 1 0 
 % 64.9 29.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 
         
Unemployed Saudis WI 11 4 3 2 0 0 1 1 
 % 36.4 27.3 18.2 0.0 0.0 9.1 9.1 
         
Unemployed Saudis WOI 11 7 3 0 0 0 1 0 
 % 63.6 27.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 
         
Unemployed Non-Saudis 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 % 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 162 62 36 20 11 8 14 11 
  % 38.3 22.2 12.3 6.8 4.9 8.6 6.8 
 
Table 48 Slice 2 and 3 Levels of Willingness to Pay  
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Non-Saudis privately employed 125 43 6 21 19 15 8 13 
 % 34.4 4.8 16.8 15.2 12.0 6.4 10.4 
         
Dependent on Non-Saudi  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
privately employed % 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 126 44 6 21 19 15 8 13 
  % 34.9 4.8 16.7 15.1 11.9 6.3 10.3 
Non-Saudis SDU employed 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 % 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
 Total 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  % 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
 
Table 49 Slice 4 Levels of Willingness to Pay  
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Saudis publicly employed with 
PHI 8 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 
 % 12.5 37.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 
Saudis privately employed 82 23 10 21 10 2 4 12 
 % 28.0 12.2 25.6 12.2 2.4 4.9 14.6 
Dependent on Saudis privately 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
employed WOI % 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 91 25 13 22 11 4 4 12 











Table 50 Slice 5 Levels of Willingness to Pay  
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Saudis publicly employed  23 4 1 6 3 2 2 5 
eligible to SDU % 17.4 4.3 26.1 13.0 8.7 8.7 21.7 
         
Saudis employed in SDU 56 12 4 16 5 2 2 15 
 % 21.4 7.1 28.6 8.9 3.6 3.6 26.8 
         
Dependent on Saudis SDU 35 2 7 8 9 1 2 6 
employed WI % 5.7 20.0 22.9 25.7 2.9 5.7 17.1 
         
Dependent on Saudis SDU 7 3 1 2 0 0 0 1 
employed WOI % 42.9 14.3 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 
 Total 121 21 13 32 17 5 6 27 
  % 17.4 10.7 26.4 14.0 4.1 5.0 22.3 
 
Table 51 Slice 6 Levels of Willingness to Pay  
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Saudis publicly employed  6 0 1 2 1 0 0 2 
eligible to all % 0.0 16.7 33.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 33.3 
         
Saudis privately employed 80 10 10 20 13 4 7 16 
eligible to all % 12.5 12.5 25.0 16.3 5.0 8.8 20.0 
         
Saudis SDU employed  6 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 
eligible to all % 33.3 33.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
         
Unemployed Saudi WI 6 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 
eligible to all   % 0.0 0.0 33.3 50.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
 Total 98 12 13 25 17 4 9 18 














Table 52 Willingness to Pay Levels Based on the Demographic Characteristics 
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Gender           
 Male 443 114 53 87 55 32 35 67 
  % 25.7 12.0 19.6 12.4 7.2 7.9 15.1 
 Female 
157 51 28 33 20 4 6 15 
  % 32.5 17.8 21.0 12.7 2.5 3.8 9.6 
Age          
 18 - 25 126 25 17 33 16 3 10 22 
  % 19.8 13.5 26.2 12.7 2.4 7.9 17.5 
 26 - 35 273 91 33 52 36 15 13 33 
  % 33.3 12.1 19.0 13.2 5.5 4.8 12.1 
 36 - 45 131 35 18 19 17 11 13 18 
  % 26.7 13.7 14.5 13.0 8.4 9.9 13.7 
 46 - 55 54 11 10 14 3 5 3 8 
  % 20.4 18.5 25.9 5.6 9.3 5.6 14.8 
 56 - 65 11 3 2 0 3 1 1 1 
  % 27.3 18.2 0.0 27.3 9.1 9.1 9.1 
 65 < 5 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 
  % 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 
Nationality          
 Saudi 434 95 64 98 56 21 32 68 
  % 21.9 14.7 22.6 12.9 4.8 7.4 15.7 
 Non-Saudi 166 70 17 22 19 15 9 14 
  % 42.2 10.2 13.3 11.4 9.0 5.4 8.4 
Marital Single 238 67 34 51 33 11 15 27 
Status  % 28.2 14.3 21.4 13.9 4.6 6.3 11.3 
 Married 337 92 43 63 40 23 21 55 
  % 27.3 12.8 18.7 11.9 6.8 6.2 16.3 
 Divorced 13 3 2 4 0 1 3 0 
  % 23.1 15.4 30.8 0.0 7.7 23.1 0.0 
 Widowed 12 3 2 2 2 1 2 0 
  % 25.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 8.3 16.7 0.0 
Chronic          
Disease With 48 5 8 12 5 4 6 8 
  % 10.4 16.7 25.0 10.4 8.3 12.5 16.7 
 Without 552 160 73 108 70 32 35 74 
  % 29.0 13.2 19.6 12.7 5.8 6.3 13.4 
Health          
Status Excellent 346 108 42 77 37 13 22 47 
  % 31.2 12.1 22.3 10.7 3.8 6.4 13.6 
 Very Good 186 38 30 30 31 14 16 27 
  % 20.4 16.1 16.1 16.7 7.5 8.6 14.5 
 Good 58 16 9 10 6 8 3 6 
  % 27.6 15.5 17.2 10.3 13.8 5.2 10.3 
 Fair 8 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 
  % 25.0 0.0 25.0 12.5 12.5 0.0 25.0 
 Poor 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 










Table 53 Willingness to Pay Levels Based on the Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
Education          
   First Level          
 Primary 15 5 0 4 2 1 3 0 
  % 33.3 0.0 26.7 13.3 6.7 20.0 0.0 
 Secondary 13 5 2 2 1 2 1 0 
  % 38.5 15.4 15.4 7.7 15.4 7.7 0.0 
 High School 81 26 16 10 14 1 6 8 
  % 32.1 19.8 12.3 17.3 1.2 7.4 9.9 
 Total 109 36 18 16 17 4 10 8 
  % 33.0 16.5 14.7 15.6 3.7 9.2 7.3 
   Second Level          
 Diploma 100 20 15 33 12 2 4 14 
  % 20.0 15.0 33.0 12.0 2.0 4.0 14.0 
 Bachelor 333 97 40 61 40 27 22 46 
  % 29.1 12.0 18.3 12.0 8.1 6.6 13.8 
 Total 433 117 55 94 52 29 26 60 
  % 27.0 12.7 21.7 12.0 6.7 6.0 13.9 
   Third Level          
 Higher Diploma 12 1 2 4 2 2 0 1 
  % 8.3 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 0.0 8.3 
 Master’s 41 11 6 6 4 1 4 9 
  % 26.8 14.6 14.6 9.8 2.4 9.8 22.0 
 PhD 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
  % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 80.0 
 Total 58 12 8 10 6 3 5 14 
  % 20.7 13.8 17.2 10.3 5.2 8.6 24.1 
Income          
   < Average          
 < 3,000 108 38 13 17 17 4 9 10 
  % 35.2 12.0 15.7 15.7 3.7 8.3 9.3 
 3,000 - 5,999 92 29 9 20 17 6 4 7 
  % 31.5 9.8 21.7 18.5 6.5 4.3 7.6 
 Total 200 67 22 37 34 10 13 17 
  % 33.5 11.0 18.5 17.0 5.0 6.5 8.5 
   > Average          
 6,000 - 8,999 129 31 19 28 16 9 10 16 
  % 24.0 14.7 21.7 12.4 7.0 7.8 12.4 
 9,000 - 11,999 89 26 12 14 9 4 6 18 
  % 29.2 13.5 15.7 10.1 4.5 6.7 20.2 
 12,000 - 14,999 82 21 17 17 5 5 6 11 
  % 25.6 20.7 20.7 6.1 6.1 7.3 13.4 
 15,000 < 100 20 11 24 11 8 6 20 
  % 20.0 11.0 24.0 11.0 8.0 6.0 20.0 
 Total 400 98 59 83 41 26 28 65 












Table 54 Willingness to Pay Based on the Possession of Private Health Insurance 
  Total Zero >0&<1 >1&<2 >2&<3 >3&<4 >4&<5 ≥5 
PHI          
 With  315 81 32 68 47 23 21 43 
   % 25.7 10.2 21.6 14.9 7.3 6.7 13.7 
          
 PHI Level          
  VIP 37 5 4 3 7 3 3 12 
   % 13.5 10.8 8.1 18.9 8.1 8.1 32.4 
  A 119 28 19 31 17 4 8 12 
   % 23.5 16.0 26.1 14.3 3.4 6.7 10.1 
  B 73 17 8 23 9 4 5 7 
   % 23.3 11.0 31.5 12.3 5.5 6.8 9.6 
  C 86 31 1 11 14 12 5 12 
   % 36.0 1.2 12.8 16.3 14.0 5.8 14.0 
 Without  285 84 49 52 28 13 20 39 






























Table 55 Eligibilities, Demographic, and Socio-Economics' Average Willingness to Pay 
   1Average  2Average  3Average 
Provisions    
 Willing to Increase 2.27 2.38 2.77 
 Willing to Maintain  2.75 2.98 3.26 
 Willing to Obtain  2.98 3.15 3.48 
    
 
 Overall  2.68 2.87 3.19 
Slices    
Slice 1     
 Saudis employed in public 2.56 2.69 3.07 
 Non-Saudis publicly employed  0.88 0.88 1.38 
 Unemployed Saudis WI  2.07 2.21 2.57 
 Unemployed Saudis WOI  1.50 1.50 2 
 Unemployed Non-Saudis  0.0 0.0 0.0 
     
 Overall  2.27 2.38 2.77 
Slice 2      
 Non-Saudis privately employed 2.95 3.11 3.45 
 Dependent on Non-Saudi privately employed  0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
 
 Overall  2.95 3.11 3.45 
Slice 3      
 Non-Saudis SDU employed 5.50 6.50 6 
     
Slice 4      
 Saudis publicly employed with PHI 1.78 1.78 2.29 
 Saudis privately employed  2.58 2.79 3.08 
 Dependent on Saudis privately employed WOI  0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
 
 Overall  2.50 2.68 3 
Slice 5      
 Saudis publicly employed eligible to SDU 3.18 3.44 3.68 
 Saudis employed in SDU  3.11 3.45 3.61 
 Dependent on Saudis SDU employed WI  2.53 2.71 3.03 
 Dependent on Saudis SDU employed WOI  2.25 2.50 2.75 
    
 
 Overall 2.90 3.17 3.40 
Slice 6      
 Saudis publicly employed eligible to all 2.83 3.16 3.33 
 Saudis privately employed eligible to all  2.87 3.10 3.37 
 Saudis S,D,U employed eligible to all  1.75 1.75 2.25 
 Unemployed Saudi WI eligible to all  2.50 2.50 3 
    
 
 Overall 2.79 3.00 3.29 
Gender    
 Male 2.83 3.03 3.33 
 Female 2.23 2.37 2.74 
     
Age    
 18 - 25 2.71 2.93 3.22 
 26 - 35 2.62 2.80 3.12 
 36 - 45 2.87 3.06 3.38 
 46 - 55 2.52 2.71 3.02 
 56 - 65 2.75 2.87 3.25 








Cont’d Table 55 
 
   1Average  2Average  3Average 
Nationality    
 Saudi 2.68 2.88 3.19 
 Non-Saudi 2.69 2.84 3.20 
     
Marital Status    
 Single 2.51 2.67 3.02 
 Married 2.83 3.05 3.33 
 Divorced 2.40 2.40 2.90 
 Widowed 2.39 2.39 2.89 
     
Chronic Disease    
 With 2.78 2.96 3.28 
 Without 2.67 2.86 3.18 
     
Health Status    
 Excellent 2.65 2.85 3.16 
 Very Good 2.75 2.93 3.25 
 Good 2.59 2.73 3.10 
 Fair 3.33 3.66 3.83 
 Poor 1.50 1.50 2 
     
Education    
First Level    
 Primary 2.80 2.80 3.30 
 Secondary 2.25 2.25 2.75 
 High School 2.41 2.55 2.91 
    
 
 Overall 2.44 2.55 2.95 
     
Second Level    
 Diploma 2.36 2.53 2.86 
 Bachelor 2.78 2.98 3.29 
     
 Overall 2.68 2.87 3.18 
     
Third Level    
 Higher Diploma 2.22 2.31 2.73 
 Master’s 3.10 3.40 3.60 
 PhD 5.30 6.10 5.80 
     
 Overall 3.13 3.43 3.63 
Income     
< Average    
 < 3,000 2.62 2.77 3.13 
 3,000 - 5,999 2.45 2.56 2.95 
     
 Overall 2.54 2.67 3.05 
     
> Average    
 6,000 - 8,999 2.61 2.77 3.11 
 9,000 - 11,999 3.00 3.29 3.51 
 12,000 - 14,999 2.48 2.66 2.98 
 15,000 < 2.92 3.17 3.43 
     









Cont’d Table 55 
 
   1Average  2Average  3Average 
PHI    
          With  2.76 2.95 3.26 
 Level of PHI     
  VIP 3.56 3.94 4.06 
  A 2.35 2.49 2.86 
  B 2.42 2.55 2.93 
  C 3.31 3.53 3.82 
          Without 2.60 2.79 3.1 
 
Abbreviations: 1The last option in the payment scale is based on adding the width of the option before it to 
5%. 2The last option was set based on the maximum percentage that other counties with long established 



















Table 56 Summary of Chi 2 and Fisher Exact Tests (Last Study) 




Gender*     0.11 - 
 Male 329 114 443 
 Female 106 51 157 
Total  435 165 600 
Age     0.03 11.68 
 18 - 25 101 25 126 
 26 - 35 182 91 273 
 36 - 45 96 35 131 
 46 - 55 43 11 54 
 56 - 65 8 3 11 
 65 < 5 0 5 
Nationality*     0.00 - 
 Saudi 339 95 434 
 Non-Saudi 96 70 166 
Marital Status*     0.99 - 
 Single 171 67 238 
 Married 245 92 337 
 Divorced 10 3 13 
 Widowed 9 3 12 
Education     0.23 9.28 
 Primary 10 5 15 
 Secondary 8 5 13 
 High School 55 26 81 
 Diploma 80 20 100 
 Bachelor 236 97 333 
 Higher Diploma 11 1 12 
 Master’s 30 11 41 
 PhD 5 0 5 
Employment*     0.88 - 
 Employed 381 146 527 
 Unemployed 54 19 73 
Employed*     0.4 - 
 Public Sector 121 55 176 
 Private Sector 211 76 287 
 SDU 49 15 64 
Total  381 146 527 
Unemployed     0.67 2.34 
 Self-Employed 2 1 3 
 Public Pensioner 5 0 5 
 Private Pensioner 1 0 1 
 Student 20 8 28 
 Unemployed 26 10 36 











Cont’d Table 56 
 
Independent Variable W2P unW2P Overall P-value Chi2 
Statistic 
Income     0.16 7.82 
 < 3,000 70 38 108 
 3,000 - 5,999 63 29 92 
 6,000 - 8,999 98 31 129 
 9,000 - 11,999 63 26 89 
 12,000 - 14,999 61 21 82 
 15,000 < 80 20 100 
PHI*     0.31 - 
 With 234 81 315 
 Without 201 84 285 
Level of PHI*     0.04 - 
 VIP 32 5 37 
 A 91 28 119 
 B 56 17 73 
 C 55 31 86 
Total  234 81 315 
PHI Provider*     0.76 - 
 Employer 222 78 300 
 Family 12 3 15 
 OOP 0 0 0 
Total  234 81 315 
Chronic 
Disease* 
    0.00 - 
 With 43 5 48 
 Without 392 160 552 
Health Status     0.1 7.58 
 Excellent 238 108 346 
 Very Good 148 38 186 
 Good 42 16 58 
 Fair 6 2 8 
 Poor 1 1 2 
Increase*     0.00 - 
 Increase 100 62 162 
 Otherwise 335 103 438 
Maintain*     0.00 - 
 Maintain 252 58 310 
 Otherwise 183 107 290 
Obtain*     0.03 - 
 Obtain 83 45 128 
 Otherwise 352 120 472 
Slice 1*     0.00 - 
 MOH 100 62 162 
 Other Provisions 335 103 438 
Slice 2*     0.04 - 
 Private Sector Only 82 44 126 







Cont’d Table 56 
 
Independent Variable W2P unW2P Overall P-value Chi2 
Statistic 
Slice 3*     0.47 - 
 SDU Only 1 1 2 
 Other Provisions 434 164 598 
Slice 4*     1.0 - 
 MOH & Private 
Sector 
66 25 91 
 Other Provisions 369 140 509 
Slice 5*     0.00 - 
 MOH & SDU 100 21 121 
 Other Provisions 335 144 479 
Slice 6*     0.00 - 
 All Three Provisions 86 12 98 
 Other Provisions 349 153 502 
 
*The dependent variable that violated the assumptions of Chi2, which requires minimum of five 
observations in each cell. Therefore, Fisher exact test was performed. 
 
Note: if the variable does not show Total, this means that the total of those who are willing is 435, 
















Table 57 Mann Whitney Test  
Variable Category Observation Rank Sum Expected Z statistic P-value 




Male 329 75139 71722 
Female 106 19691 23108 
Total 435 94830 94830 
Nationality     0.338 
 
0.73 
 Saudi 339 73541.5 73902 
Non-Saudi 96 21288.5 20928 
Employment     -1.457 
 
0.14 
 Employed 381 84291.5 83058 
Unemployed 54 10538.5 11772 
PHI     -1.472 
 
0.14 
 With 234 52897 51012 
Without 201 41933 43818 
Chronic 
Disease 
    -0.234 
 
0.81 
 With 43 9553 9374 
Without 392 85277 85456 
Increase     3.246 
 
0.00 
 Increase 100 18292.5 21800 
Other 
groups 
335 76537.5 73030 
Maintain     -0.997 
 
0.32 
 Maintain 252 56174.5 54936 
Other 
groups 
183 38655.5 39894 
Obtain     -2.248 
 
0.02 
 Obtain 83 20363 18094 
Other 
groups 
252 74467 76736 
Slice 1     3.246 
 
0.00 
 MOH 100 18292.5 21800 
Other Prov1 335 76537.5 73030 
Slice 2     -2.083 
 
0.03 
 Private S2 82 19968.5 17876 
Other Prov 353 74861.5 76954 
Slice 3     -1.435 
 
0.15 
 SDU 1 394.5 218 
Other Prov 434 94435.5 94612 
Slice 4     0.943 
 
0.34 
 MOH & P-S3 66 13519 14388 
Other Prov 369 81311 80442 
Slice 5     -1.33 
 
0.18 
 MOH & S4 100 23246 21800 
Other Prov 335 71584 73030 
Slice 6     -0.647 
 
0.51 
 All Prov5 86 19409.5 18748 
Other Prov 349 75420.5 76082 
 
Abbreviations: 1Other provision.2Sector. 3MOH & private sector. 4MOH & SDU.  5All provisions. 
Note: if the variable does not show Total, this means that the total observation is 435, rank sum 94830, 




Table 58 Kruskal-Wallis Test Results  
Variable Category Observation Rank Sum Chi 2 P-value 








18 - 25 101 22083 
26 - 35 182 39080 
36 - 45 96 22159 
46 - 55 43 8735.5 
56 - 65 8 1821 
65 < 5 951.5 






Single 171 35383.5 
Married 245 55701.5 
Divorced 10 1941.5 
Widowed 9 1803.5 










Primary 10 2337.5 
Secondary 8 1526 
High School 55 10865.5 
Diploma 80 15596.5 
Bachelor 236 53256 
Higher Diploma 11 2109.5 
Master’s 30 7228 
PhD 5 1911 
Employed    6.14 
 
0.04 
 Public Sector 121 20681 
Private Sector 211 41924 
SDU 49 10166 






Self-employed 2 94.5 
Public Pensioner 5 65.5 
Private Pensioner 1 7.5 
Unemployed 26 856 
Student 20 461 








< 3,000 70 15121.5 
3,000 - 5,999 63 13122.5 
6,000 - 8,999 98 20857.5 
9,000 - 11,999 63 14901 
12,000 - 14,999 61 12107.5 
15,000 < 80 18720 






VIP 32 4709.5 
A 91 9123 
B 56 5809.5 
C 55 7853 
PHI Provider    0.07 
 
0.77 
 Employer 222 26021 
OOP 0 0 





Cont’d Table 58 
Variable Category Observation Rank Sum Chi 2 P-value 






Excellent 238 51156.5 
Very Good 148 32986.5 
Good 42 8940 
Fair 6 1605.5 
Poor 1 141.5 
Access Three    12.09 
 
0.00 
 Increase 100 18292.5 
Maintain 252 56174.5 
Obtain 83 20363 








Slice 1 100 18292.5 
Slice 2 82 19968.5 
Slice 3 1 394.5 
Slice 4 66 13519 
Slice 5 100 23246 

















Table 59 Variance Inflation Factor before Merging Categories 
Independent Variable  Observation VIF 1/VIF 
Gender Base Category (Female)   
 Male 1.55 0.64 
Age Base Category (18 - 25)   
 26 - 35 2.50 0.40 
 36 - 45 3.10 0.32 
 46 - 55 2.50 0.40 
 56 - 65 1.40 0.71 
 65 < 1.71 0.58 
Nationality Base Category (Non-Saudis)   
 Saudis 5.73 0.17 
Marital Status Base Category (Single)   
 Married 1.64 0.61 
 Divorced  1.18 0.84 
 Widowed 1.45 0.68 
Education Base Category (Primary)   
 Secondary 2.02 0.49 
 High School 7.10 0.14 
 Diploma 8.86 0.11 
 Bachelor 14.86 0.06 
 Higher Diploma 2.12 0.47 
 Master 4.95 0.20 
 PhD 1.56 0.64 
Employment Base Category (Unemployed)   
 Employed 2.87 0.34 
Income Base Category (< 3,000)   
 3,000 - 5,999 2.72 0.36 
 6,000 - 8,999 3.58 0.27 
 9,000 - 11,999 3.38 0.29 
 12,000 - 14,999 3.56 0.28 
 15,000 < 4.62 0.21 
PHI Base Category (Without PHI)   
 With PHI 3.74 0.26 
Chronic Disease Base Category (Without)   
 With 1.35 0.74 
Health Status Base Category (Poor)   
 Fair 5.16 0.19 
 Good 28.04 0.03 
 Very Good 66.46 0.01 
 Excellent 75.42 0.01 
Access Base Category (Slice 1)   
 Slice 2 7.25 0.13 
 Slice 3 1.09 0.91 
 Slice 4 1.82 0.54 
 Slice 5 1.81 0.55 
 Slice 6 omitted - 
Access of Three Base Category (Increase)   
 Maintain omitted - 
 Obtain omitted - 







Table 60 Variance Inflation Factor after Merging Categories  
Independent Variable  Observation VIF1 1/VIF VIF2 1/VIF 
Gender Base Category (Female)     
 Male 1.50 0.66 1.46 0.68 
Age Base Category (18 - 25)     
 26 - 35 2.37 0.42 2.31 0.43 
 36 - 45 2.90 0.34 2.84 0.35 
 46 - 55 2.19 0.45 2.18 0.45 
 56 < 1.49 0.67 1.49 0.67 
Nationality Base Category (Non-Saudis)     
 Saudis 5.47 0.18 5.46 0.18 
Marital Status Base Category (Single)     
 Married 1.60 0.62 1.60 0.62 
 Divorced & Widowed 1.36 0.73 1.36 0.73 
Education Base Category (First Level)     
 Undergraduate 1.71 0.58 1.70 0.58 
 Postgraduate 1.68 0.59 1.67 0.59 
Employment Base Category (Unemployed)     
 Employed 2.07 0.48 2.06 0.48 
Income Base Category (< Average)     
 6,000 < 1.96 0.51 1.93 0.51 
PHI Base Category (Without PHI)     
 With PHI 3.39 0.29 2.50 0.40 
Chronic Disease Base Category (Without)     
 With 1.31 0.76 1.30 0.76 
Health Status Base Category (Fair & Poor)     
 Good 6.33 0.15 6.33 0.15 
 Very Good 14.32 0.06 14.32 0.06 
 Excellent 16.30 0.06 16.28 0.06 
Access Base Category (Slice 1)   excluded  
 Slice 2 6.70 0.14   
 Slice 3 1.08 0.93   
 Slice 4 1.75 0.57   
 Slice 5 1.73 0.57   
 Slice 6 omitted -   
Eligibility Base Category (Increase)     
 Maintain omitted - 2.67 0.37 
 Obtain omitted - 5.94 0.16 
Mean VIF  3.77  3.97  
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